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The emergence of Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the 1990s has been 
described as the largest cultural change for decades in the way the public sector 
operates. PFI projects distinguish themselves from traditional methods of public 
purchasing by their commercial complexity and long contractual term. Most of these 
projects have to be delivered within the regulatory framework of public procurement 
which has remained largely unchanged since the 1970s. 
The overall objective of the study has been to gain a complete picture of PFI 
practice in the light of the apparent divergence between the law and commercial 
requirements. It was aimed to investigate whether this divergence has brought about a 
"PFI procurement practice. " If so, it was aimed to examine the reasons for the 
emergence of the practice and whether it deviated from procurement law. 
To achieve these objectives, PFI practice Nvas approached from an outsider and 
insider perspective. Ile perspective of insiders was gained by conducting a qualitative 
empirical study based on interviewing PH experts. Ile outsider perspective was 
derived from legal analysis backed up by relevant material provided by interviewees. 
The main conclusion of the study is that legal practitioners have adopted 
solutions in different PH projects largely resembling each other. The resemblance 
justifies referring to them as PFI procurement practice. This, practice was found to be 
not always in compliance with a literal interpretation of procurement law. 
Factors driving the divergence between law and practice include the perception of 
practitioners that strict compliance disproportionately hampers the commercially 
oriented PFI procurement practice. In addition, H. M. Treasury has increased the 
divergence by publishing guidance notes on PFI procurement which disregard 
procurement law in many respects. A further reason for the divergence is that private 
sector bidders have abstained from enforcing procurement law in the courts. In so 
_doing, they have significantly reduced 
the risk of challenges for authorities developing 
PFI procurement practice. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1. Private Finance Initiative 
In times of limited public budgets, public authorities endeavour to find new ways 
of financing their public tasks. Especially when delivering capital intensive I 
infrastructure projects, government departments have aimed to harness private sector 
funds and management expertise by entering into "partnerships" with private sector 
companies. 
The term public-private p"erships-(PPý) encompasses a variety of qualitatively 
very different arrangements that involve the use, to varying degrees, of private sector 
funding and expertise. LPPPs enable some countries to establish urgently required 
public infrastructure for the first time, including the delivery of roads and facilities for 
water and sewage treatment. In other countries, PPPs allow government departments 
to meet an increasing demand for high quality public services by improving or 
; updating existing infrastructuý. ) 
In the United Kingdom, investments in the public infrastructure and public 
services have been falling in real terms for years leading to a significant backlog of 
infrastructure investments. Under those circumstances, PPPs are intended to provide 
governments with the opportunity to improve the delivery of services to the public 
without increasing public spending and the public sector net requirement. 
It is for these reasons that the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was adopted in the 
United Kingdom. The PFI scheme implemented an elaborate kind of public private 
partnership. Essentially, PFI projects are arrangements where the government 
department responsible for the delivery of a public service entrusts the delivery to the 
private sector under a contract. The private sector contributes the capital for the 
substantial asset involved in the delivery of the public service. In the example of a 
prison PFI, the Prison Service no longer procures the prison but "custodial services, " 
comprising the design, construction, finance and operation of the prison. The adoption 
r 
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of PFI has been referred to as the "largest cultural change for decades in the way the 
public sector operates"' in the United Kingdom. 
1. Z Public prOcurem-ent law 
Public procurement refers to the purchase of goods and services by authorities in 
the market place from another legal entity, generally by contractual agreement. 2 
Authorities acquire by means of PFI projects services, works or goods from private 
sector suppliers. Therefore, PFIs will be generally classified as procurement 
transactions and come within the realm of procurement law. 
Procurement law in the United Kingdom was developed on the basis of five E. C. 
Council Directives. The major rationale of enactipg supra-national rules in this area of 
law has been to open procurement markets for foreign competitors so as to increase 
competition in national Drocurement markets. The latter account for a substantial 
proportion of the overall economic activity. The state's direct involvement in the 
economy appears to make public procurement per se susceptible to discriminatory 
"buy national" practices. It is for this reason that procurement has increasingly 
become subject to international regulation. 
Apart from the E. U. rules, the international regulatory activities include a number 
4 
of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. Like the other agreements, European 
procurement law was intended to play a pivotal role in establishing the European 
Single Market. The European legislator enacted transparent procurement procedures to 
ensure fair competition and equal access to government contracts for bidders from all 
Member States. 
-The E. U. procurement rules and the implementing U. K. Regulations 
govern the award of many PFI projects. However, as European procurement law d ates 
I Lindrupt Godfrey, ButterworthsPFIManual (1999), para 1. 2* Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (1996); Digings/Bennett, E. C, Public 
Procurement (1992); Fernandez Martin, The E. C Public Procurement Rules: a critical Analysis (1996); Trepte, Public Procurement in djeEC (1993); Weiss, Public Procurement (1993); PfieB, Das 
Offentliche Auftragswesen in der Europaischen Union (1994); Bright, Public Procurement Handbook 
3 
(1994); Bovis, Public Procurement Law in the EC (1997). 
Wallace terms this development "global revolution" in "The changing world of national procurement 
systems" (1995) P. PI. R. p. 57. 
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back to the 1970s, a significant issue is whether the legislative fi-amework can cope 
with the challenges posed by a changed socio-economic environment, including the 
development of innovative methods of procurement such as PFI. 
1.3. The current study 
1.3. L Aims of the stu 
The aim of this qualitative study is to increase the understanding of procurement 
law in analysing its practical application and its resulting impact on PH procurement 
practice. Understanding the reasons that led to the adoption of a legal practice and the 
extent to which the law impacted on the practice is paramount for a possible re- 
evaluation of the law in the books. 
At first glance, it appears possible that the emergence of PFI has resulted in a 
divergence between the commercial reality of procuring PFI and the rigid legal 
requirements of procurement law. For example, authorities may find it difficult to 
procure complex PFI contracts by following rigid and formalised tendering procedures 
without having recourse to extensive negotiations with bidders and project lenders. 
The possible discrepancy between commercial reality and the law may have caused a 
5 
number of difficult legal questions. 
The complexity of the legal issues in PFI procurement raises questions of 
considerable interest. Given a lack of bespoke procurement rules for PPPs, authorities 
have to apply norms which were designed for contracts of much less complex 
structure. The resulting difficulties in applying a probably inadequate legal fi-amework 
to complex procurement tasks may disproportionately hamper the procurement 
process. 
Analysing these issues and the ways in which procurement law has been 
practically applied in PFI is of relevance for legal practitioners worldng for 
4 WTO "Agreement on Government Procuremenf' (GPA), APEC 'Document on Principles of 
Transparency in Government ProcuremenV'Ch. 10 of Nafta and the E. U. /USA bilateral agreement. 5 H. M Treasury, 'TFI: Public Procurement Issues, " paper delivered at "Public Procurement: Global 
Revolution" Aberystwyth, September 11-12,1997. 
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government departments and private sector companies alike. Increasing the 
understanding of how procurement law is applied in a commercial situation for which 
it was not designed is further of interest to supra-national institutions involved in the 
European legislation process. They will be interested to learn whether the legal 
framework they have perceived is functioning effectively under the changed socio- 
economic circumstances. As an increasing number of other European countries are 
implementing private finance schemes modelled on the experiences gained in the U. K. 
with PFI, their national governments will want to increase their understanding of the 
difficulties surrounding PFI procurement practice. What is more, scholars of E; U. law 
should be interested in a study looking at the impact and insider perception of one of 
the legal cornerstones of the Single Market. 
Previous studies in procurement law and the majority of studies in other areas of 
European Union law have focussed on the impact of the law in the books on its 
addressees. In E. U. Law, the European Commission regularly conducts or 
commissions studies measuring the economic impact of rules constituting the Single 
Market. 6 In addition, there are academic studies dealing with specific areas of E. U. 
law analysing its impact on the national legal systems of the Member States and the 
role of Community institutions meant to ensure its effectiveness. 
As a result of those studies, some progress has been made towards understanding 
the behaviour of addressees of supra-national. law implemented by national regulatory 
measures. Those studies have additionally explored the nature and preconditions of the 
effectiveness of Community law as well as the principal means of ensuring it. 
In the area of public procurement, only a few impact studies have been 
6 European Commission, Single Market Review Series (1996) with subseries related to the impact on 
manufacturing, services, dismantling of barriers to trade, trade and investment, competition and scale 
effects and regional impact; European Commission, The Impact and effectiveness of the Single 
7 
Market, COM(96) 520 final, 30 October 1996. 
Snyder, "Ile Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and 
Techniques" (1993) Modern Law Review p. 1 9. 
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published! The most detailed study of the overall economic impact of procurement 
law was published by EuroStrategy Consultants. 9 In the specific area of PFI 
procurement, there have been some quantitative studies with the aim to gauge the 
impact the PFI scheme has made on the construction industry. 10 
One common aspect of impact studies on procurement law is that they are based 
on quantitative data or pure legal analysis. In addition, the analysts have adopted 
outsider perspectives. Their studies described socio-legal phenomena, but neglected 
subjective aspects, such as the motivation of insiders, their experiences and meaning 
attached to behavioural strategies adopted. 
Furthermore, none of the impact studies analysed the living procurement law, 
meaning its practical application, and its possible divergence from the procurement 
law in the books. So far, explanation was sought by studying externalities. No data are 
available at all on. how practitioners perceive PH procurement practice or, when they 
do not follow E. U. law, why they perceived it necessary to diverge from the law in the 
books. Additionally, there is no qualitative data on the impact of procurement law on 
PFI procurement practice. 
1.3.2 Outline of the studv 
The study falls broadly into four parts which this section will briefly outline. The 
first part comprising chapter 2 and 3 introduces the two main concepts the study is 
dealing with, namely PH and procurement law. Chapter 2 will map out the objectives 
and the underpinning of PFI and its three different types of projects. It will also outline 
Cox, "E. U. Procurement Policy: Public and Private Obstacles to the Creation of the Single European 
Market"(1992) P. P. LR. p. 139; Hartley/Uttley, "The Single European Market and Public Procurement 
Policy: the Case of the United Kingdom" (1994) P. P. L. R p. 114; Cox/Furlong, "The jury is still out 
for utilities procurement: the impact of the EU procurement directives on the location of utilities 
contract awards in the twelve "member" statee' (1996) P. P. L. P- p. 57; Telgen/de Boer, "Experience 
with the E. C. Directives on Public Procurement: a survey of Dutch Municipalifiee' (1997) P. P. L. R 
12 1; Fernandez Mart4 op-cit., note 2, ch. 1; Bohann/Redonnet, 'T.U Procurement Legislation: Does 
the Emperor Have Clothes? An Examination of the New Empirical Evidence" (1997) P. P. L. R 14 1; 
Gordon/Rinuner/Arrowsmith, "The economic impact of the European Regime on Public Procurement: 
Lessons for the WrO" (1998) World Economy p. 159; Bovis, An Impact Assessment of lite European 
Public Procurement Law and Policy "(1999) J. ofBusiness Law pp. 126. 
EuroStrategy Consultants, Single market review series. Subseries 3, Dismantling of barriers v. 2 
- Public Procurement (1997). 
10 Birnie, ITFI 
- 
UK Construction Industry Response" (1999) Construction Procurement p. 5. 
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the advantages of PFI and the obstacles govenunent have to face in carrying out 
projects. 
Chapter 3 will then turn to the legal frarnework within which many PFIs have 
been delivered, namely procurement law. The chapter will outline the economic 
rationales of regulating public procurement on an international level before turning to 
the European regime which underlies the U. K. Regulations. It will map out the need 
for further research into questions related to the practical application of the "law in the 
books" in PFI. 
Chapter 4 can be viewed as the second part of the study, mapping out how the 
study aims to learn more about the practical application of procurement law, its 
possible discrepancy from the law, its explanations, and the forces and institutions 
sustaining it. To find out more about the reasons why the legal practice was adopted in 
PFI procurement and to understand the views, and perspectives of practitioners, an 
empirical research was conducted. Chapter 4 will outline the methodology of the 
empirical study, its design, and the underlying legal theory. It will then sub-divide the 
main research question related to the practical application of the law into a number of 
more specific research questions. 
Ile third part of the study, comprising chapters 5 to 11, will then turn to seven of 
the most pertinent legal problems and uncertainties arising from the practical 
application of procurement law. The seven uncertainties are not only relevant in PH 
but previous studies have identified many of the uncertainties as negatively 
influencing the legal effectiveness of procurement law in general. " Chapters 5 to II 
will further explore the salient question what impact procurement law has had on PFI 
procurement practice. This will be achieved by comparing in each chapter the 
uncertain legal situation with the solution adopted by practitioners. 
The fourth and final part of this research project describes in chapter 12 common 
L 
11 EuroStrategy Consultants, op. cit., note 8, p. 70. 
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themes arising from the seven specific problems and uncertainties and draws in 
chapter 13 a general conclusion. Firstly, chapter 12 will highlight the development of 
PH procurement practice. At a second stage, the chapter will explain why the practice 
emerged, before turning to exploring its main characteristics. In a fourth section, 
chapter 12 will shed some light on the impact of procurement law on PH procurement 
practice from an insider and an outsider perspective. If it is found that the living law 
diverges from the law in the books, the risk for the authority to be challenged will 
consequentially increase. Chapter 12 will address this question in detail and highlight 
the considerations taken into account by authorities and bidders. 
Chapter 13 will firstly consider PH procurement from an outsider perspective in 
examining the law's impact on the legal practice. It will then analyse the perspective 
of insiders in discussing their subjective perception and interpretation of the law. The 
integration of both perspectives aims at providing the study with a complete picture of 
the procurement practice in PFI. 
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Chapter 2 The Private Finance Initiative 
Chapter 2 sets out in its first part the formative context of the initiative, its 
evolution and related concepts. The following sections will concentrate upon the 
questions of why the government adopted PFI, what rationales- are underlying the 
scheme and, finally, what obstacles government had to face when implementing the 
scheme. The last two sections of this chapter consider the different types of PH 
projects and their corporate and contractual structure. 
2.1. Background and evolution of PFI 
The return of a Conservative-led government in 1979 marked the beginning of 
series of initiatives attempting to transfer the responsibility for the delivery of non- 
core government goods and services away from the public sector to the private sector. 
The initiatives included the privatisation of state-owned industries and the contracting 
out of public sector activities, and then the Private Finance Initiative. ' 
The Tbatcher government launched the privatisation progranune in 1979 at a time 
when nationalised industries accounted for one-tenth of the national output and some 
2 1 V2 million employees. It was perceived that the essential reason for widespread 
inefficiency and significant losses of these industries was that their survival did not 
depend upon pleasing consumers as they were not genuinely exposed to market 
pressure. 
As a part of the privatisation programme, the Treasury set up a committee led by 
Sir William Ryrie which reported in 1981 on the use of private finance to fund public 
sector projects. On the basis of the "Ryrie rules ý)3 developed by this committee, a 
relatively small number of high profile transport-related infrastructure projects were 
undertaken, such as the Channel Tunnel (1985), the Dartford Crossing (1987) and the 
Second Severn Crossing (1990). 
1 H. M. Treasury, Public Private Partnerships 
- 
7he Government'sApproach (2000), p. 25. 2 Brown/Ridley, Ptivatisation(1994), p. 139. 
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On 12 November 1992, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, 
launched in his Autumn Statement the "Private Finance Initiative" (PFI) to promote 
the notion of private finance in order to deliver "higher quality and more cost-effective 
public services. "A With this statement, the government inaugurated the encouragement 
of joint ventures between the private and the public sector, particularly for the 
performance of large infrastructure projects which would otherwise not be affordable 
to the public sector. Important features of the original launch in 1992 were that the 
self-financing private projects were no longer required to be compared against a 
theoretical public sector solution' and the encouragement of the private sector to lead 
6 joint ventures with the public sector. 
Due to the lack of impact, the Initiative was re-launched in 1993 together with the 
creation of the "Private Finance Panel" and the publication of the first PFI guidance 
Breaking New Ground 
- 
towards a new partnership between the public and private 
sector. 7 Since March 1995, there has been, in effect, a "presumption" in favour of PFI 
in the United Kingdom central government. The Treasury did not authorise 
expenditure on a capital project unless the viability of the PFI approach had been 
tested. Testing the suitability of the PFI approach meant that authorities had to seek 
expression of interests and running a competition based on a PFI solution. 
The new Labour government abolished this requirement within days of coming 
into power in May 1997, considering it as being too restrictive and one source of 
delay. Instead of pursuing a categorical approach, the new administration stressed its 
determination "to make PFI work where appropriate. "' Hence, the presumption that 
the private sector always provides the better route for delivering services to the public 
3 The original set of the "Ryrie rulee' had to principal themes: a privately financed solution had to be 
tested against a publicly funded alternative and shown to be more cost-effective. Secondly, privately 
4f 
manced expenditure could not be additional to public expenditure provision. 
H. M. Treasury, Private Finance Panel, Private Opportunity, Public Benefit (1995), p. l. 5 This implied defacto the abandonment of the Ryrie rules, Fox/Tott, Ae PR Handbook (1999), p-7- 6 H. M. Treasury, Joint Ventures 
- 
GuidanceforDeparinients (March, 1993), para 4. 7 H. M. Treasury, Breaking New Ground 
- 
towards a new partnership between the public and private 
sector (November 1993). 
8 H. M. Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, PartnershipsforProsperity (1997), Chapter 4. 
page 10 
was replaced by the strategy that makes best use of what both sectors have to offer in 
effective public private partnership (PPP). ' The Labour administration further 
reinvigorated and strean-dined the Private Finance Initiative by swiftly implementing 
measures recommended by Sir Malcolm Bates in his first "Bates Review. '" 
The recommendations concerned the institutional structure of the Treasury, the 
procurement process, learning lessons, and minimising private sector bid costs. The 
change in the institutional structure implied the winding up of the Private Finance 
Panel" and the establishment of the Treasury Taskforce, which was meant to focus 
not only on policy issues, but also on supporting individual authorities in the delivery 
12 of PH projects. The latter function allows the Taskforce to test the commercial 
robustness of significant projects before the formal procurement process is 
commenced. This helps projects to deliver the individual project within an acceptable 
timetable and avoiding potentially abortive expenditure. 
The Treasury Taskforce has published a considerable number of generic guidance 
notes, 13 policy statements dealing with policy issues arising from the implementation 
'14 ain s of PFI technical notes providing guidance on how to implement certz a pects of 
the PFI, 15 case studies of PFI solutions already carried OUtI6 and, finally, documents on 
the standardisation of PH contracts. 17 Sir Malcolm Bates was asked in 1999 to report 
9 DETP, Local Government and the Private Finance Initiative (1998), preface. 10 H. K Treasury, Review ofPFI (Bates Report), Summary (1997). 11 Ibid., at p. 7. 12 Ibid., at p. 7-9. 13 A Step by Step Guide to the PFI Procurement Process (19 9 9). 
14 PRI and Public Expenditure Allocations (1997); Public Sector Comparators and Value For Money (1998); PH and Public Expenditure Allocations for NDPBS (1998); PH Projects: Disclosure of 
Information and Consultation with Staffand Other interested ParWes (1999); Provision ofInformation 
to Parliament (2000). 
Is How to Account for PFI Transactions (1999); How to follow the E. C. Procurement Rules and 
A dvertise in lit e OJEC (19 9 8); How to Appoin t and Manage Advisors to PPY Projects (19 9 8); How to 
Appoint and Work with a Preferred Bidder (1999); How to Construct a Public Sector Comparator (1999); How to Manage the Delivery ofLong Term PH Contracts (1999); How to Achieve Design 
16 
Quality in PFI Projects (20 00). 
For Example: Highway Agency, DBFO 
- 
Value in Roads 
-A case study on the first eight DBFO 
roads (1997); Treasury Taskforce, Yhe IAD Caseworking Programme (1997); Ibid., Lewisham 
Extension to Docklands Light Railway (1999); Ibid., Lowdliam GrangePrison Service; Report on the 
Procurement of Custodial Services in DCIN prisons (1999); Ibid., ColrarSchool, Dorset-A Case 
17 
Study on thefirst DBFO School Project (I 998ý 
General standardisation document: Standardisation of PFI Contracts (1999); Standardisation of IT Contracts (2000). 
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on the progress made in implementing the findings of his first review. In March 1999 
he submitted recommendations mainly concerned with strean-dining the PFI 
procurement process and reforming the institutional structure. 18 One contested 
proposal of the second Bates report was to substitute the successful Treasury 
Taskforce for a Public Private Partnership called "Partnerships U. K. " This body is 
supposed to carry on the work of the Treasury Taskforce's project arm, inter alia in 
bundling together projects such as schools in different authorities to make deals big 
enough, 19 and to invest in projects in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. 20 
As other Member States of the European Union have been turning increasingly 
towards the private finance approach, 21 PFI has become in recent years an export 
industry for British banks, legal advisers, and other companies with PFI experience. 
Those entities had the opportunity during the past few years to acquire an invaluable 
22 
set of skills in private financing and are now much-in-demand experts overseas. 
2.2 Public Private Partnerships 




. .-- .---- 
together in a long term partnership for mutual benefit. 23 Although the terms Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) and Public Private Partnership (PPP) are used 
interchangeably, it is suggested that the term Public Private Partnership should be used 
as an umbrella term for co-operative business structures and partnership arrangements 
between the public and the private sector. This concept includes -arrangements from 
the Private Finance Initiative and "contracting out" to joint venture companies and to 




19 Financial Times, December 13,1999. 
20 It was this function that sparked criticism amongst PFI practitioners who feared that such a solution 
would result in a conflict of interests: on the one hand Partnership U. K. is supposed to numin-dse its 
profits whilst by taldng equity shares, whilst on the other hand it has to fulfil the role as an altruistic 
2 
facilitator of projects helping to find the best deal for the respective government department. 
This goes in particular for Italy, cf. Piselli, "PPPs in Italy: Some important Developments" (2000) 
P. P. L. R. CS21; Nfinistero del Tesoro, Summary ofactivities ofthe Vnita lecincafinanza di progretto. 
Ile Netherlands and Ireland also adopted PPP programmes in the last two years, which are closely 
modelled on the United Kingdom Private Finance Initiative: each of those three countries has 
established a central taskforce to lead, drive and co-ordinate the PPP process. 22 Financial Times, 19 August 1999; RM Treasury, op. cit., note 1, p. 9. 23 HM Treasury, op. ciL, note 1, p. 10. 
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the sale of equity stakes in state-owned businesses. 
22L Definition 
Ilere is no common understanding of the concept of Public Private 
Partnership? and the academic commentators agree only on the very basic feature 
that such partnerships require the involvement of a public sector body and a private 
sector company. A contractual relationship linking the two parties is largely deemed 
dispensable, 25 though it is, especially in more complex projects, a "common factor. ))26 
Mainly due to the elusiveness of its definition, the term Public Private Partnership 
designates a heterogeneous range of co-operative ventures between the public and the 
private sector reaching from informal co-operationS27 to complex long-term 
contractual relationships related to a specific asset. This wide definition has sparked 
criticism from some academic writers for including every contact between private and 
public sector in the definition of Public Private PartnersWp 
. 
2' Budius and 
Kouwenhoven attempt to illuminate the basic dimensions of the PPP definition by 
choosing the "degree of formalisation" and the "degree of how the aims of the partners 
are complementary" as constituent criteria. Pursuant to this definition, partnerships 
can be both of informal or formal nature and may -be institutionalised by the 
establishment of a company. Of crucial importance to the partnership is a high degree 
of complementary aims29 allowing both parties to maximise their synergy gains. 
Four of the most common types of arrangements falling within the scope of the 
PPP concept are outlined below. 
24 See: Affowsmith(ed. ), Public PtivateParttiersliipsatidPF41(2000), para 1.004; Lawless, "Offentlich- 
private Partnerschaften in GroBbritannien 
- 
Analyse und Kriw' in: Heinz (ed. ) Public Private 
Partnership- ein neuer Weg zur Statitentwicklung? (1993), p. 212; Budaus/Gr(Ining, 
"Verwaltungsrefom und Public Private Partnership, " in: Ellwein/Gfimn-dHesse/Folke/Schuppert 
25 
(eds. ), Jahrbuch zur Staats- und Verwaltungswissenschaft, vol. 9/1996, p. 121. 
Budilus/GAIning, op. cit., note 24, p. 121 eLseq.; Kouwenhoven, Tublic-Private Partnership: A Model 





Society Interactions (1993), p. 120. 
Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 24, para 1.004. 
27 For example: Allegheny Conference on Community Development in Pittsburgh established in 1943 to 
strengthen the economic development of the Pittsburgh region. This conference was the starting point 
for a network of informal joint ventures between the public and the private sector inter alia aimed at 
re-developing the inner city. 
21 Budaust GrEining, op. cit., note 24, p. 125-127. 
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Contracting ou 
Contracting out, or outsourcing, describes all circumstances where an 
independent private entity is given responsibility for the day-to-day carrying out of 
services previously carried out by the government. 30 T'llis includes that cleaning 
services which were previously supplied "in-house" by public sector staff are 
transferred to a private sector contractor. In contrast to the private finance approach, 
the contracting 
-out--of-hitherto-public services does not necessarily mean-that the 
private contractor fmances the project. 
Governments across the globe have employed contracting out policies in order to 
achieve efficiency gains, while maintaining or increasing service quality levels. 31 In 
the United Kingdom of the early 1990s, contracting out was predominantly used to 
improve the quality of public services and to make them respond better to the wishes 
of their users, by expanding choice and competition. 32 All government departments 
were required to perform "market testing" exercises to compare costs and quality of 
the services delivered in-house with what private sector undertakings could offer. 33 
It is noteworthy, that governments in many countries not only outsourced 
ancillary services, such as cleaning of accommodation, to private sector companies but 
also the actual delivery of public services, including prison services, reffise collection 
and public transport. 34 In these instances, where a long-term agreement establishes a 
substantial connection between the private, contracts for contracting out public 
services are coming in the United Kingdom under the umbrella of Public Private 
Partnerships. 35 
29 Ibid. ýO OECD, Contracting Out 
- 
Best Practice Guidelines and Case Studies (1997); Sutcliffe, "Contracting 
31 
Out Public Services: U. K. Policy v EC Law" (1993) Anglo American Law Review p. 337. 
3 
See: Ascher, 7he Politics q(Privatisation: Contracting Out Public Services (1987). 2 HM Treasury, Competingfor Quality (199 1). 
33 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, pp. 621-648. 34 PrieB, "Privatisations and the E. C. Public Procurement Rulee'(1 998) P. P. Lp-, p. 2. 35 Arrowsmith (ed. ). op. cit., note 24, para 1.008. 
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223. Joint venture companies 
The archet e of Public Private Partnerships are joint venture companies jointly 
owned by the private and public sector, to which both parties contribute assets, finznce 
36 
or expertise. These businesses will be generally set up for a specific purpose and can 
be either of long term or short-term nature. Although this form of PPP provides the 
parties with utmost flexibility when tailoring the company to the specific purpose, 
joint venture companies are not widely used in the United Kingdom due to legal 
constraints placed especially on local authoritieS37 and NHS Trusts 
. 
31 
2.2.4. Introduction of pLiLvate sector ownership 
A third type of Public Private Partnership is the introduction of private sector 
ownership into state-owned businesses. " 'Mere is a range of possible options to 
involve private sector companies into the delivery of public services by means of 
introducing ownership, such as bringing in strategic private sector partners or selling 
either a majority or minority share of a floated state-owned business. The introduction 
of private sector ownership can be categorised as PPP, only if private and public 
sector engage in some kind of co-operative activity subsequent to the change in 
ownership. 
22.5. Private Finance Initiative 
The most notable examples of Public Private Partnerships in the United Kingdom 
are the many schemes delivered under the Private Finance Initiative. PFI has been 
initially launched in 1992 and its prime focus at that time was on the imprqvýqment of 
the transport infrastructure, ranging from roads, 40 bridgeS, 41 and tunnels to light 




37 Arrowsn-dth (ed. ), op. ciL, note 24, chapter 5. 
38 Since NHS Trusts are prohibited from holding shares in companies, establishing joint venture 
39 
companies is not a viable option for them. 
40 
H. Nt Treasury, op. cit., note 1, p. 10. 
NAO/DETR, The Private Finance Initiative: The First Four Design, Build, Finance and Operate 
Roads Contracts, (1998); Highway Agency, op. cit., note 16; NAO, The First Four Design, Build 
Finance and Operate Road Contracts, 47h Report (1998); HM Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, A Case 
Study on thefirst eiglit DBFO road contracts and their development (1997). 41 Committee of Public Accounts, Yhe Skye Bridge, 42nd Report (1998); NAO, 77te Skye Bridge (1997). 
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railway 42 and tramway projects. Since then, PFI has been employed to deliver a 
diverse array of projects such as the provision of IT services, 43 the construction and 
refurbishment of NHS hospitals, 44 local schooIS45 and government accommodation, 46 
military equipment47 and most notably prisons. 4' 
The main feature of "Private Financed Projects" is to entrust the management of a 
hitherto public service or facility to the private sector, the private sector providing the 
I necessary capital for a substantial asset. Besides the provision of private capital, the 
private sector is responsible for the design, construction, and management of the 
faCility. 49 
At the heart of the PFI approach lies a fundamental shift of focus in public sector 
purchasing. Government departments no longer acquire the asset or infrastructure, but 
let a contract to.. private sector company to provide the services related to the asset. 'O 
This means, for instance, that the Prison Service no longer procures prisons but 
cc custodial services, " comprising the design, construction, finance and maintenance of 
the prison. Subsequent o the completion of the asset, the private sector company is 
reimbursed for the delivery of the public services either by means of a periodical sum, 
including prison projects, or by the right to levy charges on the end-user of the facility, 
42 MA Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 16 (Lewisham). 41 11M Treasury, Private Finance Panel, The Private Finance Initiative and Government 1S11T (1994); 
HM Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, Private Finance and IT A Practical Guide (1998); Federation of 
Electronic Industry, The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) & Information Systems Information 
TechnoloV (ISITD (1996); HM Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, PFI and ISIIT case study. OSIRIS (Oflice Systems hi/rastructure Review and Implementation for the Welsh Office) (1998); Sternberg/ 
Carter, "Are successful IT Projects really deliverable? " (1999) PF1 Intelligence Bulletin (Oct. ); HM 
Treasury, Treasury Task-force, ESIE DS IT Partnership 
- 
PFI Case Study (19 9 9); Committee of Public 
44 
Accounts, Improving the Delivery ofGovernment IT Projects (2000). 
NHS Executive, Private Finance and Capital Investment Projects HSG (95)15 (1995); NHS 
Executive, Public Private Partnerships in the National Health Service. 
- 
Yhe Private Finance Initiative 
- 
Good Practice (1999); NAO, The PFI Contractfor the new Dartford & Graveshain Hospital HC 
45 
423 1998/99 (1999). 




Finance for F-ducatioW'(1 994) New Civil Engineer/New Builder (PFI Supplement July) p. 34. 
HM Treasury, Private Finance Panel, PRI in Government Accommodation 
- 
Practical Guidance to lite 
47 
Private Finance Initiative (1996). 
Ministry of Defence, Private Finance Initiative: Guidelinesfor die MOD; Ibid., Private Finance and 
1S17T 
- 
Case Study TAFMIS... and after (1998); NAO, 77se Private Finance Initiative: 77te Contract 
48 
for lite Defence Fixed Telecommunications System, HC 328 Session 1999-00 (March 2000). 
49 
NAO, The PFI Contracisfor Bridgend and Fazakerley Prisons (1997). 
Similarly: Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit, note 24, para 1.009. 
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such as in the case of a toll bridgeý-'Jhý Iývýeý of payment by the public sector is based 
52 
on performance of the private sector operator against agreed level of services. 
PFI is further based on the assumption that public and private sector should limit 
their-activities--to--cortain core 
- 
"business- areas. "--Whilst the public sector should 
establish the framework* for provision of public services, decide what services should 
be provided and subsequently ensure that they are properly provided, the private 
sector should be responsible for the actual provision of the service. 53 Hence, PFI seeks 
to achieve its economic aims by fundamentally changing the role of government and 
simultaneously expanding the scope for private enterprises. ' '4 Moreover, by engaging 
private sector companies in the provision of classical public services, the line between 
private and public sector is blurred and, consequently, serious accountability issues 
em_ arise 
. 
55 For qxample, 
-prisoners-have-to-be-guaranteed-their-basic-humaiq rights while 
being held in privately managed. custody. 
The following section discusses the socio-economic circumstances which paved 
the way for the PFI, its underlying rationales and the difficulties encountered by the 
British government in implementing the Initiative. 
ZZ5.1. Reasonsfor adopting PFI 
In its early days, projects procured under the auspices of the Private Finance 
Initiative have required substantially more time and financial resources in comparison 
to conventional infrastructure procurement57 where the government owns and operates 
the asset. The question arises, why virtually every government department in the 
"0 H. U Treasury/ Private Finance Panel, Risk aid Reward in PH Projects (1996), p. 5; I-IM. Treasury, 
op. ciL, note 8 of ch. 2, para 3.01; Lindrup/ Godfrey, op. cit., note I of ch. 1, para 70 eLseq. 51 For a more detailed account on the payment mechanisms, see below. Chapter 2, M. 52 DETR. op. cit, note 9, para 1.7. 53 HM Treasury, op. cit, note 1, p. 10 et. seq. 54 Bailey, Public SectorEconomics (1995), p. 136. 55 Taylor, PrivatePrisons and Public Accountability (1997). 56 The question arises of whether the private sector company can and should be directly accountable to 
citizens using the public facility. Taylor, "Public Private Partnerships 
- 
Third Way or muddled 
57 
middle? " (1999) Public Finance (October) p. 20. 
HAL Treasury, op. cit., note 10, p. 4, p. 11-17; NAO, op. cit., note 40, pp. 23-25. 
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United Kingdom has employed this scheme despite the costs and complexity of the 
PFI procurement process. 
There are, generally speaking, three socio-economic circumstances why the 
government embarked on the PH scheme. These are significant cash constraints, the 
urgent need of infrastructure investment and procurement failures of the past. 
The considerable cash constraints faced by governments are one macroeconomic 
reason for adopting the PFI scheme. 5' These constraints are reflected in the tension 
between the limited opportunities to increase public expenditure through increased 
taxes or public sector borrowing" and the ever-higher expenditure demands by social 
services budgets, such as social security, health and education, and public 
infi-astructure maintenance. 60 
In traditional procurement, government is paying up front for major assets used to 
provide public services and, hence, the capital spent on the asset adds to the current 
government spending and to the public sector net cash requirement 
- 
the measure that 
the financial markets regards as the best guide as to whether the government is 
spending prudently. 61 In PFI procurement, the payments for the asset are spread over a 
period of years. This practice allows the deferring government expenditure and 
reducing total public expenditure, i)arficularly_g_apital-spe; iding. 62 
For example, a conventionally procured hospital involves the government paying 
a large sum up front for the design, construction and equipping the hospital building. 
With the PFI approach, government can defer the payments for the new hospital and 
make a series of payments over a period of 20 to 30 yearS63 and, additionally, *the 
private finance employed does not count towards the PSBR. 64 This effect makes the 
PFI approach attractive for governments, which 
-can -deliver 
improved services to the 
m Artis(ed. ), 7he U-K gconomy(1996), p. 199 etseq. 59 Bafley, op. cit, note 54, Part L Chapter 5. 
60 Lindrup/ Godfrey, op. ciL, note I of ch. 1, para 3-21. 61 Bagey, op. cit, note 54, Part II, Chapter 11. 
62 Bafley, op. cit, note 54, p. 136. 
63 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 24, para 2.001 et. seq. 
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public without having to pay for it immediately. The mechanism of deferring public 
spending has sparked considerable criticism for pursuing a "buy now pay later" 
policy, applying "creative accounting" measures and procuring public projects "off the 
balance sheet. "6' 
The second reason why the U. K. government initiated the PFI approach is the 
significant backlog of infrastructure investment. 66 In 1962, a national plan promised 
224 new hospitals and nearly 40 years on, bnly-a7third-have been delivered 
. 
67 A similar 
picture can be drawn of the education sector, where a significant percentage of the 
classroom space is provided by accommodation which was categorised as "temporary" 
68 
when first brought into use over 30 years ago. PFI facilitates the required investment 
in neglected infrastructure9 whilst simultaneously allowing the government both to 
control the public sector borrowing requirement and to reduce the usual tax 
implications. 
Another main political driver for launching the Private Finance Initiative was that 
conventional public sector provision of infrastructural projects was perceived to be 
characterised by time and cost slippage created by over-engineered projects that were 
frequently changed and poorly managed 
. 
70 The fact that public servants were 
operating in a competitive market situation like their counterparts in the private sector 
was said to be the main reason why hospitals were built behind schedule and housing 
stock was poorly maintained. These concerns contributed to the perception that private 
6, Artis (ed. ), op. cit., note 58, p. 203. 
65 See for instance: "Mr Clarke's free lunclf' The Economist (January 28,1995); "Cooking the books, " 
The Economist (October 28,1995); "Public Spending. Initiative test. " Yhe Economist (June 29,1996); 
"Public Spending 
- 
Farewell straighIjackef' The Economist (July 18,1998); "Punch-up ahead? " Yhe 
66 
Economist (June 30,2001). 
H. M. Treasury, op. cit, note I of ch. 2, p. 13. 
67 ". How Britain mortgaged the future" New Statesman (18 October 1999); in comparison, NHS Trusts 
68 
signed between May 1997 and March 2000 contracts for 35 major hospital project. 
69 
Lindrupt Godfrey, op. cit, note I of ch. 1, pam 9. 
Alan Milburn, Chief Secretary to the Treasury said at the launch of the IPPR Comn-tission into PPPs: 
'TPPs make possible more investment in our key public services after years of systematic under- 
investment. Over the last Parliament public sector net investment fell by I per cent of GDP (and by 2 
and a quarter per cent of GDP between 1979 and 1997, " ILM.. Treasury News Release 152/99, 
22/09/1999. 
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sector companies are more capable of planning, delivering and managing major 
construction projects than the public sector. 7. I. 
.. 
Further, the discussion about how to improve traditional procurement methods 
produced evidence that savings could be achieved by integrating design, construction 
and operation. It was suggested that the design of the asset should take into account 
the requirements of an efficient use and maintenance of the asset. 72 In the United 
Kingdom, the debates surrounding the shortcomings of conventional procurement 
methods have coalesced into the PFI, which seeks to harness the managerial skills of 
the private sector and simultaneously_ leads to a closer. integration of design, 
construction a. ndgp. eration. ofpublic facilities. 
2ZS. Z Rationales underlying PH 
Having briefly discussed the socio-economic framework favouring the adoption 
of the Private Finance Initiative, the following section will consider its objectives and 
major rationales. 
The primary economic rationale of any PFI arrangement is the creation of a 
service delivery mechanism that provides better value for money than the 
conventionally procured public sector alternative. One may define value for money as 
the optimum combination of whole life costs and benefits for the public sector. It is 
uncontested that it is cheaper73 for central government departments than for a private 
sector company 74 to raise capital funds. Hence, the higher private sector borrowing 
70 Committee of Public Accounts, TiiePFICotitractsforBtidgetidwidFazakerley Prisons, 57111 Report 
(1998), p. 19; H. Nf. Treasury names four projects which have overspent their original budget 60-200% 
71 
and faced delays between 2 and 5 years, H. Nt Treasury, op. ciL, note I of ch. 2, p. 18. 
Morrison/Owen, Private Finance Initiative (1996), p. 1-2. 
72 This has been identified as a critical factor for the success of a PF1 project by a survey amongst PF1 
experts, Morledge/Owen "Critical Success Factors in PF1 Projects, " in: Hughes, Will (ed. ), 
Proceedings 14th ARCOM Conference, September 1998, p. 569; I-LNL Prison Service/ Private Finance 
Panel, Report on the Procurement of custodial services for the DcAfl; ' Prisons at Bridgend and 
Fazakerley (1996), p. 5. 
73 Arthur Andersen claims in its report to the ILM. Treasury that difference is now typically in the range 
of only 1-3%, Arthur Andersen/ LSE Enterprise, Value for Money Drivers in the Private Finance 
74 
Initiative (2000), para 3.4. 
This is because central government departments do not face the insolvency risk- private companies 
encounter. Hence lending institutions rate them "risk--free. " However, local government used not to be 
rated "risk-free, " a situation which is remedied since September 1998. Since then, local governments 
Footnotes continued on the next page. 
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costs must be more than offset by savings in other capital and operating costs for 
private provision to be cheaper and to provide better value for money than the public 
sector alternative. 75 'Me fact that private finance is per se more expensive requires 
public sector purchasers to vigorously compare the costs of the PH project with the 
cost of alternative means of provision to ensure value for money. 76 
It is possible to identify five interrelated essential value for money drivers in PFI 
projects. 77 Those are private sector management skills, effective risk allocation, the 
long-term nature of the contract and effective performance measurement and 
competition. 
The first source of cost savings is the private sector's ability to balance cost, risk 
and return more efficiently than the public administration 
. 
78 It is assumed that private 
sector companies operate in a fast moving and competitive environment, which 
provides them with strong incentives to maximise efficiency and to take full advantage 
of business opportunities. This also means that private sector operators will -usually 
adopt a less risk averse culture than public bodies and are better equipped to challenge 
inefficient and outdated working practices. 79 
The private sector partner is considered capable of exploiting the assets more 
intensively due to additional revenues from shared use of facilities and the sale of 
redundant assets. 'O By enlarging the asset and sharing its use between the public sector 
and other customers, or between two or more public sector customers, the private 
sector solution is susceptible of achieving economies of scale. For example, other 
seek PH Credits which is in fact an approval scheme for the private sector which indicates that 
75 
revenue support for the respective PFI project will be forthcoming, cf. DETR, op. ciL, note 9. 
This goes although the gap between public and private borrowing is not as high as often suggested, cf 
76 
Arthur Andersen/ LSE Enterprise, op. ciL, note 73, para 2.1. 
This comparison is accomplished by means of a 'Tublic Sector Comparator" (PSC), which has to be 
dealt with in detail below in this section. 
77 A recent report on value for money commissioned by the H. K Treasury Taskforce suggests six key drivers, namely: risk transfer, the long term nature of contracts, the use of an output-based 
specification, competition, performance measurement and incentives, and private sector management 
skills, Arthur Andersen/ Enterprise LSE, op. cit., note 73. Another study suggested that securing value for money is the key rationales of PFI, see: Robinson et al. The Private Finance Initiative 
- 
Saviour, 
Villain or irrelevance? (1999), p. 13. 78 Lindrup/Godfrey, op. cit., note I of ch. 1, para 184. 79 HM Treasury, op. cit., note 1, p. 11. 
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private or public customers may also use a computer system delivered under PFI. 
Thus, the private sector provider may create additional revenue. 
These theoretical considerations turn out to be more difficult in practice. The PFI 
project of the National Insurance Recording System (NIRS2) reveals" that the 
potential additional revenue stream limited in scope and certainly subject to agreement 
with the contracting authority. Selling products developed as part of the PFI scheme 
may generate additional revenue, particular skills acquired or experience obtained. 82 
In addition, private sector participation is also deemed to ensure avoiding "gold- 
plated" solutions by focusing on outputs instead of over-prescriptive approaches to 
design. 83 The private sector can achieve savings in PFI projects by employing 
innovative approaches to design, construction, and maintenance and by taking into 
account more operational considerations into the original design. 
Another value for money driver is the efficient allocation of the risks inherent to 
the project with the partner which best able to manage or mitigate the respective 
category of risk. Since the notion of optimal risk allocation is one of the major 
rationales of the PFI approach in its own right, " this issue shall be dealt with in a 
dedicated section below. 
The long terra nature of PFI contracts has been referred to as a key condition for 
delivering value for money, because of the scope it provides for the private sector 
contractor to recover the initial investment, to develop alternative approaches and to 
focus on whole life costing. " In practice, the contract term will vary between sectors. 
Projects where a significant proportion of the project cost is devoted to a building may 
require a contract of 20 to 30 years or longer if best value for money is to be 
80 Lindrup( Godfrey, op. cit, note I of ch. 1, para 185. 81 H. M Treasury, op. ciL, note 4, p. 24. 82 Ibid., p. 3. 
R3 PH has been criticised on this ground, for encouraging "cheap" design of public buildings. This 
should now be avoided with dedicated Treasury guidance: H. NL Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op. ciL, 
note 15 of ch. 2 (design quality). 
84 HIL Treasury, op. ciL, note 4, p. 12; Arrowsmith, op. ciL, note 24, para 2.035. 85 H. M. Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op. ciL, note 15 (preferred bidder), section 4.2.; Arthur Andersen/ 
LSE Enterprise, op. cit., note 73, para 2.17. 
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obtained. " Where the expected life of the project assets is only limited, such as by IT 
systems, difficulties arise in developing mechanisms for technology refreshment and 
incentivising the contractor to make continuing investments. For example, a 20 year 
IT contract would be unlikely to offer demonstrable value for money given the pace of 
change in the sector and the frequent need to replace and up-date systems. Most IT 
contracts signed to date have consequently been of a shorter length, up to a maximum 
of 15 years. 87 
The focus on the whole life cycle of a project allows the private sector to offer a 
complete package, which is in turn a major source of savings. " Ile designing, 
building, operating and financing of a project by one company achieves synergies and 
incentives to base decisions on whole life cycle costs. Furthermore, when a project 
structure assigns the service provider the responsibility for designing and creating and 
operating the asset" it is likely to lead towards a closer integration of service needs 
and design and construction. Thus, new technologies and new, more effective business 
processes will be applied to ensure that assets are fiilly fit for their purposes but not 
more, what means removing any tendency to over-design or "gold-plate"90 assets and 
the cost pressure from post-contract design changes 
Although it might not be viewed as an absolute pre-condition, 91 competition has 
been referred to as the best guarantor of value for money, 2 since it is much easier to 
demonstrate value for money where there has been an effective price-led competition. 
In the early days of PFI, public purchasers were faced with a lack of a supplier base 
and had to create93 and nurture the markets. 94 The appropriate level of competition was 
86 For example, in a typical highway project, the contract duration is 30 years, NAO, The Private 
Finance Initiative: The Contract to Complete and Operate the A74MIM74 Motorway in Scotland 
87 
(1999), p. 8. 
Arthur Andersen/ LSE Enterprise, op. cit., note 733, para 4.35. 88 Ibid., para 4.34. 
89 HM Treasury, op. cit., note 4, p. 3, p. 17. 90 H. M Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 8 of ch. 2, para 3.08. 91 Ibid., para 3.09; RM Treasury, Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 4, para 5.16. 92 Arthur Andersen/ LSE Enterprise, op. cit., note 733, para 4.45. 93 For instance: custodial industry, H. M. Prison Service/ H. M. Treasury, Private Finance Panel, op-cit., 
note 72, para 2.2; road operating industry: NAO/ DETR, op. cit., note 40, para 1.4. 
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achieved by means of extensive market consultation which were supposed to test the 
interest of the operators in delivering PH solutions. 9' Throughout the procurement 
process of the project, government departments remain anxious to sustain a 
competitive market situation from the early planning stages of the project until a very 
late stage. 96 
However, the costs for preparing a bid for a PFI scheme are genuinely 
97 
encumbering effective competition between PFI providers. As tendering for a PH 
scheme is an especially cost-intensive process, no more am three or four tenderers" 
are usually invited to submit a fully priced tender. Ile dichotomy between a 
competitive market tendering process and the high bidding costs is reflected in the 
practice to designate a "preferred" and "reserve bidder"99 once the bids have been 
evaluated. This practice keeps up the competitive pressure on the "preferred" company 
during the final negotiation stages, whilst avoiding costs incurred by other 
tenderers. 1w 
In order to harness fully the private sector management skills throughout the life- 
time of the PH project, authorities have to ensure that the service provider operates in 
a competitive situation under market disciplines. This means that competitive pressure 
should be applied to the service provider not only during the procurement process but 
also, if possible, during the operation phase of the project. 
Performance measurement fulfils a different role than the factors discussed 
above. While the other value for money drivers have a direct impact upon the pricing 
of the project, performance measurements are a means to ensure that value for money 
94 Arthur Anderseril LSE Enterprise, op. cit., note 733, para 4A8. 95 PFI markets are still a long way from being perfectly competitive, meaning that there is a large pool of 
undifferentiated buyers and sellers and that there is a fair balance between the public and private 
sectors' bargaining strengths; Arthur Andersen/ LSE Enterprise, op. cit., note 73, para 4A7. 96 Cf. H14 Treasury, Competition and the Private Finance Initiative (1994). 97 For instance, in the first four highway projects, the reserve and winning bidders spent bid costs in 
98 
excess of L4 million, NAOMETIZ, op. cit., note 40,1.33. 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), Private Skills in Public Service 
- 
Tuning the PM, Summary 
(1996), pp. 22-23; RM Treasury, Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 4, para 5.24. 99 H. NL Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op-cit., note 13, stage 12. 100 Fox/Tott, op. cit., note 5, para 5.7.11. 
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is delivered as promised in the original contract. '01 
The actual cost savings for the goverment achieved by PFI and its notion of 
cc sweating the capital""' are claimed to be "huge" and are estimated to be between 
10% for DBFO road proj ects and up to 20% for defence proj ects. 103 To ensure that the 
private finance approach is more viable than conventional funding, authorities should 
employ a "Public Sector Comparator" (PSC). '04 The PSC may be defined as a 
hypothetical risk-adjusted costing to an output specification'O' which serves as a 
benchmark against which private sector bids are assessed. A PSC is constructed on the 
assumption that the procurement is undertaken through conventional funding and that 
significant managerial responsibility and exposure to risk is retained by the public 
sector. The PSC should provide the project partners with an ongoing benchmark 
against which the performance of the project is continually to measure. 
The essence of a truly beneficial Public-private partnership is the sharing of risks 
_ 
Re 
and rewards between the partners. 106 Hence, the second flMdamental requirement of 
the PH scheme is the appropriate transfer of risk to the private sector. In the context of 
PFI services, risks relate to any area of the promised service which may fail 107 and 
they are measured with reference to the potential consequences and cost of failure and 
10, Arthur Andersen/ LSE Enterprise, op. cit., note 73, para 4.38. 102 CBI, op. cit., note 98, p. 12. 103 H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 1, p. 17; However, these figures are highly contested. The NAO and critics 
of the PFI scheme ascertain that departments use high discount rates (8% instead of 6%) and thus 
significantly overstate the benefits achieved; cf NAO/DETR, op. cit., note 40, para 2.16 et seq.; 
Warner, 'TFI spotting: the PPP track" (1998) The Batiker (Sept), p. 25; Broadbent/Laughlin, 
"Accounting choices: Technical and Political Tmde offs and the U. K's Private Finance Initiative, " 
Paper for presentation at the Critical Perspective on Accounting Conference, New York April 1999; a 
summary of the discussion can be found in: Arthur Andersen/ LSE Enterprise, op. cit., note 73, paras 
3.13-3.26. 
104 H. M. Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 14 (PSC and V"; H. M. Treasury, Treasury 
Taskforce, op. cit, note 15 (PSC); H. M. Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 13, Step 3; H. M. 
Treasury, ValueforMoney in Construction Procurement (1997). 
105 H. M. Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 15 (PSC), para. 2.3.1. 106 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Yhe management of the prison service (public and 
private): the Govennnent reply to the second reportfrom the Home Affairs Committee (1997), pA. 107 H. M. Treasury/ Private Finance Panel, op. ciL, note 50; Ak-intoye/Taylor/Fitzgerald "Risk Analysis 
and Management of Private Finance Initiative Projects" (1998) Engineering, Construction and 
Architectural Management p. 9; Birnie, op. cit., note 11 of ch. 1; Pitney/Smitli, 
, 
Public Transport 
Systems: The Allocation of Risks in Construction Contracts" (1998) Constmction Law Jout? ial p. 240; 
Price/ Shawa, "Risk and Risk Management in Project Related Finance" (1997) Jourrial of 
Construction Procurement p. 27. 
page 25 
the likelihood of occurrence. 10' The evaluation of risk is repeated for each identified 
category of risk, such as design and construction risk, commission and operating risk, 
including maintenance, demand volume/ usage risk, technology/ obsolence risk and 
Regulation and legislation risk. 109 
In transferring risks, the purchasing authority primarily aims to incentivise the 
private sector to manage and minimise those risks which are within its control. ' 10 lie 
contractor can thus perform efficiently and cost-effectively. An appropriate transfer of 
risk, "' which exposes the private sector companies only to those risks which they are 
best placed to manage, is likely to offer best value for money to the public sector, 
although the private sector will attach a price for being exposed to risk. ' 12 The notion 
of best capacity for managing the risk' 13 should be reflected in the terminology. 
Instead of a mere "genuine risk transfer" the second requirement for PFI project 
should be termed as the "optimum allocation of the risks involved. " 
In early projects, authorities sought to transfer too many categories of risk to the 
private sector contractor irrespective of whether the respective category was better 
managed by the public sector itself. The most prominent example of transferring risk 
for its own sake occurred in the first prison project when the Prison Service sought to 
transfer the "volume risk, " meaning the risk related to the occupancy of prison cells. 
However, the volume risk lies beyond the control of the private sector company 
managing the prison, since the supply of prisoners is dependent on the judicial 
sentencing system and the criminal activity within the community. 114 
The fundamental structural difference between traditional public procurement and 
log Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24, para 2.034. 
109 H. M Treasury, Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 50, chapter 3. 110 H. M. Treasury, Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 46, p. 24. 
"I Landers, "Procurement Streamlining: the prison service approaclf' (1996) Private Finance Initiative 
112 
Jourrial (5), p. 43. 
This means that the public sector has to weigh carefully whether to retain certain risks or to accept the 
increased price demanded by the private sector company and consequently to increase the overall 
costs of the project. See: Grout, "71be Economics of the Private Finance Initiative" (1997) Oxford 
Review ofEconomic Policy p. 59. 
113 Freedland, "Public; Law and Private Finance 
- 
Placing the private Finarice Initiative in a Public Law 
Frame" (1998) Public Law p. 306. 
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PFI is the transfer of a facility's operation and management o the private sector, once 
it has been delivered under the PFI contract. The public sector reduces its role to an 
enabler and facilitator of public services, while the private sector contractor bears the 
responsibility for the actual delivery of the service to the public. This approach is 
more likely to emphasise the strengths and "core business" areas of each partner and 
may include the devotion of more resources to the respective "core business. "' 15 The 
public sector's role is to concentrate on its duty to decide what service should be 
provided, leaving the private company to consider how it can be done best. ' 16 PFI 
"fundamentally changes"' 17 the role of government departments and agencies from 
being owners and providers of assets into purchasers of services. "' 
The fundamental change in the delivery of public services described above 
involves redefining the state and its purposes. The public sector withdraws ftorn 
functions which were classically deemed to be of public nature. '19 Moreover, the PPP 
approach supports the change from the hitherto predominant bureaucracy model of 
public administration to a managerial orientated approach. 120 
By using private funds in addition to public expenditure, public sector authorities 
are enabled to undertake projects and provide services that otherwise might not be 
affordable or achievable due to insufficient public ftinds. 121 Without adopting a PFI 
approach it might not have been possible to build the prisons at Bridgend and 
Fazakerley and the Skye bridge would have been opened at least five years later under 
a conventional procurement. 122 Hence, private participation offers the potential to 
114 Lindrup/Godfrey, op. ciL, note I of ch. 1, para 181. 115 Dept. of Finance Nova Scotia, Trwisterring Risk itiPublicIPtivatePart? iersiiips(1997), para 1.4.3. 116 H. M. Treasury, op. ciL, note 8, p. 3. 
117 Morrison/Owen, op. cit., note 71, p. 2. 118 HJA Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op. ciL, note 8,3.01. 119 Thomas, "Private Finance Initiative 
- 
Government by contract" (1997) European PublicLavsý p. 519. 12 0 H. 1vL Treasury, op. ciL, note 1, p. 13, para 21. 12, The IPPR study Building betterPartnerships (May 200 1), characterises this argument in favour of PFI 
as "spurious, " because all PFI projects are publicly funded and incur future liabilities for the Treasury. 
PFIs per se would not lead to "extra" schools or hospitals being built See also: Arthur Andersen/LSE Enterprise, op. cit., note 73, para 3.50; PiiceWaterhouseCoopers, Attitudes to the Private Finance 
Initiative (1999), p. 3. 
'2' For other examples see: KPMG, The Benefits ofPRI (1998), p. 5. 
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improve the efficiency of infrastructure services and relieve at the same time pressure 
of public budgets that had been previously the only source of infi-astructure finance. 
Public private partnerships have been referred to as being a key element in the 
government's strategy to improve the delivery of public services'23 after many years in 
which the public sector asset stock was allowed to deteriorate. 124 Improving one 
country's infrastructure is naturally a costly process. PFI offers the mechanism to 
deliver improved or new public facilities to the taxpayer without increasing public 
expenditure which had to be financed by tax increases. '2' 
Apart from improving the quality of public services in general, PFI is said to 
offer the advantage that the quality of services delivered to the final user is likely to 
improve. 126 This may be achieved through increased efficiency, better management 
and more innovative solutions contributed by the private entrepreneur who is vested 
with comparatively more commercial expertise and experience than the public 
authority. 127 
Furthermore, the private sector is perceived to put forward solutions that respond 
to customer demands, as its "profit motive" is considered a better incentive to carry 
out the project highly efficiently rather than the public sector's "service mission. " This 
includes that the private provider of a newly erected motorway bridge will seek to 
ensure that there is less congestion on the bridge because otherwise dissatisfied 
customers will try to use other ways to pass the river which would mean less revenue 
for the private entity. Hence, the commercial incentive to perform better is a 
continuing feature throughout the design, asset creation and operation of the activity in 
question. 128 
123 H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 1, para I of the introduction. 
124 Ibid., p. 13. 
125 McLellan asserted that the electorate wants a considerable and rapid improvement in the quality and 
availability of public services but is not prepared to pay extra tax to fund that improvement, "Public 
126 
Project Private Money" (1994) New Builderfivew CivilEngineer, (PFI Supp. Jul), p. 6. 
127 
H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 1, p. 13 et. seq. 
Foxtrott, op. cit., note 5, pam 1.2.6. 128 H. IvL Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 8, para 3.25. 
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Tle partnership approach inherent to the Private Finance Initiative encapsulates 
that projects delivered under the scheme are not only beneficial to the public sector. 129 
PFI offers the private sector the prospect of gaining a predictable income stream over 
25 or more years 130 and a closer long-term relationship with the public sector 
clients. 131 PH projects also offer the opportunity for accruing substantial profits when 
the private sector service provider manages to meet or even to exceed the standards 
agreed to in the main PFI contract. Some schemes give the provider the possibility of 
additional income generation opportunities which are not directly related to the 
services delivered, such as shopping facilities within hospital buildings. 132 
In recent years, PFI has created such a magnitude of projects that knowledge of 
the Initiative has become a prerequisite for basic commercial activity. Companies that 
took part in PFI projects gained a valuable set of skills, which make them more 
competitive in other industry sectors or abroad. 133 Hence, public private partnerships 
are not only a major boost to the construction industry from the viewpoint of the 
magnitude of projects and the sums involved, but they have also exerted A major 
impact on restructuring and modernising industry. 134 Ile partnership arrangements 
made it necessary for companies to adopt more efficient approaches as to the 
management of their consortium, the supply chains involved 135 and the long-term 
relationship with the public sector partner. 136 These innovative methods, which were 
further developed and refined in PFI projects, allowed private sector entities to 
perform more efficiently and, hence, be more competitive in other ventures. 
129 A recent survey amongst senior decision makers revealed that three quarters of all respondents 
130 perceived 
PFI as beneficial to all those involved, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, op. cit., note 121, p. 3. 
131 
Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24, pam 1.034. 
132 
Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 43, para 2.4. 
133 
Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24, para 1.037. 
This goes in particular for the financial and legal advisor who could transfer their experience to other 
sectors and even to other countries interested in the PPP approach. 134 McNamara, "Tbe current Perspective of major United Kingdom Construction Companies on the 
Private Finance Initiative, " in: Stephenson (ed. ), Proceedings 13'h ARCOM, September 1997, p. 578; 
135 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, op. cit., note 121, p. 8. 
Cox/Harris/Park-er, Privatisation mid supply chain management (1998); Saunders, Strategic 
Purchasing & Supply Chain Management (1997). 
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ZZ5.3. Obstaclesfaced by the government 
The obstacles that the British government had to face in pursuing and fostering 
PFI were addressed in the two' 
. 
'Bates Reports, " issued by Malcolm Bates on behalf of 
Treasury in June 1997 137 and March 1999.13' The reports identify several 
procedural and infrastructural areas that should be enhanced in order to achieve good 
value for taxpayers' money. Four of the most pertinent and yet unsettled problem 
areas are discussed below together with the emerging solutions. 
Industry consistently expresses two major concerns as regards to the Private 
Finance Initiative, which are partly interrelated. Bid costs remain too high and the 
contract award process is too SIOW. 139 Government departments have a genuine interest 
to attract private sector companies to tender for PFI projects, since they need a sound 
industrial base from which to choose eligible providers. 140 'Me more firms are able to 
participate in the procedure leadin g to the award of the project, the more competition 
will induce not only a more preferential overall price but also a greater variety of 
possible solutions. This basic procurement rule that competition between the 
prospective suppliers induce a greater choice of variant tenders is pertinent in complex 
PFI projects. In those cases, the authority aims to achieve a variety of proposals 
concerning the parameters of flimcing, designing and operating. The multitude of 
parameters to be considered in the award process distinguishes a PFI from 
conventional procurement and provokes lengthy negotiations and ultimately high 
tendering costs for interested private companies. 
The first Bates Reports made a number of recommendations to decrease the 
length of the negotiations and consequently the bidding costs for PFIs, including the 
136 See Cox/ Townsend, Strategic Procurement in Construction (1998); HeaL "Construction Partnering: 
Good Faith in Theory and Practice" (1999) Construction Law Journal, p. 167; RM. Treasury, 
137 
Procurement Guidance N6.4: Teamworking, Partnering andIncentives (1997). 
H. NL Treasury, op. cit., note 10. 
138 H. M Treasury, op. cit., note 18. 
"" Arthur AnderserYLSE Enterprise, op. cit., note 73, paras 3.35,3.37. 140 Turpin, Government Procurement and Contracts, p. 153. 
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use of standardised documents, 141 the early limitation, that is "short-listing, " of the 
bidders to a maximum of four, and the removal. of legal uncertainties. 142 
In response to the recommendations, the Treasury commenced to publish 
standardisation. documents for PFI contracts in general and a number of sector specific 
standardisation documents such as for IT contracts, contracts of local governments, 
defence related contracts and contracts for health projects. '43 It is hoped that by 
establishing sets of standard contract conditions and the standardisation of tender 
documents, legal fees and other costs may be reduced, as will the time spent 
negotiating with a preferred bidder. '44 
The standardisation documents, which are drawn up from experience gained with 
past contracts, provide the various building blocks of a PFI agreement. They include 
inter alia service provision, pricing and payment mechanisms to "promote a common 
understanding of what risks are included in a statutory PFI contract; to allow 
consistency of approach.... and to reduce the cost of negotiation. v)145 
Tle second means to reducing proposal costs, the early reduction in the number 
of bidders, appears to stand in contradiction to the essential procurement requirement 
of competition. Conversely, this reduction of candidates invariably suits both sides of 
a PFI transaction as the establishment of a "preferred bidder status" avoids incurring 
of substantial expense 
Apart from streamlining the procurement process, the first Bates Report held that 
it is of utmost importance to remove legal uncertainties especially regarding NFIS 
Trusts and local governments. 146 Bates identified especially the uncertainties 
surrounding the question of whether local authorities had the statutory powers, vires, 
of entering PFI agreements as a major obstacle to progressing the PFI scheme. The 
"' HM Treasury, op. cit. note 10, p. 11. 
142 HM Treasury, op. cit. note 10, p. 22. 
143 See note 17. 
144 Committee of Public Accounts, op-cit., note 70, para 8; A typical PH procurement procedure is likely 
14 
to take about 15-18 months depending on the size, novelty and comple)dty of the individual project. 5 H. M Treasury, op. cit. note 10, Introduction, I. B. 
- 
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amended Local Government Act 147 protects now contractors and financiers from a PFI 
contract being void, which is the usual consequence of an ultra vires contract. 14' 




first. Bates. Report and-a jor source of delay 
was the compulsory "universal testing" of projects through central government 
agencies in the late stages of the project. 149 This requirement has been abolished""O and 
now the Treasury Taskforce signs off the commercial viability of significant projects 
before the procurement process commences, reducing the transaction costs for 
bidders. 15' Additionally, the Treasury has given written assurance that funding for 
contracts by central government departments will not be cut after signature of 
contracts. 152 
Despite the improvements made to the PFI procurement process over the last 
years, recent surveys show that industries still consider the financial implications of 
tendering for a PFI scheme as too high and the bidding process as such as too 
onerous. 
153 
PFI projects are difficult to structure for government departments due-to various 
reasons. Firstly, there is the problem of how to draw up the project specifications, 
which is of crucial importance for the quality of proposals received. The 
specifications, sometimes consisting of two documents the user brief and the output 
service specification, should not be too prescriptive about the means by which the 
requirements will be met. '-54 Exceptions to this rule may be only permissible in 
situations of operational constraints or existing policies, including building materials 
146 H. Ni Treasury, op. cit., note 10, para 22. 
147 Cf. the Local Government (Contracts) Act 1997. 
148 For a detailed account of the ultra vires issue: Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit, note 24, paras 5.121-5.134. 149 HM Treasury, op. cit, note 10, para 4. 
See for the exemption where central government funds are involved: Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 
24, paras 5.106-5.120. 
H. M Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op. cit, note 8, paras 2.04-2.06. 
Ibid., para 4.07 for the approval procedure. 
Arthur AndersenILSE Enterprise, op. cit., note 73, paras 3.35; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, op. cit., note 
121, p. 9; McNamara, op. cit., note 134. 
H. M Treasury, Private Finance Panel, Practical Guidance to the Private Finance Initiative 
- 
Writing 
an output specification (1996); 4Ps, Output Specification in PFIProject (1999). 
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to be used, total gross or net floor space to be delivered. 155 There is a danger of being 
over-specific for this could stifle innovative bids and proposals. 156 Bidders should, 
therefore, be given utmost flexibility but within the context of clear high-level service- 
based objectives which are fully defined in the specification. 
Secondly, it has turned out to be rather difficult for procuring authorities to 
persuade firms to accept the transfer of a reasonable portion of risk. 157 There have 
been instances where the public sector has attempted to transfer risk to the private 
sector that is beyond its control, as in the example of transferring the volume risk to 
the private prison operator. 
Finally, there may be pressures to re-negotiate PFI contracts where they do not 
turn out to be profitable enough for the private contractor to reimburse its investment, 
such as the Channel Tunnel. The same scenario is thinkable vice versa that the public 
sector is tempted to re-negotiate the agreement, if the private contractor is gaining 
excessive profits. 'Me demand to re-negotiate and to adjust the agreed contractual 
terms to changed economic circumstances is likely to occur in the course of PFI 
schemes, because of the relatively long duration of the contract which invariably 
implies uncertainty about ftirther viability. 
Another reason for criticism is the poor regulatory basis of PH which is not based 
on a single "PFI law" but many different statutes 158 forming the foundation for PFI in 
each sector, such as the London Regional Transport Act 1996. These are accompanied 
by a series of general guidance notes, policy statements, technical notes and case 
studies issued by the Treasury. "9 In view of the wide range of deals which only a few 
years ago would have been inconceivable, it is perceived as obvious that a single piece 
of legislation is needed to confirm that all types of public bodies have power to enter 
into PFI agreements. The related De-Regulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 may 
155 H. M Treasury, Private Finance Panel, op-cit, note 46, p. 9. l-'56 H. M Treasury, PFL GuidelinesfOr smoothing the procurement process, No. 6 (1996). 157 CBI, op. cit. note. 98, p. 17; Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24, para 2.035. 
'm Read, "Procurement of PFI contracts: Part I, " (1996) JI. S. S., p. 188. 
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serve as a pattern for this type of "omnibus" legislation. 160 One result of the absence of 
a clear regulatory or constitutional 16' basis had been unclear responsibilities between 
involved governmental authorities 162 that cause prolonged and lastly more costly 
proceedings. 
A distinct problem from regulating the procurement process and the settled vires 
issue is the question of how to regulate the newly created entities delivering services 
to the public. Public private partnerships are delivered within the policy context of 
deregulation and effectively blur the classical dividing line between public and private 
sector. 163 This context has repercussions for companies established under such 
agreements, since it appears questionable whether they are accountable to the public'64 
and subject to public law constraints, such as the procurement Regulations 165 or the 
human rights act, for the reason that they are delivering services to the public. '66 
Furthermore, PFI deals are resource-intensive and require public and private 
sector negotiators to make expert judgments on a new and inherently complex web of 
commercial issues. At the heart of PFI lies a fundamental change in perspective. 'nie 
public sector is no longer merely purchasing and owning assets but it is becoming 
"intelligent purchaser of long term services. 7)167 On the side of the public sector, PFI 
requires no less than a radical change of culture. Public sector servants who operated 
to date in accordance with rules and rigid procedures are now supposed to negotiate 
deals with the private sector. 16' Hence, the public sector's "learning lessons" have to 
provide civil servants with training 169 in areas of project scoping, management and 
159 Cf. HIL Treasmy, op. cit, note 8, Annex "Other relevant Publications. " 160 Editorial, "Legislation for the PFI, " (1997) Construction Law, p. 173. 161 Cf. Freedland, op. cit., note 113. 162 H. M Treasury, op. cit. note 10, p. 4. 163 Bailey, op. cit., note 54, p. 13 8 164 RM Treasury, op. cit., note 1, p. 36. 165 For the application of the procurement rules to joint venture companies: Arrowsmith (ed. ) op. ciL, note 
166 
24, para 8.012. 
This is discussed below in section 10.2A. 167 HAL Treasury, op. cit. note 10, p. 5. 
" Bailey, op. ciL, note 54, p. 138. 
169 "Skill management" H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 1, p. 28. 
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finance and elementary negotiation skills. 170 This learning process is likely to require 
substantial time as 95% of local councils responding to survey in 1998 171 felt that they 
require greater understanding of PH with 92% needing to improve their knowledge of 
the private finance market generally. " 
In comparison with a conventional supply contractý the PFI is also of substantial 
longer duration. For instance, the NIRS2 is for a term of seven years, while the 
Croydon Tramlink is contracted for 99 years. A long-term contract reduces the 
competitive pressure on the supplier to cut down costs and enhance quality in order 
not to lose the contract. This effect can be minimised by the use of performance 
improvement measures and incentives in the contractual agreements, in particular, in 
the payment structure. 
The performance measures have to be carefully designed, closely monitored, and, 
if appropriate, vigorously enforced in order not to undermine the agreed allocation of 
risks. "' It is not compatible with PFI theory that despite the transfer of the risk of late 
delivery to the private sector provider, government departments have to cope with the 
consequences when new systems arrive late or fail, 174 such as the passport agency's IT 
system 175 or the NIRS2 project. 176 
With respect to the enforcement of contractual terms, experience has shown that 
there is not only a gap between PH an theory and practice but also a clash of 
paradigms. On the one hand, the authority has to take a vigorous stance in enforcing 
the rights of the taxpayers under the project agreement to ensure value of money. 
170 NAO/ DETF, op. cit., note 40, at para 58. 171 Comn-dssioned by the Local Government Management Board mid the DETR (7 October 1998). 172 These results are mirrored in a survey amongst senior private sector decision makers, who were not 
very confident that the public sector ms maldng best use of its skills, cf. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
173 
op. cit., note 1211, pp. 2,4. 
Select Committee on Public Accounts, Getting better value for money from the Private Finance 
174 
Initiative 23d Report (1999), para 19. 
"IT: Suppliers to avoid public sector deale'Financial Times, March 25,1999. 175 Public Finance (October 29,1999), p. 6. 
"6 In the case of the NISR2 project, the Treasury reffained from claiming more than L4.1 million, 
although the Contributions Agency have incurred nearly 316 million in irrecoverable costs, Financial Times, March 21,2000; for a detailed report on this project see: Select Committee on Public Accounts, Delays to the new National Insurance Recording System, 22"dReport (June 1999). 
page 35 
Without claiming the agreed financial penalties and possible compensations from the 
failing private contractor, risk has not been fully transferred and value for money is 
jeopardised. 177 On the other hand, enforcing the risk allocation vigorously arguably 
prejudices the partnership relationship which was established inter alia to adopt a less 
adversarial approach to the resolution of conflicts. 178 
2.3. Types of private finance projects 
2AL Pffspecific differentiation 
Three types of private finance projects have to be distinguished. These are 
financially free standing projects, joint ventures between private and public sector and 
services sold to the public sector. 179 
ZILL Financiallyfree standing projects 
The rationale of financially free standing projects is that the private sector 
undertakes a project on the basis that the incurred costs will be entirely remunerated 
through charges for the services delivered to the final or end user. "O The public 
sector's role is limited to "enabling" the project to go ahead, "' including activities 
such as the initial planning, the licensing, the awarding of works concessions, and 
providing ancillary works or assisting with statutory procedures. 182 Typically, such 
contracts are of long term nature, meaning 20-25 years, and the assets are transferred 
to public ownership at the end of that period. "' 
The most illustrative example for a financially free standing project is a newly 
erected toll bridge, that is planned and awarded by a public authority, whereas 
designed, financed and built by a private sector company or consortium. The latter 
recovers its costs from the final private user by levying toll over a stipulated period. 
177 Select Committee on Public Accounts, op. ciL, note 173, para 20. 178 Coxfl7hompson, Contracting for Business Success (1998), p. 29; Trepte, "Partnering: Political 
Correctness or False Modesty? " (1993) ECLR, p. 205. 179 H. M. Treasury, op. cit, note 7. 
180 Arrowsn-dth (ed. ), op. cit., note 24, para 1.012. 18, Gilbert, The enabling State (1990). 
IB2 RM. Treasury, op. cit, note 8, p. I. 183 Digings/Benett, op. ciL, note 2 of ch. 1, para D2.3 (1992). 
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2 3. L2 Joint ventures 
Joint ventures are projects to which both the public and the private sector 
contribute and whose returns they share. The projects' costs are met by public fiinds 
and by other, meaning private, sources of income. '" Ile private sector bears the 
responsibility for development and overall control of the operation in which the public 
sector retains a continuing interest. 
The public sector contribution assures broader social benefits that cannot be 
entirely captured in commercial revenue, 185 such as reduced road congestion' 16 or, 
generally speaking, enhanced quality of life. The public sector contribution to a joint 
venture may comprise grants, loans, existing assets, such as land, or ancillary or 
associated works. Concrete examples are infrastructure projects like various town 
centre regeneration schemes, urban light railway projects, such as the Croydon 
Tran, dink, Dockland Railway Extension and the Channel Tunnel Rail Link. 
2.3. LA Services sold to the public sector 
Services are considered sold to the public sector when 
-their- costs 
-are partly or 
entirely met by charges from the private sector service provider to the public sector 
bodj7__Whi-cli -Ieis--- &--contract. The public authority is in effect contracting out the 
service provi sion or buying-in the service in question. 187 
In comparison with the classical "contracting out, " as defined above, the 
"services sold to the public sector" method has the distinct feature that the service 
provision depends upon the provision of dedicated capital assets, such as purpose-built 
plants or buildings, by the private sector contractor. Agreements for private 
contractors to design, build, finance and operate prisons or IT systems are examples of 
services sold to the public sector. As in the case of financially free standing projects, 
I" H. NL Treasury, Private Finance Panel, op. ciL, note 4, para 1.4. 185 HIL Treasury, op. ciL, note 8, p. 2. 186 Digingsh3enett, op. ciL, note 2 of ch. 1, D2.4. 187 Freedland, op. ciL, note 113, at p. 2 90. 
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such contracts are typically of long tenn nature. "' Ownership of assets may or may 
not transfer to the public sector at the end of the period. 
23.2 General differentiation 
Another method to differentiate concession-type arrangements, which is applied 
on international level, "" is to identify the involvement of the concessionaire in the 
individual phases of the arrangement. This differentiation results in schemes as "build 
operate transfer" (BOT), 190 "build operate own transfer" (BOOT), "build own operate" 
(BOO), "design build operate maintain" (DBOM), "design build finance operate" 
(DBFO), or "design construct manage finance" (DCMF). 191 
One principal difference between these contract types is the legal ownership of 
the assets build and financed by the private sector. In some instances, the ownership 
remains private until their transfer to the state at the end of the concession term, such 
as in many BOT/ BOOT schemes. 192 In other circumstances the assets are owned by 
the public from the moment they are built, as in traditional French concessions, the 
private operator retaining full commercial control over them until the end of the 
concession period. Finally, under BOO schemes, the assets remain in private 
ownership. 
In accordance with this internationally adopted differentiation, PFI projects may 
1 93 be classified mostly as variations of the "humble concession" scheme apart from the 
feature that they generally'94 not involve the transfer. ofthe 
-assets -to -public ownership 
subsequent to the expiration of the concession term-" Contrary to the outlined 
188 Digings/Benett, op. cit, note 2 of ch. 1, D2.4. 
Guislaim%erf, "Concessions- The Way to Privatize Infrastructure Sector Monopolies, " Public Policy 
for lite Private Sector (The World Bank), Oct 1995. 
190 Wallace, "Emerging Host Country Legal Framework- for Privately Firmced Infrastructure Projects 
(BOT): Ile Procurement Elements, " paper presented at "Public Procurement: Global Revolution" 
Aberystwyth 1997; UNIDO, BOT Guidelines (1996); Walker/ Smith, Privatized Infrastructure 
- 
the 
BOT approach (1999). 
Cf. Pertchik-, "The Build-Operate and Transfer Approach to Infrastructure Development in Mexico" (1995)P. P. L. k p. 169. 192 Ibid., at p. 170. 193 Vinter, Project Rinance (1998), p. 240. 194 Notable exceptions are prison and motorway projects. 195 PF1 projects will be classified as DCMIF, DBFO or DBOM schemes rather than BOT, BOO or BOOT. 
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concession approaches, the emphasis of PFI is away from sole funding and towards an 
increased involvement of the contractor in every stage of the project. Hence, the 
private sector contractor will in most cases be involved in the design and operation of 
a capital asset, since. 196 
2.4. Corporate and contractual structure of PFI projects 
In the previous sections, the major contractual parties were referred to as "public 
sector authority" and "private sector company, " which are mere umbrella terms. Ile 
purpose of the following section is to introduce the two major parties to a typical 
public private partnership project conducted under the Private Finance Initiative and to 
outline the complex contractual relationship between them. 
2 4. L Dramatis personae 
Public private partnerships involve at least two partners, a public body and a 
private entity, usually in a contractual relationship. Besides these two major players, 
there are a number of other actors involved in a typical PFI arrangement, such as the 
project funders and the major subcontractors. The following section deals with the 
identity and the specific contribution of each partner to a typical PFI project and 
describes their roles and objectives. 
Z 4. L 1. Public sector body 
Under the umbrella term of "public sector bodies, " a multitude of government 
departments and agencies on all horizontal levels of government can be identified. In 
some instances, they have delivered PF1 projects across departnental boundaries. 197 
The hierarchical evel of government department or agency representing the public 
sector depends on the sector concerned. School projects are advertised by local 
authorities, whilst defence contractors will have to deal directly with the Ministry of 
Defence and PF1 projects in the health sector are normally advertised by National 
Health Service Trusts. 
196 HM Treasury, op. cit., note 8, p. 12-13. 
page 39 
In addition to the awarding authority, a typical PFI project will also attract the 
attention of the responsible government minister and, in some cases, the Treasury. '9' 
Considering the plethora of departments and agencies involved in signing PFI 
projects, it does not seem possible to view the public sector as one entity. This has 
negative implications for learning lessons from previous projects, since each 
department has to go through a similar learning process, gradually acquiring a level of 
expertise at considerable costs. 199 Hence, although the public sector is involved in a 
200 great number of PFI schemes, it is not able to realise the full synergies 
. 
Irrespective of the individual governmental deparunent or agency involved, the 
role of the public sector authority in a PFI deal is to enable the project and to manage 
its procurement process. Where appropriate, the contracting authority shall guard the 
interests of the users and the customers by ensuring during the operation phase that the 
201 agreed quality standards are satisfied. 
The three distinct phases of a typical PFI project require distinct sets of skill from 
the procuring authority such as defining the need in output terms, procuring and 
negotiating a contract and then managing the project including monitoring and 
202 
enforcing the safety, quality and performance standards. The main objectives for the 
public sector to embark upon PFI projects are to achieve value for money and to 
allocate each category of risk with the partner best able to manage it. Thus, it is sought 
to complete the asset to time, cost and quality. 203 
197 Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24, para 3.005. 198 In the contract for the new Dartford and Graveshain hospital, the responsible health authority, the 
NHS Executive Regional Office, the NHS Headquarters and the H. M Treasury got involved, NAO, 
199 
op. cit., note 44, para 1.19, figure 2. 
2 
Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24, para 3.008. 00 This issue has been mentioned in the first Bates report (op. cit., note 10, para 5). The Treasury sought 
to minimise its effects by publishing guidance notes. Strengthening the bargaining power of the public 
sector has been also a major theme of the Gershon Report, leading to the recommendations to 
establish a central procurement organisation (Office of Government Commerce), H. U Treasury, Review ofCivil Procurement in Central Government by Peter Gershon (1999). 201 CIPFA, The Private Finance Initiative (1997), p. 7 et. seq. 202 HM Treasury, op. cit., note 1, p. II 203 Fox/Tott, op. cit., note 5, pp. 21-22. 
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2 4. L2 PHvate sector 
The role of the private sector contractor, on the other side, is characterised by the 
delivery of a wide range of works, services and products, which are part of the overall 
PH business delivered to the public. Such an agreement requires a diversity of skills 
and experiences. 
204 
Firstly, the private sector company has to finance the project up-ftont, since the 
revenue stream from the government department only commences on delivery of the 
services to the specified standards. Apart from pre-financing the project, the private 
sector contractor has to deliver the design and the actual construction of the asset and 
its management and maintenance. 205 
To satisfy the diverse requirements, private sector companies operating in 
different markets usually join together and establish consortia when bidding for PFI 
contracts. A consortium typically comprises construction companies and developers, 
manufacturers, facilities management provider, bankers and insurers and financial or 
legal PH advisers. In the late stages of the award process, the successful consortium, 
itself lacking a corporate structure, establishes or promotes a "special purpose vehicle" 
(SPV), in most instances a limited company, 206 which then becomes party to the 
project agreement to be concluded with the contracting authority. The SPV is a mere 
shell company, especially established for the PH project and, hence, its obligations 
and liabilities towards the government department should be matched by back-to-back 
liabilities and obligations of the sub-contractors to the SPV. The former consortium 
members will hold an interest in the project-specific SPV by way of shareholding, a 
loan made to the SPV, or a sub-contract. 207 
'04 Monison/Owen, op. ciL, note 71, para 1.5.2. 205 The operational duties of service providers in the operation phase of the project will normally be 
spelled out in detail, since these clauses serve as performance measure and can influence the payment 
stream of the private contractor. CE RM. Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, Agecroft Prison Management Limited 
- 
Conditions of Contract for the Design, Construction, Management andFinancing ofa Custodial Service atAgecroft, Saybrd(1998), partIll, IV. 206 Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24, para 3.011. 207 Morrison/Owen, op. cit., note 71, para 4.1 et. seq. 
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On winning the PFI contract, the SPV has to implement the agreement and 
ultimately ensure the long term growth of the business. 208 The main goals for the 
private sector contractor are, therefore, to minimise bidding costs during the 
procurement phase, whilst maximising the profits arising from the scheme, by 
21 minimising inter alia their exposure to risk. 
Other private sector players are the financiers of the project, whose interests 
might deviate from those of the SPV, since their major aim is the protection of the 
investment made. 210 'I'liese are primarily the providers of the "senior debt, " such as 
banks or other lending institutions, which may decide to syndicate their debt in 
sizeable projects. 211 
Apart from the debt provided by the senior lenders, the project is financed 
through equity provided by either active investors such as the shareholders of the SPV, 
or passive investors such as specialised PFI fUndS. 212 Lending institutions and public 
sector authority share the interest to secure the continued existence of the project. 
Whilst the' bank is interested 
-to secure the revenue strewn securing its debt, the 
authority will seek to ensure the delivery of the services to the public. Ilerefore, each 
of the parties will want the contractual option to step in the SPV's rights and 
obligations under the PH contract and its sub-contracts if the SPV failS. 2'3 
2.4.2. Contractual structure 
The contracting authority and its private sector partners establish a complex 
contractual structure, which distinguishes public private partnerships from 
conventional bipartite procurement contracts. The backbone of the PFI project, 
defining the partnership, is the multi-faceted project agreement between authority and 
208 LindrupIGodfrey, op. cit., note I of ch. 1, para 66. 209 Fox/Tott, op. cit., note 5, pp29-30. 210 On financing the PH project see: Morrison/Owen, op. cit, note 7 1, chapter 4. 211 Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24, para 3.021. 212 The ratio between debt and equity in a typical PFI project is about 85/15. 213 Step-in rights are looked at more closely in chapter 11. 
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the SpV. 214 Most PFI project agreements will contain inter alia clauses dealing with 
215 the duration of the contract, the transfer of the asset at the end of the project term 
, 
the payment mechanism, the termination of the contract and indemnities and insurance 
216 issue. Furthermore, the authority will want to enter into a direct agreement with the 
project funder. The direct agreement contains inter alia the right of the funder and the 
authority to step-in the rights and obligations of a failing (sub-) contractor and 
ultimately to replace the (sub-) contractor jeopardising the success of the projeCt. 217 
The SPV will neither perform the work or services itself nor will it be prepared to 
accept the risks attached to the performance of the contractual obligations '218 but will 
pass on both risk and responsibility for the actual works and services to sub- 
219 
contractors. The SPV will conclude a construction agreement with the major 
construction contractor, 220 which will be a fixed price, time certain turnkey contract 
under which the contractor accepts the related construction risks. 221 The major 
construction contractor will then enter * into agreements with sub-contractors 
guaranteeing the supply of equipment and ancillary works. Apart from the 
construction agreement there will be at least one further contractual relationship 
between the SPV and sub-contractors dealing with the operation and maintenance of 
the asset. 
A third level of agreements is formed by contracts related to the finance. of the 
asset and the internal organisation of the SPV. Ile project will be normally funded by 
a mix of equity and debt, both of which are backed up by funding agreements with the 
214 Arrowsrnith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24, para 3.050. 215 The asset is transferred either to the authority or to a new supplier. 216 For a very detailed account of the contractual clauses see: H. M. Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., 
217 
note 17 (PFI Contracts). 
2 
See below chapter 11. 
Is However, there are exceptions from this typical contractual structure. For example, IT projects am 
219 
often performed by the SPV itself 
220 
Morrison/ Owen, op. cit, note 71, para 4.8. 
In addition, the SPV might want to conclude a direct agreement with the parent of the construction 
company to guarantee the performance of the construction contract. Ile same applies to the operating 
and maintenance agreement, which may be backed up by a performance guarantee too. Seeking such 
performance guarantees from the parent companies was one key lean-dng lesson from the first prison 
221 
contracts, H. M Treasury, Private Finance Panel/ H. M Prison Service, op. cit., note 93, para 6.1.4. LindrupIGodfrey, op. cit., note I of ch. 1, para 226. 
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debt funders and equity providers. 222 The relationship between the SPV and its active 
investors will be regulated in a shareholder agreement'223 setting out inter alia the 
legal rights and liabilities of its members, the management and voting arrangement 
and the profit distribution. 
222 See on the funding agreement: FoxtTott, op. cit., note 5, chapter 8. 223 Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24, para 3.065 et seq. 
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Chapter 3 The EU procurement rules 
3.1. Introduction 
As public authorities are using the PF1 scheme for purchasing goods, works or 
services, most PFI projects are subject to these rules on public procurement laid down 
by the European Union in Council Directives' that have been implemented by the 
2 United Kingdom by way of statutory instruments (Regulations). The Council 
Directives of the European Community can be regarded as one major stimulus towards 
the process of liberalising public purchasing world-wide, since it has been 
internationally used as pattern by many countries and organisations for modelling their 
procurement rules. 
Chapter 3 will firstly map out in section 3.2. the economic objectives of 
regulating procurement on international and supra-national level. Section 3.3. will 
then introduce the legal frame work of public procurement within which most PFIs 
have to be delivered. Finally, section 3.4. will describe why it is necessary to conduct 
fimther research into PFI procurement. 
3.2. Economk objectfves of regulated procurement 
The rationale for regulating procurement on international level is that 
harmonising national rules and policies in this area is supposed to achieve substantial 
economic benefits by way of liberalising the domestic procurement markets. The 
importance of free markets as a method of gaining a higher level of productivity, 
income and employment and of reducing costs and prices is generally laid down in 
Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome 3 and is also embodied in the European Single Act of 
Council Directive ("Works Directive") 93/37/EEC (OJ [1993] L 199/p. 54); Council Directive 
("Services Directive") 92/50/EEC (OJ [19921 L 209/p. 1); Council Directive ("Supply Directive") 
93/36/EEC (OJ [1993] L 199/p. 1); Council Directive ("Utilities Directive") 93/38/EEC (OJ [1993] L 
199/p. 84). 
2 Public Works Contracts Regulations ("Works Regulation"), S. I. 1991/2680, as am. by Public Supply Contracts Regulations 1995, S. I. 1995/201; Public Services Contracts Regulations 1993 ("Services 
Regulation"), S. I. 1993/3228, as amended by Public Supply Contracts Regulations 1995, S. I. 
1995/201; Public Supply Contracts Regulations 1995 ("Supply Regulation"), S. I. 1995MI; Utilities 
Contracts Regulations 1996 ("Utilities Regulation"), S. I. 1996/2911. 
3 "The Community shall have as it task [ 
... 




1985. Opening up procurement markets, in particular, was pinned to the expectation 
that this would lead to increased competition between European companies, improved 
industrial efficiency and competitiveness of European companies in global markets 
and, finally, reduced purchasing costs of the public sector and utilities. 4 
Prior to 1992, Member States continued to use public purchasing as an instrument 
of their economic policies and kept much of their procurement closed to foreign 
competition despite the liberalisation objectives laid down in the EC-Treaty. The 1988 
Cecchini Report described public sector markets in the EC12 as closed and generally 
uncompetitive. In the run-up to the Single Market, experts have attempted to estimate 
the financial implications of the continued closure of the Community's markets for 
public contracts. The report estimated the additional cost of non-realisation of the 
Common Market in this area to be some 21.5 billion ECU, 5 equivalent to V2per cent of 
total Community GDP 
.6 The "cost of non-Europe" was identified as a direct, serious 
threat to essential components of the Community's industrial potential. 7 
In view of these potential economic benefits, opening procurement market in 
establishing rules for procedures and remedies for public purchasing has been 
characterised as a major instrument for achieving the European Single Market! In the 
phase leading to the creation of this Single Market in 1992, the European Commission 
recognised in 1987 that total purchasing controlled by the public sector exceeded ECU 
500 billion and amounted to 15% of the Community's gross domestic product. 9 
Nevertheless, in 1987 only 2% of supply contracts and 2% of public construction 
contracts had been awarded to firms from other Member States, compared to levels for 
private sector purchasing of between 25% and 45%. 10 
4 European Commission, op. cit., note 10 of ch. 1, para 1.13. 
' Cecchini, The European Challenge: 1992. The Benefits ofa Single Market, p. 18. 6 W. S. Atkins Management Consultants, Yhe Cost ofNon-Europe in Public Procurement, Vol. 5A, p. 54. 
European Comn-Lission, Public Supply Contracts 
- 
Conclusions a? d Perspectives, Communication to 
the Council CONX84) 717 fmal, pA. 
European Commission, Economics of 1992, p. 17. 
Cecchini, op. cit., note 5, p. 16. 10 Emerson, The Economics of 1992, p. 48. 
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In theory it is assumed that providing foreign competitors with access to the 
traditionally closed procurement markets is likely to improve overall economic 
welfare by having at least three distinctive effects, namely the "static trade effect, " the 
"competition effect" and the "restructuring effect. "" According to the competition 
effect, open procurement markets allow foreign companies to enter the market and 
hence to align the prices of domestic suppliers with those of the most competitive 
foreign firm. As a result, authorities are provided with the opportunity to realise 
savings when buying at lower prices from the most competitive, possibly foreign, 
suppliers in the Community. This effect is referred to as "static trade effect. " 
Furthermore it is argued that industries have to re-organise themselves under the 
pressure of new competitive conditions via joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions to 
create global players capable of competing with companies from the United States and 
Asia in world markets. This reorganisation of certain strategic industries is capable of 
effecting economies of scale which will be passed on in the form of lower prices. 12 
The evaluation of the economic implications of liberalising the Community's 
procurement markets made prior to the creation of the Single Market and the 
underlying theoretical considerations appear over-optimistic from today's 
perspective, 13 since the actual "results still fhll far short of the total potential 
benefits. 1114 Even though the overall figure of import penetration increased from 2% to 
10%15 in 1994 and the public sector purchasing amounted to ECU 721 Billion, 
equalling 11.5% of the GDP, 16 the November 1997 Single Market Scoreboard 17 
confirmed that public procurement is one of the key areas of the Single Market where 
results do not yet meet expectations due to a variety of unsettled problems. There 
11 Cecchini, op. cit., note 5, p. 17. 12 "Restructuring effect. " 
13 For a critical account: Arrowsn-dth, "The Way Forward or a wrong Turning? An Assessment of European Community Policy on Public Procurement in Light of the Commissiores Green Paper" 
14 
(1997) European Public Law, p. 389. 
European Commission, op. cit., note 10 of ch. 1, para 3.6. 
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper- The 1996 Single Market Review (1996), 
16 p. 
4648. 
Ibid., p. 45. 
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remain inherent structural obstacles like different national standards in certain product 
areas and the phenomenon that suppliers tend not to pass on their savings but rather 
price to the different markets by undercutting their domestic competitors just to the 
slightest extent necessary. 18 It is not surprising that "there is as yet little evidence of 
substantial savings to public purchasing authorities. "19 
'Me 1997 Scoreboard also revealed that public procurement is one of the areas 
where the implementation deficit is the greatest, with only 55.6% of the Directives 
correctly implemented in all Member States. In face of failing or inadequate 
transposition of the Directives it appears as yet too premature for rendering a 
conclusive judgement on the economic effectiveness of the European procurement 
rules. 
3.3. Legal framework 
European Public Procurement law is based on three pillars, namely certain 
provisions in the E. C. Treaty, two sets of Council Directives and four fundamental 
principles which can be derived from the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice. 
3.3. L Treatv Provisions 
The EEC Treaty of 1957 (Treaty of Rome) was primarily concerned with creating 
a single market in Europe by setting out broad general principles such as the free 
movement of goods, services, labour and capital ("the four freedoms") within the 
Community's territory? The Treaty, which was recently extensively modified and 
renamed the E. C. Treaty by the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), makes 
no expressive mention of public contracts 
. 
21 Nevertheless, a number of its more 
general provisions concerned with free movement are pertinent to public procurement. 
17 European Commission, The Single Market Scoreboard (1997). 
18 Bohann/Redonnet, op. cit., note 4 of ch. 2, p. 169. 19 European Comn-dssion, op. cit note 15, p. 48. 20 For a more detailed coverage of the "four freedoms! ' see Wyatt/Dashwood, European Conimunity Law (1993), Part III; Craig/De Wwca, E. U. Law (1998). chapter 8. 
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They institute and guarantee the proper operation of the Single Market. The effect of 
these general obligations under the Treaty of Rome is, effectively, to render any 
conduct by regulated entities unlawful which discriminates, directly or indirectly, 22 
against contractors or products from other Member States 23 and which obstructs the 
realisation of the European single market. 
In the context of public contracts, the E. C. Treaty is, firstly, of considerable 
importance for those contracts, which do not come within the ambit of the more 
detailed procurement Directives. The Articles of the E. C. Treaty outlined below are 
applicable as sole legal source to small contracts not exceeding the value threshold of 
the Directives and, more pertinent in the context of PFI, to contracts granting service 
concessions. 24 Secondly, the E. C. Treaty is applicable, albeit on a supplementary 
basis, to contracts that come within the scope of the Directives. 25 
Tberefore, irrespective of whether the individual public contract is fullY, 
partially 26 or not subject to the regime of the procurement Directives, the awarding 
authority has at all events to comply with the basic rules of the E. C. Treaty. 
3.3. LL Article 12 
Article 12 E. C. Treaty now contains the basic rule prohibiting any discrimination 
on grounds of nationality which was formerly included in Article 6. This rule does not 
only aim at overt discriminations but prohibits ftirther all kinds of indirect 
discrimination, which, irrespective of the connecting factor for the discrimination in 
question, have as their de facto effect an unequal treatment of citizens of other 
21 With the exception of Art. 130R2) concerned with supporting co-operation among undertaldngs, 
research centres and universities by opening up national public contracts. 22 After the landmark decision in "Cassis de Dijon, " Case 12on8 Rewe Zentral AG v. 
Bundesmonopolvervmllungji'IrBrati? itwein [1979] E. C. R. 649, even non-discriminatory measures can 
be held not reconcilable with Article 28. 
23 Arrowsmith, "An Overview of EC Policy on Public Procurement: Current Position and Future 
Prospects! '(1992)P. P. L. R p. 30. 
24 European Commission, Draft Commission interpretative communication on concessions under Community law on public contracLs (1999). 1 PrieB, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 64. 
26 "Lightly regulated contacts! ' such as concessions, see below section 7.2.6. 
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Member States. 27 
In the context of public procurement it is therefore not possible to exclude 
bidders from other Member States from the contract award procedure or to 
discriminate against them on the grounds that they are non-nationals. The European 
Court of Justice ruled that the imposition of certain conditionS28 "which could be 
satisfied only by tenderers from the State concerned or indeed that bidders from other 
Member States would have difficulty in complying with"29 are not compatible with 
Article 12. However, Article 12 is of autonomous application only in situations 
governed by Community law for which the Treaty does not provide any specific rules 
on non-discrimination. 30 
3.3. L2 Article 28 
Articles 28 of the Community Treaty prohibits quantitative restrictions on the 
free import and export ("movement") of goods and all measures having equivalent 
effect, between Member States. Measures have, according to the "Dassonville Rule, "31 
equivalent effect for the purposes of Article 28 when they are capable of hindering 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade. The Dassonville 
Rule is subject to a rule of reason as developed by the ECJ in the Cassis de Dijon 
case. 32 Pursuant this rule of reason, certain measures, though within the Dassonville 
formula, will not breach Article 28 if they are necessary to satisfy mandatory 
requirements. A further derogation from the general rule of "free movement of goods" 
can be found in Article 30 and allows for considerations of health and public policy. 
In the context of public procurement Article 28 is invoked not only when certain 
measures affect the domestic market as a whole, but also where only the access to the 
27 PrieB, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 6. 28 For exarnple the employment of long-term unemployed persons. zS 29 Case 31/87 GebroedersBeen(jes v. TheNetheriands [1988] E. C. R. 46ý, atpara 30 of thejudgment. Case C-1019OMasgio v. Bundesknappschaft [1991) E. C. R_ 1-1119. 31 Cam 8n4ProcureurduRoiv. Dassonville [1974] E. C. R. 837. 
32 Case 12on8 Rewe ZentraIAG v. BundesnionopolverwaltutigftIrBratuitweitt [1979] E. C. P, 649. 
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government market is restricted. 33 It has to be fiirther noted that Article 28 does not 
only apply to supply contracts, but any contract such as for the performance of works 
or non-construction services. 3' 
The scope of Article 28 includes, firstly, measures which directly discriminate 
between national products and those from other Member States. Government 
departments are thus precluded from purchasing only national products, such as cars, 35 
or to require that national products are used as far as possible. 36 In addition, the Court 
of Justice held that the pursuance of procurement policies granting preferences to 
undertakings operating in underdeveloped regionS37 is not reconcilable with Article 28 
since those policies discriminate inter alia against imported products. 38 
Secondly, Article 28 prohibits measures which are indistinctly applicable to 
domestic and imported products but which have de facto the effect of favouring 
domestic products. Such indistinctly applicable measures are, for instance, national 
standards which apply to domestic and to foreign products but favour in practice 
domestic products, since only domestic firms are likely to manufacture their products 
in compliance with the national standard. " 
In applying the Cassis de Dijon principle, Article 28 bars thirdly certain measures 
which are neither directly nor indirectly discriminatory when they are related to the 
characteristics of the goods, such as safety standards. This principle precludes in the 
context of public procurement that contract specifications contain unduly restrictive 
product characteristics. 40 For example, the specification of a certain computer system 
was held to be unduly restrictive not for the reason of favouring national suppliers, but 
merely for the fact that providers of alternative products, which were also suitable for 
33 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 79. 
34 Case 45/87 Commission v. Ireland "DundaW'[1988] E. C. R. 4929, at para 17 of thejudgment. 35 Case C-263/85 Commission v. Italy [19911 E. C. R. 1-2457. 
36 Case C-243/89 Commission v. Denmark "StorebaelV'[1 993] E. C. R- 1-3353. 
37 Case C-21188DuPotitdeNemoursItaliatiav. UnitaSanitara [1990]E. C. R. 889. 
Critical in so far- Stehmann/Fernandez Martin, "Product Market Integration v. Regional Cohesion in 
the Community" (199 1) ELRev. p. 242. 
39 Case 45/87 Commission v. Ireland "Dund"'[1988] E. C. R. 4929. 
40 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 83. 
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meeting the government's requirements, were thus excluded. 41 
3.3. L3. Article 43 andArticle 49 
Article 43 abolishes restrictions on the freedom of establishment imposed on 
citizens of one Member State in the territory of another Member State. This freedom 
of establishment includes the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed 
person, and to set up and manage undertaldngs on equal basis with nationals of the 
host state. 42 
In the context of public procurement the freedom of establishment abolishes any 
restrictions on access to government contracts which affect the activities of non- 
nationals established in the Member State in question. 
Article 49 secures the freedom of citizens to provide services on a temporary 
basis in another Member State, including persons wishing to participate in government 
contracts for services. Hence, Member States are precluded to reject bidders on the 
ground that they are not in the possession of an establishment permit. 43 
Both, Article 43 and 49 prohibit measures discriminating directly or indirectly 
nationals from other Member States. When the Italian legislation required companies 
interested in contracts for the development of data processing systems for public 
authorities to be directly or indirectly in Italian public ownership, the Court of Justice 
held that both articles embody specific instances of the general principle of equal 
treatment. This principle prohibits not only direct discrimination by reason of 
nationality, but also all other indirect forms. 44 A piece of Italian legislation was 
challenged on the grounds of stipulating that awarding authorities must reserve 15 to 
30% of public works to contractors located in the region where the works are to take 
41 Case C-353/93 Commission v. The Netherlands 'UNDC'[19951 E. C. R. 1-157. 
42 Article 43, second paragraph; Case C-221/89, Factoname [1991] E. C. R. 1-3905; Case 182/83 Fearon 
[1984] E. C. F- 3677. 
43 Case 76/81 Transporoute et Travaux SA v. Ministere des traveamvpublic [1982] E. C. F- 417. 44 Case C-3/88 Commission v. Italy "Re Data Processing, " [1989] E. C. R. 4035; [1991] 2 CMLR 115; 
this judgment was confirmed in the late Case 272/91, Commission v. Italy "Italian Lottery"/ 
"Lottomatir-a"[1992] E. C. R. 1-3929 in the President's first order, with annotations: Arrowsn-dth, A 
Guide to the Procurement Cases ofdie Courr ofJustice, p. 127; Giliams, (1992)P. P. LA p. 160. 
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place. ' These provisions were held to be not compatible with Article 49 (the former 
Article 59) as they essentially favoured Italian firms which were much more likely to 
be active in the region concerned than companies from other Member States. Another 
form of indirect discrimination, which is not compatible with Article 49,46 is the 
insistence of the authority to use local labour which makes it more difficult and more 
expensive for non-nationals to provide the works or services with their own work 
force. 47 As in the case of Article 28, the Treaty provisions on services catch genuinely 
non-discriminatory measures. 4' 
The E. C. Treaty provides in Article 55 a derogation from the above outlined 
principles of Article 43 and 49 in excluding such activities from the Articles' scope 
which "are connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority. " 
Albeit it is not entirely clear how this derogation affects public procurement, 49 the 
Court of Justice indicated that Article 55 should be interpreted narrowl Y50 as 
encompassing only authorities which exercise actual judicial and legislative powers. 51 
3.3. L 4. Article 296 
In the area of defence procurement, the E. C. Treaty provides a number of 
significant exemptions, which in view Of most commentators means that the area is 
substantially excluded from the rules on the free movement of goods and services. 52 
Article 296 excludes measures relating to products of military nature from the realm 
of the Treaty and Article 297 includes an exemption for various exceptional 
circumstances, such as war. Furthermore, the free movement provisions of the Treaty 
provide for derogations on national security grounds, which allow security goals, such 
as to preserve domestic industries in strategic sectors, to be implemented through 
45 Case C-360/89 Commission v. Italy, [1992] E. C. R. 1-3401. 
46 Case C-243/89 Commission v. Denniark"Storebaelf'[1993] E. C. R. 1-3353. 
47 Case C-113189RusliPonugesav. Office nationald'immigration [1990] E. C. F- 1-1417. 48 Case C-384193AIpineInvestments [1995] E. C. R- 1-6097, at para 37-38 of thejudgment 49 Arrowstnith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 93. 50 Case C-3/88 Commission v. Italy "Re Data Processing" [1989) E. C. F- 4035, para 13; Case 272/91, 
Commission v. Italy "Italian Lottery"/ "Lottomatica" [I ý92] E. C. R- 1-3929. 
51 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 93. 




3.3.2 EC Procurement Directives 
From the outset, the European legislator was aware that an open market in 
procurement cannot be left solely to the general provisions of the Treaty and the 
Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. 54'llie legislator was faced with a great diversity 
of procurement systems in Member States and with considerable differences in the 
organisation of the relevant markets and public authorities. For those reasons, the 
Council initially adopted two Directives in the area, one for the procurement of works 
in 1971 and in 1977 another one for the supplies of goods 
. 
55 These can be viewed as 
the predecessors of the current public sector Directives as they regulated the purchases 
of traditional public bodies such as government departments, regional governments 
and local authorities, and certain other authorities of public nature. 56 
57 These rules and their later amendments, consisting of various legal instruments 
adopted between 1971 and 1980, resulted in a complex body of Community law. 
Alongside the complexity of the rules, their insufficient incorporation into national 
law of each Member State rendered it impossible to establish an internal market for 
public procurement by uniform rules of law. " The almost complete disregard of these 
rules of law by the participants in the market, these are public purchaser and private 
sector suppliers, 59 was encouraged by the absence of any substantial enforcement. 
Furthermore, in the absence of rules on aggregation, public purchasers 
circumvented the rules by splitting up contracts so that no single contract exceeded the 
respective threshold and had to be advertised. 60 
Finally, the Community rules did not deal with important sectors such as public 
53 Case 72/83 Campus Oil v. MitiistryforltidustryiujdE? iergy [1984] E. C. R. 2727. M European Commission, Public Procurement in the Community, COK86) 375 final, p-3- 55 Council Directive 71/305/EEC (Works), [1971] O. J. LI 85/1; Council Directive 77/62/EEC (Supplies), 
56 
[1977] O. J. L13/1. For details of these original Directives cf. Weiss, op. cit. note 2 of clL I, chA. 
57 
Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, chapter 3. 
For example Directive 80n67/EEC of 22 July 1980. 
European Commission, op. ciL, note 54, pA 59 European Commission, Public Procurement in the European Union 
- 
exploring the way forvwrd (November 1996), para 2.6. 
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services contracts and, most notably, contracts in the "excluded" utilities sector, where 
the potential for significant savings existed. 
The European Commission recognised the foregoing malftinction of the early 
procurement rules in its 1985 White Paper "Completing the Internal Market"61 as part 
of its review of the Community's single market policies. In this, the Commission 
emphasised again the important role of public procurement within the Community's 
general policy of creating a Single European Market and launched the plan of 
reinvigorating the slow and unsatisfactory integration process in this area. 
As a result of the 1985 White Paper, the Commission adopted not only measures 
to improve the existing Directives and the enforcement mechanisms but also extended 
the existing regime to the four important "utilities" sectors of water, energy, transport 
and telecommunications. 
To make up for the above-outlined deficiencies identified in the early rules, a set 
of new Directives were adopted in the late 1980's, namely Directive 89/44OC-2 
amending Directive 71/305 for works contracts and Directive 88/295,63 which 
amended Directive 77/62 as amended by Directive 80/76764 for supplies contracts. 
The main innovations of the Directives at this stage were the inclusion of the 
definition of the Directive's scope and more transparent procedures. Both Public 
Sector Directives only amended the original Works and Supplies Directive but did not 
implement a consolidated text. 
A further major step towards an effective regulatory regime was the adoption of 
the Remedies Directive 89/665 6' dealing with remedies for enforcing the public sector 
rules. Finally, the Council enacted in addition, as part of the rejuvenation of the 
60 European Comn-dssion, -Completing the Internal Market"COM(85) 310 final, para 4.3. 61 Ibid. 
62 [1989] O. J. L 210/1, of 21.7.1989. 
63 [1988] O. J. L 127/1, of 20.5.1998. 
64 [19801 O. J. L215/1, of 22 July 1980, implementing the Commurdty's obligation under the 1979 
GATT Agreement on public procurement. 
65 [1989] O. J. L395/33, of 1989. 
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procurement rules following to the White Paper, the first "utilities" Directive 90/531 66 
regulating works and supplies contracts in this area. 
The outcome of this second round of legislatory activity had been that legal 
framework on public procurement was scattered over several instruments and as such 
not easily accessible for the participants in the market. The above-outline legislation 
was finally replaced by the three public sector Directives 93/3667 (supplies), 93/37 68 
(works) and 92/5 069 (services), which aligned in a single text the stricter and more 
detailed rules of their respective area. Moreover, Council Directive 93/1370 added a 
remedies Directive to enforce the utilities sector, so that the following picture 
-of the 
current procurement regime emerged. 
There are two sets of Directives, one set for the public sector and another one for 
the utilities sector. ne public sector rules consist of three Directives for the award of 
public works, supplies and services contracts and one remedies Directive. The utilities 
rules consist of two Directives, namely one for the award of contracts in the relevant 
areas and one distinct remedies Directive. 
Ile most recent change to this fi-amework of European procurement law has been 
the amendments to comply with the WTO Agreement on government procurement 
(GPA 1996)71 by means of Council Directive 97/5272 for the Public Sector and 
Council Directive 98/473 for the Utilities Sector. These brought about slight changes in 
the areas of thresholds, time limits and the provision of information to rejected 
tenderers and to the Commission. 
3.3.2. L Puhlic sector directives 
The first set of Regulations, comprising Works, Supply and Services Directives 
66 1990] O. J. 297/1, of 29.10.1990. 
67 [1993] 0.1. L199/1, of 9.8.1993. 
, [1993] O. J. Ll 99/84, of 1993. 
69 [1992] O. J. L209/1, of 1992. 
, [1992] O. J. L76/14, of 1992. 
71 Based on Council Decision 94/800/EC, [1994] O. J. L336/1, of 22 December 1994. 
71 [1997] O. J. L328/1, of 13 October 1997; see: Williams, "Ile Long Awaited Directive (97/52) 
Amending the EC Public Sector Procurement Regime7'(1 998) P. P. L. R p. 25. 
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, )74 
apply to "contracting authorities 
. 
This category of entities encompasses "the 
state, "75 meaning central, regional or local governments, and "bodies governed by 
public law. " The public sector rules define. in some detail the latter concept, which 
encompasses bodies with legal personality whose main fiinding is from other 
regulated bodies, or whose directing personnel are mainly appointed by such bodies, 
or which are subject to control by such bodies. Moreover, "bodies governed by public 
law" have to be established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general 
interest, not having an industrial or commercial character. 
Besides the entities referred to as "contracting authorities, " the Works and 
Services Directives also regulate certain subsidised contracts76 when the element of 
subsidy exceeds 50% of the contract value, even though the purchaser may be a 
private entity. n Finally, limited rules in the Works Directive also apply to private 
sector bodies holding public works concessions. 
Ile Public Sector Directives apply to contracts in writing for consideration, 
which are either public works contracts, public supply contracts or public services 
contracts exceeding 5 million ECU. 78 Works contracts are contracts for carrying out 
works or a work, i. e. activities listed in the Schedule to the Works Directive. A supply 
contract is one for the acquisition of products, even if the purchase is conditional or a 
hire purchase, where the contract value lies above 200.000 ECU. Services contracts 
are concerned with non-construction services worth more than 200.000 ECU, which 
are further sub-divided in priority and non-priority services. Only the former category 
is subject to the full rules under the Directive, whilst the latter are subject only to the 
technical specifications, award notices, and certain obligations on provision of 
73 [1998] O. J. L101/1, of 16 February 1998; see: Williams, "Directive 98/4 Amending the E. C. Utilities 
Procurement Regime" (1998)P. P. LP- p. 95. 74 Cf. Art. I(b) Supplies, Works, Services Directive, for the U. K cf. Works Reg. 3 (1). 75 Cf. Case 31/87, Gebroeders BeenYes v. 77je Kingdom ofthe Netherlands, [1988] E. C. R. 4635. 76 Contracts covered by Class 50, Group 502 of the NACE classification and contracts relating to building work for hospitals, facilities intended for sports, recreation and leisure, school and university 
buildings, and buildings used for administrative purposes; mid services contracts relating to these 
activities. 




The differentiation between the three public sector Directives is expressis verbis 
regulated only for the boundary between supply and services contracts. The contract 
shall be deemed as one or services, if the value of the service element in question 
exceeds that of the products. 'O The legislator refrained from regulating the division 
lines between works/service and works/supply contracts, which renders it necessary to 
deal with those boundaries in greater detail below. 
If a contract falls within the ambit of one of the three Directives, the contracting 
authority has to award it in accordance with one of two standard procedures. These are 
either the open procedure, where any party is permitted to submit a bid for the 
contract, or the restricted procedure, within which only invited parties may submit a 
bid. In exceptional circumstances an authority may use the negotiated procedure 
which does not require formal tendering. There are two versions of this type of 
procedure adopted in the Directives, namely the negotiated procedure with 
advertisement ("competitive negotiated procedure') and the one without 
advertisements. 'Me grounds for deviating from the two standard procedures are 
narrowly construed, " and the burden is placed on the purchaser to show that these 
82 grounds are met. It is noteworthy, furthermore, that each public sector Directive 
contains different grounds of justification for the use of the negotiated procedure. 83 
Once interest has been solicited for the contract he next step is to assess which of 
the responding bidders meet the minimum requirements for the project. In open, 
restricted and negotiated procedure, contracting authorities may examine the 
suitability of suppliers only on the basis of the qualitative criteria established in the 
78 Dischendorfer, "Current nuesholds under the EC Procurement Directives, " (1999) P. P. Lk CS 21. 
19 The categories of services are defined according to the CPC in Annex IA ("Part X' or priority 
services") and Annex IB ('Tart B" or "non-priority services") to Directive 92/50. 
so Article 2 Services Directive, U. K Supply Reg. 2(l). 
Case C-199/85 Commission v. Italy [1987] E. C. P, 1039, para 14 of thejudgment. 
Case C-328/92 Commission v. Spain [1994] E. C. R. 1-1569, para 15 of the judgment; Case C-57/94, 
Commission v. Italy [1995] E. C. R. 1-1249. 
Cf. below chapter 8. 
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Directives. " The common rules on participation contained in the Directives can be 
subdivided into three categories, namely technical, financial and legal or 
"miscellaneous" requirements. Contracting authorities must follow objectively 
determined and homogeneously specified selection requirements for enterprises 
participating in the award of public contracts and are generally not supposed to use 
criteria different from those mentioned in the Directives to exclude bidders from the 
award procedure. 15 
Whilst in the open procedure every tenderer complying with the basic 
qualification criteria is automatically entitled to participate in the award procedure, in 
restricted and negotiated procedure the authority may limit the number of candidates it 
invites to tender or negotiate by means of a "shortlisting ý46 exercise. 
It is controversial which criteria may be employed by the contracting authorities 
when shortlisting bidders. Some authors argue, based on case C-360189 Commission v. 
Italy, 87 that the criteria for shortlisting under the public sector Directives are limited to 
the qualification criteria. Accordingly, tenderers could only be shortlisted by using the 
technical and financial requirements in a relative manner. From the author's point of 
view, this opinion is based on a misinterpretation of the above cited judgment within 
which the ECJ primarily focused on the question of whether the qualification criteria 
expressly mentioned in the Directives could be widened to include criteria based upon 
so-called secondary (environmental, social, etc. ) policies. This view is submitted by 
the Commission in its recent guidance on public contracts. It says "authorities may... 
" Case 76/81 Transporoute v. Minister ofPublic Works [1982] E. C. R. 417. 85 Case C-360/89 Commission v. Italy [1992] E. C. R. 1-340 1. 
There is no precise defiriition contained in the Directives of the terms "selection: ' "qualif icatioW' and 
'shortlisting. " This has caused significant confusion for example in the first edition of the Treasury 
guidance Step-k, 
-Step Guide to PH Procurement Process. ne author adopts the terminology 
suggested by Arrowsmith, Boyle and Treumer: "quafificatioif' refers hereby to the process of 
selecting suitable contractors by applying the basic financial, technical and legal requirements stated 
in the Directives. "Shortlisting" is the selection among qualified firms in order to limiting the number 
of firms participating in the final stages of the procurement process. Treumer, "The Selection of 
Qualified Firms to be Invited to Tender under the E. C. Procurement Directives" (1999) PALA, P. 
147; Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 217; Boyle, 'T-C. Public Procurement Rules 
-A Purchaser 
reflects on the Need for Simplificatioif '(1994) P. P. LR p. 101. 
Case C-360/89 Commission v. Italy [1992] E. C. R. 1-3401. 
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limit the numbers of those invited to tender or negotiate only by taking into 
consideration the candidates with the best qualifications in accordance with the 
selection criteria specified in the contract notice. " 
Other authors submit that shortlisting may include, apart from the relative use of 
selection criteria, the approximation to the award criteria, that is the assessment of 
which firms are likely to create the optimum competition in the later award stages. 
Using shortlisting criteria which are approximated to the award criteria, renders it 
difficult for contracting authorities to satisfy the requirements established by the 
European Court of Justice in the Beentjes case. " The Court emphasised in this case 
that the "examination of the suitability of contractors to carry out the contracts... and 
the awarding of the contract are two different operations... " which are "covered by 
different rules. " 
Although both procedures may be conducted simultaneously, contracting 
authorities should not to fail to distinguish the distinct criteria applicable. Hence, when 
examining tenders, contracting authorities may not allow themselves to be influenced 
by the tenderer's financial capacity or give a tenderer who has failed to satisfy the pre- 
established selection criteria a second chance because they deem its proposal 
advantageous. " Using, as advocated in the literature, an approximation to the award 
criteria in shortlisting bidders, is therefore hardly reconcilable with the findings of the 
Court of Justice. 
Hence, during the shortlisting exercise, the awarding authority can limit the 
number of candidates only by selecting those candidates with the "relatively" best 
qualification9o with respect to the basic qualification criteria specified in the contract 
88 Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beenyes v. The Netherlands, [1988] E. C. R. 4653, paras 15,16 of the 
89 
Judgment. 
European Conunission, Guide to the Commutdry Rules onPublic Works Contracts, para 6.1. 90 It is not entirely clear whether beside the relative use of the ordinary selection criteria even an 
approxixnationto the award criteria ispem-dssible, cf. insofarTremner, op. cit., note 86, p. 151 ff. 
page 60 
notice. 9' In order to ensure genuine competition, the minimum number of shortlisted 
candidates may not remain under three candidates when the competitive negotiated 
procedure is used or five when using the restricted procedure. 
Once the contracting authority has selected the most suitable tenderers in terms of 
qualifications, competence, skills and abilities, the remaining ultimate decision is the 
actual contract award. This decision must be either based on the "lowest price" 
criterion or the contract must be awarded to the bidder offering the "most 
economically most advantageous" tender. The criteria used in the award of the 
contract must be listed in either the contract notice or in the contract documents; 92 
criteria which have not been publicised in this way may not be used in selecting the 
tender. 
3.3.2 2 Mities sector directive 
The second set of European procurement rules deals with the purchases of 
relevant "contracting entities" which are active as "utilities" in the relevant areas of 
water, energy, transport or telecommunications. The Directive includes three groups 
of contracting entities, namely contracting authorities within the meaning of the public 
sector Directives, public undertakings and entities operating on the basis of "special or 
exclusive rights. " Public undertakings are entities over which public authorities may 
exercise directly or indirectly dominant influence, by virtue of ownership, financial 
participation in the entity, or the rules governing it. Conversely, entities are operating 
on the basis of special or exclusive rights when the authorisation confers licences or 
concessions having 'tie effect of reserving for one or more persons the exploitation of 
an activity. "93 
Tle reason for adopting Community rules regulating the purchases of the entities 
in the relevant areas was that utilities were not exercising their massive spending 
91 Where the criteria have not been stated in advance, the authority may not efiminate any candidates 
who have met the basic criteria from the procedure. 92 Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beenyes v. The Netherlands, [1988] E. C. R. 4653, at para 21 of the judgment. 93 UtilitiesReg. 3. 
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power, itself six per cent of the Community's GDP, on the basis of Community-wide 
competition. 94 Beside the particular closed national markets in these areas, the other 
main reason for the lack of EC-wide competition has been attributed to the 'ývarious 
ways in which national authorities can influence the behaviour of these entities, 
including participations in their capital and representations in the entities' 
administrative and managerial supervisory bodies. 705 
There are further significant differences between the public sector and the utilities 
sector rules, 96 inter alia in the areas of thresholds, where supplies and services 
contracts must exceed ECU 400.000 (ECU 600.000 for telecommunications). The 
other major difference is that the three award procedures are equal-footed in the 
Utilities Directive, meaning that contracting entities are free to choose between open, 
97 
restricted and negotiated procedure. Finally, there are numerous further differences 
between both sets of Directives which justify the concluding remark that the rules for 
utilities are in general more flexible in granting more discretion to the purchasing 
entity. 
3.3.23. Remedies directives 
Generally speaking, there are two ways in which the rules on public procurement 
are enforced, namely either by the Commission or by legal action in national courts. 9' 
In the first alternative, the Commission examines the authorities' conduct either 
on its own initiative or following a complaint submitted by an individual, such as an 
aggrieved bidder. 99 These proceedings have the disadvantage that they are launched 
amst the Member State and not the purchasing entity as such. A breach of 
procurement law would constitute, therefore, pursuant to Article 226 EC-Treaty a 
94 Brown, "Extension of the Community Public Procurement Rules to Utilities" (1993) CM. LR. p. 722. 
95 12'h recital of the Utilities Directive. 
96 Arrowsmith, op. cit, note 13 of ch. 3, p. 393. 
97 Article 20 (1) Utilities Directive, Utilities Reg. 13; cf. Brown, op. cit note 94, at p. 73. 
For an overview on remedies in procurement law cf. Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, cIL18; 
Arrowsmith, Remedies For Enforcing the Procurement Rules (1993); Ohler, Rechisschutz bei der 
Vergabe qffentlicher Auftrage in der Europaischen Union (1997); Tyrell/ Bedford, Public 
Procurement in Europe: Enforcement ividRemedies (1997). 
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breach of the Member State's "obligation under the treaty" with no immediate 
enforcement action being applied under Article 228 EC-Treaty. In considering 
additionally that the average length of such a proceeding is around 20 monthsloo and 
that it is not clear whether Article 228 ever requires to set aside concluded contracts, 'O' 
it can be assumed that aggrieved bidders rather do not choose this procedure for 
pursuing their interests. 102 
Hence, the second main way of enforcement before national courts is of particular 
significance for individuals seeking relief in procurement cases. The national fora are 
not necessarily courts in a formally legal sense as Member States are free to confer 
review powers on a body which is not of judicial character. 103 These bodies have to 
enforce the rights of the individuals in question in accordance with two fundamental 
principles, namely effectiveness and non-discrimination. 
The first principle, effectiveness, requires primarily that remedies must be 
effective, meaning above all rapid, to avoid or diminish any substantial economic 
damages to the parties involved. "4 Furthermore, as regards to the principle of non- 
discrimination, "Member States shall ensure that there is no discrimination between 
undertakings claiming injury in the context of a procedure for the award of a contract 
as a result of the distinction made by this Directive between national rules 
implementing Community law and other national rules. "105 In essence, there are three 
specific forms of relief, namely interim measures, set aside and damages. 
Article 2(l)(a) of both Remedies Directives provides that the national review 
body shall be vested with the power to award interim relief to suspend or secure the 
suspension of the award procedure, or the implementation of any decision. Ile 
For a more detailed account on the Article 226 procedure cf. Harding/Swart, Enforcing European 
Community Rules (1996). 
100 In 1997 it was 19.7 months: Proceedings of the Court ofJustice and of the Court ofFirst Instance of 
the European Communities (1997), p. 9. 
, 01 For a more detailed account: ArroWsn-dth, op. cit. note 2 of ch. 1, p. 930 eLseq. 102 Fernandez Martin "Me European Commission's Centralised Enforcement of Public Procurement 
103 
Rules: a Critical View" (1993) P. P. LK p. 40. 
Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult [1997] E. C. I; L 14961. 
104 Article 1 (1) Public Sector Remedies Directive. 
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general aim of interim measures is to rapidly correct the alleged infiingement and thus 
to prevent further damage to the interests concerned. 
Article 2(l)(b) of both Remedies Directives provides that the review body shall 
furthermore have the power to set aside decisions taken unlawfully. The question of 
whether an already concluded contract may be set aside has been expressly left to 
national law. 106 The Member States are free to provide in this situation that the power 
of the review body is limited "to awarding damages to any person harmed by an 
infringement. " The United Kingdom is one of the Member States, which have taken 
the option to bar remedies other than damages. This effectively places the principle of 
legal certainty, meaning, in particular, the long term administrative and economic 
planning of the parties to the contract, 107 above the principle of fair and transparent 
procedures. 
Finally, both remedies Directives provide rules for the award of damages to 
persons injured by infringements 108 but neither specify the principle according to 
which damages are to be awarded nor the method of their calculation. Damages are 
principally awarded for facts which are designated as "tortious" under common law or 
"delictual" under civil law on the basis of the common principle that the plaintiff is to 
be put in the position in which he would have been had the wrongful act not 
occurred. 109 
In pointing out only two of the numerous problems in relation to calculating the 
damages one should mention the question of whether the aggrieved bidder would have 
actually obtained the contract had the wrongful act not occurred. Furthermore, it 
appears rather difficult to specify the bidder's profits, which he could not realise due 
105 Article 1(2) Public Sector Remedies Directive. 
106 Article 2(6) of both Remedies Directives. 
107 Weatherill, "Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules in the United Kingdom, " in: Arrowsmith, 
op. cit., note 98 of ch. 3, p. 283. 
108 Article 2(l Xc) Public Sector Remedies Directive and Article 2(l Xd) Utilities Remedies Directive. 109 Arrowsmith, "Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules: Legal Remedies in the Court of Justice and 
the National Courts, " in: Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 98 of ch. 3, p. 70. 
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to the occurrence of that act. "O 
The Commission recognised in its Green Paper.. that priority in the area of 
remedies should be given to ensure that individual cases can be effectively resolved at 
national level, that is in the domestic courts. In pursuing this aim, the Commission has 
tried in recent years to diminish the remaining deficiencies or at least inconsistencies 
at national level. The inconsistencies between the national systems include that the 
amount of damages granted is sometimes limited to the mere recovery of the tendering 
Cost. 112 
In this context, the Commission promotes in its Communication 113 the 
establishment of independent national supervision authorities in order to monitor 
compliance of contracting entities with the procurement rules. These authorities 
should serve as one-stop contact points for a rapid, informal solution of problems 
encountered in gaining access to public contracts. 114 What is more, supervision 
authorities should make the national remedies system more accessible for foreign 
bidders. 
3.3.3. Fundamental principles of Public Procurement 
In addition to the free movement rules of the E. C. Treaty and the rules of the 
procurement Directives, the European Court of Justice has developed two fundamental 
principles, non-discrimination and transparency, and other less pertinent principles, 
including mutual recognition and proportionality. The principles may impose further 
obligations on contracting authorities and therefore deserve closer scrutiny. 
110 The latter question is of particular significance in complex contracts as under the PFI scheme, where 
III 
many unknown factors may affect the cost of performance. 
112 
European Cominission, op. cit, note 59. 
Brown, "European Commission Green Paper on Procurement: Exploring the Way Forward" (1997) 
P. P. L. R. CS36. 
113 European Commission, Public Procurement in the European Union Cornniission Communication 
COM(98) 143,11 March 1998, para 2.2.3. 114 "pilot Project on Public Procuremenf' concerning the administrative Co-operation on Problem Solution 
-a project involving Denmark-, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom. For more information, purposes and background of the pilot project cf Haagsma, "The European pilot project on remedies in public procurement" (1999) PALX CS25-CS33- 
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3.3.3.1. Equal treatment1non-discrimination 
In 1993, the European Court of Justice held in its Storebaelt decision"' that the 
E. C. Works Directive is based on the principle of equal treatment. This judgment has 
triggered an academic debate as to where the "fundamental principles" find their 
foundation. The outcome of this on the first glance academic debate is whether or not 
it is possible to subject contracts which do not fall within the fiill realm of the E. C. 
Directives to a regulatory regime based on the principles. These are inter alia 
contracts falling completely outside the Directives, since their value lies below the 
respective thresholds, or their coverage is not intended by the legislator, such as 
services concessions. Other contracts relevant to this debate, such as contracts for 
works concessions or for Annex IB services, are only subject to certain minimum 
rules laid down in the Directives ("lightly regulated contracts"). Those contracts have 
the Treaty as their prime legal source, in so far as they do not come within the realm 
of the respective Directive. 
Annotators 116 and two Advocate Generals' 17 have submitted that equal treatment 
and the other fundamental principles were based only on the procurement Directives 
and do not apply in this way under the Treaty. AG Tesauro held that the principle of 
equal treatment lies at the heart of "any set of rules governing procedures for the 
award of public contracts since it is the very essence of such procedures. "' 18 
However, the ECJ supported in Telaustria'19 the viewpoint of the Commission 120 
and other commentators 121 that these principles originate ftorn the non-discrimination 
115 Case C-243/89 Commission v. Denmark "Storebaelt" [1993] E. C. R. 1-3353. 
116 Braun, "A matter of principle(s) 
- 
The treatment of contracts falling outside the scope of the European 
public procurement Directivee' (2000) P. P. L. R p. 39; Arrowsn-dth (ed. ) op. cit., note 24 of chl, para 
7.051. 
117 Case C-243/89 Commission v. Denmark "Storebaelt" [1993] E. C. R. 1-3353, opinion of AG Tesauro, 
118 
para 18; Case C-275/98 Unitron and 3-S [1999] E. C. R. 1-829 1, opinion of AG Alber para 35. 
Ibid. 
119 Cam C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH (unreported) December 7,2000, para 60 of thejudgment. 120 European Commission, op. cit, note 59, p. 13; Us view is maintained in the more recent Draft 
Commission interpretative Communication on Concessions wider Community Law on Public 
Contracts, where the Commission argues the point that the principles are applicable to concession 
contracts. If this is the case, these principles must be viewed as being founded on the E. C. Treaty and 
not on the Directives, since concession contracts are 
- 
with the notable exemptions of works 
concessions 
- 
not at all subject to the regime of the Directives. 
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and free movement provisions to be found in the Treaty. 122 The Court suggested that 
the principles could be viewed as the very essence of the Treaty provisions instituting 
and guaranteeing the proper operation of the Single Market. " 
Apart from the uncertainty where the principle finds its foundation, it is 
furthermore unclear whether positive legal obligations arise from the principle. 
The Court of Justice held that the legal obligations arising from the principle of 
equal treatment include that similar situations are not to be treated differently unless 
Us is justified by objective reasons. 124 This general principle prohibits not only the 
obvious discrimination based on nationality, but also bans forms of discrimination 
which, by applying other criteria of differentiation, lead de facto to the same result. '25 
According to the ECJ, the principle must not be interpreted restrictively. 126 
The European Commission sought in its draft interpretative Communication to 
define the legal obligation arising from the equal treatment principle in some detail 127 
in modelling its regulatory depth closely on the procurement Directives. It argued, 
firstly, that tenderers throughout the Community should know the rules of the 
respective procurement in advance and an equal amount of information should be 
provided to them at the same time. 
All offers to be considered during the selection stages of the award procedure 
should be, secondly, in conformity with the tender specifications in order to guarantee 
an objective comparison between them. Non-compliant bids should be rejected and 
variants may only be considered if this has been expressly stated in the contract 
121 Platzer/Ohlinger, E. U. 
-Konforme Ausschreibung (1997) p. 23. 122 However in Case T-203/96 Embassy Limousines & Services v. European Parliament (unreported) 
para 49,85 of the judgment the Court referred to equal treatment as an "essential principle for the 
123 
application of the [procurement] Directive 
...... It is noteworthy that the Commission has obviously changed its opinion on this question, since it used 
to argue that "the principle of equal treatment [is] underlying the Directive, " cf. in Case C-243/89 
124 
Commission v. Denmark "Storebaelf' [1993] E. C. R 1-3353, at para 74 of the report for the hearing. 
Case 81ong Oberschar [19801 E. C. & 2747, para 16 of the judgment; Case C-243/89 Storebaelt [1993] E. C. PL 1-3353. 
This covers even measures of non-discriminatory nature, for exiunple: the requirement that the firm to 
be awarded the contract should be owned by the Utalian] govemment, cf Case C-3/88 Data 




12' According to the Commission, Member States are precluded from reserving 
public contracts for domestic. companies and from giving preferences to bidders 
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originating from a less developed region or preferences for domestic products 
. 
The Commission maintains in addition that the nature of the initial project must 
not be changed during the award procedure. Finally, the contractor should be chosen 
on an objective basis. The Commission's interpretation of the law is controversial 131 
and the ECJ has not endorsed the view. 
3.3.3.2 Transparency 
The ECJ held that the principle of equal treatment implies "an obligation of 
transparency in order to enable the contracting authority to satisfy itself that the 
principle has been complied with. ""' Transparency aims to ensure undistorted 
Community-wide competitions between suppliers and allows them to monitor 
compliance with the procurement rules. The Court has stated that a non-distorted 
system of competition can only be guaranteed if the various economic players have 
equal chances in transparent procurement procedures. "' It appears questionable 
whether the principle of transparency implies the requirement to publish contracts 
falling outside the ambit of the detailed advertisement rules of the Directives. 
On the one hand, the Commission notes that one key element of transparency is, 
therefore, that all contracts are publicised as early as possible in a medium equally 
accessible to all interested parties. This does not necessarily means, according to the 
Commission, that all public contracts have to be advertised in the Community's 
Official Joumal, 134 but awarding authorities have to ensure that they choose an 
appropriate medium of making their intention public, including a contract notice in the 
129 Case C-243/89 Commission v. Denmark [1993] E. C. P- 1-3353, para 37 of thejudgment. 129 Case C-21/88 Du Pont de Nemours [1990] E. C. R. 889. 
130 Case C-263/85 Commission v. Italy [ 199 1]E. C. R. 1-2457. 131 Anowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24 of ch. 2, para. 7.014; Braun, op. cit., note 116, p. 39. 132 Case C-275/98 Unitron Scandinavia and 3-S [1999] E. C. R. 1-8291, paragraph 31; Case C-324/98 
Telaustria Verlags GmbH, 7 December 2000 (unreported), para 61 of thejudgment. 133 It can be argued that the principle of transparency is in the context of public procurement rather a 
" principle of transparent procedures" 
134 European Commission, op. cit., note 4 of ch. 2, p. 12. 
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national press. The notice should contain the necessary information, including the 
nature and scope of the works or services expected. It should also include the 
objective selection and award criteria to be employed. Once the contract has 
advertised, the Commission considers any material changes to the project's 
specifications as incompatible with the transparency principle. The extent to which 
these procedural rules are elaborated show that the Commission does not only 
interpret the transparency principle, but seeks to impose detailed positive obligations 
on contracting authorities. 135 
On the other hand, the European Court of Justice held that the obligation of 
transparency demanded a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the services market 
to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of procurement procedures to be 
reviewed. 136 Procurement procedures should be formalised and transparent inter alia 
by employing objective selection and award criteria when auctioning the contract. 
Companies must be furnished throughout the process with "precise information 
concerning the conduct of the entire procedure. "137 Finally, bidders should be provided 
with the opportunity to challenge any decision by means of an effective review 
procedure. 
The interpretation of both the Commission and the ECJ in Telaustria have been 
received with criticism. It has been argued that transparency is merely concerned with 
ensuring the fundamental fairness and openness of the award procedure"' and does 
not impose any further obligations on authorities. In the view of Advocate General 
FennellY, the principle does not require the. awarding entity to apply by analogy the 
most relevant provisions of the procurement Directives. 139 
135 Arrowsmith (ed. ) op. cit, note 24 of ch. 2, para 7.015. 136 Case C-324/98, Telaustria Ferlags GmbH, 7 December 2000 (unreported), para 62 of the judgment. 137 Case T-203/96 Embassy Limousines & Services v. European Parliament, (unreported), para 85 of the judgment. 
138 AG Fennelly in Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH, 7 December 2000 (unreported), para 43 of 
the opinion. 
131 For a detailed discussion see: Braun, op. ciL, note 116. 
page 69 
3.3.3.3. Otherpiinciples 
Apart from the main principles underlying procurement law, transparency and 
equal treatment, there are other less pertinent principles including "mutual 
recognition" and "proportionality. " 
According to the Commission, the principle of mutual recognition requires 
contracting authorities to accept the products and services supplied by undertakings 
from other Community countries if the products and services are capable of meeting 
the legitimate requirements of the recipient Member State. " The application of this 
principle to procurement projects implies that technical specifications, diplomas, and 
qualifications have to be accepted when they are recognised as being equivalent to 
those required by the Member State in which the service is to be provided. 
Ile second less pertinent principle, the principle of proportionality, requires that 
any measure taken by the public entity should be both necessary and appropriate in the 
light of the objectives sought. 141 In choosing the measures to be taken, a Member State 
must adopt those, which cause the least possible disruption to the pursuit of an 
affected economic activity. 142 
Applied to the area of public contracts the principle requires, according to the 
Commission, 143 that the definition of performance and technical specification is 
necessary and appropriate in relation to the objective to be reached. The Commission 
concludes that it is not permitted for authorities to lay down excessive and 
disproportionate technical, professional or financial conditions when selecting 
candidates. Mutual recognition and proportionality are recognised as general 
principles of European Law in the wider context of the four freedoms, they have not 
yet been employed by the Court of Justice in a specific procurement context. Although 
140 Case C-340/89 Hassopoulou [1993] 2 ChER 221; for services: Case C-76/90 Dennenteyer [1991] 
141 
E. C. R. 1-4421, para 15 of thejudgment. 
Case T-260/94 Air Inter SA, judgment of the Court of First instance of 19 June 1997. 142 Cf 
. 
for example: Case 122/78 Buitoni [1979] E. C. R. 677, para. 16 of the judgment; Case 66/82 
Fromangais [19831 E. C. P, 395, para 8 of the judgment Case 15/83 Denkavit Nederland [1984] 
E. C. R. 1-2171, para, 25 of the judgment. 
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it is possible to identify certain rules in the Directives suggesting that the concepts of 
mutual recognition and proportionality influenced the Directives, '" those principles 
are clearly underlying the Treaty. Insofar as the Commission maintains that the 
principles of mutual recognition and proportionality directly stem from the Treaty, the 
145 approach outlined in its draft interpretative Communication is not contested. 
3.4. Need for further research 
From the brief outline of PPPs and regulated procurement in Europe one may 
conclude a discrepancy between the two concepts. PPP schemes on the one hand 
attempt to introduce entrepreneurial elements into public purchasing. Public sector 
bodies are supposed to outline business cases, assess complex financial models and, 
above all, negotiate and enforce long term project agreements. 
During the procurement process, the parties want conduct intensive discussions 
on issues such as scoping, financing and delivering the project. The other concept, 
regulated procurement, contains rigid procedural rules governing inter alia the award 
of PPPs in Europe. It allows discussions between authorities and contractors only 
under exceptional circumstances. The regulatory regime is likely to create notable 
difficulties in the context of PPPs if a strict interpretation is applied to its rules and the 
underlying principles, such as transparency. 
The possible discrepancy between the rules and the requirements of the 
commercial reality and the related question of how practitioners sought to reconcile 
both shall be examined in the next chapters. Chapter 4 is concerned with the research 
design and the underlying legal theory of the study. The chapter outlines how the 
study attempts to learn more about the discrepancy between the living law and law in 
the books, its explanations and the forces and institutions sustaining it. 
143 European Conunission, op. ciL, note 10 of ch. 1, pp. 12-13. 
144 Such as the mutual recognition of the respective professional or trade register in Article 21 Supply 
Directive, Article 25 Works Directive, Article 30 Services Directive. 
145 However, it appears noteworthy in this context that the Commission recognises in its Green Paper (at 
para 3.26) the principles of equal treatment, non-discrin-driation, transparency and mutual recognition 
Footnotes continued on the next page. 
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Chapter 5 to 11 shall then highlight seven specific procedural problems in PFI 
procurement. Each of the seven section shall consist of an analytical part, which 
highlights the legal issues at stake, and an empirical part, which summarises the 
empirical findings of the study. Those findings contain the experiences of legal 
practitioners in dealing with the specific procurement law issues. 
Finally, chapter 12 will analyse the PFI procurement practice as it emerged over 
the last years in the U. K. 
as "fundamental Treaty principles, " whilst it singles out in its later March 1998 Conununication (at 
para 2.1.2.4. ) only equal treatment and non-discrimination. 
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Chapter 4 Methodoloqy 
This chapter deals with the methodology to be applied in this research project. 
Section 4.1. maps out the research theory by introducing the perspective taken when 
observing PFI procurement practice. Section 4.2., the second and most substantial part 
of chapter 4, deals with the design of the study and charts out the research process. 
Ile expositions on the research questions in section 4.2.1. and research subjects in 
section 4.2.2. are followed in section 4.2.3. by a brief discussion of the collection and 
analysis of verbal and document-based data. Finally, section 4.2.4. is dedicated to the 
question of how to establish the trustworthiness of the findings and the dependability 
and validity of the data. 
4.1. Research theo 
4.1. L Introduction 
The objective of this study is to analyse the "living" procurement law in the area 
of the Private Finance Initiative, and to measure the extent of divergence firom the 
nonns encapsulated in the "law in books. " 
The main theory underlying this research project is that due to an incompatibility 
between the rigid procurement rules and the structural and commercial necessities of 
PPP projects, lawyers may have developed a legal practice which may be inconsistent 
with the narrow interpretation of the procurement norms as developed by the ECJ and 
the European Commission. The incompatibility of the practical necessities with the 
procurement rules may have resulted in the development of a distinct PFI procurement 
practice and, ultimately, may have created a gap between the "law in the books" as 
envisaged by the European legislator and the "law in action" in PFL in behavioural 
terms, the procurement la%v may have failed to make the impact envisaged on the legal 
practice of contracting authorities delivering PFIs. 
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Accordingly, the main research question of the proje6t is how practitioners have 
applied public procurement law in the PFI context. It is feasible to approach this 
question from three different perspectives. 
On the one hand, one could adopt an outsider perspective and examine the impact 
procurement law has had on the social behaviour of the addressees of legal norms. In 
the specific context of this research project, a behaviouristically-oriented researcher 
taking an outsider perspective would ask questions such as whether procurement law 
has had the impact on the legal practice the legislator intended it to achieve and 
whether procurement law was "functioning. " The overall aim of such a project might 
be to examine the "effectiveness" of procurement law in the specific PFI context. 
Alternatively, the project could focus on an insider perspective by asking how 
participants perceive the law and its role in the legal practice. The insider perspective 
does not examine the question of whether the law is effective or not, but rather seeks 
to analyse the meaning underlying the actions. Finally, there is a third approach, 
seeking to reconcile the two positions and considering the insider and the outsider 
perspective. 
Since the choice of perspective has major repercussions on issues such as the 
specific research questions asked, the factors considered, the methods employed and 
the overall aim of the research, it becomes necessary to discuss the different analytical 
models and their theoretical underpinnings. 
4.1.2 Outsiderperspectiv 
The outsider perspective, which is traditionally associated with legal positivism, 
is premised upon the notion of a unified science, with natural sciences providing the 
model for the social sciences. As Durkheirn explained, this perspective "treats social 
facts as things"' which can be measured and analysed in almost the same manner as 
the natural scientist would measure and analyse substances and processes in laboratory 
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experiments. Taking this view, the aim of social science, and of socio-legal research, 
is to explain social behaviour through the formulation of universally valid causal laws 
of behaviour which allow for reliable predictions. The formulation of causal laws is 
based upon the observation of empirical regularities 
.2 It is inherent to a behavioural 
approach to socio-legal research that law is "always viewed from the outside, iv3 from 
the perspective of an observer of behavioural regularities, rather than that of a 
participant. 
To achieve the self-imposed "objective scientific standard" in socio-legal 
research, the outsider perspective considers only existing patterns of behaviour 
external to the observed social actors and abstains from considering "subjective" 
views and the meaning of the participants. 4 The insider perspective is regarded as 
inferior to the objective data, since only the latter allows for formulating objective and 
universally valid natural laws. Subjective perceptions and meanings of the 
participants, on the other hand, may change. 
The declared goal of this analytical model is to achieve "pure" sociology by 
emulating the "pure" natural science model of observation and measurement, 
deliberately ignoring. human assumptions, assertions or implications, their preferences 
goals and intentions, insulated from subjectivity and meaning. 5 
As the outsider perspective is rather interested to quantify and classify social 
phenomena, this analytical model has the tendency of being associated with 
quantitative rather than qualitative research methods. 
4.1.3. Insider Perspective 
The insider perspective, which is traditionally associated with interpretivism, 
cliallenges the outsider perspective by asserting that social sciences are distinct from 
Durklichn, 77te Rules ofSociologicalMethodand Selected Texts on Sociology and its Methods (1982), 
pp. 60,161-162. 
2 Black, "The Bowidaries of Legal Sociology" (1972) Yale Law Journal, p. 1076. 
I Cotterrell, Law's Community (1995), p. 25. 
, Black, "The Epistemology of Pure Sociology" (1995) Law and Social Inquiry, p. 849. 
5 Black, op. cit., note 2, p. 1092. 
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the natural sciences. Social sciences are concerned with thinking, interpreting, active 
subjects who construct the social world through shared meaning, in contrast to the 
6 insensate objects studied by natural science. 
Building on this recognition, the analytical model stresses the importance of 
interpreting "understanding" of social phenomena in terms of the motivations of social 
actors rather than the mere observation of behavioural patterns or measurement of 
7 
attitudes. Hence, it is one major aim of the insider approach to detect the factors 
influencing the decision-making of social actors, such as rules, doctrines, 
interpretations, reasoning, and arguments. ' 
This is achieved by adopting an "internal, participants' point of view"9 taking into 
account the understanding of the participants and the complex of rules and meaning 
that constitutes the social action observed. Whilst some researchers favouring the 
outsider position acknowledge that it is essential to describe the internal view, 10 the 
insider perspective goes one step fiirther and interprets the behaviour based meaning. " 
They claim that social life is substantially constituted by meaningful social action, 
which is based on ideas and beliefs of the participants. 12 Those ideas and beliefs are 
considered as valuable objects of investigation. 13 
- 
Even detailed quantitative data based on questionnaires cannot bring out the full 
nuance of insider experience and social meaning. 14 Therefore, analysts employing the 
insider perspective are more likely to have recourse to qualitative research methods. 
6 Cotterrell, The Sociololy of Law (1992); Trubek, "Where the action is: Critical Legal Studies and 
Empiricistif'(1984)StatifoidL, aw Review, p. 575; Gordon "New Developments in Legal Theory, " in: 
D. Kairys, The Politics qfLaw. - A Progressive Critique (1990), p. 413. 
7 Cotterrell, op. cit., note 6, p. 11. 
, Weber, in: Roth/Wittich (ed. ) Econonty and Society, (1978), p. 8. 
9 Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986), p. 14. 
Hart, The Concept qfLaw (1994), p. 242. 
Cotterrell, "Why must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Sociologically? " (1998) Journal of Law and 
12 
Society, p. 173. 
Ibid., p. 171. 
This view is endorsed by "Critical Legal Studies" scholars: Trubek, op. cit., note 6, p. 575; Gordon, 
op. cit., note 6, p. 413. 
Murphy/Dingwall, Qualitative Research Methods in Health Technology Assessment, (1998) Health 
Technology Assessment (2), at p. iii. 
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4.1.4. Inte-aratedperspectiv 
The third perspective advocates the integration of external and internal 
perspectives. The integrated perspective combines the interpretation of meaningful 
social actions with the objective observance of behavioural patterns. It is argued that 
since behaviour and meaning are inseparable aspects of human interaction, social 
science must pay attention to both perspectives. 
The integrated approach acknowledges that both insider and outsider perspective 
have their uses, and that most of the paradigms contained within these two approaches 
contribute interesting and informative perspectives on the social world. " Hence, it is 
sought to reconcile the two polar positions, which have been constructed in fierce 
opposition to each other, and to augment the strengths of one view by the strengths of 
the other. 
Whilst the integrated perspective concurs with the insider perspective in its 
criticism of the outsider perspective for ignoring the internal view of the participant 
and reducing human behaviour to its simplest expression, visible behaviour 
'16 it 
recognises the importance of observing behavioural patterns reflected in the activity. 
Tamanaha, for example, observes that meaning can only be discerned by investigating 
behaviour. 17 Nevertheless, ignoring the understanding of the participants helps to 
focus on their actions, allowing to test whether social actors are in fact doing what 
they believe they are doing or claim to be doing. Hence, Tamanaha argues that the 
combination of both views provides a richer picture. The predictive power of 
behavioural research underpins, and enriches, the explanatory power of the insider 
perspective. " 
For this research project it is submitted that the social phenomena observed 
should be examined from every perspective possible. The classic social theorists Max 
Twnanaha, Realistic Socialxgal Theory (1997), p. 58. 
Cotterrell, op. cit., note 6, p. 13. 
Tamanaha, op. cit., note 15, p. 70. 
Tamanaha, op. cit., note 15, p. 68. 
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Weber, Karl Marx, and tmile Durkheim, understood the analysis of social phenomena 
in a broad sense. Max Weber endorsed the viewpoint that social phenomena should be 
looked at from different angles. "On the one hand he recognised explanation in terms 
of causality and statistical correlations... On the other hand there was explanation by 
means of the attempt to understand ("verstehen") the motivations of the actors. "19 This 
approach attempts to overcome the artificial limitations of partial perspectives and 
allows taking a holistic picture of the observed social phenomenon. 
The social phenomenon observed in this study is the "living law" in PH 
procurement, this is "PFI procurement practice 1'20 But what is a legal practice? 
Acknowledging several variations of the notion of a practice, this study is build upon 
the definition suggested by MacIntyre. He defines practice as "any coherent and 
complex form of socially established cooperative human activity which has its own 
standard of excellence. "21 Accordingly, a legal practice is "what lawyers and 
practitioners do, their activities, and the norms and standards they follow in pursuit 
thereof , 22 
MacIntyre's definition shows that practices are of a variable nature as they may 
be small or large, trivial or momentous. Additionally, it is difficult to identify 
precisely what a practice is beyond the broad statement of coherent social behaviour 
based on own standards. Maclntyre seeks to clarify the notion by saying that practices 
firstly must not be confiised with institutions. For example, while practising law can 
be described in terms of a practice, the legal system is a collection of institutions. 23 
He stresses, secondly, that persons are initiated to a practice by accepting its 
normative authority and subjecting own attitudes and preferences to the standards 
19 Weber, Economy and Society, Roth/WitLich (eds. ) Mar Weber 
- 
Economy and Society (1978), p. 4 
etseq.; Wilson, Social 77jeory (1983), p. 1 19. 20 Se below section 412.1. 
2, Machityre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (1994), pp. 187-188. 22 Tamanaha, op. cit., note 15, pp. 167 etseq., 194. 23 Tarnanaha, op. cit., note 15, p. 169. 
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which cuffently define the practice. 24 Ile participants' acceptance of certain standards 
and behavioural patterns does not entail that practices are internally of homogenous 
and uniform nature or that participants fully endorse all aspects of the practice. 25 
Whilst participants will share the basic standards of the practice their attitudes as 
regards risk-taking may still vary. MacIntyre ascertains that those standards are not 
immune to criticism, as the practice could not evolve otherwise. On the other hand, 
persons cannot be initiated into a practice without accepting the authority of the best 
standards realised so far. 26 
The question arises whether the living law in PFI procurement can be brought 
within the realm of MacIntyre's definition of a legal practice. Without going into 
details at Us stage, it is important to note that applying procurement law in PFI 
projects is a human activity for the purposes of MacIntyre's definition. The activity 
has its own normative criteria, such as value for money. Chapters 5 to 11 and chapter 
12 will discuss whether observable actions (outsider perspective) and accepted 
standards (insider perspective) in PFI procurement are sufficiently coherent to refer to 
them as practice for the purposes of MacIntyre's definition. 27 
The main reason why the study hinges on the notion of "legal practice" is that the 
concept encompasses the meaning social actors attach to their behaviour and their 
observable actions 
. 
2' Hence, understanding social activities in terms of practices helps 
to study them internally and externally by adopting an integrated perspective. 29 
Practices are more than the observable behaviour and include the practitioners' views 
and doctrines. It can be concluded with Cotterrell that the concept of living law, or 
legal practice, does not make any sense except by having regard to the subjective 
24 Raz, Practical Reasons and Nonns 0 975), 5.2-5.4, 
25 Raz points out that addressees of a norm may have a practical interest in what is required which leads 
them'U make normative statements from a point of view w1fich they do not necessarily accept as 
valid, " lbid. p. 177. 
26 MacIntyre, op. cit., note 21, p. 190. 
27 See section 12.2. 
21 Cotterrell, op. cit., note 6, p. 35. 
29 Tamanaha, op. cit., note 15, p. 194. 
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meaning which the living law has for participants of the legal area regulated by it. 30 In 
integrating "meaning" and "doing, " practices make therefore ideal objects for studies 
adopting an integrated perspective. 
The following sections introduce the distinct features of each perspective to the 
legal practice. 
4.1.4.1. Outsider perspective 
Applying first an outsider perspective to the legal practice under consideration, 
the research project examines the impact of procurement law on PFI procurement 
practice. 
It is noteworthy that the concept of law underlying the outsider perspective is a 
functional one. Law is viewed as fulfilling certain functions within the society. 
Functionalism is theoretically grounded in the analogy between natural and social 
sciences. Ile principal consideration underlying this functional approach is how each 
part of the societal organism contributes to the survival and maintenance of the 
whole. 31 
This approach is profoundly based on the hypothesis that the law is essentially 
capable of influencing the behaviour of individuals. This hypothesis is one of the most 
contested theories among scholars of law and SoCiety. 32 Furthermore, functionalism 
has been criticised for alleged theoretical shortcomings, such as the over- 
simplification of societal processes. 
Tle many studies conducted exploring the impact of a certain legislative measure 
on parts of the society, are all to a varying extent based on a functional notion when 
examining whether the legislative measure has made an impact on its social context, 
meaning whether it has fulfilled its function. This is especially obvious if the 
legislative measure is of highly technical nature and was enacted to fulfil a specified 
function within the society. 
30 Cotterrell, op. cit., note 6, p. 35. 
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A good example for a technical legislative measure with a confined area of 
application is the European public procurement regime. It has the wider function of 
creating competitive, non-discriminatory public procurement markets in the European 
Union. 33 On a more specific level, the rules enables goods and services to enter freely 
procurement markets of Member States. It is suggested that establishing competitive 
and transparent procedures for contracts above a certain value threshold ensures value 
for money for taxpayers and consumers alike. 34 
Even if one takes a cautious approach as regards to a functional interpretation of 
law, one has to admit that the legislator clearly employs public procurement law as a 
tool to achieve a specific impact. Hence, in the light of the explicit legislators' 
intentions it seems to be justified to adopt a functional approach to procurement law. 
Studying the impact of procurement law on PFI procurement practice was 
identified as one of the key aims of this research 
. 
35 The impact of a norm refers to all 
36 legally relevant behaviour influenced by a norm, including all side effects. The 
concept of impact is therefore not merely concerned with compliance. When we ask, 
what is the impact of any given rule, we mean what behavioural change follows the 
issuance of that rule. 'Me socio-legal literature has extensively discussed possible 
conditions positively influencing the impact of law on the behaviour of its addresses. 37 
This study does not pursue the ambition to point out every possible factor playing 
a role in procurement law making an impact, but to target those conditions which are 
most pertinent. Possibly relevant conditions for procurement law to impact behaviour 
include the absence of competing rules, the proper implementation of European Union 
Directives into national law, the consistent re-evaluation of the norms, a positive cost- 
31 Vago, Law and Society (1995), p. 53 
32 For a summary of the discussion see: Vago, op. cit, note 26, p. 285 etseq. 33 For example: 5h and 14'h preamble to Directive 93/36 "Supply" Directive (OJ [19931 L 199/p. I). 
31 European Commission, Special Sectoral Repoil No. 1: Public Procurement (November 1997), para. 1.1 35 Cotterrell, op. cit., note 6, p. 35, for an overview of the problems involved in conducting impact studies 
see: Vago, op. cit., note 26, pp. 88-94. 
I Friedman, Law and Society (1977), p. 127; Friedman/Macaulay, Law and Behavioral Science (1977), 
p. 193. 
37 With further references: Vago, op. cit., note 26, p. 326 et. seq. 
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benefit analysis and the diligent enforcement of rules. These conditions will be 
discussed in chapter 12. 
Ile study distinguishes the "impact" of rules from their "effectiveness. " While it 
is acknowledged that both concepts may partially overlap, effectiveness only refers to 
net impact. Accordingly, an act is effective if the provoked behaviour meets the 
expectations of the legislator and the behaviour is not offset by countervailing side 
effects. Effectiveness suggests that it is desirable to comply with the law, and that the 
ideal system is one in which all addressees entirely comply with all legal rules and 
orders 
. 
3' This necessarily raises wider questions related to compliance including 
whether compliance with a legal act is suitable to achieve its underlying aims and 
purposes and whether the overall compliance costs are lower than the benefits. If 
certain rules are found ineffective, studies into the effectiveness of the law may 
ultimately result in suggesting how the law should be regulated to be more effective. 
In focussing on the wider impact of procurement law on PFI procurement 
practice, the study will not address the aforementioned questions relating to the 
effectiveness of procurement law. Without going into details at this stage, the main 
goal of the study is not to examine whether practitioners complied with the rules or 
whether compliance was desirable. The study rather attempts to shed light on the 
strategies employed by lawyers when dealing with discrepancies between the legal 
framework and commercial requirements of the legal practice. Exploring the 
effectiveness of procurement law in PFI is therefore unsuitable to answer the study's 
research questions which focus on-the practical application of the law. '9 
It is further suggested that a legal act can have a substantial impact on society, 
even if it is not "effective" or successful. 40 Rules may provoke tactics of disobedience, 
ignorance, and avoidance, which cannot be easily caught by describing a rule as 
effective. As such strategies are not immediately related to the effectiveness. or success 
38 Vago, op. cit., note 26, p. 94. 
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of the rules from the viewpoint of the legislator, the legal impact4' and not just the 
effectiveness of the rules has to be discussed. 
4.1.4.2 Insider perspective 
Exploring the participants' perspective of a legal practice primarily involves 
recovering the subjective meaning that certain practices have for them, their 
interpretations of tasks and conduct, and the arguments they emp loy. 42 It is inherent to 
the insider approach that the meaning participants attach to a certain social action may 
vary quite substantially according to differences in experience, knowledge, and 
practices of the legal actors. This is especially true of the law, where there is no single 
ideal legal point of view, but conflicting viewpoints contributing to a professional 
discourse that is fundamentally argumentative 
. 
4' However, the insights thus gained are 
fundamental to the exploration of the "living law, " meaning the "real-life" law 
interwoven with the rules written in the law books. 44 
This study investigated insider perspectives by interviewing experts working in 
different areas of PFI and asking them how they perceive the role of the European 
procurement rules in PFI procurement. A number of themes were explored. Did they 
perceive any discrepancy between the procurement law and their practical 
requirements? How did they perceive this gap and, if they did, how did they try to 
bridge it? Furthermore, the interviews shed light on practitioners' attempts to come to 
terms with various legal uncertainties of PFI procurement. An important and 
especially sensitive issue is the question of how practitioners assessed the risk of being 
challenged when possibly deviating from a strict interpretation of the rules and 
whether they balanced this risk against the benefits incurred by adopting a more 
pragmatic goal-orientated interpretation. 
39 See below section 4.2.1. 
40 Friedman, op. cit., note 36, p. 127. 
41 It is of note that the study does not consider the econon-dc impact of procurement law, 42 Cotterrell, op. cit., note 6, p. 12. 
43 Ibid., p. 35. 
44 Gurvitch, Sociology ofLaw (1947), p. 121. 
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4.1.5 Status of the observer 
Irrespective of whether one chooses an outsider, an insider or a combined 
perspective, the status of the observer has to be clarified. In adding another 
internal/extemal distinction, it is possible to differentiate participant observers 
(internal) from non-participant observers (external). The distinction between the two 
categories reflects the experience of the researcher in the observed field. The 
participant observer has some practical experience in the field of study, whilst a non- 
participant observer has not participated in the practice observed. 45 
This project involves nOn-participant observations external to the legal practice 
observed. The author has no practical experience in providing contracting authorities 
with legal advice in PFI projects. 
4.2. Research desig 
Having opted for an integrated approach to develop and prove the theory outlined 
in section 4.1., the project firstly looks at the observed legal practice from an external 
view, by exploring behavIOUral patterns. The outsider perspective will be based on 
text-based research and legal analysis of material publicly available or made available 
to the study. The design of the research based on texts and materials is outlined in 
section 4.2.3.1. VAule outsider and insider perspective share the research questions, 
which will be discussed in section 4.2.1., the remainder of the chapter will focus on 
the question of how to gain the perspective of insiders. The researcher is an outsider to 
the practice. Therefore, it has to be further addressed in section 4.2.2. which persons 
and documents could serve as appropriate research subjects and provide the study with 
the necessary insider information. Section 4.2.3. will then address the related question 
of how access to the internal perspective of practitioners can be secured. At a final 
stage of the research process, in section 4.2.4., the trustworthiness of the findings has 
to be established. 
45 Tanuuiaha, op. cit., note 15, p. 175. 
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4.2 1. The definition of the research questions 
The main research question is how practitioners applied public procurement law 
in the PH context. It reflects the theme underlying this study, the possible existence of 
a discrepancy between procurement law in the books and the law in action. The 
divergence may have been caused by an incompatibility between the rules and the 
structural and commercial necessities of PPP projects. 
It is possible to sub-divide the main research question into more specific 
questions targeted to seven procedural problems and uncertainties caused by the 
divergence between the law and commercial requirements. These are pre- and post- 
tender negotiations, the possibility of changing specifications, the classification of 
contracts, the choice of award procedure, the selection of bidders and contract award 
criteria, the treatment of consortia and step-in rights. 
These seven procedural uncertainties and problems will be assessed from an 
outsider and an insider perspective throughout the analytical chapters 5 to 11. They 
47 
were identified by analysing the existing literature46and conversing with lawyers 
. 
One criterion for selecting the specific research questions has been that they 
reflect problems regularly confronted by procurement lawyers. Additionally, the 
selected legal uncertainties shall occur in a wide array of PFI projects to ensure that 
the discussed issues are relevant to as many circumstances as possible. The specific 
relevance of each problem for PH procurement will be discussed in the respective 
analytical chapter. 
Moreover, all seven sets of specific research questions aim at drawing 
conclusions about the strategies the procuring authorities have adopted. The research 
questions shall further explore the risks and uncertainties that most PFI projects have 
in common. Due to the seven legal uncertainties and problems, authorities have no 
alternative but to accept certain risks when deciding on the procedural options. It is 
For references see note 24 of chapter 2. 
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one aim of the study to find out more about the risk assessment in PFI regarding the 
targeted procurement law issues. 
4.2.2 Selectinz the research subiects 
It has to be decided in a next stage to whom the research questions should be 
addressed to gain the insider perspective. As researchers have to render an informed 
decision on the selection of the individual subjects to study, they are usually 
confronted with three questions. Firstly, what is the total population to be observed 
and what is the nature of the interest in this population? The second question to be 
posed is, which particular subjects of the wider population shall be observed? This 
question is pivotal, since social researchers cannot always observe all subjects relevant 
to their theory. Problems of access to such subjects and restrictions of time, money, 
and personnel all limit total observation 
. 
4' The third and final question arising in this 
context is which strategies and procedures to employ to select ("sample") the relevant 
subjects of the wider population and, interrelated with that, whether or not those 
selected subjects will permit generalisation to the wider universe. As it is not sufficient 
to assume that findings for the sample are replicated in the rest of the population, 
researchers have to apply a sampling strategy to be as confident as possible that the 
observed portion ("sample") is representative of the total set of events or objects. Data 
and findings should be qualified accordingly. 
4.221. Thepopulation 
The main object of interest of this research project is PH procurement practice as 
it has developed in the United Kingdom since 1992 and was employed in the 
approximately 700 projects planned, signed and, at least partly, delivered under the 
auspices of the Private Finance Initiative. ' 
47 'Ile lawyers consulted prior to counnencing the study included BothSA#2, PubSA# 3 and PubSA# 11. 
' Denzin, Sociological Methods (1970), p. 100. 
49 II. M. Treasury, op. cit., note I of ch. 2, para. 1.1. 
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In recent years, PFI procurement practice has become increasingly standardised 
under the influence of a variety of guidance notes issued by H. M. Treasury and other 
governmental departments, such as DETR and MOD. 
Besides those governmental guidelines, procurement practice was very much 
influenced by legal practitioners advising authorities. The complexity and novelty of 
PFIs require that contracting authorities, which are the actual addressees of 
procurement law, have recourse to external legal advice. Legal advisors are in the 
position to acquaint authorities with procedural options available and to assess the 
risks attached to each option. 
Authorities have lacked the in-house expertise necessary to assess the legal issues 
involved and, hence, have been largely dependent on the advice of the external experts 
in deciding which procedural avenue to go down. Authorities especially sought 
external legal advice when exploring new pathfinder projects which paved the way for 
further projects in the same area. 
Legal advisors can be perceived as key managers in the process of applying the 
law in the books to real life situations. In other words, they manage the interacting 
process between the living law and the law in the books on behalf of their clients. 
Therefore, for answering the specific research questions, accounts of lawyers who 
advised public sector authorities on PFI projects are especially valuable and more 
knowledgeable, than the information authorities could provide. Lawyers working in 
law firms for central and local government departments are the obvious choice for the 
investigation, since only these experts are capable of providing the study with the in- 
depth information required. Interviewing legal advisors instead of public sector 
authorities necessitates that the lawyers know whether their clients implemented the 
advice given. This question was addressed in the questionnaire and put to the 
interviewees. 50 Though they made it clear that "any client has the discretion not to 
"S See question #I b in Annex H. 
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follow our advice, " advisors to the public sector confirmed that their clients generally 
followed the legal advice on procurement law 
, 
51 "because that is what they are paying 
fo r. , 52 PubSA#6 added that the lower down the awarding body was in the public 
sector hierarchy, the less likely it had latitude to take its own view on procurement 
issues. 
4.222 Sampling strategies 
Sampling strategies select the appropriate research subjects to be studied and 
assess whether those subjects will permit generalisation to other cases of the same 
phenomenon. In designing a suitable sampling method for this research project, one 
has to consider that any probabilistic method is not practicable, since it is not feasible 
to provide every legal practitioner in the PFI area with an equal and known 
opportunity of being chosen for the sample. " This is mainly due to the reason that the 
precise number of legal practitioners with PFI experience is unknown. Furthermore, 
employing a probabilistic sampling method does not seem to be desirable with the 
above developed research questions. Those questions are targeting "experiences" with 
rules and focussing on problems best explored by qualitative analytical methods rather 
than by looking for statistical patterns. 
4.223. Theoretical sampling 
For research prOjects based upon a theory, theoretical sainpling is the most 
suitable selection method. 54 Emerson defines this selection strategy as sampling "... in 
which new observations are selected to pursue analytically relevant distinctions rather 
than to establish the frequency or distribution of phenomena. "" Instead of being 
concerned, as in probability sampling, with typicality and inferences about the 
" For example: BothSA# 1, BothSA#2, PubSA# 1, PubSA#2, PubSA# 3, PubSA#4. 
52 PubSA# 1. 
" For a summary of the discussion whether it is appropriate to use probabilistic methods in qualitative 
54 
research see: Murphy/Dingwall, op-cit., note 14, para 4.1.1.1. 
With further references: Flick, Qualitative Forschung (1999), chapter 7. 55 Emerson, "Observational fieldwork- (198 1) Annual Review qfSocioloýy, p. 351-78. 
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distribution of a characteristic, the researcher aims for theoretical generalisations 56 
beyond the sample. The generalisations are based on the essential linkage between two 
or more characteristics in terms of some systematic explanatory schema. " Hence, it is 
not representativeness that forms the basis for generalisation in qualitative research, 
but rather that the case is held to either exhibit or test some theoretical principle. " 
Researchers use their hypotheses to make predictions and then seek cases that will 
allow them to test the robustness of such predictions under different conditions. 59 
The actual selection of the research subjects, the people, texts or events, to 
include in the research follows a path of discovery in which the sample emerges as a 
sequence of decisions based on the outcomes of earlier stages of the research. 60 In 
seeking such analytical and emphrical generalisations, a range of sampling techniques 
are used, 61 including the study of negative, critical, discrepant and deviant cases to 
62 
explore and extend existing theory 
. 
This is practically done by seeking to test the 
theoretical proposition in a number of different settings, in particular, in such where it 
63 
seems least likely that the theories, which have been developed so far, hold good 
. 
The sample constructed has to be "theoretically meaningful. " That is, it has to 
build in certain characteristics which help to develop and test the theory. This means 
for the selection that the sample is constructed in a way that will help not only to 
ftirffier develop the theory, but also to test its limits significantly and to seek out 
negative instances or contradictory cases in relation to the analytical ideas. 
The actual size of the sample, the number of the subjects sampled and the related 
question of whether the sample is big enough to be statistically representatiVe of a 
total population, are not major concerns when using a theoretical sampling strategy. 
51 flanunersley/ Atkinson, Ethnography 
- 
Principles in Practice (1995), p. 42 et seq. 
57 Glaser/Strauss, "Theoretical Sampling, " in: Denzin, op. cit., note 41, p. 106. 
Silverman, "Telling convincing stories: a plea for cautious positivism in case studies, " in: 
Glassner/Moreno (eds. ), The qualitative-quantitative distinction in social sciences (1989), pp. 57-77. 
,9 Firestone "Alternative Arguments for generalising from data as applied to qualitative research" (1993) 
Educational Researcher, pp. 16-23. 
'0 Lincoln/Guba Naturalistic Inquiry (1985). 
(, I Yin, Case Study Research (1994), p. 44. 
o2 Ibid. 
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Rather, it is important to select research subjects enabling the researcher to make 
meaningful comparisons to the research questions and the emerging theory. Hence, the 
researcher has to sample sufficient cases to test the limits of the theoretical proposition 
in different settings. This means, that the sample size Will not only be relatively small, 
but also that the researcher following the principles of the grounded theory will not 
want, or be able, to specify at the outset exactly how large the sample will be. 64 
"Sampling aimed toward the development of the emerging theory"O does not end until 
66 theory has been adequately grounded and no new data are forthcoming. This 
situation is referred to as "saturation of the theory , 67 
Theoretical sampling encourages researchers to conduct multi-faceted 
investigations, considering a number of different slices of data. That is different 
perspectives of different groups with respect to the social phenomenon observed. 
Glaser and Strauss, who developed the theoretical sampling strategy, argue that the 
variety of data gathered is highly beneficial, suice it yields more information on the 
different categories, and ultimately makes the study more holistic 
. 
6' According to 
them, a theory based on diverse data has taken into consideration more aspects and 
therefore can cope with more diversity in conditions and exceptions to hypotheses. 
To employ a theoretical sampling strategy, the research project has to be based 
upon a theory. Theories attempt to answer "how? " and "why? " research questions and 
provide explanations and predictions of social phenomena. The main theory 
underlying this research project, which was outlined in section 4.1.1., is that due to an 
incompatibility between the rigid procurement rules and the commercial requirements 
of PPP prOjects, lawyers have developed a legal practice which may be inconsistent 
with the law in the books. It is suggested that the incompatibility may have resulted in 
63 HammeTsley/Atk-inson, op. cit., note 56, p. 43. 
64 Denscombe, Ae Good Research Guide (1999), p. 27. 
Glaser/Strauss, "Theoretical Sampling, " in: Denzin, op. cit, note 4 1, p. 105. 
Denzin, op. cit., note 41, p. 102; Strauss, Qualitative Analysisfor Social Scientists (1987), p. 21. 
07 Glaser/Strauss, The Discovery ofgrounded Theory: Strategiesfor Qualitative Research (1967), p. 6. 
68 Ibid. 
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the development of a distinct PH procurement practice and, ultimately, in a gap 
between the "law in the books" and the "law in action. " 
In a second stage, it has to be explained how to test the validity of the theory 
underlying this study. Theoretical sampling aims at the development of an emerging 
theory by selecting research subjects on the basis of their relevance to the research 
questions, the theoretical position and analytical framework, and, most importantly, 
the explanation or account to be developed. 
During the first quarter of 1999, a range of possible interview and co-operation 
partners was contacted to test the viability of the empirical study. These experts were 
chosen both for their experience in dealing with the legal aspects arising in PH 
projects and the already existing contacts 69 with the supervisor of this research project. 
Informal approaches were made to investigate whether lawyers were prepared to 
participate in an empirical study on PFI procurement in any ways. More specifically, 
lawyers were asked about their willingness to share their knowledge and, if possible, 
to provide access to internal case studies and related files in the course of the 
empirical study. 
Whilst the majority of the lawyers approached expressed their interest in the 
research project, others declined to co-operate. The latter group of practitioners 
justified their behaviour with overriding commercial sensitivity of the cases and 
confidentiality obligations vis-A-vis their clients. One lawyer argued that the PFI has 
now reached a state where a sufficient number of deals have been completed rendering 
further research in this area unnecessary 
. 
70 However, as the overall response to the 
request was positive, it appeared viable to conduct an empirical study dealing with PFI 
procurement. 
Requests for interviews were sent to lawyers in August 2000. The potential 
interview partners were chosen on the basis of two main selection criteria, namely 
6' This practice is described as viable in: Hanunersley/Atkinson, op. cit., note 56, p. 38. 
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their experience in PFI procurement and the expected diversity of the information 
provided. 
Firstly, lawyers were approached for reason of their experience in PFI 
procurement as reflected in the position of their firm in the "Legal 500" directory. " 
The directories of 1999 and 2000 recommended law firms and lawyers with PFI 
experience and contained references to delivered projects. It was inferred from the 
reference projects that only lawyers working for one of the law firms listed in the 
directory were capable of providing the study with significant input. Lawyers 
employed by one of the listed firms have experience with PFI which goes beyond 
more than just a few projects and the "wealth of expert practitioners matches deal flow 
with all-around market knowledge and influence. 72 
The second main criterion for selecting interview partners was the diversity of the 
expected information. Theoretical saturation can only be achieved if different 
perspectives of the studied socio-legal phenomenon are considered, thereby ensuring a 
sufficient bandwidth of data 
. 
7' This study sought to test its underlying theory from all 
possible perspectives considering as many diverse experiences as possible. Lawyers 
were selected with the intention of ensuring regional diversity, diversity in the PFI 
projects they have delivered and diversity of their client base. 
Firstly, the study sought to ensure regional diversity. It was deemed important 
that not only lawyers working for national and international law firms were 
approached, but also those working for firms based in the regions. Whilst lawyers 
employed by city firms are more experienced in major projects for central government 
departments In the defence, transport and prison sector, lawyers In regional firms have 
accumulated experience with health projects and local government schemes. 
'0 He probably misunderstood the nature of the project and assurned it would be confined to analysing 
the grey areas. 
The list is available at www. icclaw. com. 
hiternational Centre for Conunercial Law, Legal 500, PKvate Finance Initiative 1999. 
73 See above p. 89. 
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The regional diversity of the approached lawyers thus ensured, secondly, that the 
study took into account experience with smaller local PFI projects, including schools, 
hospitals and local government accommodation. Local government and regional NHS 
Trusts delivering those local or regional projects were often advised by lawyers based 
in the regions. For this reason, the sample of 16 lawyers working for national law 
firms was complemented by eight legal advisors employed by the top regional law 
firms in the Midlands (Birmingham, Manchester, Nottingham), the West (Bristol) and 
the North (Newcastle). 
The third selection criterion was that the lawyers to be included into the sample 
should have a diverse client base between them. It was sought to approach not only 
lawyers who advised public sector authorities, 74 but also legal advisors with 
experience in advising private sector clients, including consortia and project lenders. 
While many of the research questions are concerned with procedural issues which 
have to be decided by authorities and their legal advisors, the inclusion of private 
sector advisors was necessary to gain a more complete picture of the PFI procurement 
practice. 
It is of note that procurement law is not only about public sector obligations, but 
also creates rights for private sector participants in the tendering process. For instance, 
private sector advisors could contribute invaluable information to the study on why 
contractors in the United Kingdom did not use the remedy system. In addition, private 
sector advisors could answer bidder specific questions, including the question of 
whether consortia considered advertising their sub-contracts according to the 
procurement rules. '5 Hence, private sector advisors and lawyers who advised both 
sectors added an additional dimension to the study. 76 
74 Public sector advisor will be referred to as PubSA. The personal pronoun "she" will be attached to 
75 
them irrespective of their real life gender. 
Private sector advisor, which will be referred to as PrivSA, will be described with the personal 
pronoun "he, " irrespective of their real life gender. 
Advisors with private and public sector clients will be referred to as BothSA and will be described 
with the personal pronoun "he, " irrespective of their real life gender. 
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On the basis of the selection criteria, 27 lawyers were approached in August 
2000. The Legal 500 list identified 24 national and regional law firms as especially 
experienced. Considering the selection criteria, requests were sent to 20 of those 24 
lawyers, equalling a coverage of 83.3% of the especially recommended firms. Other 
lawyers approached worked for regional firms or firms with a lower national ranking. 
Despite repeated efforts to establish contacts with all of the lawyers approached, three 
of them chose not to reply to the request for an interview. In total, interviews with 24 
lawyers were conducted throughout late August, September and early October 2000. 
The 24 law firms employing the interviewees represent almost two-thirds" of the 
market for legal advice on PFI as identified by Legal 500. 
After half of the interviews it became apparent that the research had already 
arrived at the point of "ffieoretical saturation. M The incoming data, meaning the 
experiences shared by lawyers, confirmed the analysis rather than adding new 
information. The answers given by practitioners became increasingly repetitive and 
predictable with the exception of minor aspects resulting from the particular 
experience of certain interviewees. It was therefore possible to infer that lawyers 
generally have made the same or very similar experiences when dealing with legal 
issues in PFI procurement. To confirm this impression and to gain the full picture by 
including all available nuances of experience, all practitioners who agreed to be 
interviewed were interviewed. 
For the lack of any more precise terminology, the outlined sampling approach is 
referred to as limited empirical and theoretical generalisability, aiming at drawing 
inferences in comparable social settings of other PFI projects. It is submitted that the 
theoretical sampling method allows for making limited generalisations beyond the 
studied cases on the general practices pursued in other PH projects. If this claim is 
sound, the implication follows that what is said of the setting studied is true of all or 
77 Precisely 63.16%. 
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most of the settings in the aggregate; and the account should be of interest to anyone 
who is interested in the general PFI procurement practice. 
4.2.3. The research strategies emplove 
The research strategies applied to develop and test the theory of the study are 
interviews of experts and text-based research. 
4.2.3.1. Text-based research 
The research was firstly based on the analysis of the documents and case studies 
available. The documents and case studies published in the area under consideration 
were interpreted by employing the usual interpretative methods for legal texts. The 
resulting interpretations built a cornerstone of the analysis which will compare the law 
in the books and the law in action and assessing the impact of procurement law on PF1 
practice from an outsider perspective. 
It emerged in the early stages of the study that it is impossible to gain a 
sufficiently informed insider perspective to PFI procurement practice only by 
employing traditional text-based research strategies. This is due to the limitations 
inherent to these strategies. Though practitioners have written some of the available 
case studies and reports, those documents do neither convey personal experiences in 
applying procurement law nor the meaning practitioners attach to their behaviour. To 
gain insights into the "living law" it was therefore indispensable to have recourse to 
empirical research strategies which allow practitioners to directly contribute their 
views. 
4.23.2 Interviewing experts 
This study sought to gain access to the insider perspective by interviewing 
experts in the PFI procurement area. Interviewing has a long-standing tradition as a 
research tool in social science; it has been referred to as the favourite "digging tool,, 79 
78 Strauss, op. cit., note 55, p. 21. 
79 Benney/flughes, "Of Sociology and the Interview: Editorial Preface" (1957) American Joumal of Sociology, p. 137. 
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and the "main data gathering device"'O of sociologists. The first part of this section 
deals with the basic techniques of this research tool before introducing the "expert 
interview" as a special type of interview, which is pertinent in this study. In 
conclusion, the section considers how to interpret the data gathered by means of 
interviewing experts. 
The question arose whether it was appropriate to use interviews in this research. 
Considering the limitations as regards to time and financial resources, probably a 
trade-off" had to be made between breadth and depth. In practice, the researcher may 
have to decide whether to collect more information that is superficial from a large 
number of respondents ("surveys") or collect more detailed information from a 
smaller number of people ("face-to-face interviews"). 
The information required in this study is not only based on sensitive issues, but 
also on privileged in-depth information. In-depth information concerning personal 
experiences is best explored in face-to-face interviews providing interviewees with 
sufficient scope to elaborate on the issues in their own words. 
On the other hand, to draw conclusions about practices prevalent in a certain area 
of the law, it is pertinent to ensure a sufficiently broad coverage of the area. Hence, 
conducting in-depth interviews with a small number of interviewees is probably not 
capable of ensuring a sufficient breadth. 
As almost two-thirds of the law firms operating in the market for advice on PFI 
project participated in the study by way of one of their employees or partners, it can be 
ascertained that the study has considerable breadth. 
It can be concluded that by conducting in-depth interviews with 24 lawyers it was 
not necessary to make a trade-off between depth and breadth. Conducting face-to-face 
interviews is therefore a suitable way for collectmg in-depth data in this research 
ensuring a sufficiently broad coverage of the area studied. 
80 Denzin, The Research Act (1989), p. 102. 
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Interviews are commonly classified by their degree of structuring and 
standardisation. The literature differentiates between structured or standardised 
interview, semi-structured or non-schedule standardised interview, and unstructured or 
non-standardised interviews. " 
Structured or standardised interviews involve that the wording and order of the 
questions are the same for every respondent. The fact that all questions are identical 
for every respondent provides the researcher with the opportunity to detect variations 
between the answers of the interviewees. 83 
With semi-structured interviews the interviewer has a clear list of issues to be 
raised and questions to be answered. The researcher will be prepared to be flexible in 
terms of the order of the topics and to let the interviewee develop his or her ideas. The 
flexibility in the interview structure allows investigating into the subjective areas of 
the respondent's mind in an attempt to learn more about his or her point of view. 84 
Non-standardised or semi-structured interviews recognise the respondent as an 
individual who may come forward with a unique interpretation of the topic and are 
well suited to understanding the interviewee's perspective. 
Finally, there are unstructured or non-standardised interviews. Here the 
researcher puts even greater emphasis on the respondents thoughts and seeks to be as 
unintrusive as possible. " The technique of unstructured interviews stems from 
psychotherapy and, hence, it is most appropriate for studies seeking to probe the 
respondents' deepest and most subjective feelings and experiences. 86 
In this project, interviews are a means to discover the insider perspective of PFI 
practitioners regarding, amongst other things, the legal difficulties and assessments of 
81 Patton, How to use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation (1987), p. 46. 
82 On interviews see: Bailey, Methods ofSocial Research (1987), ch. 6. 
83 However, this view is based on the assumption that the respondents share a vocabulary and have the 
same meaning for the questions, cf Denzin, op. cit., note 70, p. 104. 
84 Bailey, op. cit., note 72, p. 19 1. 
85 See for example the strategy Becker employed to interview marijuana users, Becker, "Niarijuana Use 
and Social Control" (1955) Social Problems, pp. 3544, reprmted in Rose (ed, ), Human Behavior and 
Social Processes (1962), p. 592. 
86 Bailey, op. cit., note 72, p. 192. 
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risks. This proposition renders it necessary that practitioners can convey their 
professional experiences with the procurement rules by using their own wording and, 
more importantly, their own interpretations. Hence, wholly standardised interviews are 
ruled out. 
On the other hand, in contrast to narrative or biographic interviews, the researcher 
interviewing experts is less interested in the person than in his or her capacity as 
expert in a specific field. " The expert is not considered as an individual case, but as 
representing a group of particular experts. " The individual expert is not of major 
interest, but his or her experiences and interpretations in the PFI area. '9 This 
proposition limits the scope of relevant information to be gained substantially and it 
becomes important to steer the conversation by means of an interview guide to focus 
the discussion on the role of the interviewee as expert. 
Interviewing experts is aimed at analysing and comparmg the knowledge of the 
interviewed experts. The commonalities or differences between the individual expert 
interviews are the touchstones for the validity of the research theory. An unstructured 
interview style is therefore not suitable for the purposes of the study. Having 
previously ruled out standardised interviews, semi-structured interviews can be 
deemed most appropriate for questioning experts. 
Individuals are deemed experts if they bear direct responsibility in implementing 
or controlling the solution of a specific problem or have privileged access to sensitive 
information about decision-making processes. It is important that they hold a position 
which is influential enough to influence the decision-making process. Lawyers who 
have given advice to authorities fall within both categories. They have directly 
influenced the decision-making process of the authority with regards to legal 
procurement aspects and have had in this position the opportunity to gain access to 
87 Flick-, op. cit., note 43, p. 109 et seq. 
88 Meuser/Nagel, "Experünnemnterviews 
- 
vielfach erprobt weiüg bedacht" in: GarzWaüner (eds. ), 
Qualitative-empitische Sozialforschung (199 1), p. 444. 
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privileged information. In addition, requests for interviews were only addressed to 
partners, ensunng the expert status of the interviewees. 90 
Using semi-structured interview, a questionnaire had to be designed to guarantee 
that the saine issues were addressed in each interview. The questionnaire encapsulated 
the research questions by means of a combination of open-ended and closed-ended 
questions. 91 
Before discussing the way in which the questions are ftamed it appears 
worthwhile to recapitulate the specific context within which this research project has 
been conducted. We have seen in this section that the insider perspective into PFI 
procurement practice was gained by means of expert interviews. 
The implications are mainly twofold: firstly interviewing experts means that the 
respondent is generally more experienced in the area under consideration than the 
interviewer. Secondly, the subject matter of the interviews is a highly sensitive one. 
Experts are interviewed to convey sensitive insider information on, amongst other 
things, engaging in a practice which does not always comply with the law. It was 
anticipated that experts will feel responsible towards their clients and will particularly 
seek to upheld the confidential details of deals. 
Viewing both aspects together it became apparent when drafting the 
questionnaire that it may become necessary to motivate experts to give full access to 
their insider perspective. 92 This was sought to be achieved by introducing context into 
questions, 9' briefly surnmansing the practice as it has been discovered analysing 
89 Arbeitskreis Qualitative Sozialforschung, Verfahrung zum Qualitativen Forschen, eine 
Methodenauswahl (1994). 
90 Apart from one senior partner who chose to delegate the interview to a junior colleague, all 
interviewees were senior associates or partners in their firms. 
91 See Annex H. 
92 Gorden, Interviewing: Strategy, techniques and tactics (1975), p. 339 et seq.; Richardson/ 
Dohrewend/ Klem, Interviewing. Itsforms andfunctions (1965), partly reprined in: Hopf/ Weingarten, 
Qualitative Sozialforschung (1979), pp. 205-23 1, at pp. 224 et seq. 93 See for example questions 2a, 2d, 2g, 2k, 3a, 3b, 4d, see Annex 1. 
page 99 
government guidance and publicly available case studies. For example, Question 2a94 
states that 
" The overwhelming number ofPFIprojects 
was delivered by using the negotiated 
procedure; " 
before asking 
"which procedure do you normally 
choose to award PH contracts? " 
Frarmng question 2a in a way to presume that the possibly non-compliant practice 
is widespread put the burden of denial from the mind of the respondents. The 
interviewer signalled to the respondent that the practice he or she has engaged in is 
commonly employed and the interviewer was not surprised that the respondent 
engaged in the practice. 
It has been argued that if the anticipated answer of the respondent happens to be 
in violation of public ideals or norms, then any question which is biased towards the 
anticipated answer will make it more likely that the respondent admits his deviant 
experience. 95 That is particularly true when the interviewer's manner shows that he 
expects the respondent to have had such an experience and that he does not condemn 
him for it. 
What is more, questions containing some context softens possibly "threatening 
question. 396 Stating that other practitioners may not have complied in the 
"overwhelming number of PFI projects" with a literal interpretation of the law places 
the respondent's own decisions in a non-threatening perspective. It was expected that 
IM See Annex L 
" Gorden, op. cit. note 92, p. 360. 
96 Sud=uV Bradburn, Asking question (1986), chapter 3. 
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this would make it easier for lawyers to freely discuss the sensitive issues involved if 
the question was based on the presumption that "everybody does it. ý, 
97 
On the other hand, motivational elements of questions may provide the 
interviewer with the opportunity to unduly bias the question towards certain, possibly 
correct, answers. " The question arises whether any undue influence is likely to occur 
in the specific context of the conducted expert interviews. 
It is submitted that potentially distorting effects of contextual elements are 
nummised where the respondents have accurate information clearly in mind. 99 We 
have seen that respondents were selected on the basis of their knowledge and 
experience in PFI procurement. As in the case of other expert interviews the distorting 
effect of contextualised questions is Minimal as the experts interviewed have a 
practical knowledge of the subject matter which is superior to the knowledge of the 
interviewer. Lawyers in this study were very much aware of their superiority which 
has made them confident to critically assess the presumptions underlying the 
questionnaire in the light of their experience. 
The theoretical consideration that the expert status of respondents minimises any 
potentially distorting effects of context elements have been confirmed during the 
empirical stage of this research prOject. For example, Question Id contains a bold 
statement of a practitioner who said that "the procurement rules are fundamentally 
incompatible with the commercial necessities of PFI procurement. " Asked whether 
they agreed, most of the interviewees rejected this statement as being too general and 
not reflecting their experience. 10' As intended, lawyers used the statement as a starting 
point to develop their perception of the relationship between regulated procurement 
and the commercial requirements of PFIs. 
97 Ibid., p. 75 
98 Black/Champion, Methods and Issues in Social Research (1976), pp. 339 et seq. 99 Gorden, op. cit. note 92, at pp. 224 et seq. 
Inter alia: PubSA#2; PubSA#3-, PubSA#4; PubSA#5; PubSA#9; PrivSA#2; PrivSA#3, see below 
section 12.4.2. 
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Another example against the suggestion that contextual elements have skewed the 
responses was provided by lawyers who have chosen to adopt a more cautious 
approach than the general PH practice in the seven problem areas. 101 In the course of 
the interviews, those lawyers used a number of occasions to reject the approach taken 
by the mainstream PH procurement practice which were intrinsic to the questionnaire. 
They used the underlying presumptions to explain the reasons that lead them to adopt 
their slightly more cautious approach to procurement law. 
In several other instances, practitioners questioned presumptions underlying the 
questionnaire. For example, only two of the practitioners said they had used a 
shortlisting criterion related to the development of PFI industries. 102 Similarly, 
practitioners' 0' rejected the presumption on which question 2d was based that "many 
PH practitioners argue (with the Treasury) that PH projects will regularly come under 
the umbrella of the "overall pricing" derogation... " In doing so, some respondents used 
the context provided by the question to freely develop their more detailed and more 
differentiated responses. 
The examples show that the context elements used in the questionnaire were by 
no means framed in a way containing suggestions for the experts as to the most 
appropriate answer. Conversely, the respondents remained genuinely free to reject 
presumptions on which the questions were based. All practitioners showed that they 
were capable and willing to utter their own views by rejecting some of the provoking 
presumptions put to them and, instead, to reach highly differentiated answers in 
response. 
Summing up the findings it is possible to say that introducing context into 
questions is, considering the specific field and methodological strategy of this 
101 SuchasPubSA#4-, PubSA#3; PubSA#10; PubSA#9. 
102 PiivSA#5; BothSA#4. 
103 BothSA#3; PubSA#2-, PubSA#4; PubSA#7. 
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research, a viable way to gain a maximum of data related to the research questions. 104 
It is submitted that the way in which the questions were framed did not distort the 
responses, mainly because the interviewees were in the position to contradict the 
presumptions underlying the questions and the interviewer did not take control of the 
interview situation. The non-distortion of the findings was furthermore secured by 
asking open-ended questionslo' providing respondents with the opportunity to 
prioritise the procedural problems and develop their experiences. 
For the convenience of the interviewees, the interviews took place in their offices 
and took between 45 and 90 minutes. All but three interviews were recorded by means 
of an audio tape-recorder. The first two interviews with PrivSA# I and PubSA# I were 
not recorded on the assumption that they would refiise the recording. With the 
exception of BothSA#6, who expressly said he preferred not to be recorded, this 
assumption later proved to be unfounded. 
The tape recording of the majority of the interviews was to ensure the accuracy of 
the field notes taken and to provide a more accurate rendition of an interview than any 
other method. '06 The audiotapes were then transcribed into interview reports which 
followed in their structure the seven sets of research questions identified in section 
4.2.1. A classical transcription stricto sensu not only contains the complete verbal 
actions, including intonations, emphasis and accents used in speech, but also the non- 
verbal ones, such as gestures. However, with expert interviews it is unnecessary to 
keep details of the non-verbal communication. Documentation of expert interviews is 
rather concerned with the collection of information and exploration of professional 
judgment conveyed by that person. For this reason, literal transcriptions are the 
exception in the context of expert interviews and it is appropriate to paraphrase the 




reprinted in: Hopf/ Weingarten, op cit. note 92, pp. 171-204, at p. 180. 
For example questions I c, I d, 5c, see Annex 1. 
'06 Yin, op. cit., note 6 1, p. 9 1. 
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conversation. 107 The paraphrase should give a concise account of the insider's 
information, experiences, and interpretations. 'O' The question of which parts of the 
interview are literally transcribed and which are paraphrased was decided in the light 
of the importance of the interviewee's statement for answering the research questions 
and testing and developing the underlying theory. 
The verbal data gathered in the interviews were then interpreted with the purpose 
of detecting commonalities and differences in the experiences of experts. 109 The 
analysis aimed to explore the existence of a shared knowledge, common structures and 
interpretational models that can be found in the aggregate. 110 
The use of an interview guidance ensured that each interview had the same focus 
based on the same theoretical hypothesis. The interviews were conducted in 
accordance with the interview guide, and it was therefore likely that they resulted in 
similar passages, each of which focussed on specific topics. Those passages of the 
interviews were screened for common themes and structures, but also for 
discrepancies and positions diverging from each other. In a third step, common 
behavioural strategies of the practitioners were identified. Eventually, the empirical 
findings were confronted with the theories on which the project is based. This research 
strategy allows assessing whether theory and the empirical findings coincide or not. "' 
4.2.4. Establishinz the trustworthiness of the rindings 
The research has to be designed and conducted in a manner warranting the utmost 
trustworthiness of the fmdings. There is considerable disagreement among qualitative 
researchers regarding the evaluative criteria that may be applied to the research data, 
about which criteria are appropriate and about how research may be assessed in 
relation to such criteria. The traditional categories of internal validity, external 
validity, reliability, and objectivity, which were developed in the context of 
107 Meuser/Nagel, op. cit., note 78, p. 455. 
los Ibid., p. 157. 
'09 Hoffmeyer-Zloüa (ed. ), Analyse verbaler Daten (1991). 
"' Meuser/Nagel, op. cit., note 78, p. 452. 
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quantitative research, are suggested to be inappropriate when dealing with qualitative 
data. ' 12 Nevertlieless, those traditional categories formed the basis for developing three 
criteria for evaluating qualitative research, namely dependability, validity, and 
transferability. 
4.24.1. Dependability 
Dependability is analogous to reliability in quantitative research, meaning that it 
has to be possible to repeat the operations of a study, such as the data collecting 
procedures, without achieving different results. "' The dependability of the research 
depends upon being able to form a judgment of the research process, which led to the 
findings presented, and hence evaluate the evidence upon which claims are based. 
In order to ensure the dependability of the findings, the research processes 
followed must be clear, systematic, well documented, and provide safeguards against 
Was. 114 Confidence in the dependability of the findings, meaning the accuracy of the 
data collected, is increased by using interview guides, recording by mechanical means 
transcribing or paraphrasing the interviews, and the development of a database. 
In this research project, dependability of the findings was sought to be established 
by means of using an interview guide and tape-recording almost every interview. As 
mentioned earlier, initial interviews were not tape-recorded on the assumption, which 
later proved to be unfounded, that interviewees would not agree to be recorded. "' 
Interviews were then either paraphrased or transcribed and the findings entered into a 
research database to facilitate the comparison of the data gathered. 
To evaluate the evidence upon which claims are based it is noteworthy that, 
unless stated otherwise, references given to responses of interviewees represent the 
Ibid., pp. 453467. 
Robson, Real WorldResearch 
-A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researcher (1993), 
pp. 402403. 
113 Yin, op. cit., note 50, p. 41,45. 
114 Robson, op. cit., note 87, pp. 405. 
115 The only exception was BothSA#6 who preferred not to be recorded. 
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experience of the respective practitioner and are not representative of the total number 
of interview responses on the issue. 
4.2.4.2. Validity 
The second criterion in assessing qualitative research, validity has two 
components: credibility and transferability. 
The goal of credibility, or "internal validity, " is to demonstrate that the enquiry 
was carried out in a way which ensures that the causal relationship between two 
phenomena is accurately identified and described. 116 One can ascertain with Yin that 
internal validity poses a major concern only for causal or explanatory studies, where 
an investigator tries to establish a causal link between two events. ' 17 In such a causal 
study, the findings can be held to be internally valid when the researcher can show that 
no third factor interfered with the assumed causal relationship. In descriptive or 
exploratory studies like the present, which are not concerned with making causal 
statements, this logic is not directly applicable. 
The notion of internal validity may prove beneficial in the case of descriptive or 
explanatory studies, however, if it is extended to the overall problem of making 
inferences from such studies. This broad approach to credibility is endorsed by many 
social scientists. '" The researcher has to consider questions such as the following. Are 
the inferences being made correct? Do the conclusions do justice to the complexity of 
the social phenomenon observed? Have the instances been selected on explicit and 
reasonable grounds? Have all rival explanations been considered? Is the evidence 
convergent? Have the findings been triangulated with alternative sources as a way to 
bolster confidence in their validity? Can informants be relied upon? Is there any 
reason to suspect lack of candour? 
116 Flick, op. cit., note 43, p. 243 et. seq. 
117 Yin, op. cit., note 50, p. 43. 
118 Denscombe, op. cit., note 53, p. 213-214-, Yin, op. cit., note 50, p. 43; Denzin, op. cit., note 70, p. 20; 
Hannnersley/Atkms, op. cit., note 45, p. 227 et. seq. 
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Several techniques have been advocated in the literature to enhance the credibility 
of the findings, several of which can be described as triangulation. "9 Triangulation 
refers to the use of evidence from different sources (data triangulation), 120 different 
methods (methodological triangulation) 121 or different investigators (investigator 
triangulation). 122 The term was designed to evoke an analogy with navigation, where 
triangulation involves locating a 'true position" by referring to two or more known 
fixed points. 12' However, extending the analogy to triangulation in social science 
research does not necessarily imply that there is one single objective position of 
reality, which can be determined by the use of multiple methods. 124 
In this research prOject, the two research strategies of interviewing experts and 
document analysis were combined. Although this approach does not encapsulate a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, it nonetheless uses more than one 
research strategy to explore the practice from different methodological angles. 
Adopting a "between-methods" approach helped to ensure that the study gained a 
holistic picture of PFI procurement practice and that all relevant explanations of the 
legal practice were represented. As regards the Insider perspective, the analysis of 
documents, such as case studies and NAO Reports, acted as a way to scrutinise 
whether the procurement practitioners actually did what they claimed to be doing in 
the interviews. 
119 Denzin, op. cit., note 70, ch. 10. 
1211 Ibid., p. 237-239. 
121 Ibid., p. 236-1 Denscombe, op. cit., note 53, p. 93-85; CampbeWiske "Convergent and discriminant 
validation by the multitrait-multimethod matrix" (1959)PswhologicalBuilelin, p. 101. 122 Harnmersley/Atkins, op. cit., note 45, p. 23 1; Flick, op. cit., note 77, p. 249 et. seq. 123 Seale, Qualitative Research (1999), p. 53. 124 There is a controversy between positivists and constructivists on what the purpose is of tnangulation. This controversy centres around the broader question of whether there is a single point of "truth" that 
can be identified by means of triangulation. However, it is not necessary to decide on this scientific 
argument, since triangulation is not used in this project to establish a point of truth, but merely to 
enhance the robustness and comprehensiveness of the findings. For an in-depth discussion of the issues surrounding triangulation see: Blaik-ie, "A critique of the use of triangulation in social research" (1991) Quality and Quantity, pp. 115-136. 
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Text-based analysis is backed up by interpretations of the legal framework in the 
light of PFI; to identify the problems posed for legal practitioners by the procurement 
rules and to answer the research questions concerned with the impact of the rules. 
Denzin explains that data Olangulation involves using different sources of data, 
so that the researcher seeks out instances of a phenomenon in several different 
settings, at different points in time and space. 12' The notion of systematically selecting 
and incorporating different persons and settings is reminiscent of the "theoretical 
sampling" approach' 26 developed by Glaser and Strauss. Tlius, for instance, 
interviewing people in different status positions, people with different points of view 
or people working in different areas is expected to enhance the credibility of the 
findings. 127 
The strategies to achieve data triangulation were the same as those that have been 
outlined above in section 4.2.2.3. on theoretical sampling. This inter alia implied that 
the researcher was committed to cover as many areas of the PFI procurement practice 
as possible and to consider divergent views and experiences. This was sought to be 
achieved by employing a sampling method which ensures that the study reflects 
regional diversity and is based on experience gained with PFI projects in different 
areas, including transport, prisons and schools. 12' Furthermore, the study's sample 
takes into account the perspectives of lawyers acting for the different actors III PFI, 
including public authorities, private consortia and prOject lenders. 
The other criterion to assess the validity of a study is the transferability of the 
findings. Transferability or relevance corresponds to external validity and 
generalisability in conventional quantitative research. "9 This notion refers to 
establishing the domain to which a study's findings can be generalised beyond the 
immediate setting. This requires a ftill specification of the theoretical framework on 
125 Denzin, op. cit., note 70, p. 237 et. seq. 12, Flick, op. cit., note 43, p. 249. 
127 Denzin, op. cit., note 70, p. 237; Hammersley/Atkins, op. cit., note 45, p. 231-232. 128 See above section 4.2.2.3. 
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which the study is based, so that the reader is enabled to see how that research ties into 
a body of theory and existing knowledge on the area. "0 
It is suggested that in order to generalise findings of qualitative research beyond 
the immediate setting studied, data must be tested in a second or third setting, where 
the theory has specified that the same results should occur. This replication logic is 
the same that underlies the use of experiments and allows scientists to generalise from 
one experiment to another. "' 
In this study, the sampling strategy is key to transferability of the findings. As we 
have seen in section 4.2.2.3. it is sought to gencralise the study's findings to its 
underlying theory by means of "theoretical generalisation. " It was explained that 
theoretical saturation was eventually achieved by studying the socio-legal phenomena 
in a variety of different settings and considering all available perspectives. The 
transferability of the findings to other PFIs was further ensured by considering a large 
percentage, namely 63.16%, of the national market for legal advice on PFI as 
identified by Legal 500 directory. 
129 Robson, op. cit., note 87, pp. 404405. 
130 Murphy/Dingwall/et. al., op. cit., note 14, p. 197; Denscombe, op. cit., note 53, p. 214. 131 Yin, op. cit., note 50, p. 44. 
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Chapter 5 Negotiations with bidders 
Chapter 5 is the first of seven chapters dealing with a specific legal uncertainty of 
PFI procurement from an outsider and an insider perspective. 
In the course of procuring a PFI solution, public sector clients may wish to 
negotiate with their prospective private sector contractors on a variety of issues. As it 
was briefly outlined in section 3.3.2.1., negotiations with bidders are only permitted 
when the negotiated procedure is employed. Nevertheless, where authorities use one 
of the two standard procedures, the complexity of PH projects might render 
negotiations necessary. This raises the question of the permissibility of negotiations 
either in the pre-tender (5.1. ) or during the post-tender (5.2. ) stage of the contract. 
5.1. Negotiations with bidders 
- 
the legal problems 
PH solutions are complex procurement tasks due to a variety of reasons. The 
reasons include the elaborate contractual structure of the projects, their long-term 
nature, the plethora of risks to be allocated and, at least in the early days of the 
scheme, the general newness of PFIs. Apparently, these factors give rise to the need 
for consulting prospective bidders on fundamental aspects of the project when 
outlining the business case. Among the aspects are the size and length of the PFI 
contract, the balance between asset provision and service delivery, the scope of risk 
transfer, the ownership of the asset at the end of the contract and the management of 
staff. ' 
As the outline business case should be a realistic assessment of the project's 
viability and scope, ' the awarding authority is interested in gaining as much 
information and reassurance as possible from its prospective contracting partners. 
Issues the authority is interested to learn more about include the general viability of 
the project ("market testing"), the proposed risk analysis, and the design of the 
1 Treasury Taskforce, op., cit., note 8 of ch. 2, p. 13. 2 Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 86 of ch. 2, p. 5. 
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specification (-technical dialogue"). ' 
The following section examines the issues relating to pre-tender negotiations 
including the three types of pre-tender negotiations and the legal requirements under 
which these negotiations might be conducted. 
It is feasible to distinguish three types of pre-tender negotiations in view of their 
different subjects of discussion, namely "market testing" exercises, consultation on the 
Public Sector Comparator and "technical dialogue. " 
5.1.1. Testin-a the market 
Primarily in early PFI schemes, so called "pathfinder projects, " awarding 
authorities undertook market sounding exercises. They approached "key players" in 
the market and other potential participants 4 to ask for their interest in the PFI 
approach. ' This practice ensures from the viewpoint of the authority that firms with a 
potential interest in the procurement know of the proposals before it is advertised in 
the Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC). Market testing provides 
the authority with the confidence that there is sufficient market interest in the PFI and 
it is worthwhile to stage competition. 6 Moreover, after a formal market testing 
procedure the authority is equipped with a more qualified basis to render a conclusive 
judgment of the overall viability of PFI solutions in the respective market and the 
7 scope of the individual project 
. 
What is more, the department acquires thereby 
assistance in drafting the project's output specifications. 
After informal consultations, the private sector can prepare itself for the new 
challenges posed on it by the newly developed scheme. Advisers can be consulted on 
how to prepare for the PFI procurement procedure and possible partners for the 
creation of consortia can be sounded out. Hence, it is feasible to conclude that both 
3 Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 8 of ch. 2, p. 12-13. 
Such as: construction companies, manufacturers, facilities management and service providers, 
bankers, financiers, insurers, legal advisers and other equity participants. 
NAO/DETR, op. cit., note 40 of ch. 2, p. 12. 
Ibid., p. 5. 
H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 43 of ch. 2 (IT 
- 
Practical guide), para 2. 
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participants to this consultation exercise, the public and the private sector regularly 
benefit from market testing. 
Due to these benefits, the Treasury "strongly advocates that the client should 
consider sounding out the possible market place before embarking in the formal 
procurement process. "' This advice does not appear to be solely limited to pathfinder 
projects meaning projects without precedence. Market sounding also appears useful in 
regular PH projects to ensure that the investment solution is sufficiently well defined 
so as to interest potential suppliers. 
Nevertheless, the authority is not able for factual reasons to discuss with all 
prospective participants on their perception of the viability of the scheme. Even if the 
authority provides bidders which were not consulted on the Issue with the information 
gained during the market sounding exercise, companies that were consulted are likely 
to have a competitive edge. Authorities are likely to consult "national champions, " 
meaning well-established national firms, rather than undertakings from other Member 
States. The reasons why it is more likely that national firms are consulted include 
convenience, not existing language problems, possible experience of working 
together9 and lower transaction costs through the mere geographical proximity. It can 
be concluded that firms which have been disregarded in the course of the market 
testing exercise are likely to face disadvantages in the procurement process. Those 
firms are rather foreign than domestic. 
It appears arguable that informal consultations on the viability of a project 
scheme do not provide the prospective participant with a competitive advantage that 
could not be remedied. Other interested parties could be fiirmshed with the 
information obtained during the market sounding exercise. 
As it cannot be ruled out that market testing does not unilaterally favour firms, 
which took part in this exercise, it appears necessary to examine the legal implications 
Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 86 of ch. 2, p. 5. 
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of this practice. 
5.1.2 Consuftations on public sector comparator 
The National Audit Office highly recommends consulting independent 
contractors on the development of the public sector comparator (PSC). 'o This pre- 
tender consultation exercise also includes discussions with prospective suppliers. " A 
PSC is a benchmark against which value for money of a PH project is assessed. " It 
has to be noted that the PSC is not only used for mitially assessing the viability of the 
PFI approach regarding the individual project, but fin-thermore to compare the net 
present value of the preferred private sector bid. " 
The comparator is constructed on the basis that the procurement is undertaken 
through conventional funding and that significant managerial responsibility and 
exposure to risk is retained by the public sector. 14 It should centre on the forecast 
whole life costs of a realistic public sector solution for delivering the same outputs as 
the PFI option throughout the contract period. The PSC should further reflect the 
authority's past experience of traditional procurement, including cost and time 
overruns, variation orders and the true long-term cost of maintaining operational 
standards at the required performance level. " 
If there is no realistic prospect of a publicly funded solution being available 
within a realistic timescale, it is still regarded as good practice to develop and refine a 
realistic public sector solution to provide essential management information during the 
procurement process. 
The comparator should include estimates of the value of the risks to be 
transferred to the private sector. Hence, the authority letting the project agreement is 
especially interested to find out more about the appetite of the private sector to assume 
9 Bohann/Redonnet, op. cit., note 4 of ch. 2, p. 168. 
Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 14 of ch. 2. 
NAO, op. cit., note 86 of ch. 2. 
12 Ibid., para 1.3.1. 
13 Private Finance Panel, Case Study 
- 
Feriyfield House Edinburgh, para 3.7. 14 DETR, op. cit., note 9 of ch. 2, Glossary. 
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certain types of risks. To understand the risks which the prospective contractors are 
willing to assume may turn out as the most valuable outcome of the pre-tender 
consultations, since the risk allocation is one of the most contentious issues in PFI. 
The importance of having a full understanding of the proposed risk allocation 16 as 
early as possible 17 is highlighted by the naive approach initially taken by public sector 
departments. The most notable example was the initial attempt to transfer volume risk 
under the DCMF prisons contract to the private sector. " Therefore, the presumption 
should be that some form of comparator is necessary for PFI projects with the possible 
exception where there has been collected a significant body of evidence from a series 
of previous projects. 19 
Comparators are only required where public money is involved. Hence, a public 
sector comparator is both unnecessary and unhelpful in financially free-standing 
projects, which involve no public money. In those types of projects, it is the private 
sector investor's responsibility to take a view whether the project is suitable for 
investment. 
It should not be lost out of sight that the PSC is inter alia the benchmark against 
which the performance of the contractor is assessed. The involvement of future 
contractors In setting up the point of reference is therefore problematic. From the 
viewpoint of the competitors that have not been consulted for this consultation 
exercise, there is the danger that the consulted undertaking may persuade the authority 
to adopt a ceruun risk allocation. 
The capability to assume risks varies among bidders depending on their financial 
and managerial resources. Hence, this practice may favour certain consortia over 
others. It must be paramount for the authority to ensure that all bidders have equal 
access to the information and that interests from other parties are taken into account. 
15 Ibid., para 4.19. 
16 Morrison/Owen, op. cit., note 71 of ch. 2, p. 15. 17 Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 72 of ch. 2, p. 3. 18 Ibid., p. 18. 
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Nevertheless, as with the market testing exercise, it cannot be ruled out that 
companies which had been consulted on the PSC are treated more favourably than 
those which learned to know about the business opportunity only through the OJEC 
notice. Therefore, it becomes necessary to scrutinise the compatibility of this practice 
with the E. U. procurement regime in more detail below. 
5.1.3. Technical dialovau 
A further pre-tender consultation exercise is the "technical dialogue" between the 
authority and private sector experts regarding the question of how to draw up the 
project specification? This problem is likely to anse due to the complexity of the 
multi-faceted PH contract and the corresponding lack of in-house expertise. Involving 
potential providers in such early stages of the procurement is further undertaken to 
enhance the understanding of the public sector purchaser of the range of available 
options. This is particularly true for large scale IT projects, where the authority may 
21 
not know its needs at the outset of the procurement process 
. 
It is submitted that 
under those circumstances, authorities do not enter into pre-tender negotiations only 
for convenience reasons. The early technical dialogue with experts "pays value for 
money dividends" further down the procurement process, as there is less need to re- 
consider non-compliant bids. 22 
To influence authorities in the process of drafting specifications is probably the 
most powerful tool for private sector contractors to ensure that they win the contract. 
Awarding authority may have an idea of the desired outcome in the more general 
terms, but there is likely to be a range of specific outcomes consistent with the general 
aim 
. 
2' Hence, if a service provider is employed to advise on exercising the authority's 
discretion on possible solutions, it Will seek to favour the solution it can provide. This 
is of particular relevance in IT projects procured under PFI, where government 
19 H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 14 of ch. 2, para 2.3.2. 
20 On project specifications: Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 154 of ch. 2 (Practical Guidance). 21 Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 43 of ch. 2 (IT 
- 
Practical guide), para 3.2. 22 CBI, op. cit., note 98 of ch. 2, p. 22; H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 86 of ch. 2, stage 10. 
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departments are likely to only a broad understanding of their needs. When consulting 
the department on the project specification, IT suppliers have the opportunity to 
encourage the adoption of a technical solution which provides them with a competitive 
advantage over its competitors. The competitive advantage may stem from the fact 
that suppliers own intellectual property rights in the proposed solutions. 
The authority conducts the technical dialogue with experts in the field to receive 
suggestions on possible technical solutions. Hence, it is inevitable that discussions 
with firms influence the later choice of a product or service. 24 Furthermore, the 
participation in pre-tender talks allows to gather more detailed information on the 
needs of the authority than this would be possible on the basis of a "paper 
specification. " Viewed from this point, the consulted provider has a competitive 
advantage over other operators in the market, which took no part in the consultation 
exercise. 
It is arguable that competitors of the consulted undertaking have a genuine 
interest that the authority discusses technical issues before embarking on the formal 
procurement process. This avoids delays and related higher transaction costs for 
preparing bids even on their side. 
As with the market testing exercise and the consultation on the public sector 
comparator, the technical dialogue may give preference to firms that have taken part In 
the pre-tender negotiations. It becomes necessary to consider the legal implications for 
the procurement process in the next section. 
5.1.4. Lezal requirements established bv the procurement rules 
The three types of pre-tender discussions identified appear to give the 
participating private sector firms ample opportunities to influence the choice of the 
public authority. In fact, the latter explicitly has recourse to external sources only for 
the sake of being provided with input on the different issues. The three consultation 
23 Chaves/Dees, "The use of the negotiated procedure in the PFF'(1997) Construction Law, p. 59. 
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exercises generally happen to occur at the same stage of the PFI procurement process, 
namely before the publication of the Contract Notice in the Community's Official 
Journal. " 
The question arises whether the principles derived from the procurement 
Directives provide rules for limiting the authority's discretion to commence pre-tender 
negotiations. The legal requirements imposed on the authority are likely to differ 
according to the chosen award procedure. The negotiated procedure will provide much 
more room for negotiations than the open and the restricted procedures. 
5.1.4.1. Requirements under open and restricted procedure 
Under the public sector Directives and the U. K. public sector Regulations, 
awarding authorities are normally bound to employ either the open or the restricted 
procedure 
. 
2' The rules on both standard procedures are silent on the matter of pre- 
tender negotiations. This implies that only the principles underlying the procurement 
27 im II am Directives can restrict the discussions The a' of th is analys is should be to atU an 
overview about the arguments that can be derived from the procurement principles and 
the Directives on the question of whether it is possible to conduct pre-tender 
negotiations under the open or restricted procedure. 
The European Court of Justice derived from the procurement Directives in its 
jurisprudence two basic principles, namely "equal treatment, " and 'Iransparency. "" 
Another principle underlying the European procurement regime at stake is that of 
genuine competition between bidders in the field of public contracts. The latter is 
included in the preambles as one of the main goals of the procurement Directives. 29 
The principle of competition is ftirther inherent Mi the principles of equal treatment 
24 Arrowsmith, "Discussions in award procedures under the E. C. Procurement Directives" (1999) 
P. P. L. R. p. 68. 
25 Cf. Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 86 of ch. 2, p. 4-5; Neeta, "The Revised Step by Step Guide to the 
PH Procurement Process" (1998)P. P. L. k, CS158. 
The question of whether this general rule is justified or not will be dealt with at greater detail below, 
particularly with having reference to complex procurement tasks such as PFI- 
Arrowsmith, op., cit., note 53, p. 69. 
18 Case C-243/89, Commission v Denmark [19931 E. C. R. 1-3353; Case C-87/94, Commission v Belgium 
119961 E. C. R- 1-2043. 
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and transparency. 
Market sounding exercises consultations on the PSC and technical dialogue may 
be a breach of the general principle of equal treatment under the Directives. 'O The 
principle requires that all firms that are later participating in the procedure should be 
given the equal opportunity when formulating their proposals 
.31 This means as regards 
to pre-tender negotiations that bidders which did not participate in these discussions 
have to be given the same amount of information as those, which were consulted prior 
to the advertisement of the contract. It has been submitted that discussions should be 
conducted in general meetings rather than on a private basis to ensure that interested 
suppliers are treated equally. " It seems feasible to argue against this interpretation that 
the mere provision of the outcome of the pre-tender talks is not capable of remedying 
the competitive disadvantage suffered by non-consulted tenders. For practical reasons, 
it is not possible to consult every possibly interested provider throughout the European 
Community. Therefore, the provision with an equal amount of information should be 
considered as an appropriate means to ensure compliance with the principle of equal 
treatment. 
The provision of equal information is ftirther required by the principle of 
competition. Bidders should be granted a level playing field on which to compete for 
the public contract. Moreover, the slightest appearance of a competitive advantage of 
the consulted firms, would render genuine competition impossible, since other 
competitors would presumably refuse to prepare or sustain a costly bid for a PFI 
prOject on this ground. 
The principle of transparency requires that non-consulted bidders should be 
provided with the outcomes of pre-tender discussions. If one places a strong emphasis 
on transparency, it is arguable, that the mere provision of the outcome of the 
29 For example: 10 recital of the preamble of the Supply Directive 93/36. 30 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 616. 
31 Case 87/94 Commission v. Belgium [1996] E. C. R. 1-2043, para, 54 of the judgment. 
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discussion rounds is not sufficient to warrant transparent procedures. It has to be 
considered that bidders, which were not consulted prior to the contract advertisement, 
are only put at a relatively slight competitive disadvantage. If one would require the 
authority to conduct pre-tender negotiations with all interested parties, the authority 
had to negotiate possibly with a large numbers of companies. Such a practice would 
require significant time and financial expenses which are disproportionate in relation 
to its benefits. 
Even if authorities take the fundamental principles into account, there remains a 
great deal of uncertainty whether the procurement Directives require that open and 
restricted procedures should be conducted entirely as a "paper" procedure. This 
includes the question of whether discussions should be generally outlawed. The 
existing procurement Directives do not expressly regulate pre-tender negotiations. 
One reason for casting doubts on the permissibility of pre-tender negotiations is a 
statement of the Council and the Commission concerning Article 7(4) of Council 
Directive 93/37 33 which asserted that "M open and restricted procedure all negotiations 
with candidates or tenders on fundamental aspects of contracts... shall be ruled out. " 
This statement is not legally binding. It may be employed though as a teleological 
argument to ascertain that it was the intention of the legislator to prevent entities from 
entering into discussion with bidders. Pre-tender negotiations address fundamental 
aspects of the contract, such as risk allocation and the contract's general viability. 
Consequently, one can assume from the statement that the Commission will generally 
deny using pre-tender consultations with prospective bidders. 
It should not be lost out of sight that regulating public procurement in a 
supranational context is not a means to an end. It should rather seek to provide a 
framework for improved industrial efficiency and competitiveness of European firms 
Treurner, "Technical Dialogue Prior to Submission of Tenders and the Pnnciple of Equal Treatment 
of Tenderers" (1999) P. P. L. P, p. 147. 
33 June 14,1993, OJ [ 19941 LI 11, at 114. 
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in global marketS34 and reduced public sector purchasing costs by means of efficient 
purchasing practices. " It is submitted that pre-tender negotiations are not only 
conducted for convenience reasons. Authorities have justifiable economic 
considerations for conducting pre-tender negotiations which have to be brought in 
balance with the legal constraints imposed by the Directives. Consulting prospective 
tenderers on fundamental issues can realise economic benefits for the public and the 
private sector by significantly reducing the transactions CoStS. 36 
Another strong argument in favour of consulting prospective suppliers in advance 
can be deduced ftom the recital of Directives 98/04 and 97/52.37 Both Directives were 
recently" adopted by the Council to align the European Procurement Directives with 
39 the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). The tenth recital of the 
preamble to Directive 97/52 and the thirteenth recital to the preamble to Directive 
98/04 state that 
"contracting authorities may seek or accept advice which 
may be used in the preparation of specifications for a 
specific procurement, provided that such advice does not 
have the effect ofprecluding competition. " 
Unfortunately the European legislator did not specify what kind of advice 
amounted to "precluding competition, " although this term is defined by Article VI (4) 
of the GPA. 40 The GPA itself provides that 
"entities shall not seek or accept, in manner which would 
34 European Conmussion, op. cit., note 10 of ch. 1, para 1.13. 35 European Commission, op. cit., note 91, p. 3. 
36 NAO, op. cit., note 86 of ch. 2. 37 Council Directive 98/04, [1998] O. J. L101/1 of 16 February 1998-, Council Directive 97/52, [1997] 
O. J. L328/1 of 13 October 1997. 
38 It has to be noted that the Directives 97/52 and 98/04 came into effect only on October 13,1997 and 
39 
thus was not available as legal source for earlier PFI projects. 
Initially, the Commission proposed to amend the Directives by including the exact wording of the 
GPA in its four contract Directives. However, this proposal, which was contained in COM (95) 107 
final, was subsequently dropped during the legislative process. The reason for this could be, that it 
was assumed that the rule expressed in the GPA Article IV is already part of the principles derived 
from the E. C. 
-Treaty by the Court of Justice. 40 Agreement on Government Procurement reached in the Uruguay Round, signed on April 15,1994. 
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have the effect ofprecluding competition, advice which may 
be used in the preparation of a specific procurementfrom a 
firm that may have a commercial interest in the 
procurement. " 
Even though the rule contained in the GPA is more elaborate than the recitals of 
the both European Directives, it still appears difficult to judge when this important 
principle will be liable to be breached. " Furthermore, the recitals of the Directives do 
not have the legislative character of a Directive's article. The Commission pronounced 
that it would consider the "absence of call for tender or the use of discriminatory 
specifications... as a prima facie infringement. "4' It can be assumed that this pnma 
facie evidence is held to be sufficient even if an authority lets a contract which does 
not fall within the realm of the GPA but within the realm of the European procurement 
regime. 
Discriminatory specifications reduce the number of possible providers and 
products to the detriment of others and thereby preclude competition. For example, if 
a provider consulted the contracting authority in pre-tender discussions and the 
specifications are later drawn up so as to substantially favour its products, it can be 
assumed that the specifications discriminate against other providers. In addition, cases 
in which competition is de facto precluded will invariably infringe the rules on 
specifications or the advertising rules contained in the Directives. In cases where the 
consultation of prospective providers purely limits competition, for instance to a 
cerUun type of material to be used for building a road, competition cannot be regarded 
as precluded. "nese discussions must, therefore, be viewed as reconcilable with the 
Directives. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen in both cases how the Commission will 
assess the particular facts. 
41 Wilharns, "The European Cornnussion's Conununication on pubhe-private partnerslups in Trans- 
42 
European transport network projects" (1998) P. P. L. R. CS 97. 
European Cornnussion, Communication from the Commission on Public-Private Partnerships in 
Trans-European Network Projects, COM (97)453 final, p. 3. 
page 121 
A way to ensure that the competition requirement is not precluded within the 
meaning of the recitals newly introduced to the Directives, is to observe the 
advertising rules contained in the Directives. Those rules furnish public sector 
authorities with explicit provisions to provide national suppliers with information prior 
to the advertisement either by means of a "Periodic Information Notice" (PIN) or a 
"Contract Notice. " They further spell out that the contract ought not to be published in 
the national press prior to its dispatch to the Community's Official Journal. The notice 
in a national gazette may not contain more information than the O. J. notice. 43 
In the context of pre-tender negotiations, it is possible to deduce two aspects from 
the advertisement rules of the procurement Directives. Firstly, as a matter of time, the 
advertisement of a procurement should not be published in national gazettes prior to 
the publication in the OJEC. Secondly, as a matter of quality, the information for 
national suppliers may not contain more details than the OJEC notice. If it can be 
implied from the Directives that certain, most notably national, suppliers should not be 
treated more favourably regarding the timing of the information and its quality. It 
therefore seems doubtful whether the authority is allowed under both the standard 
procedures to approach certain providers before the PIN notice has been dispatched. 44 
This would entail that the consulted providers know the procurement opportunity prior 
to their competitors. They are also likely to attain "insider" information which is not 
susceptible from the formal advertisement or the contract documents. 
It could be argued that the practice to inform providers about the contract seems 
acceptable, if this is done after the advertisement is placed and no additional 
information is provided 
. 
4' This strict interpretation of the rules on advertisements has 
the advantage to coincide with Article VI(4) GPA. According to this provision, 
competition should not be precluded by accepting advice in the preparation of 
43 Article 9(9) Supply Directive, I 1(11) Works Directive; 17(6) Services Directive; 25(5) Utilities 
Directive. 
Cf. Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 195-196. 
45 Ibid., p. 206. 
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specifications for a specific procurement from anyone that may have a commercial 
interest in the procurement. 
Even if the contracting authority place a PIN notice in the Official Journal it 
remains questionable how it should choose whom to consult from amongst those 
responding to the PIN. As this situation is not expressly regulated in the Directives, 
the equal treatment principle has to be applied again. 'I'lle principle requires that 
comparable situations are treated equally unless this is justified by objective reasons 
. 
46 
Hence, where a contracting authority receives only a small number of responses to its 
PIN, all interested bidders have to be invited for consultations. In the more likely 
event that a considerable number of bidders respond, it is justifiable by commercial 
reasons, such as disproportionate transaction costs involved, that the contracting 
authority consults with some respondents only. 47 
In the light of the existing uncertainties, authorities which conduct pre-tender 
consultations under the two standard procedures, should ensure the placement of a 
PIN notice so as to meet the minimum transparency and equal treatment criteria. 
Procuring authorities are not allowed to embark on pre-tender negotiations unless they 
have dispatched a PIN in the Community's Official Journal and thereby formally 
requested advice ftom firms interested in the project. In the meantime, this practice 
has become the official policy suggested in Treasury guidance noteS4' and appears to 
be the accepted practice of public purchasers. 49 Besides advertising the PIN, 
authorities should provide bidders, which were not consulted, with the information 
obtained during the consultation exercise. 
46 Case gi ong "erschar [ 19801 E. C. R. 2747, para 16 of the judgment-, Case C-243/89 Commission v. 
Denmark [19931 E. C. R. 1-3353. 
47 It is not possible to provide a number of respondents justifying the consultation of only certain 
providers. This is dependent on the size of the project and the costs of conducting such a pre-tender 
consultation process in the given case. 
48 Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 9 of ch. 2, page 5. 
1 For example OJ notice 099/1999 of Portsmouth City Council, dispatched on May 12,1999, where the 
council expressly is looking to ascertain scope, size and nature of the services to be provided under the 
pilot project. 
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5.1.4.2 Requirements under negotiated procedure 
To avoid the uncertainties in the open and restricted procedure referred to above, 
the authority may employ the negotiated procedure. Recall that the Commission 50 and 
the Court of Justice" understand the negotiated procedure as exceptional. Therefore, 
purchasing authorities have to prove that the circumstances of the case satisfy the 
requirements of a derogation laid down in a public sector Directive. 5' In cases where 
the authority is capable of satisfying the requirements, the negotiated procedure 
permits pre-tender negotiations with tenderers. This goes even if the authority has 
already embarked on the award procedure. " 
Under the Services Directive 54 the authority may employ the competitive 
negotiated procedure if it is not capable of drawing up specifications with sufficient 
precision. As it has to be examined below in greater detail, " mere difficulties in 
drawing up the project specification are not sufficient to satisfy the strict requirements 
developed by the Court of Justice. 
As we have seen for the open and restricted procedure, the uncertainty in the 
context of pre-tender negotiations is primarily related to the question of how to satisfy 
the requirements of transparency and equal treatment rather than to the question of 
applying the rules contained in the Directives. 56 Insofar as the principles are applicable 
to both standard procedures, the situation coincides with that under the competitive 
negotiated procedure. Authorities which employ the negotiated procedure are not 
required to draw up specifications, since a tender phase is not required. If awarding 
authorities decide to draw up specifications, they should publish a PIN before 
conducting pre-tender negotiations. This is to satisfy the requirements arising from the 
50 For example: European Commission, op. cit., note 59 of ch. 3, para 3.15. 51 Case 199/85 Commission v. Italy 119871 E. C. R. 1039, para 14 of the judgment; Case 328/92 
Commission v Spain [1994] E. C. R. 1-1569; Case 57/94 Commission v Italy, judgment of May 18, 
1995 (unreported). 
52 Utilities have the free choice between open, restricted and negotiated procedure. 53 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 24 of ch. 5, p. 69. 
54 Article 11(2 Xc) Services Directive. 
Krager, "The Scope for Post-Tender Negotiations in International Tendering Procedures" in: 
Arrowsmith/Davies op. cit., note 64 of ch. 5, p. 184. 
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principles of transparency and equal treatment. 
5. Z Post-tender negotiations 
It is inherent to the PFI approach that the public sector harvests as many ideas 
and experiences as possible from the private sector on how to deliver tile public 
service in a more economically viable way. Hence, one favourable precondition for a 
successftil PFI project is the scope for imiovation in design which enables the service 
provider to design away risks and bring new ideas to the way the service is provided. 17 
Considering the ongoing Input stream from prospective contractors, negotiations with 
prospective suppliers may occur after it has been established who is interested in the 
particular contract. 
The use of post-tender consultations is unproblematic where the competitive 
negotiated procedure is employed. Even in the negotiated procedure it ought to be 
paramount for the authority to ensure that the prospective providers are treated 
equally. This includes that bidders must be given equal opportunity to negotiate issues 
with the authority. Further, every tenderer should be given the opportunity to amend 
their tenders when this is made necessary by the outcome of the negotiations. Thereby, 
an objective comparison of the bids submitted shall be ensured. " 
Conversely, when one of the two standard procedures is used it is doubtful 
whether contracting authorities are permitted to embark on post-tender negotiations 
with those bidders who respond or those which it has shortlisted. '9 
5.2.1. Possibilitv of conductink post-tender negotiations 
As in the case of pre-tender negotiations, the Directives are silent in respect of the 
question of whether it is permissible to conduct post-tender negotiations. 
5.2 L 1. Systematic argument 
It has been mentioned in the introductory chapter on the European procurement 
5' Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 24 of ch. 5, p. 69. 57 H. M. Treaswy, op. cit., note 8 of ch. 2, p. 14. 58 Cf. Case C-243/89 Commission v. Denmark [19931 E. C. R. 1-3353, para 37 of thejudgment. 59 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 24 of ch. 5, p. 
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rules that awarding authorities are vested with the free choice between open and 
restricted procedure. To employ the negotiated procedure is only permissible where 
certain narrowly construed derogations are satisfied. To allow post-tender negotiations 
in open and restricted procedure would imply that those standard procedures became 
quasi-negotiated procedures by blurring the line between them. 60 This line is distinctly 
drawn in the Directives. 
From a systematic point of view, one can perceive an apparent difference 
between the three procedures as regards transparency and competition. The open 
procedure requires that any contractor with an interest is automatically entitled to 
tender in response to the notice. When they employ the restricted procedure, 
authorities are permitted to perform a less transparent screening of prospective 
tenderers and their bids before inviting them to tender. The additional selection 
process decreases the degree of competition and transparency. The third and last stage 
of the anticlimax is the negotiated procedure where the authority selects potential 
contractors with whom to negotiate, and awards the contract to one of these firms 
without necessarily following a formal tendering procedure. Due to the freedom to 
conduct negotiations, this procedure is less transparent than the two standard 
procedures. It is therefore inextricably linked to the satisfaction of certain 
requirements. 
The existence of three distinctive award procedureS6' and their different degrees 
of competition and transparency reveal that from a systematic viewpoint negotiations 
should only be used in the exceptional circumstances provided for in the Directives. 62 
5.21.2 Teleological argument 
Having regard to the telos of the procurement rules, it is advocated that they aim 
at promoting transparent and non-discriminatory procurement policies in Europe. The 
Similarly: Arrowsnuth, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 247, 
Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 249. 
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Council aims to achieve these principles by designing the negotiated procedure as an 
exceptional procedure to the two standard tender procedures. In particular, the 
principle of transparency is paramount to the understanding of the European 
63 
procurement rules. It primarily aims to combat preferential treatment of national 
firms and discriminatory procurement practices within the European Union. From this 
conception it can be assumed that the decision-making process should only be based 
on the submitted tender bids alone. The final bid should be in the form of a final "take 
it or leave it" irrevocable tender. 64 It should not form the basis for further negotiations 
on quantities to be delivered, unit pricing, contract conditions and other substantial 
aspects. 
In respect to conducting post-tender negotiations in one of the two standard 
procedures, the European legislator clearly favours a strict understanding of the 
transparency and equal treatment principles. 
The Council, seized a number of opportunities in recent years to emphasise "that 
in open and restricted procedures all negotiation with candidates 
... 
on fundamental 
aspects of contracts, variations in which are likely to distort competition, and in 
particular on prices, shall be ruled oUt....,, 6' Albeit the fact that these statements are 
not legally binding, they can and have been referred to as guidance in interpreting the 
regulatory aims and purposes of the legislator. 660n the grounds of the guidance notes 
it can be assumed that the legislator considers open and restricted procedure as the 
standard procedures, which do not allow for negotiations on substantial aspects during 
62 Cf. Council, "Statement concerning Article 7(4) of Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 
concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts" [19941 O. J. L 
111/114. 
63 What has been subject to consistent criticism in the literature, cf. on the delicate balance of the 
procurement prmciples "transparency" and "value for money" see: Arrowsmith/Linarelli/Wallace, 
64 
Regulating Public Procurement (2000), p. 73 ff. 
Krager, "The Scope for Post-Tender Negotiations in International Tendenng Procedures" in 
Arrowsmithffiavies Public Procurement: Global Revolution (1998), chapter 10 atp. 184. 
65 European Conmussion and Council: Statement concenung Article 5 (4) of Directive 71/305/EEC, 
[19891 OJ L 210/22; Statement concerning Article 15 of Directive 90/531/EEC, [19901 O. J. L 297/48; 
Statement concenung Article 7 (4) of Council Directive 93/37/EEC, [19941 O. J. L 111/114. 
61 Advocate General Tesauro in Case C-243/89 Commission v. Denmark [19931 E. C. R. 1-3353, Para 19 
of the Opuuon. 
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the award process in contrast to the exceptional negotiated procedure. This 
interpretation is underpinned by the consistent jurisprudence of the Court regarding 
the exceptionality of negotiated procedure 67 from which it can be inferred that 
negotiations 68 per se are thought to be an exception. 
It is submitted in the literature that these statements are ambiguous and do not 
69 
entirely rule out negotiations 
. 
Authors argue that if the equality principle is observed 
and all firms that have not yet been excluded from the procedure are given the same 
opportunity to adjust their submitted bids, post-tender negotiations are at least not 
outlawed. Following this line of argumentation would mean that it is not required to 
conduct open and the restricted procedure as inconvenient "paper procedures. " 
5.22 Scope of Post-tender neeotiations 
The systematic and teleological interpretation of the procedural rules and the 
principles underlying the Directives have shown that the legal situation regarding 
post-tender negotiations is one of uncertainty. If one adopts the view that post-tender 
negotiations are legitimate under certain conditions, it has to be asked In a next step, 
what issues might be made subject to discussions without infringing the existing 
procedural rules and, in particular, the underlying principles. 
Negotiations on substantial aspects of the contract, which have a distorting effect 
on competition are not permitted under the two standard procedures 
. 
70 This means in 
the Commission's wording that discussion may only be held with candidates "for the 
purpose of clarifying or supplementing the content of their tenders or the requirements 
of the contracting entities, and provided this does not involve discrimination. 9M 
Nevertheless, the Council and the Commission avoid defining precisely what is 
67 Case 199/85 Commission v Italy [19871 E. C. R. 1039, at para 14; Case 328/92 Commission v Spain [19941 E. C. R. 1-1569; Case 57/94 Commission v Italy judgment of May 18,1995 (unreported); Case 
24/91 Commission v. Spain [19921 E. C. R. 1-1989. 
At least in the form of the non-competitive type of the negotiated procedure. 69 For example: Krilger, "The Scope for Post-Tender Negotiations in International Tendenng 
Procedures" in Arrowsmith/Davies, op. cit., note 64, chapter 10. 
7' ArTowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 249; in greater detail regarding the subjects of pernussible 
discussions: Arrowsnuth, op. cit., note 53, p. 69-70. 
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meant by "substantiality. " This lack of precision creates another regulatory lacuna 
regarding the actual scope of permitted negotiations. The Council and the Commission 
specify in their statement72 that the purchaser may not be permitted to enter into 
negotiations on aspects of the bid relevant to its evaluation, in particular, its price. One 
can ascertain that tenderers should be allowed to amend their bids if this results in 
making it less competitive. 73 
Where inconsistencies occur in the bid, such as calculation errors, it has to be 
asked 
'74 whether the clerical error was obvious to the authority on the 
face of the bid. 
Hence, if the authority is able to ascertain the exact nature and cause of the calculation 
error, the bidder should be provided with the opportunity to rectify its mistake. In Adia 
Interim, " the ECJ held that a contracting authority is not under a duty to allow 
rectification of a "not particular obvious systematical calculation error. " This means, 
conversely, that the Directives do not confer a right to the tenderer to amend its bid. In 
this case, the Court considered the principle of equal treatment as being impaired, if 
the contractor is granted the opportunity to adjust other factors, such as the profit 
margin, whilst rectifying the error. 76 It can be assumed from this judgment that there is 
a "ban on substantial amendments" in open and restricted procedure. 
The decisive question would be whether the bidder could seize the opportunity of 
correcting the unsubstantial error for adjusting more substantial parts of the bid after 
submission. In the later 'Valloon Buses" case, 77 the Court of Justice failed to seize the 
opportunity to render an obiter dictum on whether the procuring entity could allow all 
bidders to revise their offers. The Court held that the principle of equal treatment was 
breached if only one bidder was given the opportunity to substantially amend its bid 
71 Council/ European Conumssion, Statement concerning Article 7 (4) of Council Directive 9313 71EEC, 
[19941 Official Journal L 111/114. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 248-249. 
74 Case T-1 9/95 Adia Interim S. A. v. European Communities [19961 E. C. R. 11-32 1. 
75 Ibid. 
7b Ibid., para 47 of the judgment. 
77 Case 87/94 Commission v. Belgium [ 1996] E. C. R. 1-2043. 
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without giving the same opportunity to other bidders too. 
78 
A similar rule can be applied where bids are submitted, which are per se non- 
compliant with the project specifications. They may be formulated in the wrong 
language or the prices may not be quoted in required currency. In that case, the 
tenderer should be allowed to rectify the bid if the divergence can be easily and 
transparently corrected. " If it becomes necessary to provide additional information to 
render the bid compliant, the bidder could use the opportunity to make its bid more 
competitive. 
In each of those cases, it must be paramount for the authority to adhere strictly to 
the principles of equal treatment and transparency as developed in the "Storebaelt"'O 
and "Walloon Buses" cases. " This means, in particular, that if one tenderer is granted 
with the opportunity to correct its bid, other tenderers must be provided with the same 
chance. 
5-Z3 The Akreement on Government Procurement 
This interpretation can be upheld even for authorities included in the scope of the 
General Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), 82 although it does not 
correspond with Article XIV (1)(a) of the GPA. This rule provides authorities with the 
general opportunity to conduct post-tender negotiations, if this was indicated in the 
contract notice. The right to conduct post-tender negotiations derives exclusively from 
the GPA and not from the public procurement Directives. The latter do not apply for 
suppliers from signatories of the GPA. The European Directives deal exclusively with 
the relations between the contracting entities of the European Union and companies 
established there. They are consequently the only legal sources applicable to the 
78 Para 67 of the judgment. 
79 Arrowsinith, op., cit., note 53, p. 70. 
" Case C-243/89 Commission v. Denmark [19931 E. C. R. 1-3353. 81 Case 87/94 Commission v. Belgium [1996J E. C. R. 1-2043. 
82 For further reference: Hoek-man/Mavroidis, "Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government 
Procurement" in: Hoekman/Mawoidis, Law and Policy of Public Purchasing (1997), p. 13-30; 
Brown/Pouncey, "Expanding the International NIarket for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement 
on Government Procurement" (1995) Int. T. L. Rev., p. 69; de Graaf/Trepte, "The Revised GATT 
Procurement Agreemenf'(1994)P. P. L. R CS70. 
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relation between E. U. contracting authority and E. U. supplier. The GPA does not 
amend these relationships. Hence, in respect of post-tender negotiations it is 
impossible for E. U. authorities to evade the stricter European rules on post-tender 
83 negotiations in favour of Article XIV (1)(a) GPA. 
5.3. Empirical findings 
The issues involved in conducting pre- and post-tender negotiations under the 
two standard procedures are not very pertinent for PFI practitioners, because most 
PFIs are procured under the negotiated procedure. With respect to pre-tender 
negotiations it can be concluded from an outsider perspective that as long as 
authorities placed a PIN, the PH procurement practice was compatible with the 
requirements of procurement law. 
PubSA#7 commented that it was undoubtedly very difficult to bring one of those 
projects into fruition without using the negotiated procedure. She did not perceive the 
employment of the restricted procedure without any post award negotiations as a 
viable alternative. Though those questions may not seem relevant to many 
practitioners, it is submitted that this situation may change. PubSA#9 identified the 
reasoned opinion of the Commission against the U. K. In the Pimlico case 84 and the 
progressing standardisation of projects as making it more difficult for authorities to 
justify the application of the negotiated procedure. Both developments might force 
authorities to employ the restricted procedure more often in PFI. If the practitioners 
reflections on the recent developments are correct, considering the extent to which 
negotiations are permissible under the restricted procedure will become increasingly 
pertinent. 
BothSA# I reported that post-award negotiations posed a significant and frequent 
problem. The negotiations occurred although the contractor no longer faced the 
" For a more detailed examination of the relationship between the E. C. Directives and the GPA see: 
84 
Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 781-782. 
"Pimlico" case, European Conmussion, (2000) Single Market News No. 23 (October). 
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competitive pressure of fellow tenderers. " BothSA41 acknowledged the problem and 
knew that his clients might be challenged on this decision. It would be almost 
impossible to prove in the post-award stage that the negotiations distorted competition 
86 
or violated procurement rules 
. 
85 BothSA# 1. 
8' BothSA# 1. 
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Chapter 6 Chanqes to specifications 
6.1. Introduction 
The European procurement Directives and the U. K. Regulations oblige 
contracting authorities to specify in the general or contractual documents the technical 
specifications with which the goods and services to be procured must comply. ' 
6.2. Changes to specifications 
- 
the legal problems 
6.2.1. Definition of "specification 
"Technical specifications" means the totality of the technical requirements 
contained in the contract documents, defining the characteristics required of a 
material, product or supply, permitting a material, a product or a service to be 
described in a manner such that it ftilfils the use for which it is intended by the 
authority letting the contract. 2 
The European Directives and the U. K. Regulations require that technical 
requirements shall include levels of quality, performance, safety or dimensions, 
including the requirements applicable to the material, the product or the service as 
regards quality assurance, terminology, testing and test methods, packaging, marking 
or labelling. They shall also include rules relating to design and costing, the text, 
inspection and acceptance conditions for works, and methods or techniques or 
construction and all other technical conditions which contracting authority is in a 
position to prescribe in general or specific Regulations, in relation to the finished 
works and to the materials or parts which they involve. ' 
6.22 Output specification 
In a PF1 situation, specifications will typically not be drawn up with reference to 
die asset, but rather in terms of service delivery. 4 The specifications will determine for 
instance, that road users need a safe and reliable crossing, not a particular kind of 
Works Regulation 8(l), Works Directive, Annex 111, Supply Regulation 8(l), Supply Directive, 
Annex 111, Services Regulation 8(l)-, Services Directive Annex 11. 
2 Ibidem. 
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tunnel or bridge construction. As the specifications are only drafted in output terms, 
bidders have greater freedom to decide how the service is provided. 5 The "output- 
based" approach 6 to specifications is likely to produce bids that differ markedly in 
cost, benefit and risk streams and profiles. The differences between the proposed 
solutions renders it difficult for the authority to choose an evaluation method suitable 
to take all the variables into account. 7 
It appears possible to conclude from the derogation contained in Article I 1(2)(c) 
of the Services Directive that an initial lack of precision regarding the specifications 
does not pose legal problems where the negotiated route is used. The derogation 
expressly permits the use of the negotiated procedure in cases where it is not possible 
to establish specifications with sufficient provision. Conversely, under open and 
restricted procedure the specifications cannot be viewed as the mere starting point for 
further negotiations with bidders. Hence, where the two standard procedures are used, 
specifications should be drawn up with sufficient precision to be an apt basis for the 
submission of formal bids. 
6.23. Chanzinje specifications 
During the course of the procurement process, or during the execution stages of 
the contract, a PH procuring entity may want to change the specifications of the 
project on matters'which were referred to In the contract notice. ' Changing the 
specifications might become inevitable owing to an extension of the contractual term, 
an addition of related services or an alteration of the conditions of delivery. Changes 
or substantial amendments to the initially advertised contract are not a rare occurrence 
when procuring PH schemes. In the first four major road projects, for example, 
3 European Cointrussion, Guide to the Community Rules on Public Services Contracts, p. 43. 
, H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 86 of ch. 2, p. 4. 
5 H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 154 of ch. 2, para 2.2. 
, H. M. Treasury, Writing an output-based Specification (1996). 
71I. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 4 of ch. 2, p. 32. (Northern Line). 
8 Arrowsmith, "Amendments to Specifications under the European Public Procurement Directives" 
(1997)P. P. L. R. p. 128. 
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bidders proposed more than 3000 amendments to the original specifications. 9 It has to 
be noted that only a small number of those proposed amendments resulted in 
subsequent changes to the project specifications. The main reason for amendments or 
changes to the specifications was that in the past authorities drew up specifications too 
rigid and too prescriptive instead of adopting an output-based approach. 
One should not lose sight of the fact that harvesting innovative proposals is key to 
achieve value for money in PFI contracts. 10 It is possible to distinguish the innovative 
suggestions of bidders according to their compatibility with the original project 
specifications. While many suggestions will only entail amendments of the project 
which are compatible with the output specification, others will make suggestions to 
achieve the stated output In a different way. Suggestions falling within the latter 
category are usually referred to as "variations" or "alternatives. "" If an authority is 
poised to take variations into account, it has to state this possibility in the contract 
documents. 12 It should also be aware that such a variation differs per definitionem 
from the solution specified in the contract documents and per se generally triggers a 
change in the project specification 
The following section therefore examines the question of whether altering the 
project specifications during the procurement process is reconcilable with the 
European Directives. It is noteworthy that the fitidings will apply irrespective of the 
fact of whether the government department employs the open, restricted or 
competitive negotiated procedure. 
6.2 3. L Changes between contract advertisement and the submission of bids 
It is PFI procurement practice that project specifications which are initially 
drafted in fairly broad terms are further refined by consulting the market before the 
" NAO, op. cit., note 40 of ch. 2, p. 3. 10 Select Conunittee on Public Accounts, The Contract to develop and update the replacement national 
insurance recording system, 464'Report (June 1998), p. 2. 
See Arrowsnuth, op. cit, note 2 of ch. 1, p. 618-619. 
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formal advertisement of the contract notice in the OJEC. Once the project's 
specifications are advertised, they establish the basis for the whole bidding process. 13 
Potential contractors will base their decision of whether to prepare a bid proposal for 
the project on the specifications contained in the contract notice and the related 
contract documents. What then is the position, if the authority wishes to make changes 
to the project specifications once the contract has been advertised by means of a 
contract notice in the Official Journal of the European Communities but before the 
deadline for submission of bids? 
It is arguable that changes to the specifications establish a new basis for the 
submission of formal bids. In essence, the authority awards a "new" contract which 
differs in its basic requirements from the initial contract notice. It appears Possible to 
submit that if the authority awards a "new" contract it ought to terminate the current 
award procedure and commence a new advertisement process in the Official Journal. 
It is questionable whether even inconsequential changes to the contract 
specifications should trigger a new contract award procedure. It is suggested in the 
academic literature, " in U. K. case law" and by the Commission 16 that the contract 
should be re-advertised only in the case of "significant" or "material" changes to the 
project requirements. Changes should be considered as "material" if the altered 
contract could have attracted market participants which were not interested in the 
original arrangement. This could be the case if the authority advertises a contract for 
the supply of a fleet of 200 cars over a five year period and subsequently wishes to 
add a maintenance element to the already advertised contract. The addition of 10 
additional cars does not amount to a "material" change that would render a re- 
12 Works Regulation 20(4), Article 19 Works Directive-, Supply Regulation 21(4), Article 16(l) Supply 
Directive; Services Regulation 21(4), Article 24(l) Services Directive; Utilities Regulation 21(4), 
Article 34(3) Utilities Directive. 
13 Albeit it is not expressly stated in the Directives, this is clear form the function of the specifications in 
14 
the procurement process, cf. Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 614. 
Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 8 of ch. 6, p. 12 8. 
15 R. v. Portsmouth City Council, ex parte Peter Coles and Colwick Builders, Court of Appeal, judgment 
of November 8,1996. 
European Commission, op. cit, note 24 of ch. 3, p. 
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advertisement of the arrangement indispensable. As there are no expressive provisions 
in the Directives on changes to specifications, it becomes necessary to examine in the 
following whether the suggested solution is reconcilable with the principles 
underlying the Directives. 17 
The first principle worthwhile to be examined in this context is the principle of 
proportionality, which is not only underlying the procurement Directives but is held 
by the European Court of Justice as being part of the general principles of community 
law. " It requires that any measure taken by the public entity should be both necessary 
and appropriate In the light of the objectives sought. " A measure is considered to be 
"necessary" if it reconciles two conflicting interests in a way that the degree of 
impairment of the one interest for the sake of the other does not exceed what is 
deemed to be justifiable. "' This principle is also referred to as the "principle of the 
least possible impairment. 5,21 
The conflicting interests are the interests of potential participants of the bidding 
process and the interests of the contracting authority in an adequately fleXible 
procurement procedure. It can be assumed that contractors which did not respond to 
the original contract notice are not interested in a contract which is only slightly 
amended after its OJEC advertisement. Hence, the interest of the authority and the 
participating tenderers in a swift procurement procedure prevails over the interests of 
the not further consulted market. Where "material" changes to the specification occur 
and other firms in the market might be interested in the changed contract, the 
principles of equal treatment and transparency and the interests of the potentially 
interested contractor succeed. It can be assumed that this solution achieves an 
appropriate balance between the bureaucratic burden imposed on contracting 
17 See above section 3.3.3. 
18 Case 265/87 Schrader [19891 E. C. R. at p. 2237, para 21 of thejudgment. 19 Case T-260/94 Air Inter SA, judgment of the Court of First histance of 19 June 1997. 
Cf for example: Case 122/78 Buitoni [19791 E. C. R- 677, para 16 of the judgment; Case 66/82 
FromanVais [19831 E. C. R. 395, para 8 of the judgment-, Case 15/83 Denkavit Nederland [19841 
E. C. R. 1-2171, para 25 of thejudgment. 
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authorities by the Directives whilst at the same time ensuring that the objectives of 
transparency and equal treatment are not prejudiced. 22 
Secondly, it appears questionable whether the suggested balance of interest is 
reconcilable with the principle of equal treatment. The latter implies that any person 
who sought, seek or would have wished to tender for a government contract has the 
same chances to learn about opportunities and to formulate the terms of their offers. " 
The equality principle requires that sirMlar situations are to be treated equally unless 
the discrimination is justified by objective reasons. 24 A viable objective reason for 
justification is that any persons who sought, seek or would have wish to tender for a 
government contract is not prejudiced. 
In the case of slight amendments to the specifications it is advocated that the 
changed contract is unlikely to attract tenderers different from those which responded 
to the original advertisement. Although tenderers which responded to the original 
advertisement are treated differently from those which did not, the discrimination is 
objectively justified. Where specifications are only slightly amended, the principle of 
equal treatment is therefore not impaired if contracting authorities do not re-advertise 
the contract. 
In situations where the contract is materially changed, other suppliers might have 
been interested to participate in the award procedure. Hence, if the authority decides 
not to advertise the "new" contract, it unjustifiably prejudices those bidders which 
were not interested in the original arrangement. Consequently, this impairment of the 
equal treatment principle is not justified by an objective reason. It is submitted that the 
principle of equal treatment obliges the authority to re-advertise any materially 
changed contractual arrangement. 
Although the treatment of changed specifications is not expressly dealt with in 
21 Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1992), p. 300. 22 Arrowsraith, op. cit., note 8 of ch. 6, p. 12 9. 
23 Case 87/94 Commission v. Belgium "WaHoon Buses" [19961 E. C. R. 1-2043, para 54 of thejudginent. 24 CasegiongUberschdr, judgment of October 8,1980. 
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the Directives, it is possible to argue that an analogy with a derogation for the use of 
the negotiated procedure supports the solution suggested. Each public sector Directive 
contains the provision that the contractmg authority may use the negotiated procedure 
without an advertisement if a contract notice does not attract tenders or the tenders 
received are irregular or submitted by unqualified bidders. This applies on the 
condition that the contractual arrangement remains "substantially" unaltered. " Thus, 
the public sector Directives stipulate that contracting authorities may proceed without 
advertisement if the changes made to the original arrangement were unsubstantial in 
nature. The same principle may apply when deciding whether to allow an authority to 
26 proceed without advertisement in a case where the procedure has not failed 
. 
The analysis suggests that probably only material changes to the contract 
specification, meaning changes with the potential to attract other bidders, ought to be 
advertised 'in the OJEC anew. In analogy with the Directives' rules on time limits, all 
bidders should probably be provided with an extension to the usual time limits for 
amending their proposals according to the new requirements. 
If substantial changes to the specifications occur, some bidders might be no 
longer interested or capable of upholding their tenders and may withdraw from the 
tender process. This might be the case where the delivery and operation of an IT 
system is added to a contract and the consortium is not able to subcontract this newly 
appended part of the project to an IT specialist. In this case, the procuring department 
must amend its shortlist so as to meet the minimum number of tenderers required for 
. 4genuine competition" in the procedure. 27 
The Directives expressly provide that the number of candidates admitted to 
negotiate may not be less than threeN and the number considered as ensuring genuine 
,5 Article 6(2) Directive 93/36-, Article 7(2) Directive 93/37; Article 11(2) Directive 92/50. 
21 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 8 of ch. 6, p. 130. 27 Case 27/98 Metalmeccanica Fracasso v. Amt der Salzburger Landesregierung, [19991 E. C. R. 1-5697 (ECJ), para 27 of thejudgment; with comments: Dischendorfer, (2000) P. P. L. R., CSI 59. 28 For example: Article 22(3) Works Directive 93/37. 
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competition in the restricted procedure is five. " 
6.2.3.2. Changes after contract advertisement and deadline of submission of bids 
Once the deadline for the submission of tenders has expired, non-material 
changes to the specifications should be arguably permitted. This applies under the 
condition that the contracting authority honours; the transparency of the procurement 
process and the equality of the participating tenderers. The latter must be given the 
opportunity to submit amended formal bids based on the new specifications and an 
appropriate time period for the revision. 30 
6.2.3.3. Changes after contract award 
Finally, changes to the scope of the contract might arise after the contract has 
been awarded or even after it has been concluded. 
Arguably, the Directives do not bar post-award changes as long as they decrease 
the overall price of the arrangement or increase the contractual obligations of the 
31 bidder without a compensating reimbursement 
. 
Under both circumstances, the 
parties to the awarded contract do not favour the private sector contractor. 
Conversely, changes to the specifications which include an increase in the price 
paid by the authority or favour the winning bidder, provide ample scope to abuse the 
procurement process to the disadvantage of other bidders. The "favourite bidder" 
could, for example, submit a tender which is artificially low priced, on the basis of the 
understanding that it will be provided with the opportunity to raise the price once the 
contract has been awarded. The PFI scheme for replacing the national insurance 
recording system (NISR2) may serve as a good example how the private sector 
contractor can influence the contract specification in the post-award phase in its 
favour. Andersen Consulting lowered in the final round of negotiations its overall 
price from L242 million to L 134 million, thus undercutting its own indicating bid price 
by L108 million and the final bid prices of its two remaining competitors by E80 
" For example: Article 22(2) Works Directive 93/37. 
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million and LIOI million respectively. 
32 Irrespective of the question of whether the 
L134 million bid should have been considered by the Contributions Agency as 
"abnormally low" within the meaning of the Directives, " the winning contractor 
approached the Agency few months after the PFI contract was concluded to revise the 
34 
implementation timetable of the project. The time schedule formed an essential part 
of the original specifications of the prOject due to the underlying legislatory 
31 
timetable. 
In practice, the public sector authority at this stage of the project has not many 
options to choose from. It can either re-start the procurement process from scratch or 
accept the proposed amendments to the contract. The first alternative is de Acto not 
available, since advertising the contract anew is too onerous and time consuming 36 in 
view of the public demand for implementing the service. 31 This provides the private 
sector contractor with a considerable leverage to achieve favourable changes to the 
specifications. 
There are mainly three possibilities of how to deal with the problem of post- 
award changes to project specification. 
The first possibility could be to allow changes to the scope of the contract which 
increases the price or reduces the contractor's obligations only in situations where the 
Directives expressly provides for such negotiations with an existing contractor. The 
grounds provided for in the Directives are where a purchase of supplies from the 
original supplier is necessary as to avoid technical incompatibility or disproportionate 
technical difficulties or where certain works and services are a repetition of those 
'ýO Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 8 of ch. 6, p. 133. 
31 Ibid., p. 134. 
32 Select Conunittee on Public Accounts, op. cit., note 10, para 19, table 1. 33 Article 27 Supply Directive 93/36-, Article 37 Services Directive 92/50; Article 30(4) Works Directive 
93/37-, there are good arguments in favour of this assumption in the given case, cf. Committee of 
Public Accounts, op. cit, note 10, para 23. 34 Ms has caused the particular concern of the auditors: Select Comnattee on Public Accounts, op-cit., 
note 10, paras 6,7(iv). 
35 Select Committee on Public Accounts, op. cit., note 176 of ch. 2, para 28. 36 The empirical data collected verified this assumption, cf section 6.2.3.1. 
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under the original contract. Finally, under Works and Services Directives, negotiations 
with an existing provider are permitted where the additional lot cannot be separated 
from the original contract for technical reasons. " Under all three public sector 
Directives it might additionally be possible to invoke the "extreme urgency" 
derogation where the justifying circumstances are not attributable to the contracting 
authority and the situation was unforeseen. 
Arguably, the grounds contained in the Directives are the only justification for 
amending the specifications of the original contract and even slight changes to the 
original contract need to be advertised if not one of the grounds is satisfied. The better 
argument observes the principle of proportionality. Accordingly, imposing an 
obligation on contracting authorities to re-advertise the contractual arrangement even 
for slight, but unjustified, amendments 
'39 unreasonably increases the transaction costs 
for bidders and authorities. 
A second solution would be to render only de mininus changes permissible, these 
are minor adjustments well below a 10% increase of the contract volume. This 
solution could prove beneficial in large scale construction prOjects where it is 
inevitable to amend slightly the original project specifications. 40 
A third option is based on the general principles underlying the Directives. It 
would allow non-material amendments to the specifications. Changes on matters not 
required to be included in the contract notice would accordingly be permissible 
without re-advertising the arrangement. In following this broad interpretative 
approach, the provisions contained in the Directives would be applicable only in cases 
of "material changes. " Kerr I implied in Portsmouth that the "material" requirement 
This goes in particular for such highly sensitive projects such as the passport agency or the national 
insurance recording system, cf. "Computing 
- 
an explosive mixture, " Financial Times, 22 July 1999. 
Articles 6(2) Directive 93/36; Article 7(2) Directive 93/37; Article 11(2) Directive 92/50. 
39 Even slight amendments will be covered by the public sector rules in any instance, since the 
"aggregation rules" are inevitably applicable to such arrangements: Articles 5 Directive 93/36; Article 
6 Directive 93/37; Article 7 Directive 92/50. 
40 The 10% figure was suggested by Professor Arrowsmith in "PFI Contracts under the European 
Rules, " a presentation given as part of the Public Procurement and PH Seminar, London (Treasury 
Solicitor), 22"d September 1999. 
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could also be applied as "the contract progresses" and, hence, becomes applicable at 
all stages of the contract award process. 
Albeit the last of the three possibilities gives ample scope for manoeuvre, which 
might be beneficial ftom a commercial point of view, it seems difficult to reconcile it 
with the rules of the Directives and their underlying principles. In order to safeguard 
against abuse during the post-award phase it is of utmost importance to ensure that the 
changes made to the specifications after the contract has been awarded do not exceed a 
very limited extent. Otherwise, the contracting parties would be able to collude to the 
detriment of the other participants in the procedure. Such practices would impair the 
equality and transparency principles and the procedural rules laid down in the 
Directives. If one further considers the existing grounds contained in the Directives, it 
is even more questionable whether European Court of Justice will be inclined to adopt 
the suggested de minimis, although this may offer an appropriate balance between the 
interests involved. On the one hand it allows for minor adjustments and hence for 
some commercial flexibility and safeguards on the other hand the rights of the other 
bidders. 
6.24. Analvsis 
In drawing the conclusion it is possible to maintain that the rules on 
specifications contained in the Directives can be held to be the most significant hurdle 
for conducting post-tender discussions on substantial issues. This applies even if the 
authority employs the negotiated procedure. 
Changes to the contract specifications can be deemed as an essential, though 
problematic tool for contracting authorities to consider innovative solutions brought 
forward by tenderers. We have seen that harvesting innovations with respect to the 
design, construction and management of the asset is an essential source of ensuring 
value for money in PFI schemes. It is submitted that there is a general divergence 
between procurement law and the PFI procurement practice. While the first requires 
that the awarded contract has to be consistent with the terms of its original 
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advertisement in the OJEC, the latter requires ample scope for innovative input from 
the bidders. This divergence underlines the particular relevance of the legal problem 
for the PFI procurement practice. 
Taken together the findings suggest that in open, restricted and competitive 
negotiated procedure it seems permissible to change the specifications where the 
changes relate to matters not referred to in the contract notice. Furthermore it can be 
argued that changes are permissible where they relate to matters referred to in the 
contract notice but the changes are not material in that they would not have caused 
additional bidders to respond to the notice had it been re-advertised. 41 
When changes occur during the procurement process, the contracting authority 
should seek to ensure that the principles of equal treatment and transparency are not 
impaired. This includes that time limits are extended or bidders are added to the 
shortlist where appropriate. Once the contract has been awarded or is signed with the 
winning bidder, changes to the specifications are only permissible on the grounds 
included in the Directives or where they are of de minimis nature. 
6.3. Empirical findings 
The participants in the study suggested that changes to the project specifications 
were a frequent occurrence in PFI. 42 PrivSA#6 mentioned authorities were inclined to 
change the specifications due to reasons not directly related to the procurement 
process, such as planning permissions or technology changes. 4' He outlined that the 
procurement of the project may take up to two years and technology especially in the 
IT sectors was changing constantly. For this reason, adjustments to the specifications 
did occur quite regularly because authorities did not want to lock the project in to the 
market condition of two years ago, but wanted an up-to-date product. 44 




Other reasons for changing or amending the specifications came up in the course 
of the procurement process, for instance during the negotiations with bidders. 
BothSA41 remarked that amending and refining the specifications was "a natural part 
of the negotiation process. "4' PubSA#9 stated that if negotiations meant anything then 
the parties had not only to negotiate about price but exactly about what was going to 
be delivered. Thus, the level of detail of the specifications increased in the course of 
the negotiations. 46She described this iterative process as "reactive. " 
PubSA#4 portrayed the occurrences that services either "dropped out or were 
taken on board', 47 as legitimate. " They were inherent to the PFI procurement process. 
She said it was one major principle of PH to rely on the skills of the private sector to 
design and deliver projects. 49BothSA#3 added that this did not cause concern under 
the procurement rules if the project specifications were published in output terms. 'o 
Output specifications were said to decrease the risk that "substantial" changes 
occurred which required the re-advertisement of the contract. 
BothSA#3 mentioned further that the level of detail of the specifications varied 
depending on whether the project has been advertised under the works or services 
regime. Whilst the former remained largely input driven, the latter were rather output 
driven. " In the latter instance, he concluded that although the specifications seemed to 
be "jelly-like" and "services were jumping in and out, " technically there were no 
changes to the specifications due to the use of output specifications. PubS#3 agreed 
and outlined that it depended on how the project was structured from the beginning. If 
the authority used broad outline specifications and the authority would work out later 
in the process what those headings meant in detail, it was probably not changing its 
mind. 







PubSA#8 agreed in essence that changes to the specifications were to a certain 
degree inherent to PFI. She added they were also partly due to "the frustrating 
problem" that the public authorities were not always very clear about what they 
actually wanted. " 
As a result of a substantial change in specifications in the course of the award 
procedure, authorities might be obliged to re-advertise the contract so as to give 
suppliers the opportunity to bid for the changed contract. PubSA#8 endorsed the view 
that for the authority to come under this obligation, the changes to the contract must be 
substantial. She described the changes made to PH contracts as not so substantial as to 
require to re-start the whole procurement from scratch, but as not insignificant either. " 
Two lawyers encountered projects, where the specifications have been undoubtedly 
amended in a "substantial" manner. 54 Others, such as PnvSA#6, remarked that 
services were "dropping out and coming in all the time. " PubSA#4 stated that a strict 
application of the procurement rule in the area of specifications would stifle the 
negotiation process, since it would then be necessary to re-advertise the contract all 
the time. "The project would simply not get through. "" 
Although the question of "substantiality" was clearly a matter of degree, 
PubSA#4 gained the impression that due to the definitive timescale constraints 
standing against the option of re-advertising the whole project, starting ftorn scratch 
was not a realistic proposition for most PFIs. 56 BothSA#6 gave the example of a health 
project which was substantially changed by effectively doubling the amount of works 









effect that the bidders "were bidding essentially for a different project the option of 
re-advertising was dismissed as too time and cost-consuming. 
6.4. Conclusion 
It was expected that the problem of whether it is permissible to change or amend 
the specifications was perceived by legal advisors as being of practical relevance. This 
was clearly not the case. Legal advisors experienced the issue as not pertinent to their 
practice. They unequivocally stated that even where the goalposts were moved 
substantially during the negotiations, authorities failed to consider re-advertising the 
contract. 
The demand of public procurement law to re-advertise substantially changed 
contracts is deemed as unworkable in PFI, where the specifications are developed 
during the procurement process. In this context, practitioners perceived the law as a 
serious obstacle to a swift and convenient PH procurement process. So-called 
pragmatic" considerations, such as convenience and swift procedures, prevail over 
the theoretical knowledge of the legal problems involved. " This perception explains 
why the application of procurement law is not considered and the law's impact on the 
legal practice is severely limited. 
Procurement law is build on the presumption that public contracts should be 
tendered and not freely negotiated. The European legislator views tendering 
procedures as a pertinent means to warrant transparency and competition. Tendering 
procedures are build on definitive specifications against which the tenderers bid. In 
PFI, the project specifications are developed within a negotiation process. What is 
more, the outline specifications are treated in PF1 merely as a starting point for further 
discussions with bidders. The specifications are therefore altered and refined 
throughout the bidding process as bidders propose more innovative ways of delivering 
the public service required. It is therefore possible to conclude a fundamental 
57 BothSA#2. 
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discrepancy between the law and the legal practice regarding the perception of 
specifications in the bidding process. 
What is more, the procurement rules are built on the proposition that the 
procurement is concluded within a relatively short period of time. This is obviously 
not the case with PH projects. The empirical study has shown that negotiations can 
take up to five or six years in some IT contracts. Within this period, technology is 
likely to change and so are probably in some cases the needs of the authority. Both 
aspects may require amendments or even changes to the project specifications which 
may be of substantial nature. It is possible to conclude a discrepancy between the 
requirements of the legal practice and procurement law which compromised the 
impact of procurement law on PH procurement practice. 
58 This occurTence may be an overarclung issue which will be dealt with further below. 
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Chapter 7 Classification of transactions 
7.1. Introduction 
Another legal uncertainty is the question of whether PPP contracts are regulated 
by the Works, Supply or Services Regulations. The answer depends on the subject 
matter of the contracts involved and is often far from straightforward. ' 
7.2. Classification of transactions 
- 
the legal problems 
To classify PFls it is necessary, firstly, to define and, secondly, to distinguish the 
different Regulations that may be applicable. Finally, it has to be analysed whether 
PFI projects are concession contracts and what the consequences would be of 
employing these specific rules. The public procurement regime distinguishes between 
three types of contracts, these are works, supplies and services. 
Z21. Works contracts 
Works contracts are concerned with (1) the carrying out of "works" or "a work, " 
or (2) the procurement of a work "by any means. " In this context, "work" means "the 
outcome of any works, which is sufficient of itself to fulfil an economic and technical 
function, " while "works" is defined as any of the activities specified in Schedule I of 
the Works Regulations. This Schedule is based on the outdated NACE classification 
of activities, which is now mainly replaced by the community's own Community 
Product Classification (CPC). Following the Schedule of Directive and Regulations, 
building works, for example construction of flats, office blocks and hospitals, and civil 
engineering, including construction of roads, bridges, railways, etc., are included in 
the definition of "works. " The second arm of the definition, procurement of works "by 
any means, " brings within the works rules any arrangement whereby the authority 
draws up a specification for a work, and the contractor is entrusted with the task of 
providing it. ' 
Many PFI projects involve building works, as for instance the contract for a new 
1 Fox/Tott, op. cit., note 5 of ch. 2, at para 3.2.5. 
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hospital, or civil engineering, as in the case of a toll bridge. This "works" element in 
PFI proj* ects may justify the application of the Works Regulations. 
7.22 Sum& contracts 
Public supply contracts, within the meaning of the European Directive and 
implementing U. K. Regulations, are contracts for "(a) 
... 
the purchase of goods by a 
contracting authority 
... 
or (b) for the hire of goods by a contracting authority (both 
where the contracting authority becomes the owner of the goods after the end of the 
period of hire and where it does not) and for any siting or installation of those 
goods,... "' It follows ftorn this definition that even if the private contractor of the PFI 
transfers the assets after several years of exploitation, the public authority acquires 
these assets in for the purposes of the Supply Regulations. A good example is the PFI 
procurement of new trains ('Irain availability 51)4 for the Northern Line by London 
Underground. 
7.23. Services contracts 
Public services contracts are agreements "under which a contracting authority 
engages a person to provide services. "' In contrast to works and supply contracts, 
which generally come within the ambit of the respective procurement Regulations, the 
coverage of services may be described as fragmentary. The EU Directive subdivides 
services with a genuine potential for cross-border competition into two separate parts. 
Part A services listed in Schedule I of the Public Services Contracts Regulations 1993 
("Part A services") are entirely subject to the rules. This includes maintenance and 
repair, computer services, management consultancy and so forth. Services listed in 
part B of Schedule I ("Part B services") are only subject to certain technical 
specifications and post-award notices but exempt from all other procedural 
requirements. Hotel and restaurant services, rail and water transport, and health and 
2 Arrowsinith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 129. 
3 Art. 2 (1) "public supply contract" Supply Reg. 
4 H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 4 of ch. 2, p. 32. 
5 Art. 2 (1) "public services contract" Services Reg. 
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social services are good examples of Part B services. As with the Schedule for works 
contracts, the Annex for Services refers to the CPC which defines the various 
categories in more detail. In contrast to the Works Regulations, the regulatory regime 
for services (and supplies) encompasses rules for contracts of indefinite duration. In 
the view of the Treasury, a PH proposal will usually fall within the definition of a 
services contract 
.6 This is a 
"natural consequence ,7 of the emphasis the PH places on 
"outputs" rather than "inputs. " The public sector acquires services rather than works 
or goods, even with financially free-standing projects and joint ventures. 
Z2.4. Relevance 
ne procurement Regulations clearly envisage that authorities decide on the 
classification of their contracts, since the application of one Regulation excludes all 
other Regulations' applicability. ' A contract is therefore either for works, supplies, or 
services. It is for this reason that authorities have to decide on a case-by-case basis 
how to classify each PFI. This classification may have repercussions throughout the 
procurement process, because of the remaining differences' between the three public 
sector Directives. 
At the beginning of the procurement process, the PF1 contract usually has to be 
advertised in the Official Journal (OJEC). One somewhat technical reason for having 
to distinguish between different contract types is that the OJEC designates different 
advertisement sections for works and services contracts. It may be regarded as a 
substantive breach of the rules if, for example, an invitation to tender for "works" was 
advertised in the "services" section only and was therefore not recognised by a 
potential bidder searching only in the "works" section. It could be argued that twin- 
track advertisements of PFI opportunities do not compromise the transparency and 
equal opportunity principles underlying the publication requirement. If a contract is 
H. M. Treasury/ Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 46 of ch. 2, p. 3 1. 
Chave/13ees, op. cit., note 23 of ch. 5, p. 5 8. 
8 Read, op. cit., note 158 of ch. 2, p. 188. 
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published in the works and services sections of the OJEC, neither construction 
companies nor service providers will miss an opportunity to submit bids. It is 
questionable whether this practice is compatible with the procurement Directives 
which envisage the categonsation. Presumably for this reason, the Official Journal has 
sent some of the advertisements back by return and demanded a precise classification 
of the PFI scheme. In addition, it is submitted that the precise taxonomy of each PH 
contract is pertinent for six reasons arising from differences between the three public 
sector Directives. 
A significant difference between the three sets of Regulations is the threshold 
values above which each Regulation applies. Whereas the threshold value for works 
contracts is ECU 5,000,000 (equalling E3,370,00), 'o the contract's value under the 
Supply or Services Regulations has to exceed only ECU 200,000 (L134,800). " 
Improper reliance on these provisions may easily result in a breach of the rules. If, for 
example, the awarding authority mistakenly assumes that a services PH contract is 
one for works, it Will not advertise this contract in the OJEC when its value does not 
exceed 0,370,000. 
To date, most PFI projects have exceeded the ECU 5,000,000 threshold so that 
this significant difference between the two Directives did not cause practical 
difficulties. This may change when local governments begin to utillse PFIs as 
procurement toot on a more regular basis. This development, actively supported by the 
Labour government, " is likely to result in more PFI contracts falling below the ECU 
5,000,000 threshold of the Works Directive. " In these cases, the different value 
thresholds of works and Services Directives compel the procuring authority to decide 
whether the contract is to be classified as one for works or, alternatively, for services. 
The fact of remaining differences between the "public sector" rules is subject to criticism: cf. 
Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1. 
10 Works Directive, art 3 (1). 
II Supply Directive, art 5 (1); Services Directive, art 7 (1). 
12 DETR, op. cit., note 9 of ch. 2. 
13 For example: Victoria Dock Primary School in Kingston upon Hull with a capital value of E2 mio. 
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Another issue of vital practical importance for the awarding authority, is the 
question whether or not in the specific case it is entitled to utilise the competitive 
negotiated procedure. Without going into details, one can assert that the general rule 
of the public sector regime is that authorities must use the open or the restricted 
procedure. 14 
Employing the competitive negotiated procedure is linked with the fulfilment of 
certain grounds that allow derogating from the rather strict open and restricted 
procedures. The public sector rules still contain different derogations justifying the 
application of the competitive negotiated procedure. The Services Directive and the 
Works Directive, but not the Supply Directive, permit recourse to the competitive 
negotiated procedure where either the nature of the work or service or the risk 
attaching to performance are such as not to permit overall pricing. ' 5 Additionally, the 
Services Directive, but neither of the other two, may apply when the "nature of the 
services 
... 
is such that contract specifications cannot be established with sufficient 
precision to permit the award of the contract by selecting the best tender according to 
the rules governing open or restricted procedure. ý, 16 
What is more, the PFI project may be more correctly classified as a concession 
contracts. Recall that concessions are defined as agreements under which the 
consideration given by the contracting authority consists of, or includes the grant of, 
the right to exploit the works to be carried out under the contract. 17 The European 
procurement regime catches only public works concessions, meaning that if the 
concession contract is one for services it falls outside the procurement rules altogether. 
This issue will be dealt with in greater detail below. 
The fourth reason for insisting on the proper classification of PH projects is that 
" See above section 3.3.2.1. 
15 Services Directive, art 11 (2) (b)- 
' 
Works Directive, art 7 (1) (c). 1, Services Directive, art 11 (2) (c). 
17 Works Directive, art I (d). 
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the Services Regulations exclude certain services entirely, " for example contracts 
related to land, and exclude other services partly from the regime, so-called "Part B" 
or "non-priority" services, including hotel and restaurant, legal, education services. 
These exceptions are UnIque to the Services regime. 
The public sector Regulations differ in another detail, which is of some 
importance in relation to PH projects, regarding the method for calculating the 
thresholds for contracts of indefinite duration. Where the contract is of an indefinite 
duration, or for more than four years, the Services Directive, but neither the Works nor 
the Supply Directive, requires' the value of the contract to be ascertained by 
multiplying the expected monthly value of payments by forty-eight. This rule is of 
considerable importance in the context of PFI where a contractual duration of 15 or 20 
years is common. 
Finally, advertisements placed by authorities may be made subject to challenges 
by unsuccessful bidders and then it may be held by courts to be insufficient that the 
contractual award procedure complied with only one set of Regulations. In the 
circumstances of challenges, it may be crucial which of the three public sector 
Directives is to be applied. 
It is possible to conclude that for the six reasons that the question of classifying 
PH contracts is fiLr from merely "academic. " 
Z25. Treatment of mixed contracts 
It is one major rationale of Public Private Partnerships to integrate the 
construction and services elements of a project that is to create efficiency gains and 
20 21 
synergies. PH contracts can be therefore characterised as "multi-faceted contracts 
, 
in the sense that they comprise more than one of the contractual elements previously 
discussed. One example would be a hospital PH that may comprise the erection of a 
1, Services Directive, art I (a) (i) 
- 
(ix). 
19 Services Directive, art 7 (5). 
20 Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24 of ch. 2, para 8.029 21 Fox/Tott, op. cit., note 5 of ch. 2, at para 3.2.7. 
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new hospital building and the delivery of contracted "medical services. " The 
combination of several elements in one contract renders it difficult to classify a PFI 
agreement applying the criteria laid down in the procurement Directives. The E. C. 
rules were initially developed for contracts with only one predominant purpose, such 
as the building of a conventionally financed hospital (works), the acquisition of office 
materials (supply) or the provision of legal advice (services). 
The U. K. Treasury recommends that PFI proposals should be classified in terms 
of a service requirement" with an output-based specification 
. 
23 Defining the contract 
in terms of services will usually bring PFI contracts within the realm of the Services 
Directive. In the case of a contract for a new hospital, the awarding NHS Trust may 
have contracted for a specific number of hospital beds and may have approved the 
plans for the construction. Yet, its primary interest is in the provision of medical 
services, not building construction. 24 
Any construction or renovation of a hospital clearly contains "works" included in 
the definition of the Works Regulations 2' and the purchase of medical equipment may 
also be caught by the Supply Regulations. Support services, such as cleaning, security 
or catering for the hospital, would fall within the ambit of the Services Regulations. 
Thus, "the characterisation of a PFI proposal as a 'service provision' does not imply 
that it will automatically be classified as a service contract under the EC rules. It is 
feasible that a PFI project could be structured as a long-term service provision but still 
be a works or a supply contract. , 26 
7.2 5.1. Mixed supplyl services contracts 
The public sector Regulations provide rules in order to deal with multi-faceted 
contracts, which combine elements of supplies and services contracts. Article 2 (1) of 
22 H. M. Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, Technical Note 2- How to follow EC Procurement Procedure 
23 
and Advertise in the OJEC (1999). 
24 
H. M. Treasuty/Pnvate Finance Panel, op-cit., note 46 of ch. 2, p. 31. 
2 
Skilbeck, "'llie Private Finance Initiative and Public Procurement" (1996) P. P. L. R p. 148, at p. 149. 5 At least in case of an asset transfer at the end of the concession period. 2C, ILM. Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 22, para 2.3.1. 
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die Supply RegulationS27 expressly provides that the contract in question shall only be 
a public supply contract "... where the value of the consideration attributable to the 
goods and any siting or installation of the goods is equal to or greater than the value 
attributable to the services. " The contracting authority, having regard to this Article of 
the Supply Regulations, has to assess the relative value of each contractual element 
which then leads to the determination of the applicable set of Regulations. One 
example is the PFI project "Northern Line" which is concerned not only with the 
provision of new trains (design and manufacture) but also with the maintenance and 
cleaning both of trains and associated trackside equipment 
. 
28 In this project, the 
outcome of the inherently complex relative value assessment has been that the value 
of the trains is greater than the value of the related maintenance services which have to 
be performed during the contract's term. Therefore, the contract is included in the 
scope of the Supply Regulations. 
7.2.5.2. Mxed worksl services and worksl supply contracts 
Whilst mixed supply/ services contracts are subject to explicit legal Regulation, 
the classification of mixed works/ services and mixed works/ supply contracts was not 
made subject to any Regulation. The distinction between works and services contracts 
is probably the most important in the context of PFI since infrastructure projects 
consist of works plus the award of a concession to exploit the completed work as 
consideration. One example would be a contract for the erection of a bridge coupled 
with a concession to levy tolls from end users. Three possible tests to classify mixed 
contracts can be identified, these are the greater value-test, the severability-test and the 
main objective-test. 
The valuation approach adopted by the Supply Regulations was advocated in the 
past by the European Commission" as a means of determining the treatment of 
27 Article 2 Services Directive. 
28 H. M. Treasury, Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 46 of ch. 2, p. 32. 
29 European Conunission, Guide to the Community Rules on Open Government Procurement, OJ [1987] 
C359-, Public Procurement and Community Financing OJ 119891 C22. 
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contracts for both works and supplies. 'O This is another application of the relative 
value test of the elements involved in the contract just described. 
The European Court of Justice did not choose the valuation approach but 
developed in Case C-3/88 Commission v Italy [19891 E. C. R. 4035 ("Re: Data- 
Processing") a test involving the severability of the contractual elements. An Italian 
government department had advertised a contract for a data processing system which 
involved both the supply of hardware and the provision of associated services. The 
Court held that the hardware could have been procured separately from related 
services and, therefore, ruled that the effect of combining both elements within a 
single contract was to bring the whole contract within the scope of the Supply 
Directive. 
It has to be noted that the Services Directive was at the relevant time not in force, 
so the Court only considered the question whether the contract as a whole was brought 
within the realm of the Supply Directive. It did not examine the potential overlap 
between the two Directives. The notion of severability was employed by Advocate- 
General Lenz in Case C-331/92 Gestion Hotelera Internacional v Communidad 
Autonoma de Canahas [19941 E. C. R. 1329 ("Gestion Hotelera") to differentiate the 
area of application of two Directives. The case was concerned with a two-fold 
invitation to tender issued by a Spanish regional authority. The authority initially 
indicated its intention to award a concession to install and operate a casino; secondly, 
it advertised the operation of a publicly owned hotel business. Both elements required 
certain works to be carried out in advance of their opening and were linked in such a 
way that both had to be performed by the same entity. 
The Advocate-General reached the conclusion that the works element could not 
have been severed without altering the contract's legal structure 31 since it was the 
authority's intention that the building works should be carried out by the company "in 
30 Services were not regulated until 1993. 
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the framework of its [broader] obligations. ý, 32 Two factors were decisive in Mr. Lenz's 
opinion 33 that the works contract would not be considered in isolation, namely that the 
authority did not draw up detailed specifications for the work and gave no prospect of 
payment for the work. 
In a "typical" PFI prOject both scenarios are conceivable. The works to be carried 
out may have an own economic function and may be regarded as an independent 
contract or may, alternatively, be secondary, perhaps a necessary prerequisite, in view 
of other more dominant contractual obligations. In considering again the Treasury's 
statements concerning the general perception of PFIs as a "new way of procuring new 
things, , 34 the contracting authority will normally not intend "to award a works 
contract on its own account, but to find a company which would have the building 
works carried out in the framework of its obligation to the authority. "" There may be 
a presumption in favour of regarding the works carried out 'in the course of a PFI as 
not being severable and as incidental to the framework agreement. This is then 
properly classified as a services contract. 
The European Court of Justice rejected the severability approach taken in Re 
Data Processing and suggested by Advocate-General Lenz when deciding the Gestion 
Hotelera case. The judges developed instead the "main objective" test which seeks to 
determine the authority's primary intention and the "predominant purpose"16 of the 
contract. If the authority intended to award a works contract on its own account, the 
purpose of the contract is obviously one for works, whereas if the works were to be 
carried out in the framework of a broader contractual obligation to the authority, the 
contract is essentially one for services. The ECJ held in Gestion Hotelera that the 
"main object of the award of the contract was, first, the installation and opening of a 
31 Para 40 of the opinion. 
32 Ibidem. 
33 Case C-331/92 Gestion Hotelera Internacional v Communidad Autonoma de Canarlas [1994] E. C. R. 
34 
1- 1329, Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, para. 41 at p. 1340. 
35 
Read, op. cit., note 158 of ch. 2, p. 189. 
Opinion of Advocate-General Lenz, op. cit., note 33, para 40, at p. 1340. 
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casino and, secondly, the operation of a hotel business. It is common ground that those 
contracts, considered as such, do not fall within the scope of the [Works Directive] 
.,, 
37 
'Me rationale for this "common ground" can be deduced ftom the sixteenth recital of 
the Services Directive, stating that when "works are incidental rather than the object 
of the contract, they do not justify treating the contract as a public works contract. " In 
order to ascertain whether contractual elements are the main object of the contract or 
merely incidental, the ECJ developed in the Gesti6n- Case three principal criteria of 
relevance 
. 
..... First, that the documents mentioned above [specifications] did not 
contain any description of the subject-matter of the works to be carried out 
..., 
secondly, that there was no provision for remuneration for those works and thirdly, 
that the successful tenderer was not in a position to carry them out itself. "" 
The three relevant factors therefore appear to be (1) the extent of details of the 
specifications concerning the works to be performed, (2) the provisions for 
remuneration and (3) whether the tenderer could carry out the works itself 
In applying the Court's criteria to a "typical PFI project, " one can, firstly, assert 
that the specifications of the PFI will not be drawn in great detail. The fact that 
specifications are rather designed in broad terms results mainly from the requirement 
not to stifle more innovative solutions that might be brought forward by the private 
sector tenderer. Open specifications are certainly also the consequence of an "output- 
based" approach to specifications, '9 which is per se not as prescriptive as "normal 
contracts" for acquiring clearly defined goods and services. The specification in the 
contract notice to be published in the Community's Official Journal must be written 
with a certain degree of detail regarding the expected works. Otherwise the awarding 
authority may come up against interested parties who claim that all or part of the 
project has not been accurately advertised. 
'6 H. M. Treasury, Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 46 of ch. 2, p. 31. 37 Case C-331/92 GestionHotelera [1994] E. C. R. 1-1342, para23 of the judgment. 31 Ibidem, para 24 of the judgment. 39 H. M. Treasury, Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 46 of ch. 2, p. 32. 
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With regard to the second relevant factor, the provision for remuneration, the 
Court ascertains that the payment of a lump sum indicates the award of a works 
contract while remuneration by periodic payments points to the existence of a contract 
for services. It is likely that the project company in a "typical PFI project, " apart from 
financially free standing ones, will be remunerated for carrying out the project. Hence, 
the payment usually takes the form of penodic payments relating to the provision of 
the service4o rather than a lump-sum payment designed to cover capital building costs. 
This form of remuneration guarantees the effective transfer of the building nsk to the 
private sector entity. It also shows that the assumed "typical PFI" contract may more 
suitably be charactensed as a services contract according to the "remuneration 
criterion. " 
However, this criterion does not reflect modem financing practices. Lump-sum 
payment for large-scale infrastructure projects, even if not procured through PPP, is 
becoming rare. Secondly, it can be argued that the payment mechanism should not 
have repercussions for the classification of the contract. The assumed relationship is 
hardly invariable, as authorities pay for their works contracts also by means of 
periodical payments. Those contracts do not necessarily include an element of 
services. On the basis of this assumption, the Highway Agency procured its PFI 
motorway projects under the Works Directive, even though the contracts included 
41 
substantial service components 
. 
Under the final limb of the "main object" test, it should be considered whether 
the tenderer is able to carry out the work by itself or if it is necessary to employ third 
parties to perform the awarded contract. The Court's purpose in establishing this 
criterion was that if the private sector company does not perform the works itself, it 
may more properly be viewed as a service provider from the authority's perspective. It 
should be noted that the judgment was based on Council Directive 71/305 before it 
40 cf, Thomas, op. cit., note 119 of ch. 2, p. 521. 
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was amended by Directive 89/440.42 This is significant, since the ECJ could not take 
into account that the Works Directive includes the procurement of a work "by any 
means. " This term expressly provides authorities with the opportunity to appoint 
providers to let contracts as agents on their behalf Thus, considering the current 
legislative framework, the court's third criterion seems doubtful. 
In comparing the three approaches taken it has to be pointed out that all of them 
lack the precision to provide awarding authorities and tenderers with appropriate legal 
certainty. Furthermore, as Advocate-General Lenz relied on the same criteria (detail of 
specifications, provision of remuneration) in exercising the severability-test as the 
Court in its main object4est, their practical effect may be similar. The possibility 
remains that the Court could adopt the alternative relative value approach. 4' 
7. Z6 Application of the concession rules 
Once the authority has classified the PFI as being either works or services, the 
question has to be addressed whether the rules on concessions are applicable. As we 
have seen in chapter 3, contracts classified as works concessions are regulated under 
the Works Directive only in a very limited way involving requirements to advertise 
the concession. Neither the Utilities nor the Services or Supply Directives contain 
express regulation of concession contracts and it is submitted that those types of 
concessions are not covered by the directives at all. As we have seen, 44 there may 
probably be limited obligations such as a requirement to advertise under the E. C. 
Treaty. 
45 Only the Works Directive includes a definition of concession contracts. The 
distinct feature46 of a concession is that the private sector contractor is awarded the 
right to exploit the delivered asset instead of being reimbursed by a lump sum for 
41 1 lighway Agency, op. cit., note 16 of ch. 2, para 4.4. 42 Case C-331/92 GestionHotelera [19941 E. C. R. 1-1342, at para 17. 43 Digings/Benett, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, D2/20. 44 At para 2.3.3.5. 
45 Article I (d). 
41 Case 272/91 "11alian Lonery"I "Lottontatica" [19921 E. C. R. 1457; [19921 E. C. R. 1-3929 
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delivering works, services or goods. "Exploitation" in this context means that the 
private sector provider will recover its incurred costs directly from public users instead 
of charging the awarding authority. 47 Hence where the concessionaire receives 
payments from public users the contracts is not a concession but rather a service 
contract. 48 It is submitted that in a situation where a concessionaire builds government 
accommodation and is reimbursed by 
The Commission further specifies in its Draft Interpretative Communication on 
Concessions49 that another element of the definition of "exploitation" is that the 
"contractor assumes a significant part of the risks in the management and use of the 
facilities. "'O The Commission emphasises that even though the Directives do not 
expressly deal with other forms of partnerships, this does not imply that they are 
generally exempt ftorn the rules and principles of the E. C. Treaty. As many of these 
concession-type partnerships can be defined as "acts of State" in the broadest sense, 
they are, according to the Commission, subject to Articles 43 and 49 E. C. Treaty and 
the fundamental principles derived from them by the Court of Justice 
.51 This view is 
highly contentious. " 
726L Works concessions 
The Works Directive and its implementing U. K. Regulations regard public works 
concession as a distinct category of contract, the "works" being the exploited asset. 
The rules for concessions laid down by the Works Regulations are perceived as 
much less onerous in comparison with those for ordinary works contracts. The 
awarding authority has to comply only with the procedural obligation to publish its 
"intention" of awarding the concession by means of a notice in the Official Journal, " 
47 II. M. Treasury, Private Finance Panel, op-cit., note 46 of ch. 2, p. 3 1. 48 Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24 of ch. 2, para 8.041. 49 European Corrunission, op. cit, note 24 of ch. 3. 50 Ibid., at para 1.1; this view is supported by Advocate General Pergola in C-369/96 Gemeente Amhem 
v. BFI, (1998) E. C. R. 1-6821, para 26 of the opinion. 5, See above section 3.3.3. 52 Braun, op. cit., note 116 of ch. 3, p. 3 9. 53 Works Directive, art 11(3). 
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allowing at least 52 days for receipt of tenders. " The firm or consortium awarded the 
concession is itself obliged to publish a notice in the OJEC publishing the award of 
any works sub-contracts exceeding the value of ECU 5,000,000. The private works 
concessionaire may fix a time limit that is not less than 37 days for participation 
requests and 40 days for the receipt of tenders 
. 
5' There are no further procedural 
restrictions imposed on the concessionaire or the awarding authority and, in particular, 
there are no constraints set on how the tendering procedure should be conducted 
thereafter. 
PFI projects are in some cases not dissimilar to concessions 16 in the sense that the 
awarding authority is to a certain degree privatising the duty to provide "works" to the 
public. It is therefore not surprising that a number of PFI projects have been 
categorised as works concessions, including the Channel Tunnel Rail Link and the 
Skye, Second Severn and Dartford QE2 bridges. These types of PFI projects generally 
give the private sector contractor the incentive of being able to charge private users 
directly for the service or construction which they provide, for example, by levying 
toll on users of the completed bridge, in exchange for carrying out the works and 
bearing the risks of the transaction. Conversely, where the private consortium is to be 
remunerated for a project agreement only through shadow tolls, these are periodic 
payments by government based on traffic usage, it is rather an agreement for services 
than a concession because the right to charge tolls from the end user is not vested in 
the consortium. 57 
The public authority awarding a PFI as concession agreement is largely exempted 
from the general obligation to comply with the rigid procedural requirements and, in 
particular, from the obligation to make the project subject to the various competitive 
processes set down in the procurement rules. This exemption from competitive 
54 Works Directive, art 15-, Works Regulations, art 25. 
55 Works Directive, art 16-, Works Regulations, art 26. 
5, Skilbeck, op. cit., note 24, p. 155. 
57 Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24 of ch. 2, paras 8.04346. 
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tendering procedures stands in contrast to the Treasury's clear commitment to 
competition as a means of "securing value for money and helping to guard against 
corruption or the appearance of it. "" In order to reap these benefits, the particular PH 
project must be subjected to some competitive process even though it may be correctly 
classified as a public works concession and the public authority does not need, from a 
legal point of view, to follow the procurement rules. '9 
7.2.62. Services concessions 
Services concession contracts are contracts under which a purchasing authority 
engages a private sector entity to provide services and confers the right to exploit the 
provision of these services to the public by charging the final user. Although the 
concept of service concession was included in the Directive's first draft in its Article 
l(a), 60 it was subsequently left out of the final text because in some Member States 
public services concessions are awarded by contract whereas in others they are not. 
Including provisions for service concessions in the Directive would have led to 
disequilibrium among states, which would have applied the Directive differently. 61 
Services concessions are therefore excluded from the European procurement 
Directives and from the implementing U. K. Regulations 
. 
62 It is well settled, for 
example, that a concession concerning urban cleaning or waste removal services is not 
covered by the procurement rules where the contractor levies a tariff directly from the 
end users. 
The Commission promotes the application of certain principles embodied in the 
E. C. Treaty, such as equal treatment, transparency, mutual recognition and 
proportionality. It considers that these principles require inter alia that contracts for 
services concession should be advertised in advance and that these publications should 
"' H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 4 of ch. 2, p. 40. 
'9 Read, op. cit., note 158 of ch. 2, p. 188-189. 0 PrieB, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 53. 6, Read, op. cit., note 158 of ch. 2, p. 188. 
02 See Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH v. Telekom Austria, judgment of 7 December 2000 (unreported) para 49 of the judgment. 
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We have seen, that the principles of equal treatment and transparency are 
not based on the Treaty but were derived from the Court of Justice directly from the 
procurement Directives. 64 Hence, it is not possible to derive any positive obligations 
from the principles which, ftirthermore, would not be capable of delivering the 
necessary legal certainty which is much needed by practitioners involved in this 
65 field 
. 
It is particularly important in the context of concession to differentiate between 
contracts for works and those for services, since works concessions are subject to rules 
in the Directives, whilst services concessions remain completely unregulated. The 
clear distinction between works, supplies and services contracts as envisaged by the 
legislator in the procurement Directives is especially difficult to draw in large-scale 
projects which are supposed to realise synergies by integrating all three elements. The 
European Commission has advocated that the decisive criterion was whether the 
contract involves building a structure on behalf of the grantor. 66 Hence, according to 
the Commission, concession contracts are included in the scope of the rules on works 
concessions as far as they exceed the value threshold of ECU 5,000,000 and some 
kind of construction work is involved. This rule is applicable even if substantial 
services elements are involved. The effect of this suggestion is that concession 
contracts, which would be defined as service concessions by applying the greater 
value or the main objective test, are brought within the ambit of the rules on works 
concessions. 67 But that conclusion is not reconcilable with the clear intention of the 
legislator, which refrained from regulating concessions with a major services element. 
The Commission has proposed to change the procurement Directives to bring 
,3 European Commission, op. cit., note 24 of ch. 3, pp. 10-13. 
14 See above section 3.3.3. 
,5 Clark/Norris, "Euro Procurement, " (1999) Supply Management (15 April) p. 42. 
, European Commission, op. cit., note 24 of ch. 3, para 2.3. 67 Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24 of ch. 2, para 8.029. 
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services concessions within their ambit. 68 T'hese amendments are likely to introduce 
greater legal certainty by clarifýing and simPlifying the current regulatory situation. 
7.2 6 3. Utilities concession 
Utilities concessions are neither provided for in the European Utilities Directive 
nor in the implementing U. K. Utilities Regulations 
. 
69 It is therefore suggested that, for 
example, a licence to operate a local train service where the contractor levies a tariff 
directly from the end users, does not fall within the realm of the utilities rules. 
7.3. Empirical findings 
The issues of taxonomy and classification were discussed with some 
interviewees. Two related matters of controversy addressed were the questions of 
whether PFIs had to be classified as works or services contracts and whether PFIs 
came within the realm of the concession rules. 70 
7.3.1. Classirication of transaction 
When analysing the potential legal uncertainties in the early stages of the 
research, one of the more obvious uncertainties appeared to be the characterisation of 
PH contracts as being either works, supply or services contracts. 
Later when drafting the questionnaire, the issue of how to classify PFIs was 
initially excluded from the catalogue of questions. It was felt that the limited time 
available for the interviews of 45 to 60 minutes should be spend on discussing more 
pertinent and complex issues causing greater legal uncertainty. The problem of 
taxonomy and classification has been exhaustively dealt within Treasury guidance 
notes and was thus considered to be settled in PFI practice so as not to pose serious 
difficulties. 
68 European Commission, op. cit., note 24 of ch. 3, p. 7, footnote 9. 
Similar to services concession, the European Commission included utilities concessions in its first 
draft of the Utilities Directive, OJ 1989 C 264, p. 22. This provision was not adopted by the Council, 




However, it was one outcome of the necessarily iterative research process that 
this presumption proved to be unfounded. Although not addressed in the 
questionnaire, seven intervieweeS71 identified the question of classification under the 
procurement rules as one of the fundamental problems III PFI procurement. 
The fact that almost one third of the respondents mentioned the problem area 
without being expressly asked was one of the surprising discoveries of the research 
and justifies its incorporation into the research. It seems that at least some lawyers 
continue to consider the issues involved on a regular basis, regardless of the fact that 
the Treasury guidance strongly recommends the "automatic" classification of PFIs as 
contracts for services. 
What is more, there is considerable evidence that those lawyers who mentioned 
the issue and assessed its implications on a regular basis, did not endorse the 
Treasury's view. BothSA#3, for example, started from precisely the opposite 
assumptions, "all the facility projects are works, not services. " He added that 
"you go with the flow at the end of the day. And if central 
government says what you are doing is services notwithstanding 
the definition, then we say it's services to keep them happy. " 
This statement suggests that lawyers gave advice against their better judgment for 
the sake of not confusing or upsetting their clients by providing advice deviating from 
central government guidance. It is noteworthy that law firms operate in a highly 
competitive market and naturally wish to avoid alienating their clients by raising legal 
problems perceived to be of a purely "academic" nature. 72 
PubSA#4 adopted a different approach to guard her public sector clients against 
potential difficulties stemming from the "unfortunate', 73 Classification issue by 
advertising projects 'twin-tracked. " On a number of occasions, she did not decide on 
how to classify the contract under the rules but instead placed a contract advertisement 
PrivSA#3-, PubSA#10; PubSA#3; PubSA#4; PubSA#7; BothSA#2; BothSA#3. 
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in the works contract and the services contract section of the OJEC. She followed this 
"belts and braces" practice in spite of her awareness that the Regulations require 
classification according to which element is predominant. 74 Other participants 
considered those twin-tracked contract advertisements as "incoherent with the rules. 1'75 
For them, it was "either works or services. , 76 
Although those respondents raising the issue rejected the Treasury's 
interpretation lawyers including PubSA43 were aware of the advantages of applying 
77 
the Services Directive 
. 
The advantages of the latter included that it provided 
71 
authorities with an additional ground for using the negotiated procedure 
. 
Pub, SA#4 
said another advantage of using the services regime was the pre-qualification criterion 
of "ability" which provided authorities with more flexibility when shortlisting bidders. 
Taking different positions on the issue of classification, respondents also 
expressed different perceptions of the significance of the problem. BothSA#3 thought 
the matter resolved: 
11 we have gone to Counsel on that 3 or 4 years ago 
... 
but nobody 
talks about it anymore. " 
This view is reflected in statements of other respondents who rated the problem 
as being only of minor importance 
. 
79 Fourteen interviewees did not mention it at all. 
This perception shows that the respondents tend to underestimate the classification 
issue during their daily practice. It appears doubtful whether the issue of classification 




75 BothSA#3; This view is also suggested by practitioners: Bickerstaff, "The Private Finance lnitiative: 
A Legal Vie%V'www. twobirds. com/hbrary/infotech/irdtiative. htm (last accessed 1999); Fox/Tott, note 
76 
5 of ch. 2, at para. 3.2.11. 
BothSA#3. 
77 PubSA#4; BothSA#2-, PubSA#4-, BothSA#3; PubSA#9. 
78 l1ubSA#4. 
79 PubSA#3; PubSA#4; PubSA#7-1 BothSA#2. 
80 Braun, "Ticking the right box for OJEC" (2000) PH Intelligence Bulletin (3) p. 16. 
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Practising lawyers' failure to appreciate the importance of the issue may reflect a lax 
attitude towards regulated procurement, a phenomenon to which we shall return. 
7 3.2 Application of the concession rules 
Half of the lawyers interviewed had no experience in applying the concession 
rules in the PFI context. The lack of more widespread experience in applying the 
concession rules may be explained by the fact that the Treasury has always favoured 
the application of the rules on services contracts over the concession rules. 
7.3.2.1. Definition of concession contracts 
The Treasury internally promotes that a contract has to be classified as 
concession if at least 15-20% of its income stream derives from the exploitation 
element of the contract. Under those circumstances, either the rules for works 
concessions become applicable, or the contract escapes regulation of it is a services or 
utilities concession. However, this threshold is not laid down in formal governmental 
guidance. " 
Only two lawyers with experience in applying the works concession rules within 
the PFI context supported the adoption of such a comparatively low threshold. 82 They 
said that the pre-condition of a "substantial" exploitation could be satisfied even if 
only 25% of the income stream derive from the exploitation. This percentage could be 
substantial if, for instance, the contractual arrangement provided extensive minority 
voting rights. 
PnvSA#6 insisted that the Treasury's view was informed partly by the typical 
financial structure of the PFI arrangements. Lenders were usually not interested in 
taking the market-risk, that is to say, the risk of demand. Generally, the shareholders 
of the project company (SPV) bore this important category of risk, which was 
reflected in their equity investment in the SPV. The equity investment covered not 
more than 8-15% of the total project costs. Hence, the typical real amount of 
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exploitation was reflected in the relatively low equity share of the shareholders. 
Hence, to capture PFI projects with their low equity share within the rules of 
concession the Treasury wanted to keep the percentage threshold of exploitation as 
low as possible. 
The majority of lawyers experienced with applying the works concession regime 
within the PFI context felt that the 15-20% threshold was not sufficient to satisfy the 
criterion of "substantiality" as laid down in the Works Directive. " They took a rather 
robust view on what percentage is necessary and generally felt uncomfortable with the 
Treasury's figure. 84 Analogies were drawn with the predominant purpose rules or the 
greater value rules, where the percentage has to be "significant. " Therefore, PubSA#2 
and PubSA#6 felt the exploitation element should exceed 50%. 
PubSA#9 advocated a different approach in defining concession contracts. She 
wanted to look at the risk and reward attached to the project and the economic reality 
of the project as a whole, irrespective of whether the end-user was a member of the 
public. She argued it was an accident how the services were delivered and that it did 
not make any difference whether the charge was coming from the authority or the end- 
user. Under both circumstances, there may or may not be a sufficient transfer of risk. " 
Other participants in the study supported the Treasury's view that PFIs were 
generally not concession contracts. They insisted that the situation in PFIs was 
different. The revenue risk was not borne by the contractor because the project 
agreement generally did not contain an element of exploitation. Projects such as a toll- 
bridge, where the concessionaire is remunerated by the right to levy the end-users of 
the asset, were in their experience exceptional in PH 
. 
86 
" This threshold was suggested by John Colling, then head of the procurement policy department H. M 
Treaswy, during two practitioner seminars in 2000. 82 BothSA# 1, PrivSA#6. 
83 PubSA#2, PubSA#6. 
94 PubSA#3. 
85 PrivSA#6. 
81 BothSA# 1. 
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Z3.22 Works concessions 
The question arises, why there have not been many more PFI projects awarded 
under the works concession rules despite the similarities in concept and the advantage 
that the project is just "lightly" regulated. One reason for this tendency is, as 
maintained by BothSA#2, "bad experience" in the past with a major international 
infrastructure project where time and cost slippages occurred. " However, it appears 
unlikely that the cost and time overruns occurred just because that unique project was 
advertised as a concession contract. 
PubSA#3 gave an example of a works concession, the conversion of a pier. In 
that case, the responsible authority wanted a contractor to re-build and run a concert 
venue. Only a small percentage of the project was concerned with office space for the 
authority. The project company recovered their investment by renting the venue to 
concert organisers. In this project, a major exploitation element was identifiable, 
justifying the application of the works concession regime. In the examples given, the 
exploitation element of the income stream was about 90%. The classification of the 
contract as concession therefore did not pose difficulties. 
A reason why other PFIs have not been equally classified as works concessions 
may be that the concept of concession is unfamiliar to the U. K. legal system. 
PubSA49 described concessions as a "civil law concept"" and remarked that the 
uncertainties surrounding the parameters of a concession might prove a major 
obstacle. '9 PubSA#6 concurred, and added the Commission's paper on concessions 
could not diminish the uncertaintles. 90 
A further reason why the concession rules have not been used frequently in the 
past is, as said by PubSA49, the "political steer from the Treasury to use the 
negotiated procedure under the Services Directive. " 





Moreover, lawyers found it debatable whether choosing the works concession 
avenue was good for the project or not. While this simplified the procurement 
procedure, PrivSA46 held that it would probably complicate the planning of the sub- 
contractors. Consortia had to ensure that their members are brought within the 
"affiliated undertaking" rule with the effect that intra-consortium contracts do not 
have to be advertised in compliance with procurement law. 9' He insisted that the latter 
aspect was especially important for private sector consortia. 
73.23. Services concessions 
PnvSA43 argued that many PFIs should have been classified as services 
concession contracts, thus releasing them entirely from the procurement Regulations. 
He stated that the concept of services concessions could find application in education 
and in hospital projects where the majority of the work is not completing the building, 
but running the school or hospital. PrivSA43 thought this reflected the balance of 
value of most of the PFI projects and what the public sector is trying to achieve with 
them. PFIs were not about building projects, they were arrangements for contracting 
out the management of an entity. He concluded, 
"PFI contracts are not contracts for works, but for services. 
Consortia are notpaidfor the services by a lump-sum, but they are 
enabled to generate income. In all likelihood, the contract has to 
be classified as a services concession, falling completely outside 
the procurement rules. "' 
Equally, PubSA#9 felt that the concept of concession sat very well with PFL 
Especially in the case of more conventional PFIs, where the private sector is bearing 
risk and reward of the operation of tile facility, the commercial reality was comparable 
to a concession. PubSA#9 mentioned that in these situations, the private sector 
services providers were at risk. 
91 PrivSA#6. 
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Six lawyers advised on projects that were classified either as works or services 
concessions. 93 PubSA43 mentioned the reception area for a hospital as an example of 
a PFI services concession. In this project, the hospital was only interested in a 
reception desk and an IT link to the hospital. Shops occupied the remaining space of 
the reception area. The authority remunerated the project company by granting the 
right to commercial exploitation of the reception area by means of renting the space 
for shops. Despite the fact that the projects was a services concession and per se 
outside the procurement regime, the authority advertised the PFI in the OJEC. 94 
In another example, a PFI contract was concerned with running a museum. This 
contract was, on the word of BothSA43, not advertised at all. He argued that the 
decision not to advertise the contract might have been justified. The agreement 
appeared to be a concession, the granting of a license to run the museum. There were 
no ongoing payments from the public sector. The concessionaire was granted the right 
to levy charges to the public end-user mstead. '5 
The range of responses and examples is revealing. In the absence of central 
government advice there seemed to be general uncertainty amongst lawyers. The 
experience of PubSA#2, who has ftequently advised on housing accommodation for 
staff members, is a case in point. PubSA42 advised that such a project is not a 
concession, on the basis that "it does not sit easily with PFI and there were too many 
legal uncertainties involved. , 96 She had initially thought that the fact that the 
occupants were paying rent to the accommodation provider could justify applying the 
concession rules. In the end she stuck to the well-trodden paths of PH procurement 










Despite the fact that services concessions are not brought within the realm of the 
procurement Regulations, three lawyers with experience in dealing with services 
concessions agreed that authorities generally preferred to advertise their projects 
98 
voluntarily. PubSA#3 suggested that the authorities were willing to comply with the 
obligation to advertise PFIs, because they have their own standing orders, their own 
rules and Regulations obliging them to tender competitively. The authorities viewed 
advertising under the Regulations as a means to induce the necessary competition and 
to avoid potential problems that could arise from legal uncertainties-99 PrivSA43 
reported a slightly uncomfortable feeling that the rules did not apply, suggesting an 
extra-legal sense of obligation. 
PubSA-#6 gave the example of an IT project concerned with the delivery of an IT 
infrastructure of 20,000 personal computers. Payment was made on a user-charge 
basis, meaning that the contractor's charges were calculated by multiplying the 
number of the usable computers with the user charge. As the payment was based on 
the level of usable infrastructure, the exploitation risk was bome to 100% by the 
private sector. PubSA46 advocated that the classification of such a contract as a 
service concession should not change if the services were provided to the public 
authority. Although, payment was made by a non-user charge, the significant 
exploitation element remained recognisable. 100 
Although such a contract for a services concession falls per se outside the ambit 
of the procurement Regulations, the public sector authority wished to advertise the 
contract in the OJEC. Tlus was viewed as a sensible way of commencing the 
procurement process. PubSA46 observed that 
"people are quite odd. They will press you repeatedly for ways in 
which they don't have to advertise, for instance where a contract is 




to be extended If you give them a quite legitimate route that the 
rules do not apply, they want to apply them anyway. " 
It seems that the question of whether to advertise the project or not may not be 
seriously entertained in PFL Authorities want to attract a broad pool of interested 
suppliers and thus generate a sufficient degree of competition. On a more general 
level, authorities may comply with the procurement rules where regulated 
procurement has no negative effects on their project. 
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Chapter 8 The procedural requirements 
8.1. Introduction 
Public authorities failing within the ambit of the public sector Regulations are 
under a general duty to award contracts in accordance with three procedures, namely 
the open, restricted or negotiated procedure. Whereas the use of open and restricted 
procedure are equal footed, the application of the negotiated procedure is restricted to 
the fulfilment of certain derogation criteria. The latter may only be employed in 
"exceptional circumstances"' which are laid down in the Regulations. 
For procuring an asset using private finance, the open procedure seems 
inappropriate because every bid has to be considered and, it does not offer the 
opportunity to restrict (shortlist) the number of bidders. Under the restricted 
procedure, authorities are permitted to shortlist bidders, but are prohibited from 
negotiating the contractual terms. 
It is for those reasons that lawyers participating in the study perceived the strict 
application of open and restricted procedure as too cumbersome, especially because 
they do not permit negotiations between the awarding authority and prospective 
bidders. Although this restriction is not expressly mentioned in the Regulations, it can 
2 
be deduced from a joint statement issued by the Council and the Commission. This 
statement essentially declares that "in open and restricted procedures all negotiations 
with candidates or tenderers on fundamental aspects of contracts... shall be ruled out. " 
Although this statement is not legally binding, it has been employed as a teleological 
argument to assert that in both standard procedures, it was the legislators' intention to 
3 prevent the procuring entity from discussions with tenderers 
. 
PH projects consist of a bundle of multi-faceted contracts, which are inherently 
complex to deal with. For this reason it is likely that the need arises during the 
1 Case 199/85 Commission v. Italy [1987] E. C. R. 1039, at para 14. 
2 Statement conc. art. 7 (4) of Council Directive 93/37/EEC, 14th June 1993, OJ [1994] L 111,114. 
3 AG Tesauro in Case C-243/89 Commission v. Denmark [ 1993] E. C. R. 1-3353, para 19 of the opinion. 
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procurement process to enter into discussion with shortlisted bidders, as part of the 
process to select the preferred bidder no matter how well the specifications have been 
drafted. In the legal and contractual area alone, it usually takes months of negotiations 
to adjust and settle contracts that (a) reflects both parties' wishes, (b) allocate risks 
correctly and (c) meet Treasury and governmental criteria on the one hand and private 
4 
sector concerns on the other. 
8.2. Use of the negotiated procedure 
- 
the legal problems 
Due to the fact that the restricted procedure is perceived too inflexible to serve as 
a suitable framework for procuring private financed projects, ' many awarding 
authorities attempt to satisfy one of the grounds so as to derogate from the above 
outlined rigid procedures. Two types of negotiated procedures have to be 
distinguished, namely a competitive type that requires the contract to be advertised in 
the Official Journal and a non-competitive type which does not require a prior 
advertisement. 
The negotiated procedure without advertisement is only permitted on exceptional 
grounds 
.6 These grounds include circumstances where only one provider can 
deliver 
the work, good or service in question due to exclusive rights 7 or in situations of 
extreme unforeseen urgency. ' It can be expected that these grounds will only arise 
very rarely in the context of PFI. As this study did not encounter a case where the non- 
competitive negotiated procedure was applied, it will not be considered further. 
8.2 1. Negotiated procedure with advertisement 
Under the negotiated procedure with advertisement, the contracting authority 
awards its contract after publication of a contract notice and the selection of 
Morrison/Owen, op. cit., note 71 of ch. 2, p. 1 1. 
In the PFI prison projects Bridgend and Fazakerley, the Prison Service started under the restricted 
procedure but later shifted to the negotiated procedure, Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 72 of ch. 2, 
para 5.1. 
Services Directive art. 11 (3) (a)-(f). 
Works Regulation 10 (2) (c), Supply Regulation 10 (2) (d), Services Regulation 10 (2) (e). 
Works Regulation 10 (2) (f), Supply Regulation 10 (2) (e), Services Regulation 10 (2) (g). 
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candidates according to publicly known qualitative criteria. 9 The three public sector 
Directives contain different derogations for using the competitive negotiated 
procedure. In the context of PFI, there are mainly two derogations of interest and 
importance. " These are the "overall pricing" derogation of the Works and Services 
Directive and the derogation based on the fact that "services cannot be drawn up with 
sufficient precision" derogation provided in the Services Directive. These are set out 
further below. 
There is, unfortunately, little guidance on the interpretation of both derogations 
from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Nevertheless, the Court has decided two 
important issues as regards to those exceptions. Firstly, they "must be interpreted 
strictly. "" Secondly, the "burden of proving the actual existence of exceptional 
circumstances justifying a derogation lies on the person seeking to rely on those 
, 12 circumstances. 
Both quotations from ECJ case law explicitly prohibit the application of a 
derogation on a regular basis. Hence, authorities are clearly prevented from using the 
negotiated procedure automatically when procuring PFIs. It has to be observed that the 
European Court of Justice established the requirements in cases concerning the 
application of the negotiated procedure without advertisement. It is, therefore, 
uncertain whether the Court will adopt a similarly strict approach to the competitive 
negotiated procedure or favours a more flexible approach reflecting the "real 
commercial need for the use of the negotiated procedure in PPP projects. , 13 
8.2.1.1. "Overall pricing is not possible" 
The most pertinent ground to derogate from open and restricted procedure in the 
9 Works Directive art. 7 (2). 
10 Foxfrott, op. cit., note 5 of ch. 2, at para 3.3.8. 
11 Case 199/95 Commission v Italy [1997] E. C. R. 1039, para 14 of the judgment; Case 328/92 
Commission v Spain [1994] E. C. R. 1-1569, para, 15 of the judgment-, AG Lenz in Case 199/85 
Commission v Italy [19871 E. C. R. 1039, para 32 of thejudgment. 12 Case 199/85 Commission v Italy [1987] E. C. R. 1039, para 14 of the judgment-, Case 328/92 
Commission v Spain [1994] E. C. R. 1-1569-, Case 57/94 Commission v Italyjudgment of May 18,1995 (unreported). 
13 Arrowsn-ýth (ed. ), note 24 of ch. 2, p. 344, at para, 9.093. 
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context of PFI is laid down in the Works and Services Regulations. It determines that 
a contract may be awarded by the negotiated procedure "exceptionally, when the 
nature or the [works or services] to be carried out under the contract Is such, or the 
risks attaching thereto are such, as not to permit prior overall pricing. 1,14 The meaning 
of this derogation and the related question of whether it is applicable in PH are 
matters of controversy. 
The "overall pricing" derogation commences, in contrast to all other derogations, 
with the term "exceptionally. " This term expressis verbis prevents authorities from 
employing the derogation as a rule in PH projects. 
H. M. Treasury has tried to employ a historical argument by asserting that "ffie 
exceptionality attached to this circumstance should not cause concern. "The provision 
was first included in Article 7(2)(b) of the Works Directive that was negotiated in the 
1970s, before the concept of PF1 was devised. PF1 contracts may well have been 
considered exceptional at the time the Directive was drafted. " 15 The Treasury 
concludes "although there are restrictions on the use of this [negotiated] procedure, 
they are unlikely to prevent its use for most PFI projects 
. 
5516 "It is very likely that most 
PFI projects will meet the conditions required. , 17 
It appears difficult to reconcile the Treasury's opinion with the wording of the 
Directives. In fact, the Treasury seeks to turn the exception into the rule, Despite its 
apparent weakness, the historic argument Is widely used and unsurprisingly surfaced 
in some of the interviews with PFI practitioners. " The Treasury's historic argument 
disguises that the Directives, which were initially drafted in the early 1970s, have been 
regularly subjected to amendments, '9 interpreting guidelMeS20 and communications to 
14 Works Regulations art. 7 (2) (c), Services Regulations art. 11 (2) (b). 
I I. M. Treasury, Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 46 of ch. 2, p. 32. 
I I. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 4 of ch. 2, p. 4 1. 
17 Ibid., p. 62. 
18 PubSA#3. 
19 Works Directive 89/440; 93/36-, 97/52; cf. the recent proposal to streamline the Directives widiin 
which the Coirunission maintains its strict interpretation: European Commission, Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination ofprocedures for the 
Footnotes continued on the next page. 
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the Member States. " In all those documents, with the noteworthy exception of its 
"Public Procurement in the European Union" Communication, 22 the Commission 
interprets the Directives restrictively. 
In many of the communications, the "Guardian of the Treaty" complained about 
the "excessive use of the negotiated procedure. "" What is more, the Commission and 
the Council never showed any inclination to side the Treasury's view that public 
private partnerships should be considered as exceptional or as coming within the ambit 
of one of the derogations. Hence, the exceptionality of the overall pricing derogation 
cannot be dismissed as being a "historical" drafting error of the European legislator. 
It has been further argued that PFI schemes were "exceptional" when viewed in 
the context of procurement in general. PFI schemes were of exceptional complexity 
and for that reason the exceptionality requirement was generally satisfied. Although 
the complexity inherent to PFIs distinguishes the projects undoubtedly from normal 
procurement tasks, it could be argued that the overall pricing derogation was not 
intended to make the negotiated procedure accessible in the case of "exceptionally 
complex" projects. This may be concluded from the Commission's proposals to 
amend the procurement directives published in May 2000.24 Those proposals included 
a new derogation for the use the competitive negotiated procedure which is expressly 
based on the assumption that complex procurement tasks should be eligible to use the 
competitive negotiated procedure. Consequently, if "exceptional" in the overall 
pricing derogation covered "exceptionally complex" procurements, the proposed 
amendment would not change the current legal situation. 
Even if one accepts the first view, it appears difficult to classify increasingly 
award of public supply contracts, public services contracts and public works contracts, 10.5.2000, 
COM(2000) 275 final. 
20 European Conunission, Public Procurement and Community Financing [19891 Official Journal 
C22/03, of 28.01.89. 
21 European Commission, op. cit., note 59 of ch. 3. 
22 European Conunission, op. cit., note 68 of ch. 4. 
23 European Conunission, op. cit., note 59 of ch. 3, paras 3.15-3.16. 
24 European Cotnn-ýission, op. cit., note 19. 
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"standardised" PFI schemes in the health or prison sector as exceptional. 
Employing the "overall pricing" derogation is furthermore linked to the 
requirement that the "nature of the works or services" or the "risks attached" to the 
project prohibit any prior overall pricing. The question of what the drafters meant by 
the "nature of die works or services" is a matter of controversy and one can 
distinguish three interpretative approaches. 
The circumstances the Council and the Commission had initially in mind when 
drafting the Directives were contracts where the risk attached to the performance of 
the project cannot be properly quantified in advance. The Commission's interpretation 
of the term "nature of the works or services" is inspired by projects where the 
geological conditions are such that it is impossible for bidders to submit an offer with 
a firm price. 25 
The Commission gives the example of a tunnel which has to be bored through 
heterogeneous rocks. Where inconclusive geological surveys do not permit assessing 
the associated risks and the pricing structure of the tunnel project, the "overall pricing" 
derogation should be applicable. The example chosen by the Commission further 
reveals that derogation from open and restricted procedures is only considered 
acceptable in cases where the risk is immediately attached to the performance of the 
work or service, thus preventing prior over" pricing. The Commission wants 
awarding authorities "to show that pricing is impossible since the works are such that 
no contractor is able to submit an offer with a firm price. 1,26 11is narrow interpretation 
27 
of the wording underlines the exceptionality of the derogation. 
In most PFIs the uncertainty is not attached to the project itself or its 
performance. The authority is rather likely to face difficulties in pricing PFI. Those 
difficulties result from uncertainties over the technical and financial solutions the 
tenderers will propose. According to the Commission, such difficulties are not suffice 
25 European Conunission, op. cit., note 20, p. 61. 
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in themselves to justify the application of the overall pricing derogation. Hence it can 
be argued that the derogation becomes only applicable to PFIs where it is impossible 
to develop a pricing structure because of uncertainties over performance related issues, 
such as uncertain geological conditions. If one adopts such a restrictive interpretative 
approach, the overwhelming majority of PF1 projects will fall outside the ambit of the 
"overall pricing" derogation. 
The second, less restrictive, interpretation reads the wording as encompassing 
situations where there is uncertainty over what bidders will propose to deliver. It is 
submitted that the derogation is applicable in circumstances where it is unclear what 




In early PFI projects, such as the first prison contracts, authorities faced 
difficulties when establishing specifications, scoping the agreement and establishing 
the pricing mechanisms. This was due to the immense variety of possible payment 
mechanisms and the uncertainties related to the technical solutions bidders may 
propose. Those teething problems have already lessened. Over the last couple of years, 
authorities in the U. K. have become more experienced in scoping projects. In addition, 
the sheer volume of precedent cases make the individual project less unique. A NHS 
Trust planning a new PH hospital these days has access to a plethora of guidelines, 
standardised contract terms and case studies. Those documents combined with the in- 
house expertise existent in the NHS eases significantly the difficulties of the 
respective Trust to scope the project and to draw up specifications. 
Similarly detailed guidance notes and standardised contract terms exist for IT and 
defence contracts and for local government authorities. Under those circumstances it 
appears possible to anticipate the way in which the need will be met, the risk will be 
20 Ibid. 
21 European Conunission, op. cit., note 19, para 3.2. 
28 Skilbeck, op. cit., note 24 of ch. 7, p. 157. 
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allocated and the cost of tenders that will be returned. " 
This interpretative approach may have made the overall pricing derogation 
applicable to pathfinder PFIs In the early days of the scheme. In those days, PFI 
awarding authorities were uncertain over what solutions bidders would propose. 
Nevertheless, it will be difficult to justify the application of this derogation in areas 
where authorities have gathered some experience and where standardised contract 
templates are available to them. 
The Treasury promotes a third interpretative approach which applies the overall 
pricing derogation "when at the time the procedure is launched the authority cannot 
predict the amounts that will be bid. ""' In accepting the Treasury's view, works or 
services delivered by PFI projects are "exceptional" because it is uncertain which level 
of risk bidders are prepared to assume. This uncertainty regarding the level of risk 
arises from the wide range of possible solutions, such as risk allocation, finance, and 
prevents the authority from establishing a basis to price the project in advance. " 
According to the Treasury, this uncertainty triggers automatically the derogation's 
applicability and, thus, generally permits to apply the negotiated procedure in PFI. 
Accepting the Treasury's interpretation would make the "exceptional" overall 
pricing derogation applicable in almost every procurement, not only in PFL Apart 
from a small number of "off the shelf"products, the authority is usually uncertain over 
the amounts the tenderers will bid. Because this interpretation turns the exceptional 
derogation into a rule, it is incompatible with the wording of the Directives. Therefore, 
the Treasury's interpretation has to be dismissed. 
From the discussion of the three interpretative approaches it is possible to 
ascertain, firstly, that the "overall pricing" derogation may only be invoked in 
exceptional circumstances. The mere use of PFI, as promoted by the Treasury, is per 
se not a satisfactory reason for applying the derogation. Without changing the 
29 Cf. I I. M. Treasury, Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 46 of ch. 2, p. 31-32. 
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meaning of the Directive, it seems to be impossible to utilise the "overall pncing" 
derogation on a regular basis for PF1 projects. Its regular application would "suggest 
an entirely different use , 32 of the derogation. Irrespective of whether one applies the 
wide or the restrictive approach to interpreting the "overall pricing" derogation, it will 
be very difficult to justify its application in the light of the degree of standardisation 
and experience now prevalent in the U. K. 
8.2.1.2 ýVpecifltcation cannot be drawn up with sufficient precision 
The negotiated procedure may also apply as per Services Regulation 10(2)(c) 
-when the nature of the services to be provided... is such that specifications cannot be 
drawn up with sufficient precision to permit the award of the contract usmg the open 
or restricted procedure. " 
It is part of the PFI's normal "output-based" award procedure that specifications, 
which are initially drafted in broad terms, are subsequently refined. As the process 
proceeds, refinement of the specifications is based inter alia on the inputs from the 
potential providers. " Again, the question of how to appropriately allocate risks 
renders it difficult to draw up specifications which are precise in every circumstance. 
Therefore, the following section shall examine the circumstances under which it 
becomes "necessary" to make use of the negotiated procedure. 
It is not "necessary" to employ the negotiated procedure if one of the two regular 
procurement processes is available to the PFI awarding authority. 'Me restricted 
procedure allows, as the negotiated, the use of broad output specifications against 
34 
which variant bids may be submitted. Moreover, bids may be solicited on alternative 
basis, for example with or without taking into account a certain risk acceptance. The 
disadvantage of open and restricted procedure is that both envisage a single 
specification and only one tendering stage. 
30 11. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 22, (Technical Note 2). 
31 11. M. Treaswy, Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 46 of ch. 2, p. 30. 12 Digings/Benett, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, D2.12. 33 1 I. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 4, p. 10. 
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On a practical level, awarding authorities had to enter into pre-tender negotiations 
with shortlisted bidders. " At the end of the pre-tender negotiations, the contracting 
authority had to define the final technical specifications, either by retaining one of tile 
solutions presented by the participants or by combining one or more of the solutions. " 
Once this stage is completed, participants had to submit formal bids against the 
specification. 
If such a process is deemed permissible under the restricted procedure, 37 it seems 
possible for authorities to use the restricted procedure in matured PH markets. Thus, 
to justify the use the negotiated procedure for PH projects on the ground that 
specifications cannot be drawn up otherwise will be become increasingly difficult as 
PH markets mature. This goes in particular, as it is insufficient to show that it is more 
convenient to use the negotiated procedure. 
8.22 Risk of beiniz challenred 
It has been suggested that using the negotiated route in awarding PH contracts 
exposes the contracting authority to a lesser risk of being challenged by aggrieved 
38 bidders than employing the restricted procedure. Entering a discussion process with 
the authority gives bidders the opportunity to increase their understanding of the 
authority's needs and thereby to increase the chances to be eventually awarded the 
contract. Therefore, bidders will appreciate the chance to embark on more detailed 
discussions and it is unlikely that an aggrieved tenderer considers challenging the 
contracting authority on this ground. 
Additionally, it appears questionable whether the remedy Directives would vest 
the tenderer with an effective remedy against the decision of the authority to employ 
34 Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24 of ch. 2, para 9.086. 
" On the question whether this is permissible under the current regime, see chapter 5. 
31 Note the similarities with the "dialogue" process which the Commission proposed, European 
Commission, op. cit., note 19, para 3.8. 
37 The Commission believes that "such a dialogue is not allowed under the current open and restncted 
procedures, " European Commission, op. cit., note 19, para. 3.2. 
Arrowsmith, VFI Contracts under the European Rules, " presentation given as part of the Public 
Procurement and PH Seminar, London (Treasury Solicitors), 22"d September 1999. 
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the negotiated procedure. '9 The first possible remedy against any inffingement of the 
procurement rules is to claim damages. It is unlikely that a tenderer suffered damages 
from the decision under consideration and almost impossible to proof that he suffered 
a loss or the loss of a chance. Apart from damages, the tenderer, could, secondly, seek 
to "set aside" the decision, with the effect that the choice of the procedure is devoid of 
legal effect and cannot be acted upon. 40 The third option provided by the remedies 
Directives is to seek interim relief4l Without going into details, in awarding interim 
relief the court has to weigh inter alia in a "balance of convenience" the damages 
resulting from a delay to the procurement against the interests which may be 
prejudiced if no interim relief is given. Granting interim relief for the use of the wrong 
procedure would considerably delay the procurement and thereby cause a substantial 
inconvenience to the authority. As courts Will be, consequently, rather reluctant to 
grant interim relief, this remedy is unlikely to be effective against the decision of the 
contracting authority to employ the negotiated procedure. 
It is uncertain whether it is permissible under the restricted procedure to conduct 
negotiations with bidders during the award procedure. If an authority adopts a broad 
interpretation of the rules, as advocated above, 4' and discusses certain aspects of the 
contract with the suppliers, the likelihood of making errors and breaching the 
procurement rules can be considered substantial. Accordingly, bidders are more likely 
to have effective remedies at hands when the authority tries to fit the PH procurement 
process into the restricted procedure than in the case where the negotiated procedure is 
employed. Preferring the restricted to the negotiated procedure is additionally more 
costly, because it will be more difficult to find a solution presenting value for money. 
It must not be lost out of sight that the European Commission is empowered by 
means of Article 226 E. C. Treaty to institute proceedings before the Court of Justice 
311 Foxf l'ott, note 5 of ch. 2, at para. 3.3.10. 
40 For a more detailed account see: Arrowsrruth, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 904-905. 
" Ibid., p. 898-891. 
42 See section 5.1. 
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when its suspects that a Member States failed to fulfil its obligation under the Treaty. 
The Commission has used this power in the last decade with notable vigour in the area 
of public procurement and appreciates that "the threat of legal action has led to more 
conscientious adherence to the legislation. "4' 
The Commission often commences Article 226 proceedings after an individual or 
a company launched a complaint. Complaining to the "Guardian of the Treaty" offers 
substantial benefits to a tenderer as it remains anonymous and does not have to bear 
the risks and costs involved to seek remedies before national courts. 44 The 
overwhelming number of these complaints is settled in negotiations before they move 
to the judicial phase before the Court. 
The European Commission recently used its powers under Article 226 to launch 
proceedings against the United Kingdom for using the competitive negotiated 
procedure in the course of a PF1 scheme without meeting the respective derogations. 
In this respect, the risk of being challenged for not complying with the rules has 
already materialised and the outcome of these proceedings in the "Pimlico case" 
45 
remains to be seen 
. 
8.2.3. Findings 
It is submitted that authorities procuring PF1 prOjects need to have the 
opportunity to negotiate with prospective bidders. Even the Commission admits that 
concession-type contracts can only be awarded "when the awarding authority 
negotiates with several candidates. "46 It follows from the analysis that this practical 
need is hardly compatible with the existing legal framework, which can be 
characterised as too prescriptive, too inflexible and far too adhered to outdated 
European Cornmission, op. cit., note 15 of ch. 3, p. 47. 
See for a more detailed account on the role of the individual within the Article 226 procedure: 
I larding, "Models of Enforcement: Direct and Delegated Enforcement and the Emergence of a "Joint 
action" model, " in: Harding/ Swart, op. cit., note 99 of ch. 3, ch. 2. 
45 "Pimlico" case, European Commission, (2000) Single Market News No. 23 (October). 




The lack of compatibility is reflected in the great uncertainty over the 
circumstances in which the derogations for using the negotiated procedure apply and 
how strictly they have to be interpreted. 
The Commission has recently recognised this deficit. It has proposed to introduce 
a new flexibility allowing a technical dialogue between the contracting authority and 
the candidates in the case of "particularly complex" projects. Initially, the 
Commission had specified in earlier documents that it was planning to introduce a 
"competitive dialogue" which would have operated alongside open and restricted 
procedure and would have replaced the existing "competitive" negotiated procedure 
with prior publication of a notice. This new procedure would have enabled contracting 
authorities to use a competitive form of the negotiated procedure as standard 
procedure without satisýýing any narrowly defined requirements. 
The proposal, however, was not implemented in the final draft of the Directive. 
The latter only extended the existing negotiated procedure with prior publication to 
"particularly complex" procurements. This implies that the burden rests on the 
contracting authorities to prove that the requirement of "particular complexity" is 
objectively satisfied. When drafting the criterion, the Commission had especially IT 
projects in mind, where buyers might be aware of their needs but do not initially know 
the best technical solution to meet them. Other instances intended to be included are 
new procurement arrangements where no precedents for the specific project are 
existing, such as the pathfinder projects in the early days of PFI. 




It appears unnecessary to deal with the proposals because they have not yet 
impacted on the PFI procurement practice. Furthermore, it appears doubtful whether 
Cf. for a detailed account: Arrowstruth, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1. 
Braun, "E. U. public procurement directives" (2000) PH Intelligence Bulletin (sept. ), p. 12, 
Arrowsmith, "I'lie European Commission's Proposals for new Directives on Public and Utilities 
Procurement- (2(X)O) RP. L. R. NA125. 
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they will be implemented in their current form. 49 
8.3. Empirical findings 
The question of whether it is permissible to apply the competitive negotiated 
procedure is probably the most important problem in PFI procurement from the insider 
perspective. This question also reflects the discrepancy between regulated public 
procurement and the commercial requirements of the real world. Hence, it was not 
surprising that this typical concern of PFI practitioners was prominently featured 'in 
the interviews with the legal advisors of the public sector. 
The respondents fell into two camps on the issue of whether to use the negotiated 
procedure in PFI. One group followed the Treasury Taskforce (TTF) guidance and did 
not question the practice too much. They justified this approach by reference to the 
commercial requirements of PFI procurement and the innovative approaches 
delivered, which per se did not allow "overall pricing" or rendered it impossible "to 
draw up specifications with sufficient precision. " According to them, PFI fitted neatly 
into the Directives' derogations. Lawyers in this camp did not discuss the issues 
involved in great detail on a project and considered the risks involved in adopting this 
approach as low. 'o 
A second group of lawyers advocated a more cautious approach to this issue. 
Those lawyers were generally more concerned about using the negotiated procedure 
than H. M. Treasury, because "they don't have to take the risks. " They constantly 
considered the risks involved. " For example, in the view of PubSA#3, the negotiated 
procedure should be put to the clients as the exceptional procedure and should only be 
a fitllback position. 
Commissioner Bolkestein warned on November 30,2000 that "Member States should not use this 
current exercise of simphfýing and modernising the rules as a pretext to water down the crucially 
important principles of transparency and equal treatment of bidders. If the Commission considered the 
amendments under discussion went too far in this respect, I would regretfully have to abandon the 
proposals concerning complex contracts. " (2000) Single Market News 24, December 2000. 
50 BothSA# 1; PubSA# I- 
51 PubSA#3; PubSA#10; PubSA#9. 
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Both camps differed only by a matter of degree in their assessment of the risks 
involved. Even lawyers of the first category said they outlined to their clients the 
controversy surrounding this issue" and understood that they "made the projects fit"" 
into one of the derogations. For example, BothSA#2 raised the problem to his clients 
in such a way that his clients were justified to employ the negotiated procedure. Both 
camps of legal advisors also shared the perception of the reasoned opinion issued by 
the Commission against the U. K. in the Pimlico case on the ground that the negotiated 
procedure was unjustifiably employed in the PH context. They perceived the case as a 
"bombshell', 54 aimed against the PH procurement practice. 
8.3.1. Nerotiated procedure is perceived as most avoropriate 
All lawyers agreed that negotiations were a fundamental requirement of PFI 
procurement. Despite the legal difficulties inherent to the practice, only the negotiated 
procedure was perceived flexible enough to accommodate PH projects appropriately. 
All lawyers were also aware of the potential legal difficulties involved. " BothSA42 
ý, 56 said that he sought to "make the negotiated procedure applicable 
. 
Others agreed that 
it was not "always easy"57 to "put an argument together knowing that the Commission 
never meant it that way"" in order to fit PFIs in the narrow exceptions. 59 BothSA#3 
said "we try to put a square peg through a round whole and have done the best we 
could. It might not be perfect and we are still trying to make it work ourselves. " 
Despite the difficulties involved in making the PH fit into the narrow exceptions, 
only two lawyers had experience in using the restricted procedure. One of them had to 
change award procedures halfway through the procurement process and switched to 
the negotiated procedure, because the restricted route did not allow sufficient room for 
12 PubSA# 10. 
53 lIubSA44; PrivSA#6. 
54 Editorial, (20M) IIFI Report (October), p. 1. 55 "We assurne that the negotiated procedure is applicable, but nevertheless we certainly understand 







discussions with bidders. 60 
The other example of using the restricted procedure was an equipment PFI for 
hospital scanners, a contract comparatively low in value. The buyer and providers had 
been accustomed to finance-leasing for many years and consequently the payment 
mechanisms did not require detailed discussions 
. 
6' These two cases appear to be rare 
exceptions. All but one lawyer advised to use the negotiated procedure and typical 
observations were that "there is no exception to this universal rule "6' and that 
,, 63 "negotiations are vital to PFIs. 
8.3.2. Role of the TTF noteslfff procurement practice 
One of the main reasons for the universal use of the negotiated procedure in PFI 
were the TTF guidance notes issued by the H. M. Treasury. PubSA#2 and PubSA#3 
observed that the TTF guidance advocated the use of the negotiated procedure 
"always"64 and "automatically', 65 in PFl. More than half of the respondents used the 
Treasury guidance notes as reference in interpreting the procurement rules. 66 They 
took comfort III the unambiguous recommendation and advised accordingly. 67 
Lawyers were aware that the "political steer', 6' and the "strong political pressure i, 69did 
not provide authorities with a valid legal argument. 70 
Notwithstanding this awareness, they were reluctant to give contradictory advice 
because this practice was perceived as government policy. The application of the 
negotiated route thereby became a firm cornerstone of the PFI procurement practice. 
PubSA#4 thought that it would be "quite odd if you would not use it. " PrivSA#3 
further remarked that the PFI market had proceeded on the basis that the negotiated 
00 BotliSM 3. 
ol PubSA#3. 
o2 BothSA#I, PubSA#2, PrivSA#3; PubSA#4; PrivSA#6; PubSA#6; BothSA#3; PubSA#4-, PubSA#9; 




" Pub, A# I 
,, 7 PubSA# 10; BothSA#4. 
"H Mentioned by many interviewees, inter alia PubSA#9. 
01) IlubSA#g. 
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procedure was applicable. He said the procurement process was complicated and did 
71 
not easily fit into any other procedure 
. 
It is interesting that the combination of TTF 
guidance and lawyers' experience in using this procurement procedure has apparently 
resulted in a legal practice. " Practitioners do not question the practice and find it 
difficult to deviate. " PubSA# 10 suspected that 
I. a lot of'people have taken a "saftty in numbers approach, 
because everybody is doing it, why shouldn't we? 
PubSA#4 added that 
"lawyers are told that PFI comes within it and what they do 
is they convince themselves that the wordsfits thefacts. "74 
Those legal advisors who took a more cautious approach towards the rules 
criticised the TTF guidance as not helpftil and rather misleading. PubSA43 said this 
included that the guidelines did not sufficiently emphasise the exceptionality of the 
negotiated procedure. BothSA45 reported that his U. K. clients were convinced that the 
negotiated procedure applied before they looked at their individual project. BothSA#5 
observed that the U. K. situation was very different from that in Ireland. He said Irish 
authorities diligently examined on a case-by-case basis whether the negotiated 
procedure was applicable or not. In contrast, the U. K. authorities were persuaded by 
the TTF guidelines and perceived them as binding. BothSA45 mentioned that 
authorities had ceased to consult their legal advisors on the use of the negotiated 
procedure. This was said to be part of a tendency to bring external legal advice on 
board later in the process. Lawyers were consulted once the project has already been 
75 
advertised and difficult legal situations arose, such as changes to the specifications 
. 
70 At least twice. 
71 PrivSA#3. 
72 PubSA# 10. 
71 BothSA# 1. 
74 PubSA#4. 
71 BothSA#5-, contradictory evidence: "Generally, the public sector is very loathed to use the negotiated 
procedure, they feet very, very uncomfortable about it. People have to be encouraged to use the 
negotiated procedure, since I think that they are running into the danger of breaching the restricted 
procedure. " (PubSA#3). 
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In their daily practice, the overwhelming number of lawyers endorsed the 
solutions suggested in the Treasury guidelines. More cautious lawyers said that they 
had "a slightly uncomfortable feeling"76 about the practice advocated in the TTF 
guidance, but used the negotiated route nevertheless. 
Yet, this guidance arguably contravenes the wording of the Directives and the 
interpretation favoured by the European Commission. 77 Alluding to the reasoned 
opinion issued by the Commission in the Pimlico case against the U. K., BothSA#I 
and BothSA#2 suggested that the Commission pursued a hypocritical stance on this 
issue. On the one hand it supported infrastructure projects, such as Trans European 
Networks (TENs), whilst on the other hand it did not want authorities to adopt a 
necessary "commercial approach"78 when delivering those projects. 
The role of the Treasury in establishing this legal practice and the socio-economic 
elements maintaining a coherent approach will be discussed in chapter 12. 
8.3.3. Commercial requiremen 
Apart from the recommendation of the Treasury, BothSA# I said the decision to 
apply the negotiated procedure was influenced by the commercial necessities of the 
project. Contracting authorities sought reftige in the negotiated procedure which 
allowed the adoption of a commercially oriented and flexible approach to 
procurement. All but two lawyers'9 agreed that it was almost impossible to procure 
PFIs under the less flexible restricted procedure. 
8.3.3.1. Proposed solutions differ 
Interviewees said that in a usual PFI scheme the commercial approaches offered 
by bidders differed substantially. PubSA#10 gave the example of a PFI school project, 
which appeared straightforward on first glance in the light of the existing level of 
standardisation. Bidders came up with very different solutions depending on whether 
70 PrivSA#3. 
77 BothSA#2; BothSA#5. 
78 BothSA# I 
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they planned to refurbish the existing asset or proposed to build a new school building 
on land owned by the consortium 
. 
80 The contracting authority had to gain a clear 
understanding of the different solutions, because of the long contract term and the 
pertinence of the areas contracted out, such as schools and hospitals. " PrivSA#6 
mentioned the differences between the proposed solutions made the projects 
complicated and volatile. 
Furthermore, the public sector was habitually uncertain about the final result it 
wanted to achieve. 82 PrivSA#6 observed that the differences in approach were inherent 
to PFI, as it was a major aim of the public sector to draw innovation from the private 
sector. 
8.3.3.2 PMjects differ 
BothSA#2 remarked that PH prOjects still differed substantially from each other 
even if the projects belonged to the same sector. Although PFI hospitals might have 
some contractual and financial features in common, respondents said project specific 
issues had to be dealt with in negotiations. 83 
PubSA410 mentioned that the payment mechanism was a project specific issue 
which differed substantially from project to project. PubSAO remarked that another 
difference between otherwise similar projects was the allocation of risks amongst the 
parties to the contract. PubSAO added the parties had to work out the precise 
objective of the contract before they could plot the numbers into the financial model. 
'That is because you try to have this innovation and flexibility. ý, 84 
8.3.3.3. Negotiations ensure competition 
Another commercial reason to choose the negotiated procedure was, as PrivSA#6 
maintained, that it provided the authority with the opportunity to ensure full 





83 Almost every respondents. 
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competition between bidders. He said it was in the public sector interest to negotiate 
because that was the way to get the best price. " PrivSA46 said "there is a very 
competitive market between contractors and there is a very competitive market 
between the funders which provide 90% of the venture capital. " 
He suggested it was effectively impossible to capture the degree of competition 
necessary in the first bid in an open or restricted procedure. "As the list of the bidders 
gets smaller the funders and the sub-contractors bidding to them give them better 
prices in the hope of winning, " he said and added that "this is a dynamic process that 
depends on fluidity and in procurement terms on negotiations. 5,86 
8.3.3.4. Fluid specifications require negotiations 
PubSA410 said negotiations were further indispensable due to uncertainties 
surrounding the level of services to be provided and their demand. She added, those 
uncertainties were inherent to PF1. In order to reap innovative solutions, authorities 
drew up output-based specifications which specified the project only in very broad 
terms. PFI projects authorities were always uncertain at the outset about what exactly 
to procure in size, scope or value. The uncertainty resulted, according to PrivSA#6, in 
"fluid specifications" which were successively refined in negotiations throughout the 
procurement process. PubSA# 10 added that PH procuring authorities should in theory 
not be over-prescriptive about what they were procuring. This notion collided in 
practice with the interests of the procuring authority to influence the design of the 
project. 
8.3.3.5. Practical requirement to negotiate 
PubSA49 indicated that the advantages of using the negotiated procedure were 
obvious and its choice was inter alia a matter of convenience. BothSA#2 also assumed 
that it was more convenient for all parties to use the negotiated procedure and to avoid 
the difficulties of running a bid process for this kind of project under the open or the 
84 PubSA#3. 
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restricted procedure. BothSA43 argued that the restricted procedure posed a number of 
other questions, such as whether it was permissible to conduct pre-tender negotiations. 
He added that it was inconvenient for all parties firstly to negotiate the contract and 
then to bid against definite and unchangeable specifications. " BothSA43 thought the 
alternative to using the negotiated procedure would be quite difficult to implement in 
the light of varying bids. BothSA#2 agreed in observing that "what you want in a PFI 
contract is to negotiate properly. You want to negotiate with someone and go through 
a process of refining the terms. Putting out a tender doesn't really get you there. " 
BothSA42 found it questionable whether it was possible to achieve the same 
depth of negotiations by sending out contract documents after one or more rounds of 
negotiations against which bidders submit a firm Price. " BothSA#2 thought the 
problem with this approach was that it did not allow the banks to have their say, 
because they were not involved at that stage. If people would move away from the 
current structure of negotiations, the banks had to be involved earlier, resulting in an 
increase of the already high bidding costs. '9 
The European Commission probably favours this kind of restricted procedure 
with pre-tender negotiations. 90 PubSA#4 felt it has the disadvantage that authorities 
might end up with extensive post-tender or post-award negotiations conducted in a 
non-competitive manner. PubSA44 expressed her concern that the use of the restricted 
route might provoke more procedural mistakes than the negotiated process. 
85 llrivSA#6. 
81 llrivSA#6. 




"0 Ilie Commission contemplates in its recent proposal to procure particular "complex projec&' in a 
procedure resembling a conventional restricted procedure with pre-tender negotiations with no further 
negotiations during the award phase, European Commission, op. cit., note 19. 
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8.3.4. Which deroration was emploved 
Whilst some legal advisors, such as PubSA44, employed both derogations in 
combination, the majority of projects have been procured under the "overall pricing" 
ground as recommended by the Treasury guidance. 9' 
8.3.4.1. Overall pricing is impossible 
Based on the Treasury's approach to interpret the "overall pricing" derogation, 9' 
BothSA#3 criticised the widespread use of the overall pricing in PFI as "complete 
nonsense. " He explained that authorities normally prepared a very sophisticated 
spreadsheet before they launched the PFI scheme. The spreadsheet provided them with 
the debt/equity split and the prOject risks allowing them to price the contract. 93 Other 
advisors also agreed that overall pricing was possible, although this "might be a 
question of degree. "94 PubSA44 observed that if the authority was looking for a global 
figure, it should be able to get one. 
The situation where it was impossible to price the contract were rather the 
exception. PubSA#2 gave the example of the refurbishment of a community hospital 
where not much high-tech equipment and no new buildings were involved. She said 
the NHS Trust could have a "good guess" of the pricing in advance and a good idea of 
what the specifications would look like. Her interpretation of the "overall pricing" 
derogation combined the second and third interpretative approach outlined in section 
8.2.1.1. She apparently thought the derogation became applicable, if it would not be 
possible for the authority to predict what solutions bidders would propose or the 
amounts they would be bid. PubSA#2 concluded that in considering the existence of 
standard contracts, it might become more difficult to justifý the application of the 
negotiated procedure on the ground of the overall pricing derogation. 
91 BothSA#3. 




PubSA#7 said she had fundamental difficulties to understand how price can be a 
fundamental criterion in a contract not permitting overall pricing. The authority had to 
find a basis to evaluate what different options would cost. If not, the whole 
procurement would be questionable. 
Sharing the Treasury's interpretation of the overall pricing derogation, PubSA#4 
said: 
" We all know when we see a bidder's option what it is going 
to cost and you will look what the option does to your 
jbrecast. Pricing is predictable and if it weren't no bank 
would back it. "9' 
She added that even a cost plus situation permitted overall pricing because it was 
feasible to work out how long it would approximately take to erect the asset, what it 
would cost per day and to multiply the one by the other. I find it very difficult to 
think of a contract that does not permit overall pricing. Nobody will enter into such a 
contract without estimating what the costs will be. "96 
The scepticism was partly sparked by the experience with PFIs in the U. K. and 
the recent development of standardised contract terms. Both developments should not 
disguise that historically the reasons for using the negotiated procedure in PFI were 
that it was impossible and "impractical ý, 97 to accurately price the project. PubSA42 
thought that this ground sat quite neatly with the procurement rules, especially where 
variant bids were permitted. 9' She added it was impossible for the authority to price 
the project until bidders came forward with their proposals. 
PubSA#4 mentioned that clients did only know how much they could afford. Her 
public sector clients said at the outset it was impossible to price and it had to be seen 




"8 PubSA# 10. 
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negotiations were necessary even after the bids were submitted. PubSA#9 said the 
decisive question was whether the authority could draw up specifications against 
which tenderers could bid and pass. She added that this was impossible in the 
overwhelming number of PFIs. 99 
The wording of the Directive suggests that the overall pricing derogation may 
only be used in exceptional circumstances. The majority of lawyers agreed that this 
exceptionality requirement was in practice "largely ignored. "'O' This was again at least 
partly due to government advice and the procurement practice as it developed over the 
years. 
PubSA#3 adopted the Treasury's interpretation of "exceptionality" and argued 
PFI contracts might be of an exceptional nature for the procuring authority because 
they remained exceptionally in comparison to the many other contractual 
arrangements they entered into. 'O' PubSA43 gave the example of a NHS Trust which 
probably entered into 600 or 700 contracts a year, only one of which was probably a 
PFI project. Hence, PFIs were not only exceptionally complex in nature but also an 
exceptionally rare occurrence in the authority's procurement practice. 
Others remarked that this line of argument was questionable because the 
derogation was used in almost every project. The use of the negotiated procedure on 
this ground was no longer exceptional in any respect, but common procurement 
practice. 10' 
8.3.4.2. Specifications cannot be drawn up with sufficient precision 
The second derogation frequently used in PFI procurement allows using the 
negotiated procedure where "specifications cannot be drawn up with sufficient 
precision. " Authorities employed this derogation because it was not possible to come 
up with detailed technical specifications at the end of the shortlisting stage. PubSA46 
'>9 l'ub, A#9, 
lo() BothSA# 1; PubSA§2-, PubSA#4. 
'01 PubSA#4. 
112 I>ubSA#3, PubSA#9. 
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indicated the need for a considerable amount of discussions with bidder to find out 
what the customer wanted and what the bidder could supply. Another argument 
brought forward in favour of using the derogation was that the use of output-based 
specifications made it rarely possible to draw up "sufficiently precise" 
specifications. 104 PubSA#8 highlighted the wide range of solutions made it very 
difficult for the authority to draw up specifications which were so rigid to make the 
application of the restricted procedure feasible. 
8.3.5. Impact of standardisation 
Lawyers held the standardisation. process did not have a major impact on the 
issue of whether to use the negotiated procedure. Nevertheless, nuances became 
apparent in the replies to the question. 
More than half of the interviewees insisted that only the contractual terms were 
standardised and not the more important and more complex financial terms. "" The 
payment mechanism still required extensive negotiations due to the many options 
available. 106 PubSA#3 had experience in an area of PFI where also the payment 
mechanism became subject to standardisation. 107 It is for this reason that PubSA#3 and 
PrivSA46 predicted it would become increasingly difficult to justify the application of 
the negotiated procedure. PubSA#9 perceived this scenario as not desirable. 'O' 
8.3.6 Balancing the risk of beinie challenmed 
Lawyers unanimously held that bidders would not launch challenges on the 
ground that the negotiated procedure was employed. "9 The risk of challenges was 
therefore negligible. PubSA#4 mentioned that she outlined to her clients that the law 
was uncertain on whether it was legitimate to use the negotiated procedure and the 
practice was largely based on Treasury Taskforce guidance. Apart from this standard 
103 IlubSA#7. 
104 BothSA#3. 





"health warning, " PubSA# I recommended her clients to "just go ahead with their 
project. " She underlined that nobody from the bidder community questioned this 
issue. BothSA#6 remarked that using the restricted route as alternative would make 
the project even more unworkable and cumbersome. This could have the consequence 
that authorities made more procedural mistakes and thereby increased the risk of being 
challenged on a procedural irregularity. 
The recent Harmon case did not influence this risk assessment, although a but 
two lawyers knew of the case. ' 10 PubSA#4, PrivSA#2 and BothSA44 said the attitude 
towards challenging authorities remained unchanged. This was especially true for the 
application of the negotiated procedure. Conversely, private sector bidders were 
pleased with this practice as it allowed them to present their bids in more detail. ' 
8.4. Analysis 
From an outsider perspective, procurement law seems to have only negligible 
impact on the PFI procurement practice with respect to the choice of procedure. 
Practitioners opted for the negotiated procedure without spending much thought about 
whether this practice was justified or not. 
The impact of procurement law on the PFI procurement practice was 
compromised by the general lack of enforcement through bidders in national courts. 
To the dismay of public and private sector advisors, the Commission commenced 
enforcement action in support of its strict interpretation of the law. The "Pin-dico case" 
challenged the application of the negotiated procedure in a PH school project and 
thereby a procedural cornerstone of the scheme. In Article 226 E. C. Treaty 
proceedings the defendant is the Member State and not the awarding authority. 
Therefore, it is questionable whether an ECJ ruling could have a direct impact on the 
individual project. 
'09 lubSA#2. 
110 llrivSA# 1; PubSA#2. 
111 llrivSA#6; PubSA#4. 
page 201 
Chapter 9 Selection of bidders and contract award criteria 
9.1. Introduction 
The aim of European public procurement law is to combat discriminatory 
behaviour whilst at the same time allowing regulated authorities to let contracts to 
suppliers under the most favourable conditions. 
The Directives include three principal techniques to achieve this aim. These 
instruments are (1) Community-wide advertising of contracts, (2) prohibition of 
specifications capable of discriminating against potential bidders, and (3) application 
of objective and commercial criteria for participation in tendering and award 
procedures. 
The latter principle has been viewed as an invaluable tool against using public 
procurement to promote a variety of industrial, social, environmental' or general 
political concerns. ' Those "secondary" concerns were abused in the past to disguise 
"buy national" policies. It is for this reason that the European Directives, their 
underlying principles and the E. C. Treaty significantly restrict the employment of 
"secondary" criteria to select bidders or awarding contracts. 
The following chapter considers the qualification, selection and award criteria 
permissible under the procurement rules. It first defines the three distinct stages of 
qualification, shortlisting and contract award and then outlines the criteria to be 
employed at each stage. Finally, the empirical findings with respect to the 
qualification and selection of bidders will be outlined and interpreted. 
9.2. Selection of bidders and contract award criteria 
- 
the legal problems 
Before considering the criteria used to select and shortlist contractors and, finally, 
Westphal, "Greening procurement: an attempt to reduce uncertainty" (1999) P. P. L. R., 1; cf, the power 
of local governments in the U. K. to promote or "improve economic, social and environmental well- 
being" (ESEWeb), DETR, Power to promote or improve economic, social and environmental well- 
being, March 2001. 
2 Arrowsmith, "The Legality of "Secondary" Procurement Policies under the Treaty of Rome and the 
Works Directive" (1992) P. P. L. R. 412-, Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 9 of ch. 1, Fen-. Andez Martin/ 
Stelinunin, op. cit., note 38 of ch. 3; Geroski, "Procurement Policy as a tool of industrial policy" 
(1990) International Review ofApplied Economics, p. 182. 
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to award contracts it is worthwhile to recall briefly the three distinct stages involved in 
this process. 
The European Court of Justice has stressed in the Beentjes case that the 
-examination of the suitability of contractors to carry out the contracts... and the 
awarding of the contract are two different operations... covered by different rules. "' 
The Court added that qualification and award procedures may be conducted 
simultaneously. Contracting authorities should differentiate between the distinct sets 
of criteria. For instance, when examining the merits of the proposals, authorities 
should not be influenced by the tenderer's financial capacity. Conversely, authorities 
should not give a tenderer which has failed to satisfy the pre-established selection 
4 criteria a second chance, because its proposal appears advantageous. 
9.2.1. Selection of bidders 
9.2 1.1. Qualification criteria 
Contracting authorities may examine the suitability of suppliers only on the basis 
of the qualitative criteria established in the Directives. 5 The rules on participation 
contained in each public sector Directive can be subdivided into three categories, 
namely financial standing, technical capacity and legal or "miscellaneous" criteria. 
The first ground of exclusion allows the authority to seek evidence relating to the 
financial standing of the candidate. 6 This evidence forms the basis for the application 
of certain expressly regulated financial criteria. 7 Firms are permitted to produce other 
evidence where they have a valid reason not to produce the specific information 
demanded' and the authority deems such alternative information to be adequate. 
Tenderers may also be excluded from tendering if they lack the technical 
3 Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes v. The Netherlands [19881 E. C. R. 4653, paras 15,16 of the j udgment. 
E uropean Commission, Guide to the Community Rules on Public Works Contracts, para 6.1. 5 Case 76/81 SA Transporoute v. Minister ofPublic Works [ 19821 E. C. R. 417. 
The evidence permissible to be taken into account is not limited to the criteria listed in the Directives: 
Joined Cases 27 to 29/86 SA Constructions et enterprises industrielles (CEI) v. Societe cooperative 
'Association intercommunlae pour les autoroutes des Aniennes' and Others, [19871 E. C. R. 3347, 
paras II- 19 of the judgment. 
7 Directive/ Reg. 15(l) of each set of Regulations. 
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capability to perform the contract. This decision is based on considerations such as the 
skills, tools, manpower and general experience of the prospective provider, as far as 
they are related to the specific prOject. 9 In contrast to the evidence for the financial 
standing of firms, the evidence permissible to prove technical capability is 
exhaustively laid down in the Directives. 10 Article 32(l) of the Services Directive 
contains the only exemption from this general rule. The provision vests authorities 
with a general discretion to assess the "ability" of service providers with regard to 
their "skills, efficiency, experience and reliability. "" It is submitted that authorities 
have to accept any "reasonable" evidence offered by providers as an alternative to the 
evidence demanded. 12 
Finally, the Directives contain other grounds for the exclusion of providers which 
are mainly related to their ability to complete the contract, such as an order for 
compulsory winding up of the business. Other criteria are not directly related to the 
performance of the contract, such as conviction of a criminal offence. 13 
In response to unions' criticism of the PFI scheme, 14 the Treasury Taskforce 
issued a policy statement on the "disclosure of information and consultation with staff 
,, 
15 
and other interested parties 
. 
This statement is concerned with involving staff 
representatives throughout the PH procurement process by consulting them on 
employment issues. Between the advertisement of the contract and the completion of 
the pre-qualification stage, staff representatives should be invited to provide the 
8 Works Reg. 15; Supply Reg. 15(4), Services Reg. 15(4). 
Cf. R v. Secretary ofState ex. p. London Borough ofHarrow (The Times, January 16,1996). 
This is expressly regulated in the U. K. Regulations, and is, on European level, part of the case law 
developed by the ECJ in: Case 76/81 SA Transporoute et traveaux v Ministere des traveaux publics 
119921 E. C. R. 417; Cases 27 to 29/86 SA Constructions et enterprises industrielles (CEI) v. Societe 
cooperative 'Association intercommunlae pour les autoroutes des Ardennes' [19871 E. C. R. 3347; 
Case 71/92 Commission v. Spain [ 19931 E. C. R. 1-5923. 
It is noteworthy that this restriction is not included in the U. K. Services Regulation 16(l), which is 
implementing Article 32(l) of the Services Directive. 
Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 318. 
13 For a full account of the grounds see Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, pp. 331-341; Pisefli, "The 
Scope for Excluding Providers who have Committed Criminal Offences under the E. U. Procurement 
Directives" (2000) P. P. L. R. p. 267. 
For example: UNISON, Downsizingfor the 21' Century A report to UNISON Northern Region on the 
North Durham Acute Hospitals PFI scheme (1999); UNISON, Step by Step 
- 
UNISON Guide to the 
PF1 Process (1998). 
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department with "relevant" employment related information on tenderers. From a 
procurement law perspective, this recommendation raises the question of whether it is 
permissible to consider such information at pre-qualification stage. 16 
The question appears to consist of two interrelated elements. The first issue is 
whether it is permissible at all to consider information not directly obtained ftom the 
bidder. Secondly, it is questionable whether employment issues, such as the 
employment track record of the provider, has to be taken into account at either the 
qualification, shortlisting or award stage. 
It can first be voted that the information has to be related to the criteria permitted 
under the Directives. The protection of bidders against arbitrary criteria is a major 
legislative rationale underlying the criteria. 17 It seems therefore irreconcilable with the 
Directives to investigate into areas which are not part of the technical, financial or 
legal requirements" or go beyond the limits stated in the Directives. It is arguable: 19 
with respect to information relating to one of the defined three categories that 
additional information obtained from other sources than the bidders does not 
jeopardise bidders' protection against arbitrary selection criteria. On that basis it 
seems permissible to consider information which was either in the possession of the 
contracting authority or which was provided by third parties. " 
The pnnciple of transparency may require that the tenderer should be briefed on 
the information obtained. The authority should further give the bidder the opportunity 
to comment. " Some limited support for this stance can be derived from a judgment of 
the Court of First Instance which deduced from the principle of transparency that "a 
H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 14 of ch. 2 (Disclosure of information). 
It has been suggested by Arrowsmith that although this option is not spelled out in the procurement 
Directives, contracting authorities are only free to use information which could not be demanded 
17 
wider the Directives to prove that providers are qualified, Arrowsnuth, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 327. 
Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 32 8. 
18 Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentfes v. The Netherlands, [19881 E. C. R. 4653, para 17 of the judgment. 19 In particular when one adopts a literal approach, ef. Article 22 Works Directive 93/37: selection of 
20 
tenderer shall be based "on the basis of the information given. " 
This view is shared by Sir Godfray Le Quesne in General Building and Maintenance Ltd. V. 
Greenwich Borough Council [19931 I. R. L. R. 535, para 42 of the judgment. 
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company which is closely involved in a tendering procedure... must receive, without 
, 
22 
any delay, prccise information concerning the conduct of the entire procedure. 
The question arises whether the results of the consultation rounds with trade 
unions and staff representatives and the outcomes of their discussions with prospective 
providers may be considered at pre-qualification or shortlisting stage. As we have 
seen, the qualification criteria to expel firms from the tendering process must be 
strictly related to the criteria conclusively laid down in the Directives. Thus, 
contracting authorities are clearly not permitted to take general employment issues 
into account when conducting their qualification process. 
There are two exemptions from this rule expressly regulated in the Directives. 
Providers may be excluded from participation in the contract if they failed to pay 
social security contributions or were convicted of a crime. 23 It has been further 
suggested in General Building and Maintenance Ltd. v. Greenwich Borough Councif 4 
that 'technical capability should be defined in a broad manner" so as to include the 
provider's "ability competently to carry out the necessary operation of the contractor's 
trade... with proper regard to the health and safety of the public and of employees. 1,25 
This broad interpretation of 'technical capability" includes the provider's health and 
safety record in so far as it relates to its technical capability of performing tasks under 
26 the contract. It appears questionable whether the findings of the Greenwich case are 
consistent with the Court of Justice's ruling in Beent/es. In Beent/es, the ECJ held that 
a condition not required by law did not relate to technical capacity. 27 
Arguably, this implies that it is only permissible to consider legal requirements, 
21 Similar situation: Case T-203/96 Embassy Limousines & Services vs. European Parliament, judgment 
of 17 December 1998 (unreported). 
22 Ibid., para 95 of thejudgment. 
23 Article 24(c) Directive 93/37; 20 Directive 93/36; 29(c) Directive 92/50. 
24 119931 I. R. L. R. 535. 
25 [ 19931 I. R. L. R. 535, p. 543, para 40. 
21 Arrowsmith, "Restricted Award Procedures under the Public Works Contract Regulations 1991" 
(1993) P. P. L. R. CS 99; However, it is not clear whether the contracting authorities can only consider 
health and safety obligations as imposed by law, or whether they may require more burdensome 
obligations. 
27 Para 28 of the judgment. 
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which in the United Kingdom includes Regulations 14-16. According to the ECJ, a 
wider interpretation of the technical capability criterion as suggested in Greenwich is 
ruled out. 
9.21.2 Shortlisting criteria 
In the open procedure, every tenderer is automatically entitled to participate in the 
award procedure. If the authority employs the restricted or negotiated procedure it 
may limit the number of suitable candidates invited to tender or negotiate. 28 
"Shortlisting" refers to the selection process among qualified firms which aims at 
limiting the number of firms participating in the final stages of the procurement 
process. 
In order to ensure genuine competition, the authority is obliged to shortlist at least 
three candidates if the competitive negotiated procedure is used and five if the 
authority employs the restricted procedure. '9 During the "shortlisting" exercise, the 
awarding authority whittles down the number of tenderers by selecting those 
candidates which are "relatively" best qualified'o with respect to the qualification 
criteria. " It is therefore not permissible to employ criteria at shortlisting stage which 
are incompatible with the qualification criteria laid down in the procurement 
Directives. For example, it is unacceptable to shortlist otherwise qualified bidders on 
the basis of employment related issues, as it is envisaged in U. K. government 
guidance. 32 
28 Treumer, op. cit., note 86 of ch. 3, p. 147; Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 217; Boyle, note 86 of 
ch. 3. 
29 Case 27/98 Metalmeccanica Fracasso v. Amt der SaLzburger Landesregierung, [19991 E. C. R. 1-5697, 
para 28 of the judgment. 
30 It is not entirely clear, whether the shortlisting criteria relate to ordinary selection criteria or may also 
include an approximation to the award criteria, see: Treumer, op. cit., note 86 of ch. 3, p. 151 ff. 
31 Where the criteria have not been stated in advance, the authority may not eliminate any candidates 
who have met the basic criteria from the procedure. 
32 The H. M. Treasury Taskforce policy statement avoids a precise determination of the decisive question 
of when the firms with the negative track record should be expelled from participating in the tendering 
procedure. The statement maintains at para 4.3.1 that "a bidder's employment track record [ 
... 
I should 
be one of the factors taken into account when evaluating and deciding bids. " By using the terms of 
"evaluating and deciding, " the Treasury effectively renders it impossible for the observer to fmd out at 
which stage of the procurement procedure this process should actually happen. However, it is quite 
clear from an economic viewpoint that contracting authorities are interested to exclude firms with a 
Footnotes continued on the next page. 
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It is questionable whether government departments were permitted to employ one 
of the three folloWing shortlisting criterion PFL the "development of PH industries, " 
the "compulsory use of standardised contract terms" and the "ability to form a good 
working relationship. " 
The first policy consideration, which contracting authorities considered in early 
PH projects at shortlisting stage, is to foster the development of PH industries in 
particular areas. Contracting authorities sought to promote the development of "road 
operating industries"" and a market in "PFI prisons. "4 
There were two principal objectives. Government departments wanted to ensure 
that for future projects they would be able to choose from a wider range of 
contractors 
. 
35 To achieve this aim, departments awarded PFI contracts to several 
suppliers rather than awarding similar contracts to the same consortium of providers. 36 
Secondly, authorities perceived the risks of awarding different contracts to one 
provider as being very high. In particular, the risk of not delivering on time was 
37 considered substantial. 
Government departments were further anxious to allocate the contracts with 
different consortia to enable as many private sector firms as possible to progress 
through the learning curve. " Bidders had to become acquainted with the complex 
bidding procedures and also with the new and innovatory construction methods 
negative employment from the tendering process as soon as possible, meaning rather at the 
shortlisting stage than at the contract award stage. 
33 Highway Agency, op. cit., note 16 of ch. 2, para 1.4. 
34 Public Accounts Committee, op. cit., note 70 of ch. 2, at para 5. 
35 A similar policy was set out in H. M. Treasury, Setting New Standards 
-A strategy for Government 
Procurement (1995) at paras 3.13-3.15: "Departments will not act in ways in which damage 
competition" in "weighing the short terni gains against the long ternf 'benefit of being not dependent 
on one supplier and "to encourage suppliers to enter" even poorly developed markets. 
31 This was much debated during the first two prison projects, where one option would have been two 
award both prisons to one contractor and thus to realise a number of synergies resulting eventually in 
substantial savings of E30 mio. compared with the option of awarding the two contracts to different 
providers, House of Commons, Public Accounts Conintittee, op. cit., note 173 of ch. 2, para 20. 
Mid., Examination of the witnesses, para 33-39. 
38 In particular the CBI was concerned in the early days of PFI that the lack of a U. K. owner-operator 
industry could pose a significant competitive disadvantage for the U. K. industry, CBI, op. cit., note 98 
of ch. 2, pp. 18-2 1. 
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employed. '9 Early PFI prOjects where further used as an instrument to familianse as 
many private sector firms as possible with the operation of services which had never 
been delivered by a private sector firm before. A good example for such a traditional 
public sector service where the private sector lacked previous experience was the 
provision of custodial services. 
Authorities developed PFI industries in various areas by refusing better offers at 
shortlisting stage for the reason that the tenderer had already delivered another PFI 
project. 40 Ejecting bidders for this reason could be viewed as a threshold for the 
delivery of large-scale infrastructure projects. Authorities could argue that the 
threshold was established for the sake of bidders which should not carry out more than 
one PFI project at a time to avoid stretching their financial and technical resources to 
the limits. 
It can be argued with the Court of Justice in CETBelfini that if the practice is 
based on this notion, it is reconcilable with the Directives. "Member States remain 
free to maintain or adopt substantive and procedural rules in regard to public... 
contracts on condition they comply with all the relevant provisions of community 
law. , 41 The practice was held not to contravene the non-discrimmation principle, 
because it did not restrict access by contractors from other Member States. 
It is noteworthy that the imposition of thresholds for PFI contracts delivered by 
one contractor was only a minor consideration identified by authorities and H. M. 
Treasury. The major rationale behind this policy was the development of PFI 
industries. Yet, supporting new PFI industries is not related to the financial standing or 
technical capability of the contractor, or to other legal criteria laid down in the 
Directives. Hence, authorities are not legally permitted to employ the criterion of 
House of Commons, Public Accounts Committee, op. cit., note 173 of ch. 2., examination of the 
witnesses, para 48. 
40 This also occurred in the first two Prison projects (cf. above note 36) and in the first four major road 
projects, NAO, op. cit., note 40 of ch. 2, Evidence of the witnesses, para 4045. 
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developing PFI industries when qualifying or shortlisting tenderers. 
The second questionable shortlisting criteria employed in PH is the compulsory 
acceptance of standardised contract terms. The establishment of standard or model 
contract conditions 42 was one cornerstone of Sir Malcohn Bates' first review of the 
Private Finance Initiative 
. 
4' Bates claimed that "with standardisation of tender 
documents, legal fees and other costs will be sharply reduced, as will the time spent 
negotiating with a preferred bidder. "44 
Another reason put forward in favour of contract templates is the consistency of 
approach and of pricing across a range of similar services. standard contracts avoid 
"reinventing the wheel" for each issue likely to be common to all PH projeCtS4' and 
promote common understanding as to what risks are included in a typical PF1 
prOject. 46 In July 1999, the Treasury Taskforce published a general guidance on the 
standardisation of PFI contracts 47 which will be followed up in due course by sector 
specific guidance in the areas of IT 4' defence, health (NHS) and local authorities. 49 
The procurement Directives predominantly regulate the tendering process up to 
the award of the contract. They do not contain explicit requirements for post-tender 
matters, such as contractual terms and conditions that contracting authorities have to 
consider when drafting contract templates. In the absence of explicit rules, only the 
principles underlying the directives are applicable. 
Contract templates are therefore reconcilable with the European procurement 
regime, provided that they avoid direct or indirect discrimination against providers 
Joined Cases 27 to 29/86 SA Constructions et enterprises industrielles (CEI) v. Societe cooperative 
'Association intercommunlae pour les autoroutes des Ardennes' and Others, [19871 E. C. R. 3347, 
paras 13-18 of the judgment. 
Ibid.. para 10 of the judgment. 
43 H. M. Treasury, op. cit, note 10 of ch. 2. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 156 of ch. 2, para 12. 
41 H. M. Treasury, Taskforce Standardisation Documentforfinal Consultation (1999), para 1.1.3. 47 II. M. Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 17 of ch. 2 (PFI contracts). 48 11. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 17 of ch. 2 (IT contracts). 
49 Unsurprisingly given the public sector provenance of the document the consultation draft and the 
final standardisation document received a mixed response from private sector participants in the PFI 
market. In was suggested that many contractual issues are either not susceptible to uniform treatment 
Footnotes continued on the next page. 
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from other Member States. " Furthermore, the principle of proportionality" requires 
that contracting authorities must refrain from imposing unreasonable contractual terms 
and conditions. " 
There is considerable evidence that at least in one case 53 a contracting authority 
evaluated bidders on their acceptance of standardised contract terms. The department 
allocated evaluation marks at the shortlisting stage expressly on the basis of 
conformity with contractual risk allocation templates contained in the preliminary 
invitation to negotiate. 54 Providers refusing to accept the standard contract and the 
proposed risk allocation were ejected from the authority's shortlist. The Treasury" 
and the NHS Executive have endorsed this practice. 56 The NHS guidance note on 
Public Private PartnershipS57 clearly states that the use of the standard contract is 
mandatory and its key commercial terms must not be varied. The guidance further 
suggests that the acceptance of the standard form contract should be considered at the 
preliminary ITN stage. " 
Shortlisting criteria must be suitable to examine either the providers' financial 
standing, its technical capability, ability, or its compliance with legal requirements 
listed in the Directive. The acceptance of standard contract terms could be viewed as a 
minimum technical standard for those participating in the contract. It appears 
or should rather be negotiated anew for every project in order not to constrain original and innovative 
thought and allow the market to develop further. 
This could be viewed in the light of the Beentjes decision as an infringement of Articles 6 and 30 of 
the E. C. Treaty. In Beentjes the ECJ considered the issue of non-discriminatory contract conditions. It 
was held that it was possible to include contract condition relating to the employment of long-term 
unemployed provided certain conditions were met: "it had no direct or indirect discrimination on 
tenderers from other member states; it met the criterion of transparency; it was not used as a selection 
or evaluation criterion but was applied after award. " 
51 See above section 3.3.3. 
52 Digings/Bennet, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, para 133.13; it is furthermore noteworthy that E. C. Competition 
Law may become relevant since the Corniiiission has held that the imposition of unreasonable terms 
and conditions is an "abuse of a dominant position" under Article 86(l) E. C. Treaty, (Third Report on 
Competition Policy, para 68-69). 
53 "Private matters that draw public interest" in: Evening Standard, 05 May 1999. 
54 Such contract templates as regards to the allocation of substantial risks is rather the exception as rather 
non- contentious issues are subjected to standardised treatment. 
55 This is practice is indicated in H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 15 of ch. 2 (preferred bidder), at para 4.3.1: 
"[ 
... 
I it is important that a potential preferred bidder accepts, and the price reflects, the key contractual 
terms that forms the basis of the agreement between the parties. " 
Ibid. at paras 5.26-5.30. 
MIS Executive, op. cit., note 44 of ch. 2 (good practice guide), paras 5.1 and 5.2. 
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questionable whether the criterion is suitable to assess the technical capacity of the 
providers. For example, a contractor may well have sufficient manpower and 
experience to perform the contract, but would prefer to negotiate over risk allocation. 
In this situation, the bidder is technically capable of performing the contract, but does 
not meet the "acceptance of standardised contract" criterion. A requirement to accept 
contract templates is equally unrelated to the "skills, efficiency, experience and 
reliability. " Hence, it cannot be viewed as a suitable criterion to assess the providers' 
"ability. " It can be concluded that the practice of allocating evaluation marks at the 
shortlisting stage on the basis of conformity with contractual templates is not 
compatible with the procurement rules. 
This conclusion does not imply that the contracting authority may not expel those 
tenderers from the bidding process which are not prepared to accept standardised 
contract terms. Bidders submitting a tender expressly on the basis that they do not 
wish to conclude an agreement on the standardised terms, will have to be excluded 
from the award procedure. '9 Their bids are not compliant with the substantive 
requirements of the contract to be awarded. This is unproblematic provided that the 
contract templates are designed in a non-discriminatory and transparent way. 
The third shortlisting criterion used in PFI is related to the long-term nature of 
Public-Private Partnerships. Partnerships are formed on the basis that public and 
private sector will strive together towards creatmig a mutually beneficial "Win-win" 
situation. It is therefore hardly surprising that contracting authorities have been 
inclined to evaluate at shortlisting stage the ability of providers to form good working 
relationships. In fact, the long-term commitment of the parties can be regarded as the 
central requirement for the success of PF1 projects. 60 Authorities prefer to discuss with 
58 Ibid. paras 5.59,5.68. 
Ile acceptance of a non-compliant bid is not at the discretion of the contracting authority. The Court 
of Justice held in case C-243/89, Commission v. Denmark, [19931 E. C. R. 1-3353 that the acceptance of 
a non-compliant bid is generally prohibited under the Directives. 
t'O This and the other requirements of such long-term arrangements are comparable to the success factors 
in so-called "Partnering" approaches, cf, Saunders, op. cit., note 135 of ch. 2; Macbeth/ Ferguson, 
Footnotes continued on the next page. 
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suppliers the requirements of the contract at an early stage of the procurement process. 
The relationship is then gradually deepened during the negotiation process and 
eventually should foster familiarity with the needs and capacities of both sides and a 
significant degree of commitment and trust. 61 
The rationale behind this quasi-partnering or non-adversanal approach" is that 
sharing risks, expertise and information will result in greater efficiency and a speedy 
and less costly settlement of possible disputes. 6' Pursuing a non-adversanal approach 
can be viewed as one of the main principles underlying the Private Finance 
Initiative. 64 One can conclude from those basic considerations and the lessons learned 
from previous PFIS65 that it appears economically sensible to evaluate bidders on their 
ability to form a good working relationship. The relevant shortlisting criterion has 
been termed "understanding of the issues involved"66 and "senior management 
commitment. , 67 
Recall that it is only permissible to shortlist candidates on the grounds established 
in the Directives 
. 
6' Hence, the criterion of having a "good partnering relationship" 
needs to be translated in terms of the provider's relative technical capability, financial 
standing or the fulfilment of miscellaneous legal requirements. Neither the 
"commitment" of a prospective provider nor the hardly measurable attribute of 
"understanding of the issues involved" or forming "good working relationship" fall 
within one of the permissible categories. 
Partnership Sourcing (1992); Trepte, op. cit., note 188 of ch. 3, p. 204, Broomhall/ Lomas, "Partnering: 
Ali Acceptable Strategy for Utilities? " (1993) P. P. L. R. p. 22 1; Heal, op. cit., note 136 of ch. 2, p. 167. 
It is suggested that this particularly means an exchange of information including open-book costing 
and giving customers access to the supplier's accounts for cost-reduction projects; Partnership 
Sourcing Ltd, Making Partnership Sourcing Happen (1992). 
02 "PFI is not a revolution; it is essentially partnering through limited recourse concession financing, " 
o3 
Cileenti, "Exploring the future face of procurement in Europe" (1999) PFI Intelligence Bulletin (Oct. ). 
Broomhall/ Lomas, op. cit., note 60, at p. 223. 
t, 4 H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 8 of ch. 2, para 1.03. 
It was one of the major lessons learned during the NISR2 project that "the relationship between the 
Agency and its contractors is crucial to success" Public Accounts Committee, op. cit., note 35, para 8 
of the introduction. 
H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 40 of ch. 2 (D13FO Road Contracts), chapter 4, H. M. Treasury, op. cit., 
t, 7 
note 43 of ch. 2 (OSIRIS), para 2.5 "genuine understanding of the "requirements. " 
H. M. Treasury, The IND Caseworking Programme, para 2.5 
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Assessing the ability of tenderers to form a successful partnering relationship 
may be permissible in the context of the "ability" criterion laid down in Article 32(l) 
of the Services Directive. The ability criterion provides authorities with the 
opportunity to assess bidders based on their "skills, efficiency, experience and 
reliability. " Arguably, the ability to form a good working relationship is a skill within 
the meaning of the Directive that can be proven by the ability to work in specific 
ways. For instance, the authority could request evidence supporting their ability to 
successfiilly implement supply-chain management. It should be possible to break 
down the skill to form good working relationships into a number of more specific and 
less vague skills. For the sake of greater transparency and accountability it therefore 
seems desirable to avoid the nebulous global criterion and to invoke the more specific 
skills instead. 
9.2.2 Awardcriteria 
Subsequent to the selection of suitable candidates, the authority decides on the 
contract award. This decision must be either based on the "lowest price" criterion or 
the contract must be awarded to the bidder offering the "most economically 
advantageous tender. " Whilst it is obvious what is meant by the "lowest price, " the 
Directives specifically define the "most economically advantageous" criterion. 
According to the definition, the authority may consider "various criteria according to 
the contract in question, including price, delivery date, running costs, cost- 
effectiveness, quality, aesthetic and functional characteristics, technical merit, after- 
sale service and technical assistance. "69 
This list is not exhaustive. It is apparent from the examples given that only 
objective grounds may be used which are "equally applicable to all tenders, strictly 
18 European Comnussion, op. cit., note 70, para 6.2, Case 76/81 Transporoute et Travaux v. Minister of 
Public Works [ 19821 E. C. R. 417. 
0 Article 26 Supply Directive; Article 30 Works Directive; Article 36 Services Directive. 
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related to the subject of the contract 
.,, 
70 Furthermore, the criteria should be "aimed at 
ifying the offer which economically the most advantageous ,71 ident  The specific 
criteria used in the award of the contract must be listed in either the contract notice or 
in the contract documents. 72 Criteria which have not been publicised in this way may 
not be used to evaluate bids. 73 
It is contested whether contracting authorities may consider other, so-called 
"secondary, " criteria besides the award criteria listed in the Directives, such as 
environmental or social issues. The discussion has been sparked by the Beentjes 
judgment where the Court of Justice held that "the Directive does not lay down a 
uniform and exhaustive body of Community rules; within the framework of the 
common rules which it contains, the Member States remain free to maintain or adopt 
substantive and procedural rules in regard to public works contracts on condition that 
they comply with all the relevant provision of Community law... "74 
The Court further stated that authorities were free to exclude bidders on certain 
"additional specific conditions"" if those conditions were compatible with the 
principles underlying the E. C. Treaty. Further, they should "have no direct or indirect 
discriminatory effect on tenderers from other Member States" and should have been 
mentioned in the contract notice 
. 
7' The judgment has been interpreted to mean that 
potential contractors are required to meet "additional specific conditions" set by the 
contracting authority, but they cannot be excluded from the process for not meeting 
them 
. 
7' The European Court of Justice has rejected the interpretation that the specific 
70 European Conumssion, Guide to the Community Rules on Public Supply Contracts, para 6.3; Ibid. 
Guide to the Community rules on open government procurement [19871 O. J. C358/1, para 36. 
71 Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes v. The Netherlands, [1988] E. C. R. 4653 para 19 of thejudgment. 
72 Ibid. para 21 of the judgment. 
73 Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes v. The Netherlands, [19891 E. C. R. 4653 para 31 of the judgment; 
Case C-225/98 Commission v. France, judgment of 26 September 2000 (not yet reported) para 51 of 
thejudgment. 
74 Case 31/87 GebroedersBeeniVes v. The Netherlands, [1988] E. C. R. 4653 para 20 of thejudgment. 
75 Ibid. para 37 of the judgment. 
71 Case C-225/98 Commission v. France, judgment of 26 September 2000 (not yet reported) para. 51 of 
the judgment. 
77 This interpretation has been favoured by the European Commission (COM (89) 400 final) and by 
advocate General Albeit, Case C-225/98 Commission v. France, Opinion of 14 March 2000 (not yet 
reported), para 43 et. seq. of the opiriion. 
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conditions are criteria sui generis. The Court clarified the nature of the additional 
specific conditions as "necessarily constituting a criterion for the award of the 
contract. , 78 
In the award phase, it may be permissible to consider employment related issues 
subsequent to consultation with staff representatives. Those issues include the 
comparison of employment track records, the application of TUPE, wages and 
conditions, labour relations, health, safety and training. 79 Considering those issues at 
the award stage is only permissible in cases where the employment history of the 
provider is "strictly related" to the subject of the contract and where the training or the 
payment of staff is of particular importance for the contract. This could be the case 
where for security reasons it is required that the staff is adequately trained and paid to 
ensure the delivery of the service without disruptions resulting from strikes or a high 
turnover of staff. Only under those circumstances it is permissible for the government 
department to consider employment related issues at award stage. 
It can be deduced from recent European'o and national" case law that reference to 
employment related aspects is by no means an idiosyncrasy of complex procurement 
tasks, such as PFI. However, it is not possible to exclude tenderers from the bidding 
process at shortlisting stage on grounds not expressly mentioned in the Directives. 
Recall that government departments are permitted to shortlist bidders for the 
reason of establishing industries in the various PFI sectors only under exceptional 
circumstances. Notwithstanding, authorities may be permitted to use the development 
criterion at award stage, as advised by the U. K. government. 82 Criteria for the award 
of contracts must be capable to evaluate the provider's abilities to perform the contract 
78 Case C-225/98 Commission v. France, judgment of 26 September 2000 (not yet reported), para 52 of 
the judgment, with annotations: Arnould (200 1) P. P. L. R NA 13. 
79 II. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 14 of ch. 2 (consultation with staff), para 4.3.1. 
'0 For example, in Case C-225/98 Commission v. France (not yet reported), the French authority used 
the criterion of "development of employment opportunities. " 
81 For example in Germany: Kanimergericht, Order of May 20,2000 
- 
(Kart 24/97), where the court 
held that the Senate of Berlin niffinged. procurement law, by awarding works contracts only to 
contractors which agreed to comply with the regional nummurn wage rate of Berlin 
("Tarittreueerk-lArung"). 
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for which qualification is sought. 83 It is submitted that the "non-quantifiable 
benefits , 94 of developing PFI industries are not closely related to the individual PFI 
agreement. They rather aim to further the PFI scheme as a whole. Hence, the 
"development of PFI industries" is not a permissible award criterion under the 
85 procurement Directives. 
9.2.3. Overlap of shortlistin-u and award criteria 
The European Court of Justice 86 and the European Commission 87 have 
consistently demanded that contracting authorities should draw a clear distinction 
between the procedural stages of qualification and award. In view of that guidance, 
authorities are supposed to distinguish between the criteria to assess the suitability of 
the tenderer and those assessing the merits of the bid. The same applies in principle to 
shortlisting criteria. Government departments are therefore not permitted to shortlist 
potential contractors on the basis of award criteria. " 
Notwithstanding the clear-cut approach, H. M. Treasury" and the National Health 
Service (NHS) Executive9o issued PFI guidance notes that do not properly distinguish 
between the two sets of criteria. The misleading government guidance includes a 
Treasury Taskforce guidance on design quality in PFI projects. The technical note 
expressly recommends the use of project-specific award criteria at shortlisting stage. 91 
What is more, the Treasury's step by step guide maintains that bidders can be 
shortlisted "on the grounds of ability and commitment to offer a viable and affordable 
82 1 I. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 35, para 3.13-3.15. 
83 Cf. R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p. London Borough of Harrow, The Times, 
January 16,1996; with annotations: Arrowsmith, (1996) P. P. L. R CS152-156. 
84 NAO, op. cit., note 40 of ch. 2, evidence of the witnesses, para 109. 85 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, pp. 236-239,625. 
" Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes v. The Netherlands, [19991 E. C. R. 4653 para 16 of the judgment. 87 European Commission, op. cit., note 70 (public supply), para 6.1.1; European Commission, op-cit., 
note 59 of ch. 3, para 3.23. 
88 Braun, "Selection of bidders and contract award criteria: the compatibility of practice in PFI 
89 
procurement with European Law" (200 1) P. P. L. R p. 1. 
II. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 46 of ch. 2, para 3.7; similarly: H. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 43 of ch. 2 (1717 
- 
Practical guide), step 8; HM Prison Service/ Private Finance Panel, op. cit., note 72 of ch. 2, para 5.5. 
"0 MIS Executive, op. cit., note 44 of ch. 2 (good practice guide), para 5.73. 9[ rreasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 15 of ch. 2 (design quality), paras 3.2 et. seq. 
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bid for the job, approach taken, appetite for taking on the risk. 
In the health sector, NHS guidance advises NFIS Trusts that shortlisting criteria 
used in health related PFI projects should aim at "selecting the most economically 
advantageous offer. "9' From a procurement law perspective, the Treasury and the 
NHS Executive thereby recommend the employment of qualification and award 
criteria at the same evaluation stage and fail to distinguish the two sets of criteria. 
9.3. Empirical findings 
Interviewees were asked about the assessment criteria authorities employed in 
PFI. PubSA#8 perceived the assessment of bidders and their proposals was "the 
second major area of tension" within the PFI procurement process, besides the use of 
the negotiated procedure. PubSA#8 said there was a 
general uncertainty of how to move ftom a longlist to 
shortlist and then on to a preferred bidder. " 94 
PubSA44 added that, in particular, the question of which criteria to use at the different 
stages was one of the most ambiguous issues in PH procurement. 
9.3.1. Selection of bidders 
9.3.1.1. Pýe-qualiflcation and shortlisting critetia 
Interviewees across all sectors typically said that the criteria used in PFI to pre- 
qualify bidders largely resembled the criteria permitted under the procurement rules. 
9' 
Authorities employed the technical, financial and legal assessment criteria laid down 
96 in the Directives 
. 
When applying the Services Directive, authorities had particular 
recourse to the "ability" criterion which then served as a broad heading to consider a 
variety of issues. PrivSA#6 insisted that financing issues were especially important in 
92 II. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 13 of ch. 2, stage 8. 
93 NHS Executive, op. cit., note 44 of ch. 2 (good practice guide), para 5.74. 
94 PubSA#8. 
95 PrivSA# 1, BothSA# 1, PubSA# 1, PubSA# 3 and PubSA#4. 
" PrivSA# 1; BothSA# 1; PubSA# 1; PubSA# 3; PubSA#4. 
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the assessment of bidding consortia. He added that authorities were especially 
interested in the parent companies providing guarantees for the consortiUM. 
97 
PrivSA46 said that authorities have recently started to look very carefully at 
previous PFI experience of the consortia and their members. This was done to exclude 
those contractors from the bidding process which have not yet proceeded through the 
steep and costly learning curve. 9' Another qualification criterion was, mentioned by 
PubSA44, related to the cohesiveness of the consortium. Authorities wanted to pre- 
empt the need to reassess consortia during the procurement process, which might 
become necessary should their composition change. Consortia were therefore asked to 
produce evidence of previous experience in working together. 99 
PubSA-44 maintained that authorities also used criteria which were more difficult 
to reconcile with procurement law. She remarked that, in particular, the "ability" 
criterion of the Services Directive was employed to ask bidders about their 
employment and tabour relations, the application of TUPE to the prospective project, 
pension entitlements and "all kinds of odd things. "'00 Drawing from her extensive 
experience in the health sector PubSA44 added that NHS Executive guidance was 
expressly requesting NHS Trusts to ask bidders about employment related matters 
during the qualification exercise. 
PubSA#4 complained that some standard qualification questionnaires expressly 
asked for the bidders' initial proposals on the project. 10' She thought requiring project 
related information at pre-qualification stage was clearly not reconcilable with the 
procurement rules, albeit that the information contained in the "outline proposals" was 
limited to between two and four sides of A4 pages. 102 PubSA48 confirmed the 








information in the course of assessing the bidders' technical capability. PubSA48 
thought this was a clear breach of the rules. However, she failed to dissuade her public 
sector clients from engaging in the practice. 
Other authorities and law firms used a two stage pre-qualification process 
employing project related criteria, which PubSA#8 considered equally dubious. 
Commenting on those practices, PubSA#4 said that it was a matter of time before a 
bidder would challenge authorities on requesting project related information at 
qualification stage. 'O' 
On the issue of requesting project related information, three legal advisors 
reported "falling-outs"'04 and "tensions"'O' between them and their public sector 
clients. PubSA# 10 mentioned additional tensions between legal and financial advisors, 
because the latter urged the departments to request project specific information. Legal 
advisors supported a "rigid" stance on this issue. PubSA#3 explained that 'this is one 
of the areas where you have to be open and clear about where are you going and stick 
to the rules. "106As a consequence, her pre-qualification questionnaire was as close as 
possible to the E. U. Directives, "going in a bit more detail. " 
Not all advisors shared this meticulous approach. PubSA# 10 explained that if the 
authority and the financial institutions insisted on using their own shopping lists, she 
would merely "try to make them legal. 1,107 PubSA#4 sought to adopt a similar 
approach in order to accommodate the expectations and wishes of her public sector 
clients. She tried to convey to her clients that if they illegitimately requested 
information, they had to give it a lower weighting. 'O' However, she was aware that this 
did not render the practice lawful. 
103 PubSA#4. 
104 PubSA#3. 
1()5 liothSA#3; PubSA#10. 
lo, ' PubSA#3. 
107 PubSA# 10. 
108 PubSA#4. 
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As regards to the shortlisting stage, four specific shortlisting criteria were 
discussed with the interviewees, namely employment related issues, the compulsory 
use of standardised contract terms, the willingness to form a good working 
relationship, and the development of PFI industries. 
The first shortlisting critenon specifically considered was the role of staff 
consultations during the procurement process and their influence on evaluating bidders 
and their proposals. PubSA#3 observed the main concern of staff members was the 
transfer of public pensions. The private sector could not provide equivalent pensions 
because public sector pensions were final pay pensions. PubSA#3 said rules were 
included in the recent local government Regulations providing transferred employees 
with the opportunity to remain in the local government pensions scheme. PubSA#3 
added that it was likely the NHS would adopt a similar approach in the near future. "'9 
All participants agreed that staff issues and staff consultations were generally 
treated very seriously. This practice was required by TUPE and TTF guidance. "O 
PrivSA#6 observed that staff issues were also high on the agenda because the public 
sector was a responsible employer. Government departments sought to ensure that 
employees were well transferred and looked after. In addition, authorities were 
interested to keep a lid on political and union opposition to the entire PFI concept. 
PrivSA#3, PubSA#3 and PubSA#4 said the involvement of staff representatives In the 
discussion of employment related issues varied substantially between sectors and 
depended on the quality of the industrial relations. 
PrivSA#3 provided the study with a practical examples. In one NHS scheme, the 
awarding trust involved staff at the pre-qualification stage to the extent that staff 
representatives gave responses to the pre-qualification questionnaire returned by 
bidders. "' PubSA#3 observed that in some cases staff members were consulted before 
an OJEC was placed. Authorities sought to avoid possible disruptions of the 
lo" PubSA#3. 
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procurement process by members of staff who felt their jobs were at risk. Another way 
of involving staff members in the procurement process was to admit staff or union 
representatives to the project board. "' 
The "acceptance of standardised contract terms" was the second questionable 
shortlisting criterion discussed with interviewees. PubSA#3 remarked that the use of 
standardised terms was normally mentioned in the project's information memorandum 
at the very early stages of the procurement. 113 PrivSA#6 mentioned that NHS Trusts 
routinely asked bidders at shortlisting stage to indicate whether they were willing to 
agree on the standardised contract terms. ' 14 
All lawyers with experience in the health sector knew of this practice and thought 
it was irreconcilable with the procurement rules. Private sector advisors were specially 
infuriated by the "ruthless macho behaviour""' demonstrated by the NHS Private 
Finance Unit (PFU). Even lawyers without previous health sector experience, such as 
PubSA#4, were "appalled" by this practice. Three public sector advisors mentioned "a 
very strong pressure from the Trusts on the bidders"' 16 to accept the standardised 
terms. PubSA#9 maintained that NHS Trusts allocated evaluation marks according to 
the willingness of bidders to accept the contract templates. 
PnvSA#6 described the standardisation document of the health sector as hardly 
acceptable to private sector contractors. The document did not represent best value for 
money, because there were many risks the parties had to negotiate and if the banks 
would refuse to cover them, equity had to cover them instead. This resulted in a higher 
percentage of equity and a lower percentage of debt than necessary. PrivSA#6 
explained that the rate of return on equity was 15%, while the interest to be paid on 




114 Recall that, according to the NHS guidance, the shortlisting procedure takes place prior to issuing of 
the 171N. 
115 PrivSA#6. 
116 PubSA#I; PubSA#3, PrivSA#3. 
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bank debt was 5%. The difference would equal the increase in cost. In other words, 
standardised contract terms increased the project costs and made "the banks 
unhappy. "' 17 He further argued that it appeared difficult to justify the use of the 
negotiated procedure, if the authority was able to determine the standardised risk 
allocation at the outset of the project. Using the negotiated procedure was in the public 
sector interest, because it helped to squeeze the best value for money out of the 
bidders. "' 
PrivSA#3 observed that the public sector had historical reasons to insist on its 
standardised terms. In the early days of PFI, "badly prepared" and "badly advised""9 
NHS trusts were routinely disadvantaged in contract negotiations by more 
sophisticated bidders. Hence, from the viewpoint of the NES standardising 
imperfection was preferable to becoming "routinely rolled over by the private 
sector. , 120 
Lawyers interviewed in this study wondered at which stage the "acceptance of 
standardised terms" criterion could be legitimately employed. PrivSA#6 held it was 
not an apt criterion to assess the capability of the bidder to deliver (qualification 
criterion). BothSA#3 said it was illegitimate to ask this question at either pre- 
qualification or shortlisting stage. He added that one might raise the issue when 
assessing the affordability and price of the project. BothSA#3 argued that if the 
contractor refused to accept the standardised terms, this inevitably increased the 
prOject cost. PrivSA#6 raised the important question whether it was permissible for 
the authority to expel an otherwise qualified bidder from the shortlist on this ground. 
BothSA#2 mentioned that In order to avoid this dilemma, other government 
departments normally invited the submission of alternative bids and variant proposals. 






BothSA#2 said this was especially important in the PH sector where the government 
department wanted to achieve innovative solutions. 
PrivSA46 approved this practice and remarked that it was very difficult to force 
standardised contract terms on bidders because, inevitably, contractual and factual 
aspects changed. The project first tendered was always quite different from that on 
which the contract was awarded. Imposing standardised contract terms on bidders 
could therefore easily result in receiving non-compliant bids. "' 
The third specific shortlisting criteria discussed with the respondents was the 
"ability to form a good working relationship. ""' PubSA#4 reported that bidders had to 
sign contractual arrangements that they were prepared to enter into a "partnering 
relationship based on good faith and mutual trust, openness and reasonableness. " 
Lawyer respondents"' were generally dissatisfied with using the "partnering" or 
similar criteria, 124 because it lacked substance. 125 They suggested better ways of 
pinpointing the precise issues behind the vague term. For example, PubSA#3 and 
PubSA# 10 proposed the authority could assess proven ability to establish a system of 
supply-chain management. The bidders could also be asked to provide practical 
examples of problem solving in an existing partnering arrangement. 126 BothSA#2 
suggested that authorities should look at the bidders' proposals for joint working, lines 
of communications, proposals for workshops and team building. 
PubSA#4 and PubSA#10 doubted whether it was commercially sensible to ask 
questions surrounding "good working relationships" before the ITN stage. Both legal 
advisors argued that bidding consortia were of rather loose cohesiveness and their 
members "would change anyway. ""' Frequent changes in the composition of 
consortia would undermine assessment criteria based on working relationships 
121 PrivSA#6. 
122 PubSA# I. 
123 Publ; A# 1, PubSA# 3, PubSA# 8, PubSA#9 and PubSA# 10. 
124 PubSA#1; PubSA#3; PubSA#8; PubSA#9. 
125 PubSA#4. 
126 PubSA#3; PubSA# 10. 
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between the authority and particular consortium members. Despite its questionable 
usefulness, PrivSA43 felt that private sector suppliers favoured this criterion, perhaps 
because it gave them the opportunity to team about the project and the project team. 
With respect to the fourth shortlisting criterion of "developing PFI industries" 
only PrivSA#5 and BothSA#4 were aware of any bias against firms that were already 
operating PFI contracts. The occurrence that not more lawyers knew of the bias is 
partly because some of them were not involved in advising on the very early PFI 
projects and specialised in PFI only later. "' Others did not become involved at the 
evaluation stage. 129 However, this practice is well documented inter alia in NAO 
Reports on early prison and highway projects. 
9.3.1.2 Shortlisting practice 
When structuring the award process and deciding which criteria to employ at 
which stage, lawyers found themselves in a precarious situation. On the one hand, they 
are confronted with official guidance notes and the wishes of their clients to proceed 
swiftly and efficiently through the procurement process. On the other hand, they were 
aware of the clear cut approach taken by the procurement rules. 
BothSA# I and BothSA#3 remarked that they analysed the risks involved in 
shortlisting bidders on the grounds of award criteria. They concluded that the risk of 
being challenged was low, because the Treasury and other governmental departments 
recommended this approach as "best practice. " Bidders were said to have a self- 
interest in presenting themselves and their bids In the most positive manner. However, 
the experiences and approaches of respondents differed. Lawyers such as PubSA43 
risked falling out with clients by Insisting on strict procedural propriety. Others, such 
as BothSA42, preferred to find a compromise between the rules and the wishes of 





PubSA#8 reported uncertainty amongst PFI awarding authorities and their legal 
advisors as to which criteria should be employed to shortlist pre-qualified bidders. 
Uncertainty partly arose because the sector specific guidance notes, the TTF notes and 
the academic literature applied the term "shortlisting" to different stages of the 
procurement process. PubSA#4 and PubSA49 thought that the uncertainty surrounding 
the term gave rise to the illegitimate use of award criteria at shortlisting stage, 
irrespective of when this stage occurred in the process. PubSA#4 nonetheless 
defended current practice and said that neither the Directives nor the academic 
literature have yet come up with a workable solution to the problem. 
The conduct of successive rounds of bid assessments nourishes the uncertainties 
surrounding the shortlisting exercise. What is more, government guidance notes 
employ different terminologies. "' Tenderers are whittled down at "shortlisting, " 
"ISOP, " "pre-ITN" and "ITN" stages, depending on the PFI sectors. 
PubSA#3 confirmed that the confusion created by government guidance resulted 
in an inconsistent practice. In addition to the uncertainties surrounding terminology, 
the Treasury recommends requesting "mini-proposals" from bidders at shortlisting 
stage. Whilst some departments sought outline proposals at the pre-qualification stage, 
other government agencies seemed to mix up the proposals with qualification criteria 
at the ISOP" (third selection stage), "pre-ITN , 131 or ITN" stage. This confusion of 
terms and criteria has further repercussions. Although diligent attempts were made to 
clarify the applied processes during the interviews, it sometimes remained unclear 
whether lawyers really meant "shortlisting" as it is discussed in the academic 
literature. 
Representing many of the interviewees, PubSA410 described the shortlisting 
process as it is suggested in the government guidance. She perceived shortlisting as 
part of the negotiation process. The government departments had to use project 
"' Cf. above. 
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specific criteria, because they needed to understand whether a particular consortium 
could undertake a particular project. This information could not generally be inferred 
from a list of the projects the consortium had previously delivered. This is why 
authorities and their legal advisors preferred to conduct an ISOP stage. This took place 
subsequent to pre-qualification and before the authority entered into fiirther 
negotiations with half a dozen or so contractors. Bidders were then ejected through the 
different stages of ISOp'112 ITN 133 and BAFO. 134 
It can be inferred from PubSA#10's account, other interviews and government 
guidance notes that it is common PFI procurement practice to shortlist bidders prior to 
the invitation to negotiate (ITN) in the meaning of the directives. PubSA4 10 and other 
interviewees perceived the shortlisting stage as part of the negotiations. At that stage, 
die authority has not yet fon-nally invited the tenderers to negotiate by issuing ITNs. 
According to the Directives, the ITN is a watershed between pre-qualification and 
negotiation. Two distinct sets of criteria are to be employed at each stage. To use 
award criteria before the negotiation round has formally commenced with the ITN 
therefore contravenes the procurement rules. 
This was recognised by PubSA#8 who questioned the legitimacy of the ISOP or 
pre-ITN stage altogether. In her view, the procurement process effectively included 
two stages, a pre-qualificatiOn and a tendering stage. She added that it was difficult to 
see how it was possible to have an outline proposal stage right after the pre- 
qualification stage. This would only barely feasible as a first phase of the ITN stage. 135 
Only a minority of lawyers, including PubSA#3, PubSA#8 and BothSA-#3, was 
very clear about the different stages and the issues involved. They said they conveyed 
their clients the significance of the different stages by clearly separating the pre- 
131 PubSA#3. 
132 Invitation to subnut outline proposals. 
133 Invitation to negotiate. 
131 Best and final offer, PubSA# 10. 
135 PubSA#g. 
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qualification from the negotiation phase. "' BothSA#3 insisted that it was only in the 
latter stage that authorities were allowed to employ more project specific criteria and 
that it was up to the authority how it structured this phase. 
PubSA#7 employed the following distinction. Final award criteria were forward- 
looking, whilst up to the shorthsting stage the authorities was supposed to look 
backward at historical issues. This assessment included questions such as whether 
bidders paid their taxes and what happened on other projects they had worked on in 
the past. Only post-qualification, authorities were permitted to apply their forward- 
looking criteria which related to the project and nothing else. Before the 
commencement of the negotiations, it was not legitimate to employ forward-looking 
award criteria. 
Other lawyers, such as BothSA#I and PubSA#4, responded that they applied 
award criteria at the procedural stage following pre-qualification. BothSA# I was 
aware that this practice was not reconcilable with the procurement rules. "' He adopted 
this cavalier approach towards procurement law, because he felt bidders would not 
challenge his public sector clients on the decision to use both sets of criteria at one 
stage. In similar vein, BothSA#2 remarked that at shortlisting stage he looked at 
relevant prOject experience, the financial information, consortium members, and their 
track-records. He also used mini-proposals, as advocated by the Treasury guidance. 
He expected to request such information in any event at that stage. The response of 
PrivSA#6 showed that not all legal advisors were aware that this practice was not 
reconcilable with procurement law. PrivSA#6 blatantly mixed up the distinct sets of 
criteria by explaining that as long as the authority used the phrase "most economically 
advantageous" coupled with experience, technical capability, and financial stability, 
the government department could apply any criteria. 
136 PubSA#3-, BothSA43. 
137 BothSA# 1. 
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PubSA44 explained that although this practice might be difficult to reconcile with 
procurement law, it played an obvious commercial role. This is why the NFIS 
guidance insisted on conducting a pre-ITN stage at which the NHS Trusts require 
project specific information. BothSA43 reported that amongst those project related 
issues were "silly questions, " such as "what do you think of my project, " "what is 
your design approach" and "will TUPE apply.,, 138 BothSA#3 described the situation 
where a public sector client insisted on requesting this kind of information against his 
legal advice. "Quite often, " he said, "you just give in because then you are analysing 
the risk of being challenged which is negligible. " The main factors considered in the 
analysis of risks will be dealt with in chapter 12. 
9.3.2. Award criteria 
9.3.2.1. Vagueness of award criteria 
All lawyers interviewed agreed that the universally used award criterion in PH is 
11 most economically advantageous bid. " Authorities sought to avoid being too specific 
with respect to the award criteria and their weighting. A common complaint from legal 
advisors, such as PubSA#3, was that as a result government departments failed to 
make up their minds about what award criteria to include. BothSA#3 described this 
behaviour as "endemic across the public sector. " Authorities were said to avoid 
concrete evaluation models and did not want to pin themselves down to weightings or 
sub-weightings. 
9.3.2 2 Changing of award criteria 
BothSA#3 mentioned that authorities were inclined to change evaluation criteria. 
This would allow them to take the bidder they wanted rather than the person they were 
supposed to choose on objective grounds. 
Even if lawyers did not always seem to convince their public sector clients to 
follow legal advice, PubSA#3 did not experience changes to the award criteria and 
138 BothSA#3. 
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claimed to be quite strict with her clients on this issue. PrivSA#6 remarked that award 
criteria remained unaltered mainly because they were published amongst the bidders 
and subsequent changes were easy to detect. 139 
In addition, publishing only broad headline award criteria allowed the authority to 
work out later in the process what those headings meant in detail and thereby reduced 
the need to change award criteria. PubSA#3 gave the example of an authority which 
sought to evaluate the quality of the support service, but did not know at the beginning 
of the process what the support services were going to be. The criteria therefore had to 
be refined throughout the process. PubSA#3 added that authorities occasionally rushed 
into the procurement process. As a result, they forgot to list "quality" or a similarly 
essential criterion when drafting their information memorandum. Under those 
circumstances, the legal advisors had to have recourse to other criteria to 
accommodate the pertinent assessment of quality. If one criterion was technical 
expertise or value for money, than quality became an element of the value for money 
consideration. PubSA#3 concluded that going ahead without looking at quality issues 
was as impossible as re-starting the process from scratch, because "the auditors would 
hang them for that. ""0 
Nonetheless, PubSA#4, PubSA#8 and PubSA#I0 all mentioned problems in 
persuading authorities to stick to the same broad headline award criteria between the 
ISOP and final award stage. They concluded this was another area where tensions 
arose between the legal advisors and their public sector clients. 
9.3.23. Nature of the award criteria 
Some of the award criteria used in PFI were not reconcilable with procurement 
law. Two of them, the development of PH industries and employment related issues, 




qualification and shortlisting stage, staff members were also consulted throughout the 
award process. 
PubSA#4 gave a practical example where staff members were briefed during the 
negotiation process. Their representatives posted the design of the competing bidders 
on staff notice boards. Though union representatives were not regularly involved in 
the award process, PubSA#4 suspected that soundings were taken. She thought this 
was detrimental, because the authority was easily creating expectations amongst staff 
that their views would be listen to. This was in fact not the case. The authority was 
bound to apply the evaluation criteria and those criteria did not include the opinion of 
staff members on design issues. 141 PubSA#9 was clear about the fact that staff 
representatives should not play any role in evaluating bids. She advised her clients 
accordingly. 
Even if such a strict approach was adopted, PubSA48 and PubSA410 suspected 
that staff representatives influenced the procurement decision through internal 
communication channels and had their black or red book about private firms. Public 
sector advisors identified this issue as an area where tensions arose between them and 
their public sector clients. BothSA#3 mentioned all authorities wanted to keep the 
unions happy and govemment guidance, including the NHS guidance, mislead 
departnients on the issue. 
From the perspective of the private sector, PrivSA#6 said the ability to convince 
employees that the proposal of the bidder was a better idea than the automatic transfer 
under TUPE was an essential skill to win the contract. In particular in the facilities 
management (FM) area where a large number of staff was transferred, the ability to 




The results of chapter 9 are mainly twofold. Firstly, governmental guidelines 
encouraged authorities to mix up procedural stages. As a result, authorities used award 
criteria at shortlisting stage before issuing the ITN. Mixing up the two distinct sets of 
assessment criteria is irreconcilable with procurement law. Though the reasons for this 
practice will be discussed in chapter 12, it can be asserted that the practice was at least 
partly caused by unclear terminology. 
Secondly, authorities routinely disregard the procurement rules when deciding 
which criteria to employ in the pre-qualification, shortlisting and award process. Apart 
from the development of PFI industries, PH awarding authorities regularly employed 
questionable qualification, shortlisting and award criteria which did not derive from 
the procurement Directives. It is one result of the empirical study that legal advisors 
had instead recourse to TTF guidance, '42 the clients' "shopping listS,,, 143 sector 
specific guidance, '44 the lists of the project lenders 14' and, most importantly, to project 
specific considerations. 146 
There is considerable evidence that authorities and their legal advisors viewed the 
procurement Directives as one source amongst others when they chose the criteria. 
This finding explains why government departments considered other criteria, such as 
partnering, staff issues, the acceptance of standardised contract terms and the 
development of PFI industries. The motivation of authorities using the criteria against 
their better their judgment have to be explored in chapter 12. 
From an outsider perspective it is possible to conclude that procurement law has 
had significant impact only on the choice of pre-qualification criteria. The study could 
not provide evidence suggesting that authorities employed pre-qualification criteria 
different from those envisaged by the Directives. Conversely, regarding the procedural 
142 Inter alia: PrivSA#6; PubSA#8. 
143 PrivSA# 1; PubSA#4 (MOD); PubSA# 10. 
144 PubSA#9. 
145 PubSA# 10. 
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stages and the criteria applicable at shortlisting and award stage, it can be deduced that 
procurement law had only limited impact on the procurement practice. 
Prevailing practices are compatible neither with the procurement Directives nor 
with the principles underlying them. The reason why authorities adopt the non- 
compliant behaviour include that it provides them with greater procedural flexibility 
and arguably accelerates the procurement process. For example, considering the 
bidder's ideas and proposals at the shortlisting stage has certainly helped authorities to 
arrive at a more informed commercial decision. 
Equally, consultation with staff members and the insistence on standardised 
contract ternis may have helped to prevent potentially difficult issues that otherwise 
could have prolonged the negotiation and implementation of the project. In addition, 
PubSA#8 described a "general uncertainty of how to move from a longlist to a 
shortlist" which partly results from an unclear terminology and is reflected in the 
apparent miXing up of the applicable criteria. 
The problems which are yet unresolved include the question of why the law 
failed to make an impact on the PFI procurement practice. It is suggested that this 
question for the reasons of non-compliance may overarch the seven procedural 
problems and we shall therefore return to it in chapter 12. 
'46 PrivSA# 1; BothSA# 1 
-1 PubSA# 1; PubSA#3; PiivSA#6; PubSA#6; PubSA#4. 
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Chapter 10 Treatment of consortia 
10.1. Introduction 
The range of skills required meeting the obligations under a major PF1 contract 
are too manifold to be delivered by only one undertaking. This is the reason why 
companies from a wide range of disciplines commonly create consortia set up only for 
the purpose of bidding for projects under the PF1 scheme. 
10.2. Treatment of consortia 
- 
the legal problems 
Consortia are loosely structured joint ventures of private firms, the consortium 
members, bidding together for a PFI opportunity. The joint venture of private sector 
companies initially lacks legal capacity. The lack of legal capacity can pose 
difficulties when the authority assesses the financial and technical capacity of the 
consortium (10.2.1. ) and the deliverability of its bid (10.2.2. ). The loose cohesiveness 
of the consortium is reflected in the occurrence that the composition of such a joint 
venture frequently changes during the bidding process. Changes in the composition of 
the membership increase the difficulties for the authority to assess the merits of the bid 
and the capability of the newly established consortium (10.2.3. ). 
Once the consortium is awarded the project agreement it will divide the 
individual sub-contracts between its members according to their skills. Whether the 
consortium is possibly coming under the umbrella of procurement law and 
consequently has to advertise those intra-consortium contracts will be discussed in 
section 10.2.4. 
1O. Z1. The lejeal status of consortia 
It is only at the final stages of the award procedure that consortium members 
formalise their co-operation by establishing a special purpose vehicle (SPV), in which 
they jointly own the shares. The treatment of consortia and special purpose vehicle in 
the procurement process is problematic for the reason that the one-off joint ventures 
are frequently set up by firms only to co-operate in a single project. Hence, in the 
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initial bidding stages the consortium generally lacks legal capacity. Moreover, it will 
have difficulties to produce evidence of the technical or financial qualification 
required to provide large-scale projects to the public sector. 
The lack of legal capacity and the difficulties in assessing the merits of the bid 
could result in a less favourable treatment of consortia vis-d-vis other bidders. This is 
because the authority is interested to contract with parties which can assume 
obligations and may be held responsible for omitting or neglecting these obligations. 
The U. K. Works Regulation 19, Supply Regulation 20 and Services Regulation 
19 expressly state that "a contracting authority shall not treat the tender of a 
consortium as ineligible nor decide not to include a consortium amongst those persons 
from whom it Will make the selection of persons to be invited to tender for or to 
negotiate a public... contract. "' Authorities are therefore prohibited to reject a bid 
submitted by a consortium only because the latter has not yet formalised the joint 
venture by establishing a legal entity. 
Pursuant to Works Regulation 19(2), Supply Regulation 20(2) and Services 
Regulation 19(2) authorities may require 2 from the consortium to assume a specific 
legal form "when it has been awarded the contract, " meaning before entering into the 
PF1 project agreement 
.3 
This general rule appears to miffor an appropriate balance of 
the interests involved. The consortium members are not obliged to form a legal entity 
before being awarded the project contract, because such a requirement would 
inevitably increase transaction costs of the bidders. Conversely, the public authority 
has the appropriate legal certainty to enter into an agreement with an entity having 
legal personality and is fully accountable. 
It is contentious whether national authorities can circumvent this rule simply by 
The equivalent European provisions: Article 18 Supply Directive, Article 21 Works Directive-, Article 
26 Services Directive; Article 33 Utilities Directive. 
The Supply Regulation furthermore requires that this is "necessary for the satisfactory performance of 
the contract. " 
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making legal capacity a condition of participation. The Court of Justice held that 
authorities are not entitled "to seek other references than those expressly mentioned in 
the Directive. ,4 Therefore, authorities are precluded from obliging bidding consortia 
to adopt a certain legal form prior to the award of the contract. It is permissible for the 
authority, according to Regulation 14, to ask providers to register in a national 
professional or trade register. 
10.22 Assessment of consortium bids 
Where consortia or a newly created SPV bid for a PFI contract, difficulties arise 
for the authority at the initial qualification stage. The difficulties usually occur 
because the consortium or the SPV lacks technical expertise and its financial standing 
is likely to be weak. The question arises whether the authority is entitled or required to 
consider the technical capacity and financial standing of the shareholders of the SPV, 
rather than the track record and financial standing of the SPV itself. ' 
This issue arose in the Ballast Nedam case' where the European Court of Justice 
argued it was possible for the authority to consider the technical capacity/capability 
and the financial standing of consortium members. The Ballast Nedam case was 
concerned with the assessment of a holding company which did not perform any 
services itself but which responded to the advertisement in the Official Journal. 
The ECJ held the authority could not exclude the holding company on the ground 
that it did not have any experience of performing the relevant services. This was held 
provided the holding company could produce references that it had available the 
resources of its subsidiary companies which did have the technical capability and 
knowledge of carrying out the works. According to the Court, those resources had to 
be assessed by reference to the usual technical, financial and legal criteria for 
3 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 348; for the difference between the award of a contract and its 
closure see: C-81/98 Alcatel Austria AG v Bundesministerium fur Wissenschaft und Verkehr (unreported), judgment of 28 October 1999. 
4 C-71/92 Commissionv. Spain [19931E. C. R. 1-5923, atp. 5989. 5 H. M. Treasury/ Treasury Taskforce, Private Finance and IT, para 4. 
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participation as laid down in Article 24 to 27 in the Works Directive. 7 
What is more, Article 27 (e) expressly mentions the possibility of proving the 
bidder's capacities by means of "a statement of the technicians or technical bodies 
which the contractor can call upon to carry out the work, whether or not they belong to 
the firm. " Having reference to this article, the Court ascertained' the legal link 
between holding and subsidiary, respectively between SPV and its shareholders, was 
irrelevant. It was rather required that the holding "actually has available the resources 
of the latter which are necessary for carrying out the contracts. "9 
The Court of Justice's view is reflected in the amendments of Directive 88/295 to 
the original definition of public works. According to the new definition, "works" 
encompass "the execution, by whatever means, of a work corresponding to the 
requirements specified by the contracting authority. "" The Court inferred from this 
amendment in the Ballast Nedam I case that a person who did not intend to execute 
the works by itself or did not own the means to do so, could still participate in a 
contract award procedure. " Hence, where the SPV or the consortium can produce 
reference to the authority that it has available the technical and financial means of a 
particular or all of the consortium members, the authority has to consider those as 
resources of the SPV. 
From the Ballast Nedam judgments the question arises of what evidence is 
required to establish the availability of the resources of the consortium members to the 
SPV. 
The way in which a consortium establishes that it has the resources of its 
members available will vary from case to case. The ECJ ascertained in Ballast Nedam 
that it was up to national courts to determine whether the required evidence was 
Case C-389/92 Ballast Nedam [1994] E. C. R. 1-1289; Case C-5/97 Ballast Nedam II, judgment of 18 
December 1997. 
71J. K. Works Regulation 14 
-16. 8 Case C-399/92, BallastNedam I, at para 17 of thejudgment. 
9 Case C-5/97, Ballast Nedam II, at para, 12 of thejudgment. 
10 Art I (c) Works Directive. 
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provided. In most instances, the SPV will not be able to establish this availability 
simply by virtue of the fact that the shares in the SPV are owned by the consortium 
members. This is because under English company law, a company has no power to 
require its shareholders to perform the obligations of the company. Instead, the 
authority should seek to obtain evidence of contractual commitments from the 
consortium members. 
As consortia have started to bid repeatedly In the same or at least similar 
composition for PFI projects, they increasingly acquire an own technical and financial 
track record. The aforementioned problems in assessing bids of consortia are therefore 
likely to diminish. PH thereby indirectly helps to restructure the private sector 'in 
persuading companies to apply more efficient methods of collaboration when bidding 
for public contracts 
. 
12 It is likely that this will encourage the introduction of modem 
methods of collaboration outside the realm of government procurement. 
10.23. Chankres in consortium membersh 
Apart from the problems caused by the legal status of consortia and the related 
question, changes to the commercial identity of the consortium may significantly 
effect the interests of the awarding authority. 13 The changes may include the 
replacement or withdrawal of one or even more members and a change of 
ownership. 14 For instance, a consortium member with an exceptionally convincing 
track record and outstanding financial capacity may decide to withdraw from the 
consortium. This withdrawal is likely to influence the assessment of the technical and 
financial capacity of the consortium. 
The main question arising after a change in the composition is whether the 
authority is permitted or required to exclude the consortium from the bidding process. 
In the absence of any express rules in Directives, the principle of equal treatment 
11 Case C-389/92, Ballast Nedan, I, at para 14 of the judgment. 
C BI, op. cit., note 99 of ch. 2, chapter 4 "Fostering private sector capacity. " 
I lighway Agency, op. cit., note 16 of ch. 2. para 2.8. 
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requires that all tenderers have to be treated equally unless there are objective reasons 
for discrimination. It is a fundamental requirement that all tenderers are judged against 
the same minimum qualification and shortlisting criteria. This implies that a changed 
consortium has to satisfy the minimum qualification, shortlisting and award 
requirements. 
In cases where the new consortium member does not change or changes only 
slightly the quality of the consortium's bid and the status of the consortium in terms of 
qualification and shortlisting criteria, the authority should be permitted and indeed 
required to retain this bidder in the award procedure. In case of material changes to the 
consortium's composition which influence its technical or financial capability, the 
changes may eventually result in the consortium not meeting the qualification, 
shorthsting or award criteria. Under those circumstances, the consortium has to be 
ej . ected from the tendering process. To retain bidders on a long- or shortlist on an other 
basis than that previously applied to other tenderers contravenes the equal treatment 
and the transparency principle. " It will be difficult in practice to prove that the 
tenderer under consideration would have been selected in its new composition. 
10.2.4. Intra-consortium contracts 
Following the award of the main PH contract, the SPV will commence to place 
the different sub-contracts for the design, construction, management and operation of 
the asset to its members in accordance with their respective expertise. As the main PFI 
contract concerns only the project's "output" the sub-contracts are tailored to the 
specific task the member has to provide. In dividing the individual tasks between its 
members, the SPV awards in essence the specific works, supplies and services 
contracts. In a PFI contract for the provision of hospital facilities, these are the 
individual contracts concerned with building the hospital, supplying medical 
equipment and providing clinical facilities management. 
" lbid., cf the MI 
-A I road project where one consortium member was subject to a tak-e-over bid and Footnotes continued on the next page. 
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The contractual relationship between the SPV and its shareholders resembles the 
situation where a legal entity awards contracts for a publicly financed project to other 
legal entities. The aspect that PFIs are publicly financed could possibly trigger the 
application of procurement law. This would mean inter alia that intra-consortium 
contracts had to be advertised European-wide and the SPV had to conduct formal 
tendering procedures. 
Conversely, bidding consortia are only established for the purpose to bid for the 
PFI and to place sub-contracts with its shareholders. If consortia had to publicly award 
intra-consortium contracts according to procurement law, their establishment was 
rendered economically impossible and meaningless. 
The question arises whether the SPV is failing within the realm of the public or 
the utilities rules. If this question is answered in the affirmative, the intra-consortium 
contracts would have to "be awarded in full compliance with all the Directives' 
provisions. , 16 
10.2.4.1. Public sector 
Some SPVs may be included in the definition of works concessionaires and are 
thereby under a duty to comply with certain procedural rules spelled out in the 
Directives. If the SPV is held to be a public sector authority, it has to comply with the 
full regime of the Works and Services Directives. This obliges inter alia the SPV to 
award sub-contracts according to the procurement Regulations. 
The three public sector Regulations contain a common definition of "contracting 
authorities. " These are the State, regional or local authorities and bodies governed by 
public law. " Because the SPV is not a state authority listed in the Regulations, it may 
only be covered by the second leg of the definition. The term "bodies governed by 
another carried out an asset swap (including its road business). 
15 Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24 of ch. 2, p. 398, para 9.207. 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on Public-Private 
17 
Partnerships in Trans-European Network Projects, COM(97) 453 final of 10 September 1997, p. 16. 
Cf. Article I (b) Supply, Works, Services Directive. 
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public law" comprises entities, which are (1) set up for the specific purpose to meet 
needs in the general interest, (2) which are either wholly or mostly financed, 
supervised or which board members are appointed by an authority and (3) which meet 
needs not having industrial or commercial character. The European Court of Justice 
emphasised in its Mannesmann decision that the three conditions must be 
cumulatively satisfied. " The question arises whether the consortium may be 
considered as being "financed" by the contracting authority by means of the payments 
made under the project agreement. 
In the Cambridge University case, '9 the Court expanded on the concept of bodies 
governed by public law and held that "not all payments made by a contracting 
authority have the effect of creating or reinforcing a specific relationship of 
subordination or dependency. Only payments which go to finance or support the 
activities of the body concerned without any specific consideration therefore may be 
described as public financing. 20 
The Court fiirther stressed with the Advocate General that the nature of the 
specific relationship must go beyond a normal commercial relationship formed by 
reciprocal contracts freely negotiated between the contracting parties. 
The project agreement between SPV and contracting authority is a reciprocal 
contract not creating a relationship of subordination or dependency going beyond a 
mere commercial relationship. It is therefore advocated that SPVs do not come within 
the realm of the concept of "bodies governed by public law. " It can be concluded from 
the foregoing that the SPV is generally exempted from applying the public sector rules 
when awarding the intra-consortium contracts to its members. 
10.24.2 Utilities sector 
Despite the finding that intra-consortium contracts are exempted from the public 
18 C44/96 Mannesmann Anlagenbau v. Strohal Rotationsdruck, [19981 E. C. R. 1-57, para 21 of the judgment. 
19 C-380/98 The Queen and HM. Treasury, ex p. University of Cambridge, judgment of 3 October 2000 
(unreported). 
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sector Directives, they might come within the realm of the Utilities Directive. This is 
because the Utility Directive also covers privately owned entities which are "not 
caught at all by the public sector rules. "" The utility has to cumulatively satisfy two 
conditions. Firstly, the entity making the procurement must be a "relevant person, " 
either a public authority, a public undertaking or a body enjoying "special or exclusive 
rights. " Secondly, the Utilities Directive does only apply to "relevant activities" of the 
body which are expressly listed in the Directive. 
In broad terms, the listed procurement activities encompass the areas of water, 
electricity, transport and telecommunications" with exemptions for the upstream 
energy sector, 23 certain activities in the telecommunication market, 24 and the bus 
transport sector. 25 
The U. K. Utilities Contracts Regulations take a moderately different approach 
from the EC regime. Schedule I to the Regulations provides an exhaustive list of 
"relevant persons" coming within scope of the rules in column I and explicitly 
specifies In column 2 the "relevant activity" which has to be procured pursuant to the 
Regulations 
. 
26 A "catch-all" provision ensures that newly established or not listed 
entities are also caught by the U. K. rules. In respect to the regulated activities, there 
are no differences vis-d-vis the European Directive. 
The question of whether SPVs are caught by the Utilities Directive is far from 
irrelevant as some SPVs delivered "relevant activities" to the public. In the transport 
area, the PFI scheme delivered various lightrail projeCtS27 and local governments 
20 Para 21 of the judgment. 
21 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 3 82. 
22 The Conumssion proposed in May 2000 to exempt entities operating in the telecommumcations 
sectors from the ambit of the Utility Directive, European Commission, Proposal for a Council 
Directive regulating the award of contract in the excluded sector, section HI "substantive 
amendments at para 2.2 et seq. 
23 Utilities Regulation 9. 
24 Utilities Regulation 7. 
25 Utilities Regulation 6 (h). 
26 Utilities Regulation 6(a). 
27 Dockland Light Railway-Lewisham Extension, Manchester Metrolink-, Nottingham Lightrail. 
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outsourced the provision of water and sewerage services to pppS. 28 Those activities 
are per se "relevant activities" for the purposes of Directive 93/38 and could bring a 
private sector SPV within its realm. 
Hence, the SPV may have to award its intra-consortium contracts, if it is a 
"relevant person" for the purposes of the Utilities Directive and the U. K. Regulations. 
Both define relevant person as comprising public authorities, public undertakings or 
entities granted with special or exclusive rights. It has been established above that the 
SPV is not a public authority. Hence, the question arises whether the SPV comes 
within the realm of one of the two other categories. 
The concept of "public undertaking, " includes bodies of an "industrial or 
commercial nature. "" This per definitionem necessitates that "one or more contracting 
authorities are able to directly or indirectly exercise a dominant influence by virtue 
of.. "'O one of the listed means of control. These are, for instance, the ownership of the 
public undertaking, a financial participation in it, a majority of shares or the right to 
appoint more than half of the managing personnel. 
The condition of "financial participation" may catch a consortium, if the private 
sector undertakings have formed a joint venture with a public authority, " the latter 
contributes existing assets or directly subsidises the asset development. 32 
A good example for public sector financial contribution is the Docklands Light 
Railway extension to Lewisham with estimated capital cost (excluding financing 
charges) of E200 million. This figure includes private investment of approximately 
f165 million and public sector contributions from Her Majesty's Government and the 
London Boroughs of Lewisham and Greenwich. The project's sponsor and operator of 
the trams Docklands Light Railway Ltd. is additionally sponsored by the Secretary of 
28 MOD Development in Sutton Coldield, OJEC Notice of 07/07/98; Northern Ireland Office: 
Development of Public Private Partnership in the Water Industry including Bangor and Kinnegar 
Sewerage Projects. 
29 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 386. 30 Utilities Regulation 3(2). 
31 See above sections 2.2.3. and 2.3.1.2. 
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State for the Environment by being a wholly owned subsidiary of the London 
Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC). Cash contributions from public funds 
in lightrail projects will be used to cover the difference between the expected revenue 
stream and the capital costs of the works. The authority contributing the funds could 
use its contribution to retain some influence over the delivery and management of the 
project. This aspect makes the subsidy different from an ordinary payment under a 
services contract. 
One of the principles underlying all European procurement Directives is to avoid 
the risk of giving any preference to national tenderers or applicants whenever the 
contracting authority awards a contract. " As has been explained above for the public 
sector, it has to be examined on a case-by-case basis whether the financial contribution 
allows the authority to exercise at least indirectly dominant influence 34 over the 
consortium's economic activity. This can be denied in the overwhelming number of 
cases. 
The SPV which was awarded a PFI contract could be brought within the realm of 
the Utilities rules by virtue of being granted a "special or exclusive right. " This is, 
pursuant to the definition of U. K. Regulations 3(2), "a right deriving from 
authonsations granted by a competent authority where the requirement for the 
authonsation has the effect of reserving for one or more persons the exploitation of an 
activity specified in the second column of Schedule 1. ý, 3' A contracting entity shall be 
especially "considered to enjoy special or exclusive rights where for the purposes of 
constructing the networks or the facilities, it may take advantage of a procedure for the 
expropriation or use of property or may place network equipment on, under or over 
32 H. M. Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 8 of ch. 2, p. 2. 
33 C-44/96 Mannesmann Anlagenbau v. Strohal Rotationsdruck, [1998] E. C. R. 1-57, para 33 of the 
judgment. 
34 C-353/96 Commission v. Ireland, judgment of 17 December 1998 (unreported) para 39 of the 
j udgment. 
35 Utilities Directive Article 2(3). 
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the public highway. "" 
The question arises which criteria have to be satisfied to make rights -special" or 
"exclusive"" for the purposes of the Utility Directive. Rights may be regarded as 
being "exclusive" when they are "reserved for or limited to a person or a group"38 to 
39 the exclusion of other competitors. In this situation the dependence on the state for 
continued approval and the insulation of the entity from the market justify the 
regulation of its purchases. 40 
PFI contracts are not set aside for a specific group of tenderers. Hence, it is 
submitted that the concept of "exclusive rights" is not applicable. The remainder of the 
chapter will therefore focus on the concept of "special rights. " 
Rights can be defined as "special" if they are only conferred to a particular group 
or person. If every person or entity can claim a right without meeting any conditions 
or by meeting certain minimum conditions, then the right cannot be referred to as 
11 special. "4' On the first glance, a wide definition of "special rights" could possibly 
include SPVs which were awarded a PFI contract for designing, building, financing 
and operating a lightrail or a power station, such as an energy-from-waste plant. These 
projects are also likely to enjoy a special or exclusive right since the project company 
may take advantage of a procedure for the use or expropriation of property" within 
the meaning of Utilities Regulation 3(2) In order to construct a network or facilities as 
listed in the Schedule. This could be for instance a network of lightrail tracks or a 
network of overhead power lines. Hence, SPVs operating one of the utilities activities 
fall at a first glance within the realm of the Regulations. 
We have seen that if the Utilities Regulations became applicable, SPVs were 
Milities Directive Article 2(3Xa). 
37 These are perceived by the ECJ to be separate concepts: Case 202/88 Commission v. France [19911 E. C. R. 1-1223. 
Oxji)rd Advanced Leamer's Dictionary (1995), "exclusive. " 
Similarly: Arrowsmith, "Procurement in the Utilities Sectors and the Position of Private Companies" in: Abraham/Stuyck/Ballon (eds. ) Privatisations and Public Procurement in the European Union (1998), P. I(A. 
'0 l, uropean Conunission, Proposal for a Council Directive regulating the award of contract in the 
excluded sector, para 14. 
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obliged to comply with procurement law when placing its sub-contracts with the 
consortium members. It is questionable whether contracts awarded under a 
competitive procedure can be caught by this interpretation of "special rights. " 
There are five arguments suggesting that SPVs might not come within the realm 
of the Utilities Directive. 
'Me first argument against bringing SPVs within the realm of the Utilities 
Directive is of economic nature. On a micro-economic level, it can be held that 
excluding intra-consortium contracts from applying the procurement Directives is an 
economically reasonable solution. The shareholders of the SPV established the "man 
of straw" merely for the purpose of co-ordinating their activities regarding the PFI 
project. By obliging joint ventures to award their intra-group contracts according to 
the procurement rules, one would render such highly efficient co-operations 42 
impossible. 
On a macro-economic level, it can be inferred from Commission 
Communications in the areas of public procurement4' and Trans-European Transport 
Networks44 that the Commission regards Public-private partnerships and other 
concession agreements as being of "economic significance ý, 45 " and of "great interest 
for the Single Market. " In particular, the formation of special project vehicles is highly 
recommended to ensure a "stable framework within which the various partners can 
establish a confident working relationship. "46The formation of SPVs help to deliver 
cross-border projects, as for instance the Channel Tunnel, and are therefore consistent 
with the aims and purposes of the Treaty and the procurement Directives. The 
Commission concludes that any "remaining barriers to their creation should be 
41 Case 13/77, InnovATAB [19771 E. C. R. 2115. 
42 For the "partnering" approach: Cox, Townsend, Strategic Procurement in Construction. 
43 European Commission, op. cit., note 113 of ch. 3. 
' European Commission, op. cit., note 16. 
45 European Conunission, op. cit., note 113 of ch. 3. 
' European Commission, op. cit., note 16, p. 10. 
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removed. , 47 Requiring SPVs to award the contracts to their shareholders in 
accordance with the Directives would impose a significant barrier to the creation of an 
effective special prOject vehicle. From a micro- and macro economic perspective it is 
arguable to exempt SPVs from the realm of the Directive. 
The second argument supporting the exclusion of competitively awarded 
contracts is that these have been initially awarded in accordance with objective, 
proportional and non-discriminatory criteria as laid down in the procurement 
Directives. It can be assumed that the exercise of market forces have made such 
contracts significantly less susceptible to government influence. In addition, they are 
not reserved for a particular group of persons and, therefore, are not "special. " 
It is possible to argue against this view that objective criteria, as for instance 
"technical capacity" involve the exercise of subjective discretion and, hence, the 
potential for discriminatory State influence 
. 
4' This View is underpinned by the fact that 
the private entity granted with a "special" right is subject to state influence because it 
vitally depends on the state's continuing approval, for example, to carry on its activity 
under a concession. 49 Conversely, the exercise of "subjective discretion" and the 
dependence on the continuing governmental approval is to a varying degree inherent 
to every government contract and does not per se justifý the characterisation as 
"special. " 
Placing the "special or exclusive rights" alternative in its regulatory context calls 
forth a qualitative comparison with the other group of entities covered, these are 
"public undertakings" and "public authorities. " The first common element inferable 
from the comparison of the other alternatives is the exceptional exposure to state 
influence. As in the case of "public undertakings, " the reason to regulate the purchases 
of public or private entities is the possibility of state Mifluence that may induce 
47 European Conumssion, op. cit., note 16, p. 14. 
u ArTowsinith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p, 102. 
49 European Commission, op. cit., note 40, para 13. 
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.. uneconomic , 50 and discriminatory procurement practices. Consequently, the "special 
or exclusive rights" conferred to an undertaking must imply a degree of dependence 
on the state, making this concept comparable with "public undertakings" and "public 
authorities. " Dependence on the state can be assumed if the conditions laid down in 
the twelfth recital of the preamble of Directive 93/38 are satisfied. This includes cases 
where state authorities participate in the capital of the entity or are represented in the 
entities administrative, managerial or supervisory bodies. 
Both other alternatives, "public authority" and "public undertaking, " have a 
second aspect in common, namely the insulation of the entity from the market. The 
insulation results in both cases from barriers to entry for potential competitors. The 
Commission assumes that in situations where a private or public entity is sufficiently 
insulated from market forces, it can pursue other goals than securing the economically 
most viable offer. The protection of national suppliers and contractors is identified as 
one of the non-economic goals. " 
It is submitted that both conditions, insulation form the market and exposure to 
substantial government pressure must be existent to a significant degree to bring an 
entity awarded with a "special" right within the realm of the Directive. It appears 
doubtful whether competitively awarded contracts, such as contracts regarding a PFI 
project, subject the awarded entity to governmental pressures and insulates it from the 
market. Additionally, the uncertainty in relation to the required degree of "market 
isolation" and "government influence" renders it impossible to base a reliable 
statement when the "special rights" concept will be satisfied in the PH context. 
A third argument for releasing PH contractors from the Utilities Regulation may 
be gained from a comparison with in-house agreements. It is suggested in respect of 
the award of in-house contracts that where the work, the supply of goods or the service 
is awarded to an in-house service provider which is legally part of the purchasing 
50 Ibid., para 14. 
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authority, there is in law no ContraCt. 52 This means that in-house contracts may be 
awarded without following the procedures of the procurement rules. Nevertheless, the 
"in-house exemption" requires that the in-house provider is legally part of the 
purchasing orgarusation and there will not come any contract into existence between 
the both parties involved. " 
The scenario of in-house contracts bears resemblance with the legal and factual 
relationship between the SPV and its shareholders. However, the purchasing entity in 
the case of a PFI project is part of the shareholders' portfolios rather than vice versa. 
Notwithstanding, both situations share a substantial relationship between the 
purchasing entity and its suppliers which goes beyond the single works, supply or 
service contract. In both situations, the parties have specified from the outset the entity 
supplying goods or providing services. In the in-house situation, the purchasing 
authority decides to source the service or good in question from an in-house provider 
instead of seeking external offers. Under the circumstances of an intra-consortium 
contract, it is the sole purpose of the consortium to award the project's main sub- 
contracts among its shareholders. 
Conversely, it can be argued against comparing in-house with intra-consortium 
contracts that the SPV and its shareholders are separate legal entities. This feature 
clearly distinguishes both situations. Another distinct characteristic of intra- 
consortium contracts is that they are legally formal agreements between SPV and the 
respective shareholder. In order to avoid the application of the procurement regime, 
the legally separate parties had to enter into an informal and non-contractual supply or 
service agreement. 54 
However, such a practice would not be in concordance with the procurement 
guidance provided by the Treasury and would due the created legal uncertainties not 
" Ibid., Para 10. 
52 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 118. 
53 Kunzlik, "Intra-group transactions under the Utilities Procurement Directive, " (1993) Utilities Law 
Review, p. 21 1. 
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be supported by the project lenders. Those guidance notes pre-suppose inter alia that 
the contracting agency awarding the PFI contract must be "satisfied with the 
background contractual arrangements, such as the sub-contracts to be put in place. "" 
It can be submitted for reasons of accountabilItYI6 of the sub-contractor for its 
respective stake of the project that the public entity has a prime interest of ensuring 
that the contracts between the SPV and the sub-contractors are legally binding formal 
arrangements. Hence, the exemption for in-house contracts is not applicable to intra- 
consortium contracts and SPVs cannot be released on this ground from applying the 
utilities rules. 
Tbe fourth argument is that the authority concludes implied contracts with the 
SPV's shareholders. In fact, the contracting authority expressly considers the 
contractual relationships and the capability of the shareholders when assessing the 
expertise and financial standing of the SPV. This indicates that sub-contracts are 
simultaneously awarded together with the project agreement. Thereby, the authority 
implicitly concludes the PH contract with the shareholders of the SPV. 
in addition, shareholders are bound by the project agreement via their shares in 
the SPV and the performance guarantees. Those guarantees are a core interest of the 
public authority, since the SPV may lack the technical and financial means to perform 
the contract. From this perspective, it appears possible to consider the SPV and its 
shareholders as one entity. The award of sub-contracts would then be more 
comparable to the situation where works, the supply of goods or services are awarded 
to in-house providers. Consequently it can be argued to release SPVs from the 
Directive's realm. 
The fifth argument suggested against bringing SPVs within the ambit of the 
Utility rules is that the utility is not yet a "relevant person" at the time when it places 
54 Arrowsinith, op-cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 414. 
55 H. M. Treaswy Taskfarce, Case Study on the first eight DBFO road contracts and their development, 
Chapter 4, "The process". 
5' N&nistry of Defence, op. cit., note 47 of ch. 2, para 6.1. 
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the intra-consortium contracts with its shareholders, 
Before the examination of this argument, it seems useful to clanfy the different 
stages involved in the bidding process from the contractor's perspective. In employing 
the example of a lightrail project, interested firms vested with different skills join 
together to form a bidding consortium. The consortium interested to deliver "lightrail 
services" to the public may encompass a construction company, an operator and one 
57 or more financiers 
. 
The construction company and the operator will expect to enter 
into the construction contract, the operation and the maintenance contract 
respectively. " In the early stages of the bidding process, the firms will, as a natural 
part of the consortium's creation, place the prospective contracts among them, even if 
this does not happen by formally concluding the contracts. At this point in time, the 
consortium is obviously not a utility for the purposes of the Directive, since it either 
has no legal form or at least does not have the right to perform one of the "relevant 
activities. " Even if the sub-contracts are awarded in a formally legal manner, the 
"unborn utility" does not have to award its sub-contracts. 
Before the actual award of the contract, the consortium is likely to be chosen as 
"preferred bidder. " It is in this stage of the award process that the contracting authority 
59 
will, in conformity with H. M. Treasury guidance notes, insist that the joint venture 
of companies establishes a SPV vested with legal personality to negotiate and 
conclude the PFI project agreement. If possible, consortium members should "award" 
the actual sub-contracts among them as part of the process leading to the conclusion of 
the main PFI contract. Until this point in time, the SPV is not a utility, and the award 
of the intra-consortium contract can be done without having recourse to procurement 
law. 
This situation arguably changes after the award of the project agreement, vesting 
57 11. M. Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, op. cit., note 13 of ch. 2, stage 11: The proj ect's funder should get involved as early as possible to avoid unnecessary delay. 
Vinter, op. cit., note 193 of ch. 2, p. 235. S9 Central Unit of Purchasing, Guidance 51- Introduction to the EC Procurenlent Rules, para 2.12. 
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the SPV with its "special or exclusive right" to provide, for example, lightrail services 
to the public. Subsequent to the award of the contract the SPV becomes a Cý relevant 
person" for the purposes of the Directive. 
It is questionable whether the SPV exercises at this point in time a "relevant 
activity" within the meaning of the Utilities Directive. It is argued that the Utilities 
Directive does not apply to a project company during the construction of the network, 
because at this stage of the project, the SPV has not yet engaged in any utility activity. 
One could argue from the rules wording that the project company does not yet 
have or actually carried on a specified utilities activity and therefore it is not within 
the realm of the Regulations during its construction phase. 60 The operator of a lightrad 
is not yet operating "networks providing a service to the public in the field of transport 
by... tramway" within the meaning of Article 2 of the Directive. The entity only 
concludes agreements in order to construct the asset and prepare the operation of the 
lightrall. 
The Utilities Regulations does not explicitly mention the case of "ghost 
UtilltieS,, 6 ' but it defines a utility as entity which "carry on" or "has as one of its 
activities , 62 one of the specified utilities activities. With reference to those provisions, 
it has been argued that the SPV is exempted from the utility regime as long as it has 
not obtained the rolling stock and has commenced operations. In the context of 
consortia, the above argument is especially attractive due to its practical 
consequences. The SPV awarded with a PFI contract would not be obliged to put its, 
construction, operation and maintenance agreement out to tender. 
The better argument rejects this overly literal reading which exempts the most 
important63 and certainly economically most significant agreements in the life of the 
utility. Instead of focusing on the wording of the Directive, it appears more 
'0 Vinter, op. cit., note 193 of ch. 2, p. 235. 
DI Arrowsmith, op-cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 413. 
c, 2 I hilities Regulation 3(2). 
0 AiTowsinith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 413. 
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appropriate to have recourse to the more substantive aims and purposes of 
procurement law. It is submitted that the Utilities Directive aims to include entities 
which were granted with the special or exclusive right to carry on a relevant activity. 
This goes irrespective of whether the entity carries on that activity at the time in 
question. 
The adoption of a functional approach identifies the powers and rights of the 
entity as more important than the activity it is currently performing. Viewed from this 
perspective it is more important that an authority empowered the SPV to develop and 
operate a lightrail system than the fact that it has not commenced operation yet. 
Arguably, the conferral of the rights to operate the relevant activity empowers the 
grantee to pursue discriminatory procurement practices. This justifies to regulate its 
procurements. Moreover, the project agreement includes the development and the 
operation of the lightrail. It appears unjustified to artificially separate both stages and 
to conclude that the SPV becomes a utility only on the first day of its operation. The 
" provision" of a transport network does include both stages with the development of 
the network as a necessary prerequisite of the operation. 
It is therefore submitted that subsequent to the conclusion of the contract and the 
conferral of the "special or exclusive right, " the SPV becomes a "relevant person, " 
which has to comply with the utility rules when awarding its contracts. In the context 
of PFI projects, the private SPV may be brought within the realm of the Utilities 
Directive by virtue of operating in a non-competitive market situation. These findings 
entail that the procurement rules may be applicable to intra-consortium contracts. 
As a result of the five arguments one may conclude that the legal situation is one 
of uncertainty. There may be good argument in favour of releasing SPVs from the 
realm of the utilities rules, however, a wide approach to interpreting the "special 
rights" concept suggests that SPVs carrying on "relevant activities" come prima facie 
within the scope of the rules. 
It has to be noted that the Commission did not show and currently still does not 
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show any intention to pursue cases where a SPV places sub-contracts among its 
shareholders. This assessment of the risks to be challenged is based on mere empirical 
evidence and, hence, cannot guarantee that the Commission maintains this attitude in 
the ftiture. The Commission has to address the remaining uncertainties when 
reviewing Directive 93/38. The complicated situation of the law would have been 
substantially eased, if the proposed Article 4 had been implemented, which largely 
exempted contracts between concessionaires and associated or affiliated undertakings 
(shareholders). 64Tbe reasons for dropping this useful provision in the course of the 
legislative process are not comprehensible. 
10.3. Empirical findings 
In the context of how to treat consortia under procurement law, the interviews 
with legal advisors focussed on the pertinent issues, namely changes in the 
composition of consortia and the uncertainties surrounding the award of intra- 
consortium contracts. 
10.3.1. Chanresto consortia 
Many lawyers, such as BothSA#2, BothSA#4 and BothSA#6, put forward that 
the loose cohesiveness of consortia was a basic and very common problem in the PH 
procurement process. They all gave examples of projects where the composition of the 
bidding consortia changed substantially. Consortium members regularly dropped out 
or were replaced by other companies. BothSA43 said 
"in many projects, the people who are bidding for the 
contracts have nothing to do with those who end up being 
the actual contractors; there is no connection between them 
whatsoever. You see more changes to the consortium than to 
the project itsetf " 
o4 European Commission, Amended Proposalfor a Council Directive on the procurement procedures of 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, COM (89) 380 
final, pp. 31-32. 
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PubSA#4 remarked this practice raised the difficult procedural issue of how to 
assess the changed consortia. BothSA#5 said he gave the advice to go back in the 
procurement process to examine whether the consortium in its new composition still 
had been qualified, shortlisted and brought forward to the current procedural stage. He 
acknowledged that this "going back" procedure was far from straight forward in 
practice. Public sector clients had difficulties in determining the current procedural 
stage of their project. 
PubSA#4 said in order to avoid the occurrence of having to deal with one 
important member of the consortium dropping out, authorities started to examine the 
track record of companies and consortia in other partnering relationships or PFI 
arrangements. Authorities were particularly interested whether the consortium 
members previously worked successfully together and were committed to the cohesion 
of their joint-venture. 
In addition to imposing this criterion on tenderers, PubSA#3 mentioned that "big 
players in the field now know who they can work with. " It can be concluded that 
private sector firms were equally interested to ensure that the process of re-structuring 
consortia did not unnecessarily delay the procurement process. 
10.3.2 Intra-consortium contracts 
Only a relatively small number of lawyers had experience with PH projects 
involving the delivery of utility infrastructure, such as light-rail schemes and energy 
from waste facilities. Only in those projects it is likely that the SPV may be obliged to 
award its intra-consortium contracts according to procurement law. BothSA#I and 
PubSA#9 who had experienced utility PFIs uncompromisingly refused to discuss the 
issues of intra-consortium contracts. This exceptional reaction allows the conclusion 
that the issues at stake are of highly "sensitive nature. " What is more, legal advisors 
appeared to be very well aware of the potential risks involved in not advertising intra- 
consortium contracts. 
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In employing the first arguments for SPVs not coming within the realm of the 
utilities rules, BothSA#I perceived it as absurd that the SPV had to advertise the sub- 
contracts to its shareholders who established the SPV for this very reason. He added 
that 
we have notfound a way around the application of the 
procurement rules, but applying them in this situation 
would make PFIs unworkable. 65 
It can be inferred from this statement that the utility rules were widely ignored and 
sub-contracts were not advertised. 66 PnvSA#6 mentioned that In projects where the 
intra-consortium contracts had been advertised 
"there is a remarkably high coincidence between the 
identity of the developers and the contractors, so that in 
each deal the developer/contractor seems to end up 
winning the contracts even though it had been 
advertised. , 67 
The risk for the SPV of being challenged on not advertising intra-consortium 
contracts was, as maintained by PrivSA96, especially low. This was mainly because 
the remedies were available to the very people who formed themselves SPVs and 
probably were in breach of the same Regulations elsewhere. BothSA#I said 
advertising the contract was only sensible for some project developers, but not in the 
normal situation where shareholders set up a joint venture to bid for a PFI 
. 
68 
BothSA#I challenged the proposition that SPVs had to advertise their intra- 
consortium contracts at all in using the fifth argument developed above in section 
10.2.4.2. He said that the intra-consortium contracts were allocated at a time when the 
consortium did not know whether it had won the contract to become a utility for the 
'5 BotliSA# 1. 
" PrivSA#6. 
o7 PrivSA#6. 
68 BotliSA# 1. 
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purposes of the Directive 
. 
69 He concluded that "ghost utilities" arguably fell outside 
the ambit of the Utility Directive. 
PrivSA43 and BothSA43 held on similar considerations that the utility rules were 
not applicable. In the case of a light rail project, the SPV was not yet "operating" a 
transport activity, as it was as required by the Directive. In building the rail tracks and 
purchasing the rolling stock, the SPV only adopted preliminary measures to become 
operating. As a result of employing the fourth argument for releasing SPVs from the 
utilities rules, they concluded the works concession regime was more suitable to deal 
with such infrastructure projects. 70 
In using the third argument, PnvSA#6 advocated the shareholders of the SPV 
should be viewed as a part of the winning consortium and, hence, the sub-contracts 
were not genuine third party contracts 
. 
71 He supported his opinion with the argument 
that the procurement was essentially done in one piece and, therefore, an analogy 
should be drawn with the "affiliated undertaking" rule in the works concessions 
regime. Moreover, the policy objective of procurement was to ensure competition and 
value for money. Part of the latter was to transfer as many risks to the private sector as 
possible. Having both an equity interest and a contracting interest in the project 
enabled the shareholder to draw more overall risk than an external contractor. The 
former had more knowledge about the project and had the opportunity to optimise the 
72 risk transfer. 
On a practical level, the SPV was letting a whole host of sub-contracts and 
insofar as they were not taken up by the shareholders they might well be advertised. 
He suggested to advertise all sub-contracts and to deal with the problem by scoping 
the individual work packages in a way that the shareholders became effectively 
bidders. However, project lenders were not prepared to accept the additional risk that 
"9 BothSA# 1. 




the SPV is exposed to any third parties claim which was not accounted for in the 
financial model for the SpV. 7' Those claims could arise from tendering intra- 
consortium contracts in a formal award procedure according to procurement law. 
Despite the relative infrequency of the problem, lawyers were aware that SPVs 
delivering PFIs in the utility sector may have to advertise their intra-consortiurn 
contracts according to procurement law. The quote of BothSA#I he had not found a 
convincing way around the rules reflects a general attitude that the better arguments 
were supporting the conclusion that the utility rules were applicable. All respondents 
with experience in utility areas drew the attention to the great deal of uncertainty 
surrounding this issue. This uncertainty led to the adoption of the approach most 
beneficial to the private sector client. BothSA#4 said: 
11 no private sector client would consider advertising its 
sub-contracts meant to be allocated with the SPPs 
shareholders or the company's departments. "
Lawyers and their private sector clients adopted this law-defying approach 
74 because the risk of sanctions was perceived as theoretical, because 
"the remedies are available to the very people who would 
themselves form SPVs and probably would be elsewhere 
in breach of the Regs. " 
Therefore, when SPVs balanced the pros and cons of adopting a compliant 
approach, they had to reach the conclusion that the benefits of non-compliance clearly 
surpass the benefits of compliance. Strict compliance with the law would hinder the 
swift implementation of the schemes and sub-contracts would be effectively awarded 
twice. This perception reflects the low impact procurement law has had on the PH 
procurement practice regarding intra-consortium contracts. 
On a policy level, the problem of whether to award intra-consortia contracts 
'I PrivSA#6. 
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reflects the failure of the European legislator to provide suffice legislative or 
interpretative guidance. This issue may overarch all procurement problems discussed 
in the study and we shall therefore return to it in chapter 12. 
74 PrivSA#5. 
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Chapter 11 Step-in riqhts 
11.1. Introduction 
The EU procurement rules are primarily concerned with the stages leading to the 
award of the contract, whilst the European legislator disregarded the post-award phase 
of public projects. However, this important phase in the life of a PFI project, which 
easily lasts 25 years, may render decisions necessary which bear resemblance to a 
procurement process. For instance, project lenders may choose to replace a sub- 
contractor in the operation phase which fails to deliver services up to the agreed 
standards and thereby threatens the success of the project. When effectively re- 
awarding the sub-contract, the question arises whether the financiers have to comply 
with the public procurement rules. 
11.2. Step-in rights 
- 
the legal problems 
11.2. L Step-in rights 
With the exception of projects in the IT sector, PFI projects are financed by 
various sources of finance, consisting generally of a mix of equity and debt. ' Equity 
providers, such as the shareholders and investors in the SPV, typically contribute not 
more than 8-15% of the capital cost. The equity share covers certain types of risks 
with which the debt providers are not comfortable with, such as the risk of demand. ' 
Hence, debt providers cover the most substantial part of the capital costs, amounting 
to a share of 85% to 95%. Debt for PFI projects is provided by banks, a syndicate of 
debt funders acting through their agent bank or project lenders and may also be raised 
through the bond market. ' 
Debt providers have a fundamental interest to secure their investment in a PFI 
project. The SPV delivering the PFI project is a mere shell company and can offer 
Lindrup/Godfrey (ed. ), op. cit., note I of ch. 1, "Financing"-, Morrison/Owen, op. cit., note 71 of ch. 2, 
ch. 6. 
2 Lindrup/Godfrey, op. cit., note I of ch. 1, "Financing" para 44. 
-1 11. M. Treasury, CUP Guidance No. 48 Bonds and Guarantees (1994)-, Matheou, "Future financing: 
the developing market for project capital" (2000) PH Intelligence Bulletin (October); "PH: Novel 
bond behind hospital, " Financial Times May 21,1999. 
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only a few securities to its lenders. The principal assets available as security are the 
rights of the SPV under the project agreement with the awarding authority. In cases 
where the authority pays for the services delivered under the project agreement this 
includes the income stream the SPV receives from the authority. The security package 
of rights and controls is therefore designed in such a way as to provide the project 
4 banks access to the income stream 
. 
The income stream and consequently the main security of the debt providers may 
come under threat where a right for the authority arises to terminate the project 
agreement which could ultimately result in the authority ceasing to pay the SPV for 
the service delivery. 
The project lenders therefore require direct agreements with the authority and the 
major sub-contractors. The direct agreement includes the right to prior warning of an 
intention of a party to terminate and enable the bank to choose whether to step in the 
respective sub-contract. The financiers subsequently take over the contract of the 
failing sub-contractor with the aim to negotiate a transfer of the contract to another 
operator. This routine enables the service to continue without disruption and secures 
the income stream of the SPV against a precipitous termination of a project contract. 
For example, if in a hospital project the sub-contractor operating the asset fails to 
deliver services to the required standards, the authority may warn the project lender 
that it contemplates to terminate the project agreement. The prOject lenders will then 
take over the contract for a limited period until they have appointed an appropriate 
facility management company to replace the failing sub-contractor. 
From the perspective of the public authority, it is pivotal under those 
circumstances to safeguard its interests by including a veto right in the direct 
agreement. The veto right ensures that the project lenders do not assign any part of the 
Morrison/Owen, op. cit., note 71 of ch. 2, p. 6 1. 
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contract to a third party without public sector agreement. ' The grounds for exercising 
this veto right should be focused on objective categories or should prescribe a list for 
6 
unacceptable transferees rather than adopting the approach of a general veto right. 
Granting the authority a general right to reject candidates proposed by the banks is 
likely to prolong negotiations and to extend the costly time of disruption. 
11.2.2. Step-in rikhts and procurement rules 
Subsequent to the exercise of its step-in right, the financiers replaces the failing 
contractor in "awarding" the project agreement, or the respective sub-contract to 
another entity. This replacement process raises the question of whether the selection of 
a new contractor or sub-contractor needs to be made in accordance to the procurement 
rules. 
On a practical level, this raises the further question of how to draft direct 
agreements so that the procurement rules do not apply when project fiInders execute 
their step-in rights. This Issue may be considered as a typical legal uncertainty in PH 
procurement. Despite the obvious importance of the questions involved for project 
funders, the procurement rules do not contain any specific provisions and there is no 
guidance from either the Court or the European Commission. 
11.2.2.1. Replacement of sub-contractor 
The exercise of step-in rights is most likely to occur in a situation where a sub- 
contractor has failed to perform its contractual duties up to the agreed standards. This 
may eventually give rise to a right to terminate the project agreement for the authority. 
In this situation, the project agreement is likely to remain unaffected and the project 
lenders only substitute the respective sub-contractor. After the substitution of the 
failing sub-contractor, the authority novates the rights and obligations of the failing 
11. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 4 of ch. 2, para 6.32. 
H. M. Treasury, Treasury Taskforce, Guidance on Project Agreements: Consultation Draft, XVI. B. 2. c. 
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sub-contractor to the substitute proposed by the banks. ' 
The direct agreement grants the authority with the right to veto incoming 
substitutes for failing sub-contractors. The practice may have the side effect to trigger 
the procurement rules. Exercising its veto right gives the authority the opportunity to 
impose restrictions on incoming sub-contractors. There are three approaches to 
address this issue. 
A first view, advocated by the H. M. Treasury, perceives the replacement of sub- 
contractors as a mere "reorganisation within the group providing the public sector with 
a service. "' This view is based on the assumption that the project lenders are part of 
the bidding consortium Hence, the procurement rules are not applicable, if the 
contractual rights and obligations are otherwise unchanged. The public sector 
authority should have a right to veto and should be allowed to take wider 
considerations into account, such as political considerations, national security, and 
other "public interests. "9 The Treasury gives the example of replacing an operating 
company failing to deliver the adequate school services by a tobacco company. 10 From 
a public policy viewpoint, this was held to be unacceptable. 
The second option for interpretation is that by granting legal control to the 
authority over the replacement of the failing sub-contractor, the procurement 
procedures of the Directives must be adhered to. In imposing restrictions on tile 
incoming sub-contractor, the authority could effectively influence the choice of the 
project lenders in a discriminatory manner. As any discriminatory practices 
contravene the purpose of the Directives, their rules may be fully applicable when 
replacing sub-contractors after exercising step-in rights. However, applying the 
procurement rules to any replacement of sub-contractors seems unjustified as there is 
7 
"Novation" means an agreement by which all the parties to a contract agree that a third party is to 
stand in the place of one of the original parties. This is, strictly speaking, not a transfer of the original 
contract but the extinction of the original contract and the creation of a new one. 
1-1. M. Treasury, Private Opportunity Public Benefit, para 6.16. 
H. M. Treasury Taskforce, Taskforce Standardisation Documentforfinal consultation (1999), 17.4. L 10 Ibid. 
page 263 
no "new contract" coming into existence for the purposes of the Directives. In the 
situation of a mere replacement, procurement law has been adhered to before when 
awarding the project agreement. The "reorganisatiOn within the group providing the 
public sector with a service"" does not have to trigger the rules for a second time, 
because the principles underlying the Directives, such as non-discrimination, equal 
treatment and competition, are not put at risk. 
Arrowsmith submits that adopting such an extreme view is disproportionate and 
as such unnecessary to give effect to the aims and purposes of procurement law. " She 
argues that if the veto right of the authority is limited to the objective criteria 
contemplated in the Directives, "a veto is permitted without the need for 
,, 13 advertisement etc. 
... 
Hence, authorities could reject incoming substitutes on the 
grounds of the qualification requirements, such as financial standing, technical 
capability and the legal conditions laid down in Regulation 14 without triggering the 
procurement Directives. Arguably, this allows authorities to consider national security 
and the qualification criteria of the Directives, but not, as the Treasury promotes, to 
reject a tobacco company from running a school or a hospital on policy reasons. 
The restriction of veto grounds to the Regulation 14 conditions ensures that 
authorities do not circumvent the rules of qualification by interposing a body between 
the authority and the firms performing the works and services and introducing more 
restrictive criteria for their selection than permissible under the Directives. 14 
It can be summarised that it is uncertain whether in a step-in situation the 
procurement rules are triggered. 
11.222 Replacement of SPV 
A right to terminate may also arise where the SPV fails to deliver services up to 
the standards agreed in the project agreement. If the banks decide to step in, they have 
II If. M. Treasury, op. cit., note 8, para 6.16. 
12 Arrowsinith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24 of ch. 2, para 8.065. 
lbul. 
lbid., para 9.064. 
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the delicate task to replace the SPV which is the contractor to the project agreement. It 
is submitted that a novation of the nghts and obligations of the SPV is permissible 
under the same conditions as developed for sub-contractors. " 
11.2.2.3. Changes to the contract terms 
The deliberations have been based so far on the presumption that the contractual 
agreements, these are either the project agreement or the sub-contract, remain 
unchanged. The mere substitution of the SPV or a sub-contractor with a new entity is 
not the most likely scenario because the contractual terms may have been one reason 
why the departing contractor has failed. For instance, the terms of the respective 
contract may have been too onerous for reasons of unsound risk allocation. 
In addition, the incoming contractor may bring forward innovative ideas 
regarding the delivery of the respective services or just seeks to re-negotiate the 
agreement in its favour. This especially applies in circumstances where services are 
added subsequent to re-negotiating the agreement. 
Where the contractual parties consider changing the contractual arrangement 
substantially, concerns may anse over whether the changed contract may be 
considered a "new contract" for the purposes of the procurement rules. 16 Changes to 
the contract are defined as substantial if the new work exceeds 50% of the amount of 
the original tender" or if they are material to an extent that different firms might have 
been interested in the contract. " Where substantial changes occur and the "economic 
balance" of the contract is changed, '9 the contract must be re-advertised as a "new 
contract" in accordance with the procurement rules. 
15 lhid., para 9.067. 
" Arrowsinith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 123. 
17 Deduced from Article 7 (3Xd) Works Directive. 
18 R. v. Portsmouth City Council, ex parte Peter Coles and Colwick Builders, Court of Appeal, judgment 
of November 9 1996; Auricchio, "The Problem of Discrimination and Anti-Competitive Behaviour in 
the Execution Phase of Public Contracts, " (1998) P. P. L. R., p. 128. 
19 Arrowsmith (ed. ), op. cit., note 24 of ch. 2, para 8.073. 
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11.3. Empirical findings 
Respondents had experience in drafting step-in rights for project lenders included 
in direct agreements. However, none of interviewees experienced situations in PFI 
where project lender exercised their step-in rights. Only PrivSA#5 mentioned a project 
where their exercise was contemplated but did not occur in the end. Therefore, legal 
advisors interviewed found the question difficult to answer, because they had not 
spent much thought on the potential implications arising from procurement law. "' 
Some respondents, such as PubSA44 and PubSA47 doubted whether the procurement 
rules were applicable in this situation. 
11.3.1. Veto Lyrounds 
Not many respondents could recall the veto grounds previously used in PFIs. 
PubSA44 remarked the specific veto grounds were more a banking lawyers issue and 
she did not become involved in drafting those rights. BothSA#1 remarked the question 
of which step-in rights to include into the direct agreement was dealt with project 
specifically, although they became increasingly standardised. " Every lawyer who 
could remember specific step-in rights mentioned that they resembled the qualification 
criteria in the Regulations. BothSA#2, PubSA#6 and PubSA# 10 maintained that it was 
permissible for the authority to request technical, financial and legal information from 
the candidate chosen by the project lenders. 
PubSA#6 remarked to apply the criteria laid down in the procurement Directives 
meant to give the basic suitability test the necessary objectivity. She thereby agreed 
with the third option for interpretation submitted by Arrowsmith that the grounds 
contained in the Directives warrant that the authority becomes involved in the 
replacement process only to a limited extent. PnvSA46 mentioned that authorities 
frequently sought to include reputational criteria. He gave the example of a health trust 
211 PubSA# 10. l'ubSA#4. 
21 l'ubSA#2. 
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that ccrtainly did not want a tobacco company to step into a hospital contract. He 
.- 
21 described those reputational critena as sector specific. - 
PrivSA# I reported that in PFI project related to defence, the criterion of national 
security and secrecy was included in the direct agreement 
. 
23 In general, the criteria to 
be included were subject of commercial negotiations which were usually "won, " as 
PrivSA45 maintained, by the project lenders. It is possible to conclude from the 
responses given that the existing veto grounds were reconcilable with the qualification 
grounds contemplated by the Directives. 
Lawyers were unequivocal about the principles underlying the restriction of the 
veto rights. PubSA#2 mentioned that because the banks guaranteed for the 
performance during the step-in period, they had a significant economic incentive that 
24 
the substitute was capable to perform up to the required standards. She added that as 
long as the project lenders provided the authority with the limited information they 
were allowed to require, it had no rights of veto. She said by analogy, some of the soft 
facility management services were subject to 5-7 yearly market testing. This was not a 
process conducted by the authority but by the contractual partners. 
BothSA#3 similarly concluded the public sector should not interfere with the 
process of substituting sub-contractors at all. He thereby supported the Treasury's 
interpretation. It is for those reasons, that legal advisors were keen to have very 
narrow rights of veto, although the adoption of this rather "passive role"" might be 
difficult to explain to their public sector clients. 26 BothSA#3 said the theory was that 
under the PH project agreement it was all about setting the right services standards 
and the sub-contractor was financially penalised if it failed to meet those standards. 







PrivSA#6 said project lenders sought to restrict the veto rights to technical and 
financial considerations. 27 The main concern of lenders was the security of the income 
stream. Provided that the revenue stream was flowing and the debt service was met, 
the banks wanted as much flexibility as possible. From his experience, the lenders had 
the upper hand when it came to negotiating the veto rights of the authority. -" 
11.3.2. Step-in righ t as last resort 
BotliSA#3 said a common understanding existed in the market that the exercise 
of step-in rights was a worst case scenario. The funders preferred to rely rather on 
other security mechanisms before contemplating this option. '9 For instance, even in a 
major international infrastructure project where many problems occurred, the exercise 
30 
of step-in rights was seen as a very last resort 
. 
This was partly due to the impression 
that the authority was probably better off to stick with the contractors they got rather 
than bringing somebody else in. 
BothSA#2 suspected for this reason it was probably more likely that refinancing 
proposals were favoured and the exercise of step-in rights was contemplated only in 
serious situations such as insolvency. PubSA46 added this was particularly true in 
complicated IT project, where the banks lacked the expertise to get involved and 
choose an appropriate candidate. PubSA46 said that the banks she had spoken to 
would not get engaged in IT contracts except in the most unusual circumstances 
. 
31 
1/33. Are the procurement rules applicable? 
Once the step-in rights were exercised and the contract was substantially altered, 
it was suggested to the respondents that the procurement rules became applicable. 
PubSA#7 shared the view of the Treasury when arguing against this assumption. She 
said that the bank was a member of the consortium with the effect that the (sub-) 
contract did not have to be advertised under the rules. The financiers were part of the 
l'i-ivSA#6. 
PrivSA#6. 
29 IlodiSA#. 3 
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qualification and award process and if they stepped m that had been always been 
contemplated by the process that was carried on. " 
PrivSA#6 remarked the incoming contractor stepped only in a project which itself 
had been subjected to the rules. By substituting one entity by another, it was not 
required to re-enter the arena and to ensure a fair bidding process according to the 
33 
objectives of the procurement rules 
. 
PrivSA#6 argued that a major aim of the rules 
%%as to promote competition and a level playing field where bidders got the 
opportunity to put their best bid forward. The competition requirement was satisfied 
by the initial competitive bidding procedure. 
The contrary argument, which he personally supported, was that if the consortium 
owned an asset and if it sought somebody to benefit from that asset then probably 
cverybody should be afforded the opportunity to take it although the terms had been 
pre-dcternilned. 34 Hence, from a legality perspective the contract ought to be offered, 
from the perspective of the lenders it was obvious why the existing contractual parties 
%%anted to retain control. " 
11.3.4. Fin din 
Although lawyers disregarded the possible procurement issues widely, they 
granted the authority only restrictive veto grounds as proposed in the academic 
literature. This was thought to strike an appropriate balance between the interests of 
the parties to the project agreement and the financiers. As in other problem areas, 
respondents felt that the risk of being challenged on not advertising the "new contract" 
was coniparatively low due to reasons related to the remedies system. 
PubSA#4 mentioned that any changes to the consortium probably occurred 







on the decision. '6 She added it was very difficult for a third party to prove that the 
substitution of a sub-contractor should have done under the procurement rules and 
further asked what was to be gained out of such a challenge. 
'D l'ubSA#4. 
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Chapter 12 The PFI procurement practice 
12.1. Introduction 
Chapters 5 to II have analysed seven specific legal uncertainties of PH 
procurement and outlined the experiences of practitioners in resolving those problems 
and uncertainties. 
Chapter 12 will examine PFI procurement practice from an outsider and an 
insider perspective. It will firstly, explore in section 12.2. whether there is such a thing 
as a PFI procurement practice. Having concluded that such a practice does exist this 
section will then take a closer look at the forces and institutions which supported its 
emergence. 
Section 12.3. Will then describe cornerstones of the practice from an insider 
perspective. We have seen in the foregoing chapters dealing with specific legal 
problems and uncertainties that procurement law and PFI procurement practice 
diverge to a varying degree. It has been suggested that although the practice might not 
be fully compatible with the detailed procedural rules of procurement law, it might be 
compatible with the principles and aims underlying the Directives. 
Section 12.4. will examine the impact of the law in the books on the law in 
practice from an outsider and an insider perspective. From the possible incompatibility 
of the strict interpretation of procurement law and the PH practice the question arises 
what risks are attached to this conflict. 
Section 12.5. will explore the risks stemming from the review system in place 
considering the insider and the outsider perspective. It will also describe how 
authorities assessed the risks arising from not strictly complying with the law. 
12.2. Development of PFI procurement practice 
Section 12.2. will firstly outline whether it is justified to refer to the solutions 
developed in PFI procurement as a "legal practice. " Having discussed the existence of 
PH procurement practice, the question arises at a second stage which forces and 
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institutions supported the emergence of the practice. The issues to be addressed 
include the question of why authorities and their legal advisors considered it necessary 
to diverge from a strict interpretation of the rules. At a third stage it has to be asked in 
section 12.2.3. whether an institution co-ordinated the emergence and coherence of the 
legal practice. 
12.2.1. Existence of a leral practice 
We have seen in chapters 5 to II that legal advisors developed solutions to legal 
uncertainties and interpretations of procurement law which resembled each other. 
Section 12.2.1. will discuss whether those similarities justify using the term "legal 
practice" or whether they occurred by coincidence. We have seen in section 4.1.4. that 
Maclntyre defines practice as "any coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity which has its own standard of excellence. "' To enter into a 
practice as a participant therein involves accepting the standards of excellence and to 
subject ones own attitudes and preferences to the standards which currently define the 
2 practice. However, the participants' acceptance of certain standards and behavioural 
patterns does not entail that practices are internally of homogenous and uniform 
nature. Whilst participants will share the basic standards of the practice, their attitudes 
as regards to risk-taking may yet vary. The remainder of the section will examine 
whether the solutions and interpretations adopted are sufficiently coherent to justify 
using die term "practice. " 
This question will be discussed in the light of the solutions adopted by 
practitioners when confronted with the seven legal uncertainties the study dealt with in 
chapters 5 to 11. 
Chapter 5 has shown that despite legal uncertainties and various approaches to 
interpret the law, legal advisors have commonly accepted pre-tender negotiations as an 
essential tool in the procurement process. Conducting pre-tender negotiations has 
I Machityre, op. cit., note 23 of ch. 4, pp. 197-188. 
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become standard practice for authorities to gauge the interest of the market and to be 
provided with information on how to draw up specifications. Especially in pathfinder 
projects or in projects without precedence it is common practice to consult potential 
contractors prior to commencing the procurement process. To embark on pre-tender 
negotiations is suggested by both H. M. Treasury and the National Audit Office and is 
laid down in government guidance. 
Secondly, respondents to the study commonly accepted the necessity of 
amending and changing project specifications after publishing the contract notice. We 
have seen in chapter 6 that practitioners perceived specifications of PFI projects as 
inherently flexible and evolving throughout the procurement process. As a result, 
specifications were substantially altered in some projects, probably requiring the re- 
advertisement of the project agreement. However, PubSA44 thought that re- 
advertising a contract on the basis of changed specifications would not be a viable 
option in most situations, because authorities had to observe timescale constraints. 
Even if the underlying specifications had changed substantially and notwithstanding 
the significant legal uncertainties, legal advisors adopted the practice of not re- 
advertising PFI contracts. 
'I"hirdly, chapter 7 has shown that irrespective of legal uncertainties surrounding 
the question of how to classify multi-faceted PFI contracts it was standard practice in 
PH to classify project agreements as services contracts. We have seen in chapter 7 
that this applies even though practitioners used two different tests to ascertain whether 
the PH in question was a works, supplies or services agreement for the purposes of the 
rules. Individual lawyers criticised the standard practice but mentioned that it was 
firmly based on the guidance provided by H. M. Treasury. 
It is noteworthy that some practitioners even subjected their interpretation of the 
law to the interpretation of the common practice. BothSA43, for example, thought that 
2 lbul., 190. 
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some of the schemes should be classified as contracts for works, contrary to central 
government policy. However, he advertised the contracts as services in order "to keep 
them I meaning central government departments] happy. " 
Fourthly, regarding the question of which procedure to employ, practitioners 
consistentiv opted for the negotiated procedure, irrespective of differences in assessing 
the risks and interpreting the law. Respondents adopted this standard solution because 
they considered the negotiated procedure as the only procedure provided by 
procurement law to be flexible enough to accommodate PPPs. 'I'liough lawyers were 
aware of the legal uncertainty, they felt that for reasons of commerciality and 
practicability this practice was justified. Practitioners said they would diverge from the 
widely accepted practice only under very special circumstances. 
We have seen in chapter 9 that it was commonly accepted to employ award and 
qualification criteria at shortlisting stage. Most lawyers were aware of the practice 
being not compatible with the law in the books, especially with respect to the use of 
questionable shortlisting criteria, which have been discussed in section 9.2. The reason 
for diverging from the law was to gain procedural flexibility and a wider choice of 
shortlisting criteria. Project related shortlisting criteria have provided authorities with 
opportunity to eject bidders from the award process at an earlier stage in the process 
than perceived by the law and may thus result in cost savings for both sides. 
It is one result of chapter 10 that lawyers support different interpretations 
regarding the question of whether SPVs operating in the utilities area fall within the 
ambit of procurement law. Despite significant differences in Interpretation, all lawyers 
with experience in the utilities area agreed that the SPVs should in practice rather not 
follow the rules so as to sustain their economical viability. Hence, not to advertise the 
sub-contracts of the SPVs' shareholders may be characterised as part of the standard 
procurement practice in PFL 
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Finally, we have seen in chapter II dealing with the step-in rights of project 
lenders that the veto grounds for authorities were commonly modelled at the 
qualification criteria contained in the Directives. 
It can be concluded from the analyses in chapters 5 to II that practitioners 
developed coherent solutions when faced with seven legal uncertainties in PFI 
procurement. Considering the differences between individual PFI schemes in various 
sectors, the degree of coherence of the practice may be considered surprising. 
Practitioners accepted common standards in spite of differences in interpretations 
and nuances in approach, which were often based on the varying assessment of risks. 
In addition, some respondents subjected their own attitudes and interpretations to the 
attitudes and interpretations of PF1 procurement practice and accepted its normativity. 
Having regard to the coherence of the solutions developed in PF1 procurement, it 
is justified to refer to them as PF1 procurement "practice" for the purposes of 
MacIntyre's definition. The reasons for this coherence of PF1 procurement practice 
will be discussed in sections 12.2.3. and 12.3. 
12.2.2. Reasons for establishinz the practice 
Having ascertained the existence of a PFI procurement practice, we will turn in 
this section to the question of why the practice was established. One reason for 
establishing PH procurement practice could be the possible lack of compatibility 
between the law in the books and the commercial requirements of PFI schemes. The 
possible lack of compatibility may have ultimately resulted in legal uncertainties in 
applying the norms. Chapters 5 to II have used seven examples of uncertainties which 
contracting authorities regularly encountered when seeking to accommodate PFIs 
within the rigid regime of regulated procurement. 
The first example of a divergence between the commercial reality of PH 
procurement and the requirements of procurement law is the question of whether 
authorities are pennitted to conduct pre-tender negotiations. We have seen in chapter 5 
that it is uncertain whether authorities could conduct pre-tender negotiations without 
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strictly observing the principles of transparency and equal treatment. On the other 
hand, pre-tender negotiations provide authorities with undisputed commercial benefits. 
This uncertainty is particularly relevant in pathfinder projects where the authority 
could not rely on previous experience in similar projects. 
Secondly, chapter 6 has described the rules on specifications as the most 
significant hurdle to conducting post-tender negotiations and to changing the project 
specifications in any substantial manner. While the rules probably require that the 
awarded contract has to be consistent with the terms of its original advertisement in 
the OJEC, the commercial practice requires ample scope for innovative input from the 
bidders throughout the procurement process. This important potential problem may be 
avoided in practice by carefully drafting the initial contract notice. 
A practically less relevant uncertainty of the law in the books is the treatment of 
3 
mixed contracts. We have seen in chapter 7 that despite the insistence of the rules to 
classify the contracts according to the three classical categories works, supplies and 
services, it was one of the rationales underlying PPPs to combine at least two of those 
contract types to realise efficiency gains. 
One of the most important divergences the law in the books and the commercial 
reality of PPPs is the use of the negotiated procedure in PFI. We have seen in chapter 
8 that as a matter of practicality neither the restricted nor the open procedure is 
adequate to secure workable solutions in the overwhelming number of PFI schemes. 
Nevertheless, the European legislator has not yet implemented a specific derogation 
making the negotiated procedure accessible to PPPs on a regular basis. 
A further important divergence between procurement law and the requirement of 
the PFI practice is the prohibition of project related shortlisting criteria. The legal 
analysis of chapter 9 has highlighted that authorities are not permitted to shortlist 
bidders prior to the advertisement of the ITN according to criteria related to the 
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proposed solution. Strict compliance with this legal requirement prolongs the award 
process and increases the transaction costs for authority and bidders alike. It is 
noteworthy that the number of competitors may be reduced by reference to project- 
specific criteria after the ITN. 
Chapter 10 has examined the treatment of consortia in the PFI bidding process. It 
was one conclusion of the legal analysis that SPVs operating in one of the "relevant 
areas" of the Utilities Directive probably fall within the ambit of procurement law and 
therefore have to advertise their sub-contracts. The possible requirement of the law in 
the books diverges sharply from the practical requirements in a PFI scheme and 
threatens the viability of PPPs in important areas of the public infrastructure including 
public transport. 
Finally, chapter II has shown that it is uncertain whether project financiers are 
required to advertise the project agreement or sub-contracts in accordance with the 
rules when they replace a failing SPV or sub-contractor. Advertising and awarding a 
contract under those circumstances in strict compliance with procurement law is 
submitted to be inconvenient and costly for all parties involved, as it considerably 
prolongs the replacement process. 
From the seven examples, one can conclude a degree of divergence between 
procurement law and the commercial requirements of PF1 schemes or at least 
significant uncertainty. From an outsider perspective, the divergence or uncertainty 
may be considered as the main reason why the legal practice opts In all seven areas for 
the most "workable" and economically most viable solution to the legal uncertainties. 
The divergence between the legal framework and the commercial reality faced by 
authorities therefore fostered the development of a more workable legal practice. 
In practice, many authorities have classified their PFIs as contracts for services vAthout considering the legal uncertainties in great detail. The repercussions of this behaviour for bidders are perceived by 
practitioners as negligible. See section 7.3.1. 
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12 2 3. Co-ordinated development of the Practi 
While the foregoing section explored one reason for the development of the legal 
practice, the following section will address the question of whether the emergence of 
PI'l procurement practice was institutionally co-ordinated. 
It is submitted that H. M. Treasury and Treasury Taskforce (TTF) played a pivotal 
role in the development of PH procurement practice. Many lawyers acknowledged 
this role and recognised the "political steer" it applied to the process 
.4 
An important 
means to apply political pressure has been the publication of guidance notes on 
specific problem areas III PFI procurement. The players in the market treat those 
guidance notes as an authoritative touchstone when it comes to interpreting the 
procurement rules. Although some lawyers recognised the guidance as "more wishful 
thinking than anything else 
.... 
.. misleading', 6 or in parts "complete nonsense, '7 the 
notes have formed in many areas the undisputed starting point for further discussion. 
This practice resulted in the situation that lawyers provided legal advice based on the 
TTF guidance, despite knowing that "this is incoherent with the rules. "' 
Another way in which the Treasury has influenced the PH procurement process 
has been to pressurise public authorities if they deviate from the TTF guidance. 9 
Lawyers, such as PubSA#4 and PubSA#8, indicated a "strong political steer from the 
centre" that the guidance notes were adhered to. 'O In some cases, legal advisors to 
private sector companies stepped up the pressure on the authority by complaining to 
the Treasury which then intervened on their behalf " 









Because of the TTF guidance notes and the pressure applied on authorities to 
comply with them, authorities were interested to follow the guidance notes although 
their legal advisors might suggest adopting a different approach. " PubSA97 said: 
In the beginning, we doubted whether it was right to use the 
negotiated procedure. However, Treasury guidance said. * use it 
and now it seems to be an accepted norm in terms of the UK 
authorities. 13 
PubSA48 described a project, where she suggested employing the restricted 
procedure. However, the TTF raised concerns on this issue. "There was a real chive 
from the Treasury, but of course it is not really the Treasury which is at risk. " 
PubSA#8 added the market for legal advisors was competitive. Combined with 
the lax TTF guidance, the pressure was on conservative advisors to adopt more 
relaxed views. PubSA#8 added many authorities did not want to be told not to adopt a 
flexible and relaxed approach. The pressure applied by the Treasury on authorities 
seems to have developed an indirect effect on conservative legal advisors. "If lawyers 
are told, for example, that PFI comes within the derogations of the procurement rules, 
they will convince themselves that the words fits the facts. ý, 14 It was interesting that 
almost all respondents" explained they always procured PFIs under the negotiated 
procedure. After a discussion of the issues involved many of them agreed that the PFI 
procurement practice was ftom a legal point of view rather questionable. 
The Treasury also defends PFI procurement practice against challenges from 
outside. PubSA#3 mentioned that authorities were reassured that as long as they 
complied with TTF guidance, central government would support them. PubSA44 
added that this applied irrespective of whether their actions complied with 
12 PubSA#4: "In the begumuig we doubted whether it was right to use the negotiated procedure 




" Apart firom those with experience in employing the restricted procedure, such as PubSA#3 
page 279 
procurement law. PubSA43 mentioned the central government backing encouraged 
authorities to "go ahead" and to accept more risk with respect to the procurement 
process. 
There are indications that the political steer and the pressure applied did have 
impact on the PH market. Lawyers decided to "go with the flow at the end of the 
d 06 ay. PubSA#4 felt it would be "quite odd if you would not" do so. Accordingly, 
authorities took a "safety in numbers" 17 approach and were "taking additional comfort 
from the fact that other authorities are pursuing the same practices. "" 
It is noteworthy that the advice given by Treasury Taskforce and the Treasury is 
not legally binding. Authorities are not under administrative requirement to follow that 
guidance. This means in particular that if authorities decide for whatever reason not to 
follow the Treasury guidance this decision will not result in the authority being 
sanctioned. On the other hand, authorities which approached the TTF for project 
specific advice will carefully consider any recommendations provided. PubSA#6 
observed that the lower down the awarding public sector body was 'in the hierarchy, 
the less likely it had latitude to take its own view on procurement issues and the more 
were those issues influenced by the centre. 
It can be concluded that a coherent PH procurement practice partly emerged as a 
result of H. M. Treasury's commitment to make the PFI scheme a success. The practice 
was assertively developed in an institutionalised and co-ordinated way and did not 
accidentally result from authorities reaching similar interpretations under comparable 
circumstances. 
12.3. Characteristics of PFI procurement practice 
Having at least partially established why and how PFI procurement practice 
emerged, the question arises which are the main characteristics of the practice from an 
insider perspective. When confronted with the discrepancy between the requirements 
l' BothSA#3. 
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of their daily practice and the rigid procedures of procurement law, practitioners 
mentioned they adopted a "commercial" or "pragmatic" approach to applying the law. 
The following section investigates what both terms meant to respondents and 
how they justified the adoption of practices which appeared risky when viewed from a 
strict interpretation of procurement law. 
12.3.1. "Commercialio' 
The lawyers interviewed agreed that one cornerstone of the success of PH was 
the adoption of a more "commercial approach" to procurement than envisaged by the 
procurement rules. The often-quoted "commerciality" of PFI seems to comprise that 
authorities and contractors engage in negotiations throughout the process. Authorities 
not only award a one-off contract but negotiate a long-term partnering agreement. 
Negotiations are a characteristic feature of the whole PH procurement process, 
from the technical dialogue in the pre-tender phase to final negotiations with the 
preferred bidder. Thereby, the awarding authority acts like a private sector business 
rather than a public sector body. The slogan "deals not rules, " which was employed in 
the early days of PFI, captures this approach fittingly. Adopting a "businesslike" 
approach implied that rigid public law constraints placed on authorities must have 
appeared too burdensome and too inflexible to them in the light of the complex 
procurement tasks. 
One feature of the commercial approach was that authorities weighed the benefits 
of complying with the procurement rules against possible detriments, despite their 
obligation to comply with the letter of the law. " For instance, when choosing the 
award procedure, authorities and their legal advisors balanced the risk of being 
effectively challenged on using the negotiated procedure against the benefits of the 
gains in flexibility. It is noteworthy that government guidelines and NAO reports 
17 PubSA#8, PubSA#10. 
18 PubSA#8. 
19 Many practitioners confumed this practice, such as: BothSA#2; PubSA#2; BothSA#6. 
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constantly demanded the adoption of a commercial approach and the acquisition of 
commercial skills. 
We have seen in chapter 3 that one of the major goals of European public 
procurement law is to achieve commercially orientated public procurement. It is for 
this reason that lawyers perceived the Commission's stance on issues such as the use 
of the negotiated procedure as "hypocritical. "20 BothSA#I remarked the Commission 
supported infrastructure projects such as PPPs as part of the Trans European Networks 
(TEN) programme. On the other hand, the Commission criticised authorities for 
adopting a "commercial and flexible approach" which practitioners held to be 
21 
necessary for the realisation of those projects. PubSA49 identified a "conflict of 
policieS, 22 and added "the aim of transparent procurement market in Europe stands 
ý)23 
against lettmg the projects happen and not burying them in red tape. 
Lawyers were unambiguous in their support for a commercial and flexible 
approach, which has helped to evolve and develop the projects and the PFI scheme in 
general. PnvSA#l and PubSA91 observed that the commercial approach in PFI 
facilitated the emergence of commercially oriented government procurement in the 
United Kingdom. 24 
12.3.2. Pragmatism 
Interviewees said they opted for a "pragmatic approach" to the rules when 
confronted with a multitude of procedural problems and uncertainties 
. 
2' Apart from 
the explicit reference to pragmatic, practical or "workable"26 interpretations of 
procurement law, respondents employed terms such as "just do it, " "get the job done, " 
20 PubSA#9. 
21 BothSA# 1. 
22 PubSA#9. 
23 PubSA#9. 
24 PrivSA# L, PubSA# 1. 
25 Many, for example: BothSA# 1; PrivSA#6-1 PubSA#3-1 PubSA#2; PrivSA# 1; PrivSA#2; PrivSA#3. 
21 PrivSA#3. 
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-just go ahead"" or even "make it fit" when referring to the application of 
procurement law in PFI. 
With respect to the negotiated procedure, PubSA44 observed that "although the 
grounds for using it are making it a real exception, people just made it fit. " PubSA#3 
gave a reason for the "go ahead" approach in saying that "if they [the public sector 
clients] feel they have the U. K. government behind them, they go ahead and take more 
risk. " It is of note that authorities and their legal advisors also had recourse to the term 
"pragmatism" to describe a legal practice which is based on "working around"" or 
even "ignoring"'9 the applicable rules. By calling the solutions "pragmatic, " lawyers 
suggested a degree of necessity to bend the rules or to adopt risky approaches. When 
employing the term "pragmatism" respondents indicated to outsiders, and possibly to 
themselves, that they were forced into the practice by externalities beyond their 
control; for instance deficiencies of the legal framework. 
BothSA#3 defended his public sector clients and said, "it is not that people don't 
want to comply, it is just that they get swamped by unforeseen circumstances" 
resulting, for example, in changes in the specifications. 'O BothSA43 perceived the 
pragmatic approach as a natural reaction to a set of rules that "were not drafted with 
PFI projects in mind. ý, 31 
Another related aspect emerging from the interviews is that all lawyers were 
aware of the legal uncertainties discussed in chapters 5 to 11 above. BothSA43 
acknowledged he was 
"skating on thin ice in a procurement sense all the time. 
PrivSA43 explicitly said he had an "uncomfortable feeling" regarding the 







"illegality is leaning over us all the time. , 32 
The awareness of the legal uncertainties was said to stand back when advising on 
projects. " The knowledge of the problems on the one hand and the "pragmatic" 
approach on the other led to the phenomenon that lawyers clearly distinguished 
between "theory" and "practice. " PubSA41 suggested that both were "hardly 
reconcilable. , 34 Respondents, such as PubSA43, said they would usually flag the 
"academic" or "theoretical" viewpoint35 on the most pertinent procurement issues. 
BothSA42 mentioned his clients were saying "we are aware of the risk you have 
outlined to us and we are prepared to take them. " PubSA43 reported that some of her 




In the end, they gave in to the political pressure from central government 
37 
bodies and the pressure arising from the PFI procurement practice 
. 
Hence, not only 
legal advisors deliberately decided against a strict interpretation of procurement law, 
but also some of the public authorities. As PubSA49 put it: 
"What authorities want is not a public procurement problem but 
the school. " 
Irrespective of the rigid rules, PubSA44 said that public sector clients wanted 
"to negotiate things out. If they are forced into the restricted 
procedure they will go on with their negotiations and will do it 
quietly. Alternatively, they will ignore the procurement 
Regulations. "" 
The statement reveals the intention on the side of authorities to apply 
procurement law only in circumstances where it appears not to have negative impact 
for the purposes of the project. 
12 13othSA#3. 
13 PubSA# 1. 
34 lIubSA# 1. 
35 lubSA#3. 
lubSA#3. 
I'lie latter %%ill be discussed further below. 
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Decisions on procurement issues were not only made on the basis of legal advice 
but also after consultations with financial advisors. PubSA44 said the latter tended to 
support the adoption of a pragmatic and workable solution. Another force encouraging 
rule bending "pragmatic" solutions are senior government departments, such as the 
Treasury and the respective central government department. They have a significant 
political interest in "making PFI work, "'9 even if this implies working "pragmatically" 
around the rules. 40 PubSA#I maintained that nobody in the trade was challenging or 
41 
even questioning the "just do it" or "just go ahead" attitude of public sector bodies. 
We will return to this occurrence below. 
Central government and the participants in the market endorsed breaches of the 
law in the books for the sake of "making the projects work. " The "pragmatic" 
approach of the PFI practice therefore reflects a widespread disrespect for 
procurement law, which has been institutionalised by means of government guidance. 
123.3. Superioritv of the U. K. smem 
Lawyers praised the superiority of the "commercial" and "pragmatic" over a 
"theoretical" approach to procurement law. They asked why the U. K. should settle for 
a less commercial and less flexible regime because other European countries and the 
Commission were years behind in the development of efficient procurement practices. 
Those questions were discussed in the light of the Commission's proposals for 
reforming procurement law and its reasoned opinion in the Pimlico case. BothSA43 
openly remarked that 
"ij'you breach the rules, so what? Our system works and 1 want to 
do what we are doing without constraining ourselves as it is 
proposed by the Commission. " 
38 PubSA#4. 
39 PrivSA#3. 
40 See for the role of H. M. Treasury above section 12.2.3. 
41 PrivSA#6. 
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Other lawyers observed that although PFI procurement practice did not coincide 
with a strict interpretation of the rules, they would prefer the practice to prevail over a 
strict application of the procurement rules. PrivSA# I was clear in saying that 
"we should drag the rules to the practice rather than the practice 
to the rules. " 
PubSA# I mentioned she thought the procurement rules were rather applicable to 
southern European countries with greater problems of irregularities and corruption in 
procurement processes than the United Kingdom. 42 In this context, some respondents 
perceived public procurement law as an unnecessary burden which was introduced by 
European bureaucrats lacking practical experience in procurement. 43 PubSA#1 
maintained that procurement law obstructed the development of "commercial" and 
'pragmatic" procurement practices in the UX. 44 
Respondents perceived that PH procurement practice was superior to the law and 
combined this statement with the opinion that breaches occurring in the PFI process 
were of mere "technical" nature. Lawyers who uttered this view suggested that the 
breaches were by no means material, because foreign bidders, if they eventually 
materialised, were not discriminated against. BothSA#3 stated the rule of law was 
very strong in Britain: 'Ve don't mess around with the specs and award criteria. ý'45 
PnvSA45 added the transparency of the projects was warranted through internal 
auditing procedures within the public sector, which would detect any blatant breaches 
of procurement law. 46 All lawyers were well aware of the fact that the "superior" PH 
procurement practice was developed by disregarding and bending the procurement 
law. 
42 BothSA#4, I don't want to be nationalistic, but 
...... 43 PubSA#7-, BothSA#3, "when do they come to grips with reality? " 
44 PubSA#I. 
41 BothSA#3. 
4* BothSA#3. PrivSA#5. 
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12.4. Impact of the law on PFI procurement practice 
Having explored the cornerstones of PF1 procurement, we will discuss in the 
following section the impact procurement law has had on PF1 procurement practice. 
To examine the impact we will first adopt an outsider perspective before turning to the 
perception of insiders. 
12.4.1. Impact of the rules on the practice from an outsider perspective 
Various writers have tried to specify the conditions under which law can 
effectively influence behaviour and perhaps attitudes. Three most commonly 
discussed conditions will be explored in the following section. From an outsider 
perspective, section 12.4.1.1 will firstly consider whether practitioners accepted rules 
and values competing with procurement law. In a second stage it will be analysed to 
what extent the competing rules and values do actually deviate from procurement law. 
Secondly, section 12.4.1.2. presents a potential condition for Community law to have 
impact on national legislation, namely the legal implementation into national law. 
Section 12.4.1.3. will ask whether procurement law has been re-evaluated to keep it 
up-to-date with socio-economic developments and thus to maximise its potential 
impact. The two remaining pre-conditions for the law to maximise its impact, 
diligence of enforcement and benefits from compliance will be dealt with when 
addressing the question of how procurement law was enforced in PFI in section 12.5. 
12.4.1.1. Competing rules and values 
The first condition for law to make an impact is that social actors should not 
accept rules and values competing with the norms under consideration. If the 
addresses have accepted other rules and values it has to be further asked to which 
degree the competing norms deviated from each other. Both aspects will be considered 
from an outsider perspective. 
It is suggested that procurement Directives and Regulations are not the only 
source of guidance for PH procuring authorities. Public procurement law has to 
compete with sector specific guidance and with a variety of central government 
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guidance on the PFI procurement process, It has been explained that sector specific 
and central government guidance were repeatedly incompatible with a strict approach 
to procurement law as reflected in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. 
The government guidance fostered the adoption of a lax approach to procurement law 
which significantly influenced the PH procurement practice. 47 
PFI procurement practice may be viewed as another set of rules and values 
competing with public procurement law. Although the practice lacks normatiVity and 
is, in contrast to the government guidelines, not even put down in writing, it 
considerably influenced the behaviour of authorities and their legal advisors. Since the 
PH scheme was launched in November 1992, PH procurement practice has been 
consistently developed and built on the TTF guidance and previous experience. 
Procedural cornerstones of the practice include inter alia the successive refinement of 
output-based specifications and the use of the negotiated procedure. 
PubSA#4 reported she felt it was difficult to leave the trodden paths of PH 
procurement practice in favour of a more robust approach to the law. She further 
observed that it was "quite odd" not to use the negotiated procedure because it was 
likely to alienate public sector clients. Her assessment shows that practitioners and 
their public sector clients thought of the practice as having normative character. 
From an outsider perspective, the general theme occurred that authorities 
considered only those parts of the law that appeared not to have a significantly 
negative impact on their project. Authorities adopted some procedural elements, such 
as the OJEC advert and broadly the structure of the negotiated procedure. In other 
areas, including the use of the negotiated procedure, they deliberately chose not to 
follow other legal obligations and abided by the TrF guidance instead. In taking into 
account commercially oriented considerations and pursuing "best practice, " 
47 See for the role of H. M. Treasury above section 12.2.3. 
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contracting authorities have accepted rules and values other than the strict 
interpretation of the procurement rules. 
The procurement rules have to compete in PFI procurement therefore not only 
with government guidance but also against a grown legal practice, a well-established 
"law in action. " It is submitted that both sets of competing norms limited the impact of 
procurement law on PFI procurement practice. 
In applying the second limb of the concept, it has to be asked how far the 
competing norms and values deviated from the strict approach to the procurement 
rules. PH procurement practice as well as governmental guidance were considered to 
compete with the procurement Directives and we have seen in chapters 5 to II that 
both deviate from a strict interpretation of procurement law. 
Nevertheless, the competing rules could be in line with the principles underlying 
the procurement Directives, such as competition, transparency, non-discrimination. 
Although this question does not affect the fact that the practice deviates from the rules 
of the Directives, it may help to explain the degree of normative deviation and to 
assess the degree of impact procurement law has had on the practice. 
The principle of "equality of treatment, " or "non-discrimination, " requires that 
similar situations are not treated differently unless this is justified by objective 
reasons. 48 It prohibits not only obvious discrimination based on nationality, but also 
covers forms of discrimination which lead de facto to the same result. 49According to 
practitioners'O and the publicly available case studies, cross-border penetration in PH 
procurement was minimal. PubSA#2 remarked that PFI contracts were awarded to 
U. K. based subsidiaries of French and German companies and many PFI consortia had 
foreign shareholders. She did not come across any discriminatory practices in PFI. The 
48 Case 810/79 Uberschar [19801 E. C. R. 2747, para 16 of the judgment; Case C-243/89 Storebaelt [19931 E. C. R. 1-3353. 
49 This covers even measures of non-discriminatory nature, for example: the requirement that the firm to 
be awarded the contract should be owned by the [Italian] government, cf. Case C-3/88 Data 
Processing, [1989] E. C. R. 4035, para 9 of the judgment. 50 BothSA# I 
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study also did not find any evidence suggesting that PH procurement practice 
compromised the non-discrimination principle. " 
A further principle underlying the European public procurement Directives is 
transparency. It alms to ensure undistorted Community-wide competition between 
operators in the market and allows the latter to monitor compliance with procurement 
law. The ECJ held that a non-distorted system of competition can only be guaranteed 
if the various economic players have equal chances in transparent procurement 
procedures. " The principle therefore requires that participants know the clearly 
drafted" "rules of the game. 5554 Further, procurement procedures should be formalised 
and transparent inter alia by employing objective selection and award criteria when 
55 tendering the contract. Companies must be furnished throughout the process with 
"precise information concerning the conduct of the entire procedure. "'6 The 
transparency principle may take also effect in the process after bids have been 
received and before the selection of the preferred bidder. At this stage, the principle 
imposes restraints on how negotiations are to be conducted. The ECJ held in the 
Walloon Buses case 51 that it was a breach of the equality and transparency principle to 
provide only one bidder with the opportunity to amend its offer without giving such an 
opportunity to other competitors. 
In contrast to the principle of non-discrimination, it is more difficult for an 
authority to achieve perfect transparency in a project as complex as a typical PFI. 
Whilst it is certainly possible to brief bidders on the general rules of procedure, 
authorities found it difficult and inconvenient to publish their award criteria at the 
51 However, in the Hannon case, which was not procured under PFI, Hannon CFEM Facades (U. K. ) Ltd 
v The Corporate Officer of the House of Commons, High Court-, judgment of 28 October 1999, the 
House of Commons sought to discrumnate against a French contractor on grounds of nationality. 
52 Case 87/94 Commission v. Belgium "Walloon Buses " [1996] E. C. R. 1-2043, para 55 of thejudgment. 
53 Westring/ Jadoun, Public Procurement: Manualfor Central andEastern Europe (1996), p. 6. 
54 Arrowsmith/Linarelli/Wallace, op. cit., note 63 of ch. 5, p. 74. 
55 On the balance of the both procurement prmciples "transparency" and "value for money" see: Ibid., 
p. 73 ff. 
56 Case T-203/96 Embassy Limousines & Services v. European Parliament (unreported) para 85 of the 
j udgment. 
57 Case 87/94 Commission v. Belgium " Walloon Buses 1996] E. C. R. 1-204 3, para 54 of the j udgment. 
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beginning of the proceedings without changing them afterwards. " This problem is 
partly inflicted by the complexity and diversity of the possible solutions. 
Authorities sought to solve the issue by employing broad headline award criteria 
in addition to broad output specifications. Headline award criteria and output 
specifications have the advantage that the authority may refine them throughout the 
process. Both practices also seek to avoid re-commencing the procurement procedure 
because either the specifications or the award procedure were changed after 
publication of the contract notice. In practice, authorities used both practices in some 
PFIs to substantially "move the goalposts" of the project. In these cases, transparency 
was compromised for the benefit of gaining more procedural flexibility. This goes 
especially if one adopts the view that the transparency principle cannot be separated 
from the detailed procedural rules of the Directives which authorities find it difficult 
to strictly comply with. 
A further principle underlying the procurement Directives is fair competition 
between bidders for public contracts. This principle is included in the preambles as 
one of the main goals of the procurement Directives. '9 It is fin-ther inherent to the 
fundamental principles of equal treatment and transparency. Opening up procurement 
markets was pinned to the expectation that this would lead to increased competition 
between European companies, improved industrial efficiency and competitiveness of 
European companies in global markets and, finally, reduced purchasing costs of the 
public sector and utilities. 60 
It is PFI procurement practice to limit the number of bidders in the final stages of 
the project and thereby reduce competition amongst tenderers 
. 
61 De facto, the 
announcement of the preferred bidder marks the end of the competitive phase of the 
58 Article 36(2) Services Directive 92/50. 
'9 For example: 14'h recital of the preunble of the Supply Directive 93/36. 60 European Conunission, op. cit., note 10 of ch. 1, para 1.13. 61 Fox/Tott, op. cit., note 5 of ch. 2, para 5.7.8 et seq. 
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tender process. 62 As the project agreement is only in exceptional circumstances not 
awarded to the preferred bidder, the bargaining power of the latter in the final stages is 
disproportionately strengthened and the incentives to offer best value for money is 
reduced. In order to avoid this situation and to warrant the competitiveness of the 
negotiations, it is preferable to cover most commercial issues in discussions held 
before selecting the preferred bidder 
. 
6' According to the legal advisors interviewed for 
the empirical study, 64 this preferable way of conducting negotiations proved to be 
unrealistic in practice. 
It is possible to conclude from an outsider viewpoint that PFI procurement 
practice is not always compatible with the principles underlying the Directives. 
Especially the principles of competition and transparency were compromised for the 
sake of greater procedural flexibility and commercial considerations. However, 
although not always compatible with a strict interpretation of the procurement rules 
and their underlying principles, the PFI procurement practice could be in line with the 
aims and purposes of the law. The European Directives were aimed at abandoning 
restrictive and protectionist procurement practices with the additional purposes of 
fostering the better allocation of economic resources and restructuring national 
industries. 
The legislative framework for public procurement was meant to be "an incentive 
for major change in traditional purchasing practices in the Member States, thus 
contributing to an environment favourable to economic development in Europe as a 
whole. "" According to the Commission, authorities should seek to achieve this aim by 
ensuring Community-wide competition based on the principles of non-discrimination 
and transparency. 66 The "particularly important aim of efficient Procurement 5)67 
" Ibid., Brazier, "Appointing a preferred bidder" (1999) PH Jounial (3), p. 14. C. 3 Arrowsmith(ed. ), op. cit., note 24 of ch. 2, para 9.189. 64 BothSA43. 
05 European Conurussion, op. cit., note 59 of ch. 3, para 1.2. 66 Ibid., para 2 et. seq. 
0 European Coninussion, op. cit., note 113 of ch. 3, p. 1. 
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includes the "efficient allocation of resources" eventually leading to the enhancement 
of public services. 68 
It is suggested that the macro-economic aim of efficient and best value oriented 
procurement is shared by the Private Finance Initiative. PF1 was initially adopted for 
the reason to enhance the services delivered to the public and to achieve "best value 
for money, ý, 69 meaning to allocate more efficiently the scarce financial resources of the 
public sector. PH further represent the "major change in traditional purchasing 
practices, " the Commission demanded in its 1996 Green Paper. The PH scheme not 
only transformed procurement practices in the U. K. but also inspired the adoption of 
similar schemes in E. U. countries such as The Netherlands, Portugal, and Italy and 
further abroad in Japan and South Africa. 
Despite its congruence with the fundamental purpose of the rules to achieve 
efficiency in public procurement purpose, the PH procurement practice is challenged 
by the Commission for its lax approach towards the rules. 70 
It is submitted that the relaxed approach at least partly reflects the commerciality, 
meaning efficiency, of PH prOjects which the Commission favours. PH awarding 
authorities embark on negotiations with bidders because it is commercially more 
sensible to negotiate the project agreement rather than conducting a rigid tendering 
process. It is submitted that a co-ordination problem and a "conflict of policies , 71 exist 
between the macro-economic aims of the procurement Directives and their procedural 
rigidity. While aiming at commerciality and "efficient purchasing, " the niggid. 
regulatory regime seems to stifle the adoption of more commercially oriented 
procurement practices. 
Another aim of regulated public procurement in Europe was to restructure 
national industries. It was anticipated that the Single Market would result in a large 
68 Ibid. 
69 See for further references above section 2.2.5.1. 
70 With respect to the use of the negotiated procedure, see: "Pinihco" case, European Commission, 
(2000) Single Market News No. 23 (October). 
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number of mergers leading to economies of scale through rationalisation of production 
72 
and the avoidance of duplication in research 
. 
With opening up procurement market, 
it was predicted that more efficient firms would emerge to serve the whole of the 
Single Market. There is little comprehensive information on the true picture of the 
73 
economic impact of procurement policy on the restructuring of national industries 
. 
The Private Finance Initiative indirectly supports restructuring of private sector 
industries by persuading companies to collaborate when they bid for public 
contracts. 74Partnership arrangements render it necessary for companies to adopt more 
efficient approaches as to managing consortia, the supply chains involved 
'7' and the 
long-term relationship with the public sector partner. 76 Those methods, which were 
further developed and refined through PFI, allowed private sector entities to perform 
more efficiently and, hence, more competitively in other ventures outside the realm of 
government procurement. 
Summing up the findings of the section on rules competing with procurement 
law, it is suggested from an outsider perspective that the latter was only one source of 
guidance for authorities. The U. K. Regulations competed with a plethora of general 
and sector specific guidance notes and, in recent years, with an ever more matured PH 
procurement practice. 
The latter may not always be compatible with the strict interpretation of the 
procurement rules. On the other hand, the practice is compatible with the principles of 
non-discrimination and, to some extent, competition, which underlie the Directives. 
The PFI practice is also in accordance with two of the main purposes of procurement 
law, namely to achieve the more efficient allocation of economic resources and to 
restructure national industries. 
71 PubSA#9. 
71 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 48. 
73 EuroStrategy Consultants, op. cit., note 8 of ch. 1, para 7.2. 
74 CBI, op. cit., note 99 of ch. 2, chapter 4 "Fostering private sector capacity. " 75 See Cox/Hains/Parker, op-cit., note 135 of ch. 2, Saunders, op. cit., note 135 of ch. 2. 
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The compatibility with some of the principles and aims underlying the Directives 
suggest that PFI procurement practices does not deviate entirely from the Directives, 
though the degree of impact can again only be described as limited. 
12.4.1.2 National implementation of supra-national rules 
Another potentially relevant condition for Community law to be effective is its 
adequate implementation into national law. It may be useful to recall briefly the 
relationship between the Member States and the promulgation of Community norms. 
This relationship can be broken down into four general phases, namely adoption, legal 
implementation, application, and enforcement. 77 The first potential point for deviation 
from Community law is the legal implementation of supra-natiOnal Directives into the 
national legal systems. 78 This process has attracted especial attention amongst 
79 European law lawyers, since it requires the choice between competing values. 
Article 10 of the E. C. Treaty puts Member States under a duty to legally implement 
provisions of Community law to ensure fulfilment of the obligations contained therein. 
The Treaties establish that after Directives have been adopted by the Community 
legislature, they are binding on the Member States as to the results to be achieved, but 
leave the choice of the form and methods by which they are incorporated into national 
law. 'O 
In public procurement law, the Commission has consistently complained about 
the lack of proper implementation of the procurement Directives into national 
legislation" and, accordingly, vigorously enforced the implementation deadlines of 
76 See Cox/Townsend, op. cit., note 136 of ch. 2; Heal, op. cit., note 136 of ch. 2; H. M. Treasury, op-cit., 
note 136 of ch. 2. 
77 Krislov/EhlermamlWeiler, "The Political Organs and the Decision-Making Process in the United 
States and the European Community, " in: Cappelletti/Secombe/Weiler (eds. ) Integration through 
Law, Volume] Book 2 (1986), pp. 61-85. 
78 Snyder, note 6 of ch. 1; Swart, "From Rome to Maastricht and Beyond: The Problem of Enforcing 
Community Law, " in: Harding/Swart (eds. ), op. cit, note 99 of ch. 3. 
Snyder, note 6 of ch. 1, p. 21; Lenaerts/ Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union (1999), 
p. 459 etseq. 
Article 249 111 E. C. Treaty. 
European Conmussion, op. cit., note 59 of ch. 3, para 3.3 et. seq. 
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the Directives" and the quality of implementation. It has claimed that compliance 
problems and the limited impact of procurement law result from inapt legal 
implementation of Community law into national legislation. " The Commission's 
claim is not supported, however, by the impact study available in this area. 84 The 
EuroStrategy study reveals that the way in which the Directives were implemented 
does not appear to influence the law's impact. " 
In any case, the legal implementation of the three Public sector and the Utility 
Directive in the U. K. do not appear to be a relevant factor in explaining non- 
compliance in PFL The four Directives were legally implemented in the United 
Kingdom by means of Regulations in the mid 1990S86 in a manner principally 
81 
consistent with the Directives. In the few areas where the U. K. Regulations deviate 
from the Directives, the substantive rules of the procurement Directives" have direct 
effect and may be directly relied upon against the state and bodies providing services 
under state control. '9 The relevance of an adequate implementation is thus further 
diminished by the direct effect of the salient provisions of the procurement Directives. 
It is therefore suggested that the limited impact of procurement law in the PH 
context is rather related to the application of the law than to its implementation. 
124.1.3. Re-evaluation of the law 
The third possible precondition for law to have maximum impact on the social 
context is that it must remain practicable at the time of application and relevant for the 
legal practice. The growing dynamic of an ever changing economic and societal 
environment puts the law under pressure to cope with these changes and to adapt to a 
The Corarnission has consistently launched infringement proceedings against a number Member 
States for not implementing procurement Directives on time, e. g.: France and the United Kingdom for 
not implementing Directive 99/04 (9 March 2000). 
83 European Conmussion, op. cit., note 59 of ch. 3, para 3.3 et seq. 
84 EuroStrategy Consultants, op. cit., note 8 of ch. 1, para 7.2. 
85 Ibid. 
" See above note 2 of chapter 3. 
17 For one of the minor differences see: Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, pp. 123-175. 
88 For example, the criteria to evaluate bids: Case 31/87, Gebroeders Beenyes B. V v. The Netherlands 
[19881 E. C. R. 4635, paras 3944 of the judgment. 
Case C-1 88/89 Foster v. British Gas[l 9901 E. C. R. 1-3313. 
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changed socio-economic environment. 90 If the legislator fails to re-consider the law in 
the light of recent socio-economic developments, it is likely to be bereaved of its 
relevance. Under circumstances where the regulatory onus appears disproportionate, 
practitioners are more likely to apply tactics of deviance. Hence, a failure to re- 
evaluate norms is likely to result in widening the gap between the law in the books and 
the law in action and thereby limits the law's impact. 
To increase the law's impact and not to let it appear irrelevant, the onus placed on 
applicants has to be constantly monitored and, if necessary, re-evaluated. The process 
of re-evaluation eventually aims at bringing about specific changes to the rules to keep 
them relevant. 
The European Commission generally acknowledges this notion with respect to 
public procurement law. It asserts that "ffie current legal framework does not exist for 
its own sake but in order to attain the benefits, if the single market in the area of public 
procurement. Rules, policy and enforcement should follow reality rather than the other 
way round. "91 
The European procurement Directives were successively implemented into the 
legal systems of the Member States during the 1970s. Then, the procurement rules 
were consistent with their social and economic environment. They reflected largely 
the procurement practices employed, meaning one-off works and supply contracts. 
Procurement law has not changed significantly for the last 30 years despite significant 
technical developments, including the emergence of e-procurement, and socio- 
economic developments, such as PPPs. 
We have seen in chapters 5 to II that tensions between an unchanged legal 
framework and commercial requirements brought about by socio-economic changes 
have caused seven considerable legal problems and uncertainties. For each of the 
90 Similarly Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 295. 91 European Conunission, op. cit., note 113 of ch. 3, p. 2. 
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uncertainties, it has to be addressed whether the change in the socio-economic 
environment has resulted in a re-evaluation of the regulatory burden. 
In addition, it has to be asked whether the possible failure to re-evaluate 
procurement law in those seven areas may contribute to its limited impact on the PFI 
practice. The possible lack of re-evaluation may be one reason why contracting 
authorities may have deviated from the procurement rules when delivering PFI 
prOjects, as this probably offered a way to bridge the gap between the not re-evaluated, 
and hence inefficient, law in the books and the necessities of the real world. 
The first legal uncertainty discussed in chapter 5 was the question of whether 
authorities are allowed to conduct pre-tender negotiations on various issues. It is 
submitted that the need for pre-tender negotiations has increased with the emergence 
of more complex contractual structures. We have seen that from the perspective of 
authorities, pre-tender negotiations offer significant benefits in gauging the interest of 
the markets and consulting experts on the public sector comparator and, more 
importantly, on the question of how to design project specifications. 
It was submitted that pre-tender negotiations pay dividends throughout the 
remainder of the procurement process. Chapter 5 identified the principle of 
transparency as main obstacle for conducting pre-tender negotiations irrespective of 
whether authorities employ the restricted or the competitive negotiated procedure. 
Considering the substantial benefits arising from pre-tender negotiations it may 
become necessary to re-evaluate the practicability and appropriateness of the legal 
requirements arising from the transparency principle. As shown in section 5.1.4.1. 
with the solution adopted in the GPA, pre-tender negotiations can be conducted 
without necessarily compromising the principle of transparency. 
The second area of uncertainty, which was dealt with in chapter 6, was the 
question of whether changes to the specifications were reconcilable with the rules on 
specifications of the Directives and their underlying principles, most notably 
transparency. 
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Respondents said it was a practical requirement of PPPs to refine specifications 
throughout the project to adequately consider the innovative solutions proposed by 
bidders. 92 While slight amendments to specifications should be compatible with rules 
and principles, this does not apply to "significantly moving the goalposts of the 
project"9' after the contract advertisement. This practice is probably neither 
reconcilable with the rules nor with the transparency principle. 
It appears questionable whether the change in the procurement practice should 
necessarily initiate a re-evaluation of procurement law. It has been argued in section 
6.2.4. that the regulatory onus in the case of substantial changes, namely to re- 
advertise the changed specifications, appropriately balances the interests of bidders 
interested in the changed prOject on the one hand and the authority on the other. 
The problem of how to classify contracts was described as a third area of legal 
uncertainty in PFI procurement. We have seen in section 7.2.5. that one rationale of 
multi-faceted PPPs is the integration of construction and services elements to create 
efficiency gains. The integration of different contractual elements causes difficulties 
when classifying multi-faceted contracts according to the three traditional categories 
of the Directives. 
The requirement of classification was developed for contracts with only one 
predominant purpose. The changes in the economical environment, meaning the 
introduction of more complex contractual agreements integrating several contractual 
elements, seem to have outgrown the legal framework. The law in the books has lost is 
practical relevance in this area and practitioners reported that they deviated from the 
rules of classification in advertising PFIs in two categories of the OJEC or classifying 
PFIs constantly as services contract without conducting a case-by-case analysis. 
92 See above section 6.3. 
93 See above section 6.2. 
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The impact of procurement law may be increased, if the law would have been re- 
evaluated with respect to the classification requirement to accommodate multi-faceted 
PPPs more easily. 
Probably the most pertinent regulatory onus placed on PFI procuring authorities 
are the limitations for using the negotiated procedure. Although the Directives were 
amended in the 1980s and 1990s, those legislative changes did not specifically 
consider complex procurement task such as PPPs. The archetype of the procurement 
process remains a Community-wide contract advertisement followed by a one-stage 
tendering procedure and the subsequent award of the contract applying either the "best 
price" or the "most economically advantageous" criterion. Tendering public contracts, 
as envisaged by the Directives, is a sufficiently flexible method for authorities to 
competitively award the overwhelming number of their one-off works, supply, or 
services contracts. 
It has been suggested that rigid tendering processes are incapable of 
accommodating large-scale concession contracts and PPPs. The latter rather require 
ongoing negotiations throughout their procurement process. 94 The complexity of their 
contractual structure and the exceptionality of the individual project for the procuring 
authority require extensive negotiations with bidders and prOject lenders on issues 
such as drawing up specifications, financing and structuring the deal. This assumption 
was unequivocally supported by all respondents to the empirical study and is not 
contested in the academic literature. " 
What is more, conducting negotiations freed from the straightjacket of a rigid 
tendering mechanism is said to reduce the time and costs of the award process. 96 
Participants in negotiations can resolve uncertainties, ambiguities and errors present in 
the proposal leading ultimately to a more accurate evaluations and more definitive 
94 Bulow/Klemperer, Auctions vs. Negotiations (1994), see for a summary of the arguments: Klein, 
"Intrastructure Concessions 
- 
To auction or not to auction? " (1998) Public Policyfor the Private 
Sector (Nov. ), No. 159. 
95 See for example: Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, p. 72 3. 
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contracts. Furthermore, negotiations based on outline specifications can leave the 
private sector free to propose innovative solutions. Private sector companies might be 
more willing to present unsolicited project proposals such as new solutions to a known 
problem, or new ways of defining performance standards. 97 Comparing and evaluating 
bids in a negotiation process provides the authority with much greater discretion than 
within the tightly regulated framework of a tendering process. 
Despite the benefits of negotiations, European procurement law still seeks very 
much to limit the authority discretion by creating obstacles to embark on negotiations 
with interested firms. The European legislator seems to perceive discretion solely as a 
means for the department to introduce discriminatory and non-transparent 
procurement practices. Discretion is less viewed as providing authorities with the 
opportunity to introduce more commercially oriented procurement practices and as 
ensuring "best value" in public procurement, which is an aim of European 
procurement law. 9' 
Employing the negotiated procedure under E. U. law is still considered by the 
European legislator as an exception and remains linked to the fulfilment of certain 
conditions. It can be concluded that due to the emergence of more complex forms of 
procurement such as PFIs it has become necessary to provide authorities procuring 
those exceptional deals with the opportunity to conduct negotiations. In this area, 
lawyers perceived the regulatory onus as disproportionate and therefore applied tactics 
of deviance in conducting negotiations despite knowing that the derogations were not 
always satisfied. 99 It is for &s reason that the procedural rules of the Directives in 
their not re-evaluated form may compromise the impact of procurement law on PFI 
procurement practice. 
"6 For a discussion see: Peckinpaugh, Government Contractsfor Services (1997), p. 155 et seq. Klein, op. cit., note 94, p. 2. 
European Coran-tission, op. cit., note 59 of ch. 3, para 2.2. See above, chapter 8. 
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The fifth legal uncertainty, discussed in chapter 9, dealt with questions 
surrounding the criteria for selecting and shortlisting bidders and awarding contracts. 
We have seen in section 9.3.1. that PFI practitioners perceived it especially difficult to 
decide which criteria to employ in shortlisting bidders. 
While the Directives probably require the use of qualification criteria at 
shortlisting stage, PFI procurement practice also considered award criteria to whittle 
down the number of tenderers. The practice to consider project-related criteria has the 
benefit in complex projects to substantially accelerate the procurement procedure and 
to base the shortlisting decisions on more relevant information. The reduction of 
bidding costs may be employed as additional argument for considering criteria related 
to the project even prior to the ITN. 
On the other hand, authorities are permitted to employ award criteria after the 
ITN was issued. From this perspective, the regulatory burden placed on the addressees 
regarding the shortlisting of bidders may not be considered as disproportionate. 
Though the rules may be inconvenient to apply in practice, their re-evaluation may be 
deemed unnecessary to increase their impact. 
The sixth legal uncertainty dealt with in chapter 10 was the question of whether 
intra-consortium contracts, especially in the Utilities area, come within the realm of 
the Directives. The result of the legal analysis that SPVs operating a "relevant 
activity" for the purposes of die Utility Directive probably have to advertise the sub- 
contracts which were initially destined for the SPVs' shareholders. 
This requirement has been identified in chapter 10 as threatening the economical 
viability of bidding consortia. Companies vested with different skills establish 
consortia and SPVs for the sole purpose of dividing the sub-contracts amongst them. 
Demanding the advertisement of sub-contracts would render bidding consortia in PPPs 
unworkable. It is for this reason that the regulatory burden placed on the addressees of 
the law appears disproportionate. 
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As shown in section 10.3.2., the disproportionate regulatory burden has already 
provoked strategies of deviance and probably undermined the impact of procurement 
law on the legal practice. It is submitted that the probably necessary re-evaluation 
process could be modelled on the proposed Article 4 of the amended proposal for the 
Utilities Directive. This provision, which was not implemented into the current law, 
largely exempted intra-consortium contracts from its realm. ' "0 
The final legal uncertainty discussed in chapter 11 was the question of whether 
the exercise of step-in rights may trigger the procurement rules. We have seen that 
despite the fact that the post-award phase may render decision necessary which bear 
certain resemblance to the procurement process, the European legislator has neglected 
it. However, as an increasing number of PPPs enter the post-award phase, it is 
submitted that the issues involved deserve clarification. 
From the example of seven legal uncertainties in PFI procurement it is possible to 
conclude that it may become necessary to re-evaluate and clarify procurement law in 
some areas to increase its impact on the PH practice. In not amending the existing 
body of law and in not clarifying its applicability to PPPs, the European legislator 
failed to echo the emergence of those exceptionally complex procurement tasks. This 
failure negatively influenced the impact procurement law on PF1 procurement to an 
extent that practitioners perceived the legal framework in certain areas as 
"unworkable" and causing unnecessary legal uncertainties. 
It is submitted that the impracticability of procurement law, which may have 
partly resulted from the lack of re-evaluation, substantially affected its impact on PH 
procurement practice. 
12.4.1.4. Findings 
Adopting an outsider perspective, we have analysed two relevant conditions for 
making an impact on its social context so far, namely the existence of competing rules 
loo COM(99) 380 final. 
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and values, and constant re-evaluatiOn of the law. On the other hand it was held that 
the way the Directives were implemented into national law did not affect their impact 
on the legal practice. The sections have shown that none of the conditions for law to 
make an impact on a legal practice was satisfied or completely satisfied. It is possible 
to conclude from an outsider perspective that procurement law has had only a limited 
impact on PH practice, meaning the law was not capable to fulfil its function of 
influencing the behaviour of its addressees. 
12.4.2 Impact of the rules on the Practice from an insider perspective 
Having discussed the outsider perspective of impact of the rules, it becomes 
necessary to consider the perspective of insiders to gain a complete picture. PFI 
practitioners frequently mentioned that PH procurement practice failed to conform 
with a strict interpretation of public procurement law. 'O' Although not many 
respondents endorsed the provocative thesis that rules and practice were 
"fundamentally incompatible, " they concurred that "it is difficult to have them fit 
comfortably. " 10' PubSA#9 boiled it down to a "conflict of policies. " She added "the 
aim of transparent procurement market in Europe stands against letting projects 
happen and not burying them in red tape. ý)103 PubSA#5 agreed that the rules were "not 
accommodating the commercial reality of a PH prOject. "'04 
As evidence for this perception, lawyers gave the example that rules and 
structures of procurement law do not allow for the level of negotiations required. 'O' 
The Directives' rigidity made authorities think about whether it was possible for them 
to comply with the principles underlying the procurement Directives instead, such as 
non-discrimination, fair and transparent procedures, and competition. 10' PubSA#2 
observed their public sector clients had to comply not only with the procurement rules 
101 Pri vSAN 1 -, FlubSA#4. 
102 l'ubSA#3-, PrivSA#3. 
103 PubSA#9. 
104 PrivSA#6. 
'()5 For exaniple: PubSA#3. 
'00 PubSA#3. 
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but also with the documentation issued by sector-specific government departments, 
such as the NHS Executive, and by the Treasury Taskforce. Guidance notes were 
"most of the time compatible with the broad principles of the procurement rules, but 
not with the detailed rules. " PubSA42 said this matter caused "a bit of a problem on 
the interface. " Apart from compliance issues, public sector clients sought to use 
procurement law "to get the best bids in and to achieve the best result possible. "'O' 
Another aspect mentioned with respect to the relationship between rules and 
practice was that the procurement procedures were drawn up when PH was not 
invented. "' PrivSA#2 argued that there were "perfectly sound reasons for wanting to 
get outside these rigid procedures, although it's very difficult. " PubSA44 suggested 
that 
"the rules are something of a blunt instrument and the draftsmen 
had in mind fairly straight forward projects and not complex 
procurement tasks such as PFI. " 
Recently, the Commission published its proposals for amending the rules to 
accommodate PPP projects more comfortably. PubSAs#2 and PubSA43 were 
dismayed by the proposals because they still not provided their public sector clients 
with sufficient room for manoeuvre. 109 Many doubted whether it was possible to 
establish a set of rules for complex procurement tasks such as PFI and PrivSA-#I 
concluded 
" we should rather drag the rules to the practice than the practice 
to the rules. " 
l"' NhSA#2. 
108 l'rivSA#2. 
'()" BotliSA# 1. 
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12.5. Risks arising from the conflict between rules and practice 
Section 12.5. will explore the risks arising for authorities from the conflict 
between the law in the books and the legal practice. The discussion will combine the 
insider perception with the perspective of an outsider to PH procurement practice. 
Risks for the authority could mainly arise if a strict interpretation of the law in the 
books was effectively enforced. We have seen in section 3.3.2.3. that there are two 
main methods to enforce procurement law within the European Union. The law is 
firstly enforced by bidders in national courts and section 12.5.1. will deal with the 
national enforcement practice. 
Secondly, the European Commission enforces European procurement law. 110 
Section 12.5.2 will assess the risks arising from Article 226 E. C. Treaty proceedings 
from the perspective of an outsider and an insider to PH procurement practice. A lack 
of enforcement by either method could seriously limit the impact of procurement law 
on the PH practice. Diligent enforcement is, hence, the fourth potentially relevant pre- 
condition for law having a significant impact. 
Section 12.5.3. will then explore from the outsider perspective the last of the five 
potentially relevant pre-conditiOns for the law to make an impact, namely the need for 
benefits to outweigh the costs of compliance. From an outsider perspective, it appears 
questionable whether this has always been the case in PFI procurement. 
12.5.1. National enforcement Practice 
The first leg of the twofold remedy system in European procurement law is based 
on the assumption that disgruntled bidders are interested in pursuing their rights in 
national courts. "' This approach implies that if bidders are for whatever reasons not 
committed to enforce procurement issues, the law remains unenforced with the 
For an overview on remedies in procurement lawý Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2, ch. 18; Arrowsmith, 
op. cit., note 98 of ch. 3; Ohler, Reclusschutz bei der Vergabe 6ffentlicher Auftrage in der 
Europaischen Union (1997); Tyrell/Bedford, Public Procurement in Europe: Enforcement and 
Remedies (1997). 
Arrowsmith/Liiiarelli/Waflace, op. cit., note 63 of ch. 5, p. 751: "The parties most likely to initiate 




exception of significant cases which are dealt with by the Commission. Not only in 
PH but also in other areas of government procurement in the U. K., there has been an 
apparent lack of cases brought forward by bidders. 
On the other hand, contracting authorities on the continent currently face a wave 
of litigation on procurement tasks, which are smaller and less complex than PFI. It 
may therefore be that in the U. K. the assumption that bidders are committed to 
challenging authorities on procurement matters is flawed for a variety of reasons 
which are worth exploring in detail. 
Section 12.5.1.1. will firstly discuss from an outsider perspective whether the 
remedies for enforcing procurement law are adequate. Turning to the insider 
perspective, section 12.5.1.2. will then address how practitioners assessed the 
adequacy of the U. K. remedies system and the risks posed by disgruntled bidders 
employing it. Was the risk arising from the remedies suffice to influence the conduct 
of authorities? On the other hand, if bidders chose not to use the remedies system 
made available to them by the procurement Regulations, the motives underlying the 
decision deserve a closer examination. Those motives, which include the legal culture 
in the U. K. and a commercial approach to winning public contracts, will be discussed 
in section 12.5.1.3. to 12.5.1.6 by adopting the perspectives of participants in the 
practice. 
In order to answer the question why bidders did not bring challenges, the sample 
included lawyers advising private sector bidders on whether to pursue their interests 'in 
PFls by means of procurement law remedies. Both, the public and private sector 
analysed the pros and cons of challenging a PFI procuring authority. Whilst the private 
sector was interested in exploring the chances of effective remedies available to them, 
the public sector was interested in gaining insights into the risks of being challenged 
on a specific decision adopted in the course of the procurement process. 
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125.1.1. U. K. remedies systemfrom an outsider perspective 
One reason why bidders did not employ remedies may be the review system 
itself The following section will examine the U. K. remedies system from an outsider 
perspective. 
It is advocated that diligent and effective enforcement is the third major pre- 
condition for law having a significant impact. It is generally recogrused that persons 
and institutions responsible for enforcing the law must be fully committed' 12 to their 
task. "' This entails that the addressees of the norms should be aware of the possibility 
that any deviating behaviour is likely to result in being challenged and prepared to 
change their behaviour, as appropriate, to bring it into line with the law. 
The U. K. provides neither a central enforcement authority nor a national review 
body for enforcing procurement law. 114 In contrast to the implementation of the 
material procurement Directives, the implementation of the Remedies Directive in the 
U. K. has been criticised for deterring providers from launching proceedings against 
procuring authorities. 1 
Especially the difficulties to obtain interim measures' 16 under the U. K. system 
have been subjected to criticism. "' English courts were traditionally reluctant in the 
past to grant interim measures. This tradition stands in contrast to the requirement of 
raI)id review arising from the European Directives. However, in the Harmon case, 
judge Humphrey Lloyd Q. C. was prepared to give a greater weight to the interest of 
the challenging bidder when balanced against public inconvenience. "' 
112 Colombotos, "Physicians and Medicare: A Before-After Study of the Effects of Legislation on 
Attitudes" (1969) American Sociological Review, p. 321-, Dixon, From Prohibition to Regulation: 
Bookmaking, Anti-Gambling, and the Law (1991), ch. 7. 
Fvan, 7he Socioloýy of Law: A Social-Structural Perspective (1980), rephrased in: Cotterrell, op-cit., 
note 6 of ch. 4, p. 5 9. 
114 For an overview see: Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 98 of ch. 3. 
Arrowsmith, "Enforcing the EC Procurement Rides: the remedies system in England and Wales" (1992) P. P. L. R. p. 92; Weatherill, "Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules in the Untied Kingdom", 
chapter 8 in: Arrowsmith (ed. ) op. cit., note 98 of ch. 3, (1993)-, Tyrell/Bedford, Public Procurement in 
Europe: Enforcement and Remedies (1997). 
Works Reg. 31(5Xa); Supply Reg. 29(5Xa); Services Reg. 32(6Xa); Utilities Reg. 32(5)(a). 
117 l, uroStrategy Consultants, op. cit., note 8 of ch. 1, para 8.2.1. 
... Arrowsmith, "E. C. Procurement Rules in the U. K. Courts: An Analysis of the Harmon Case" (2000) 
P. P. L. R. pp. 120-134-, pp. 135-145. 
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The second remedy, the setting aside of an unlawfully adopted decision or 
action"9 is deActo not available to bidders. As contracts will be generally concluded 
when the proceedings are launched and project agreements cannot be set aside and the 
only remedy de facto available to bidders are damages. If a court should decide to 
award damages, it is uncertain under the U. K. remedies system how to calculate or 
assess them. "0 In the Harmon case, Humphrey Lloyd Q. C. held that all lost profits can 
be recovered if the bidder would have won the contract. Where this does not apply, he 
held that the bidder could recover a certain percentage of the lost profits based on the 
percentage of the chance of winning the contract, provided the chance was 
substantial. "' Irrespective of which remedy is chosen, the costs in the form of legal 
expenses and management costs and the time involved in bringing actions on 
procurement issues before the High Court 122 seems to be a major deterrence for 
bidders from employing the U. K. remedy system more frequently. 
It can be concluded from an outsider perspective that the implementation of the 
remedies Directives in the U. K. 12' resulted in a remedy system which appears difficult 
to use. 124 The highlighted inadequacies may encourage behaviour of authorities which 
is irreconcilable with a strict interpretation of procurement law and, hence, limit its 
impact. 
12.5.1.2. U. K. remedies systeinfrom an insider perspective 
Viewed from an insider perspective, all lawyers remarked that risks arising from 
either disgruntled bidders or the Commission were monitored and assessed throughout 
the PH procurement process though the degree of caution and risk awareness varied. 
11" Works Reg. 31(6XbXi), Supply Reg. 29(5Xb)(i); Services Reg. 32(5XbXi); Utilities Reg. 32(5XbXi). 
120 Arrowsmith, op. cit., note 2 of ch. 1, pp. 892 etseq., 911 etseq. 121 Hannon CEEM Facades (IJ. K. ) Ltd v The Corporate Officer of the House of Commons, High Court; 
judgment of 28 October 1999. 
122 Works Reg. 31(4); Supply Reg. (29X4)(b); Services Reg. 31(4Xb); Utilities Reg. 32(3). 
123 BothSA# I- 
124 Though there have been two recent cases on general procurement law issues: Clyde Solway v Tile Scottish Ministers, Inner House, Court of Sessions, judgment of 22 January 2001 (unreported); Jobsin 
Internet Services v Department ofHealth, High Court, judgment of 18 May 2001 (unreported). 
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In practice, legal advice on the analysis of risks is provided in different ways. 
Public sector advisors said that public sector clients request advice on this Issue, since 
the risk assessment can be deemed as being one of the more difficult questions of the 
procurement process. 125 Whilst the majority of respondents outline the procedural 
options available to their clients and recommend the adoption of one alternative, 126 
PubSA#7 rejectcd this practice and said that she suggested only one solution to her 
clients. The assessment of the risks involved in each approach is the decisive 
consideration to decide which of the procedural options is implemented. One of the 
risks constantly assessed before adopting decisions is the question of whether either 
the Commission or an aggrieved bidder could challenge the authority. 
PubSA#4 said the general perception of public sector authorities was that bidders 
were not prepared to challenge them. This was the reason why the litigation risk in PFI 
was regularly considered negligible. 127 Lawyers were very much aware of the legal 
problems involved in following governmental guidance and the risks arising from this 
approach. They nevertheless opted for "pragmatic" decisions. BothSA#3 said 
1. a lot qf the advice even ftom Queen's Counsels has been that 
there is hardly any downside: ifyou breach the rules, so what? "' 
The complacency shown by the public sector and its advisors is surprising given 
their awareness that "we have illegality leaning over us all the time. ""' The findings 
sharply contradict the assumption of the European legislator that consortia bidding for 
PH projects were interested in challenging authorities, because of the considerable 
sunis private firms spend on preparing bids and the lucrative profit margins at stake. 
One of the reasons for the apparent unwillingness of bidders to challenge was, on 
the Nvord of PubSA49, that "going to the High Court in the U. K. is quite off-putting. " 
BotliSA41 added the U. K. tradition of public procurement legislation was still in its 
PUbSA# 3, l'ubSA# 9, l'ubSA# 10, BothSA#5, BothSA#6- 
For c\, unple: l'ubSA#3. 
IIubSA#4AI1e risk of being challenged by contractors is considered to be fairly nummal. 
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infancy. The system required time to sink into the minds of private companies. 
BothSA4 I agreed the remedy system was dysfunctional due to the implementation of 
the Remedies Directive in the U. K. In particular, the U. K. lacked a central 
enforcement authority to which bidders could complain. This was the main reason 
whv authorities were not complying with the letter of the procurement rules or with a 
literal interpretation of the rules. He did not think that this was a disadvantage, either 
for the authority or for the private sector nor for the system as a whole. 130 
Probably the most significant deterrent to using the remedy processes lawyers 
mentioned were the legal costs involved in launching proceedings against contracting 
authorities. "' High Court proceedings in the U. K. were extremely costly and could 
easilN, consume the profit margin the company expected to gain from the project. The 
costs of using remedies against procurement decisions comprised the "quite 
phenomenal" 1.12 legal CoStS133 and the management costs on the side of the company. 
Even if the company was prepared to spend money on litigating against the authority, 
it was uncertain whether it would be able to recover its legal expenses and the profits 
lost. There was no guarantee that the company would win the case. PubSA#4 
suggested that bidders would only take costly legal action when "there is a cheque at 
the end of it. " 
The lack of precedent cases makes it difficult to predict the outcome of 
challenges based on procurement law and it is almost impossible for lawyers to advise 
their private sector clients on whether they will be awarded damages. What is more, if 
winning would be guaranteed to aggrieved bidders, the public sector side would 
certainly try to reach a settlement outside the courtroom. These uncertainties, partly 
due to the lack of case law, combined with the high costs of bringing challenges 
BothSA#3. 
I iotliSA4 1. 
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proves to be an efficient deterrent to bidders in the U. K. to pursue their claims in the 
courts. 
The difficulty of proving that the bidder would have won the contract was 
described to be an even greater deterrent to challenge authorities. To assess this 
question, the bidder had to have a detailed knowledge of the bids submitted by their 
competitors. Lawyers maintained that this knowledge was generally not available to 
their private sector clients. 134 PnvSA#2 remarked that if the company was not amongst 
the frontrunners to win the contract and its prices were in the middle of the range, it 
%vould be reluctant to instigate a complaint going beyond an exchange of letters. "' 
According to their legal advisors, bidders said "it is not fair, "' 36 but took "it on the 
chin""' and hoped "to get the next one , 13' and did not want to "antagonising 
every body. " 1'9 
From a public sector perspective, one can conclude that the U. K. remedy system 
poses a variety of hurdles to its utilisation. It seems that the way in which the U. K. 
implemented the Remedies Directives deters even those contractors from using 
remedies which contemplate the possibility to challenge authorities. Therefore, a 
typical risk assessment of a PFI awarding authority will generally conclude that 
private sector bidders are unlikely to challenge decisions adopted in the course of the 
procurement process. British contractors have become participants M the PFI 
procurement practice and have no interest to threaten the "fragile house of cards. "140 
PrivSA#3 mentioned the fragile house of cards could only collapse if an outsider 
to the practice commenced review proceedings. Outsiders were only likely to 
challenge the practice if the considerations which U. K. bidders took into account were 
MIUIN', fOr HIStance 13othSA#2, BothSA#6. 
PrivSM2. 
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not applicable. This applied in particular to situations where an authority awarded a 
unique project offering high returns on investments. 
It can be concluded from this section that insiders to PF1 procurement share the 
outsider analysis of the U. K. enforcement system of procurement law in describing it 
as onk, of limited effectiveness. Bidders for PF1 contracts are not willing to challenge 
their "clients. " It is submitted that the lack in diligent enforcement lead to the 
%,., Idcspread perception of public sector authorities that they "get away with 
everýlhiiig- because "who is going to challenge [them] anyway'? " 14' This persuasion 
seems to significantly compromise the impact of the procurement law on the legal 
practice and deprive procurement law from having a more significant impact in the 
U. K. 
12.5.1.3. U. K. "legal culture" 
Apart from the inaccessible remedies system, lawyers frequently mentioned that 
it was incompatible with the U. K. "legal culture" to challenge authorities on 
procurement issues. The following section will explore in greater detail from an 
insider perspective what practitioners meant by using this term. It will suggest a 
number of more precise factors deterring bidders from employing the remedies. These 
factors can be summansed as the young tradition of procurement remedies in the U. K., 
a general fear of being blacklisted, the prevalence of amicable means to settle disputes 
and a vested interest of the bidders to maintain the status quo. 
When asked why there was hardly any litigation on procurement issues in the 
U. K., lawyers firstly argued that other European countries had a longer tradition of 
procurement legislation. PubSA#9 said bidders in countries such as Belgium were 
more used to employ remedies. She assumed that, as with any other "changes in 
culture, " it would presumably take some time to change the approach taken by U. K. 
coiitractors. PubSA44 remarked that such a change in culture would be neither 
"' PubSA#3. 
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rccognisable at the moment nor desirable in the future. PrivSA#2 was "amazed that 
nobodý has challenged authorities" but he did not have "a client who asked me to. I 
spoke to the senior in-house solicitors of two or three big construction clients and 
asked them 'have you ever thought about AT No they have never thought about it. ý'142 
Not onlý- do contractors and their legal advisors have to get used to the 
aý'ailability of formal remedy procedures in public procurement; the same applies to 
the courts. BothSA46 characterised the U. K. courts as "helpless in applying EU law in 
general and public procurement law in particular. " Whether this assessment reflects 
the situatioil reasonably or not is difficult to establish. Nevertheless, it can be 
concluded from the absence of any substantial case law that U. K. courts apparently 
lack experience in enforcing procurement law, especially when compared with their 
continental counterparts. 
'rhe second reason mentioned for not suing public authorities over their 
procurement practices was that bidders feared they would be blacklisted. 143 BothSA#3 
remarked that "there is no evidence but there is rumour that certain departments 
operate a de. fficto blacklist, like health and if you are on the blacklist you don't get 
anN, jobs. " It is astounding that lawyers mentioned blacklists so frequently and yet 
none of them could give any hard evidence of cases where a contractor has not been 
considered because of such a list. Probably, the concern of being blacklisted reflects 
die general desire of firms not to dent their reputation in crowded PFI markets. '44 It 
may be for this reason that "people rather take it [meaning a dubious procurement 
decisionj on the chin" 145 than challenging potentially wrongful decisions in the courts. 
On the other hand, PubSA#9 said it was becoming less of a commercial suicide to 
challenge authorities now and there was a greater acceptance in the market that the 
rules had to be complied with. This did not amount to a change in the general legal 
142 Pnv. SA#2. 
141 1rivSA#2, hivSA#3, lubSA#4, and many more. 
144 I'tibSA# 1. 
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culture not to challenge decisions of awarding authorities, but people "know more 
now, what increases the risk. " Although the rules had been "around for some time" 
PubSA#9 observed that could not recognise "a massive upswing of procurement 
litigation. " 
Lawyers mentioned as third reason for not employing the remedies system that 
the amicable settlement of disputes was an important part of the legal culture in the 
U. K. Disgruntled bidders were said to favour indirect and informal approaches to 
pursue their interests in the contract award procedure. PrivSA#3 remarked actions 
against procurement decisions were generally limited to an exchange of letters. '46 
Bidders thereby requested more detailed more information on specific questions, such 
na 
. 
14' Especi Ily in high-profile as the interpretation of the selection and award crite i ia 
projects, private sector advisors said they "stiffed up" the authority by indirect means. 
Those means included to contact superior bodies or to leak information to the local or 
national press. BothSA#I reported he contacted persons within the Treasury or the 
superior government department on specific issues asking them to apply pressure on 
the PFI awarding authority. 14' He and other lawyers 149 characterised indirect ways for 
looking after the interests of his clients as a cost and time effective way IS) to re-open 
discussions with the authority and to complain about procedural issues In general. 
PrivSA#5 added 
"what is there to be gained out of the challenge? The market 
players want to see a financial benefit and don't see it as an 
academic exercise. -151 
14, Muiy, such as PrivSA#3. 147 lubSA#3. 
1,18 BothSA# 1. 
149 PubSA# 3. 
1 so 13othSA# I- 
"I PrivSA#5. 
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It can be inferred from the above that bidders asstime their interests are better 
served by employing informal and indirect ways to influence decisions made in the 
award process rather than by launching formal proceedings against the authority. 
The final element of a legal culture, wWch emerged in the interviews, is the 
vested interest of bidders not to question the status quo, To say it in the words of 
BothSA4 1, who acted predominantly for the private sector, 
I. not complying literally with the procurement rules or with a 
literal interpretation of the rules is not a disadvantage neither jbr 
the authority nor for the private sector nor for the system as a 
whole. ' 52 
Other private sector legal advisors reported their clients were not interested in 
challenging authorities on issues such as the unjustified use of the negotiated 
procedure. The effect of such a challenge could be that a court ruling restricted this 
practice substantially. This outcome would certainly not be in the interest of the 
complainant. PrivSA#2 remarked: "we don't want to make the law in the domestic 
courts to the effect that this (meaning PFI procurement practice) is not permissible. ""' 
Another possibility would be that the complainant had to face a similar challenge 
brought by a competitor in another PFI project, where the complainant had good 
chances of securing the contract. The effect was reinforced where only a limited 
number of contractors existed in the market. In this situation, none of the contractors 
wanted "to be the one who starts challenging. 5,154 
For die reasons mentioned, bidders are interested to keep the status quo and to 
avoid "shooting themselves in the foot., 155 PnvSA46 speculated that the status quo 
was based on the assumption that each market player was "getting a fair share" of the 
projects available. With a view to the multitude of PFI contracts advertised, the 
I iotliSM 1. 
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attitude of contractors failing to secure a contract is to "hope that they will get 
iiivoi%, cd in the next one that comes along. , 116 That means in turn that in unique 
projects, such as London Underground, the risk of challenges is much higher. In those 
projects the chance of a follow up contract is low whilst the risks and rewards of the 
projects are very high. On the other hand, in the road or hospital area, where a 
commodity product has been developed, the risks of challenges are lower because the 
inarket has matured. '-" 
PrivSA#6 remarked 
.. none of the big players would upset the non-aggression 
arrangement that currently seems to exist. , 158 
Using the military term "non-aggressive arrangement" in the context of a 
competitive contract award process appears odd. Procurement law is based on the 
assumption that contracts are awarded in a competitive ("aggressive") manner and that 
aggrieved bidders ("aggressively") enforce the rules. Conversely, the statement 
indicates the existence of a mutually beneficial understanding not only between public 
and private sector but also among private sector firms which compete for PH 
contracts not to launch challenges. It seems feasible that this understanding amongst 
market players prevents procurement law from being effectively enforced given that 
bid challenges of disgruntled tenderers are the main technique of enforcement. 
"Outsiders" to the practice might be interested in a specific PH prOject and do not 
have vested interests in preserving the status quo, such as foreign bidders. Legal 
advisors were doubtful whether the involvement of foreign bidders in the PH bidding 
process would increase the risk of challenges. They were confident that foreign 
1'rivSA#(). 




bidders %%ould have to enter into joint ventures with British firms so that "British 
bLIS111CSS practices are likely to prevail. "159 
In addition, foreign bidders were likely to require legal advice from U. K. lawyers 
%%ho %%ould recommend the same litigation strategy to their domestic and their foreign 
cliciits. Equally, foreign bidders would face the same problems in employing the U. K. 
rciiicdics procedures: "the cost and time involved in using the U. K. remedies system 
%%ill put eveii those firms off, which are used to sue their home state. Foreign bidders 
%%ant to stay in the U. K. market and have no interest in being identified as 
troubicniakers. """ Other lawyers also suggested the considerations of U. K. firms, such 
as possible blacklisting or the adoption of a portfolio approach were also applicable to 
forcigii bidders which sought to enter the U. K. Market 
. 
161 
12.5.1.4. Role of legal advisors 
Another reason why contractors do not challenge PH awarding authorities is the 
reltictarice of their lawyers to advise them to do so. There are some indications from 
an insider perspective that the competitively negotiated contractual arrangements 
bet%%eeii legal advisors and their clients do not encourage bringing challenges. 
PtibSA# I mentioned clients would have pre-arranged legal contracts with a fixed sum 
which were aimed at getting the contract closed. Hence, lawyers had no interest in 
spending too much time on one case. Otherwise, the tight margins did not allow a full 
reco%'cry of the costs incurred. 162 In the early days, law firms even accepted to incur 
losses on PH projects to get a share of the competitive market for legal advice in PFI. 
12.5.1.5. No reason to bring challenges 
When asked why companies did not challenge autho rities on procurement issues, 
some lawyers bluntly replied that "our system works" and "that the rules are fairly 
I iotliSA# I 




%%ell applied in Britain. " 163 PnvSA43 remarked from an insider perspective there had 
been "quite a lot of work done: the Treasury Taskforce has published guidance notes 
and the NAO monitors the whole process. "'64 Local authorities and certain central 
go%crninent departments in the U. K. were aware of the problems involved and were 
cautious to apply rules properly to ensure that there was nothing wrong. 165 
Other lawyers made similar statements, especially legal advisors to the public 
scoor. It is submitted that by referring to the Treasury and other sector specific 
guidance as tile rules which have to be complied with, those lawyers probably 
underestimated the divergence of the government guidance from procurement law. "' 
Tlicsc statements are an interesting account of the lawyers' perception of the Treasury 
guidance. However, they do not answer the question of whether bidders have not had 
reasons for bringing challenges. 
12.5.1. & Commercial approach to winning public contracts 
Probably die most important reasons for private sector companies not to 
challenge an authority over irregularities in PFI procurement are of commercial 
nature. Those reasons will be highlighted in the following section from an insider 
,,, ie%%point. This is mainly because managers of private firms focus on commercial 
coiisiderations. PrivSA#6 observed that "the fact that there are no challenges is not 
drivcii from the legality of the process or any legal problems, but merely by 
,, 167 commercial decisions 
. 
It is feasible to break down the most mentioned commercial 
cmisiderations into three categories, namely access to markets, portfolio approach and 
management priorities. 
One of the primary commercially oriented reasons why companies try to stay out 
ofcourts is the widespread attitude that public sector authorities are invaluable clients. 




See foi emunple the diverging views on the use of the negotiated procedure, chapter 7. 
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procurement market. PrivSA#2 said that even if a company had a good case for suing 
over procedural irregularities, it would not do so "because you don't bite the hand that 
feeds. ""' PubSA#4 commented challenging the authority was not compatible with the 
private sector's perception of a good relationship between a client and its service 
providers. The only legal challenge related to PFI, the Pimlico case, confirms this 
perception. The persons who filed the complaint in this case with the commission 
.. were not parties to the procurement process, but members of the local community, 
who sought to squash the whole concept of having run education by the private sector. 
It is more likely that such pressure groups pick on irregularities than the bidders. , 169 
Another commercial reason for not suing authorities is that many commercial 
entities bidding for PFI projects adopted a portfolio approach. PrivSA#6 maintained 
that this business strategy implied that firms sought to secure several contracts in a 
specific PFI sector. 170 This approach offered the opportunity to achieve synergies by 
grouping those projects once they have entered the operation phase. The portfolio 
approach requires a repeat product, that is a similar type of PFI project with similar 
contractual and financial terms. PnvSA#4 observed that it was common understanding 
among private sector firms to pursue such an approach. According to the 
understanding of his clients, it was detrimental to challenge a government department 
which was likely to offer other opportunities that could fit into the portfolio. 171 
As the decision over whether to sue the authority or not is commercial in nature, 
companies are said to consciously weigh the commercial advantages and 
disadvantages of such an action. It is a matter of commercial judgment and 
management priorities for them to decide whether litigation serves their interests or 
not. Lawý-ers, as the participants in the study play an essential role in analysing the 
likelihood of winning cases on procurement issues for their private sector clients. The 





advice will usually comprise the important question of whether the bidder is entitled to 
damages and whether the damages would include a recovery of the lost profits. 
PrivSA42 and PubSA#9 observed the current mind-set in the industry was that 
instead of facing problems In calculating their loss of a chance and the damages they 
could sue for, they rather sought to secure future contracts. Companies were more 
interested in doing business and positionmg themselves for future businesses. They 
tried to "win the next one" 172 or, if they were in the middle of the procurement 
process, they sought to "win the competition rather than complaining about some 
procedural irregularities. , 173 PrivSA#5 and PrivSA46 mentioned that the commercial 
judgement also included the consideration that if their clients challenged the 
procedures in relation to a project, they could find themselves at the receiving end at a 
similar challenge from somebody else on another project. A wave of litigation and the 
related delays to PH prOjects caused was not in the commercial interests of regularly 
companies bidding in PFI competitions. 
12.5.2. Enforcement Practice of the European Commission 
The enforcement of public procurement law in Europe secondly relies on the 
European Commission launching Article 226 E. C. Treaty proceedings against 
Member States. Section 12.5.2. will first highlight the outsider perspective of the 
enforcement practice before turning to its perception by practitioners. 
From an outsider perspective it can be firstly held that it may be difficult for a 
national legislative body to sustain an effective threat of enforcement. It is even more 
complicated for the supra-national European Community to achieve a satisfactory 
level of enforcement. 174 The reasons for supra-riational law being difficult to enforce 
are manifold. 17' The most obvious may briefly be mentioned. 
"' IIubSA#4, PubSA#4. 
1 '2 PubSAP). 
... l'ubSA#g. 
Switil, op. cit., note 99 of ch. 3, p. 1. 
See for i inore detailed analysis: Harding/Swaft (eds. ), op. cit., note 99 of ch. 3; Vervaele, Compliance 
and h'PIfi)rcement of European Community Law (1999). 
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First, the Commission, as part of the legislative body, is not responsible for the 
execution of its policies, which is in most areas transferred to national authonties. But, 
the national authorities responsible for implementing the supra-national law may 
pursue interests diverting from those of the supra-natiOnal legislator. 176 Even if the 
national enforcement agencies perceive the purposes of the supra-riational law as 
compatible with national interests, there is potential for misinterpretation and 
misapplication of the law. In the context of PFI procurement, H. M. Treasury, as the 
national authority responsible for implementing European procurement law into 
national U. K. law, has issued guidance notes which deviate substantially from the 
interpretation suggested by the Commission and the Court of Justice. 
Secondly, due to the sheer size of the Community and the complexity of its rules, 
the Commission is unable to monitor compliance in every sector. This development 
decreases the scope for central enforcement. Enforcement actions become dependent 
on the infringement of individual interests and the motivation either to challenge the 
infringement in the courts or to complain to the Commission. 177 In general, the latter 
gciierallv limits its enforcement activities under Article 226 E. C. Treaty to systematic 
and mornentous breaches of the procurement rules and stressed that "conflicts are to 
,, 178 be settled primarily at national level 
. 
One example of a "manifest" breach of the rules was, according to the 
Commission, the systematic reliance of PFI awarding authorities on the negotiated 
procedure. The Guardian of the Treaty held that its application was not justified by the 
circumstances and decided to send a reasoned opinion to the U. K. 179 In commencing 
infringement proceedings on this ground against the U. K., the Commission 
demonstrated its commitment to enforce its interpretation of procurement law. As the 
reasoned opinion is addressed to the Member State, it is noteworthy that it has no 
Snydei, note 6 of ch. 1, p. 24 et. seq. 
Swwi, op. cit., note 99 of ch. 3, p. 1. 
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immediate effect on the authority or the PFI under consideration. The Commission 
niaý, onlý, contact purchasers directly and ask them to respond within 21 days. "" 
Ultiniatclv, the infringement procedure could result in a judgment of the European 
Court of Justice which may interpret the rule in a manner inconsistent with the 
approach encouraged by U. K. authorities. "' From an outsider perspective, the 
deterrence arising from Article 226 actions can be therefore described as low. 
Though generally committed to enforce major breaches of Community 
procurement law, it has taken the Commission nine years since the adoption of the PFI 
scheme and a complaint from private persons to enforce its interpretation of 
procurement law in PFI. Hence, despite a general commitment to enforce systematic 
breaches of procurement law, the Commission's enforcement will remain patchy and 
dependent on third parties drawing its attention to specific issues. The patchiness of 
the Commission's enforcement action is, from an outsider perspective, mainly due to a 
lack of resources. In cases where the PFI project receives a financial contribution from 
a Community institution, including the European Investment Bank, non-compliance 
with the procurement rules may result in the Community institutions withdrawing the 
fu nd i ng. "2 
Turning, secondly, to the insider perception of the enforcement practice of the 
European Commission it can be held that practitioners either largely underestimated"' 
or ignored the risk that the Commission could challenge procurement decisions. It is 
for this reason that the issuing of a reasoned opinion against the United Kingdom in 
the Pimlico case in the year 2000 surprised many lawyers. However, it is noteworthy 
that respondents with an EU Law or a Competition Law background were less 
surprised by the action taken. 184 PubSA#4 said: 
"I'milico case, " cf. Europemi Conunission, (2000) Single Market News No. 23 (October). 
Anowsmith (cd. ), op. cit., note 24 of ch. 2, para 7.041. 
See above section 3.3.2.3. 




"I thought that the Commission wasn't posing a huge risk as well, 
but after their recent intervention, I should be probably a bit more 
nervous. 
Practitioners who knew the Pimlico case said they were more worried about the 
possible impact of the reasoned opinion issued by the Commission against the United 
Kingdom than about possible challenges from bidders. "' This goes in particular, since 
legal advisors said they had largely underestimated the risk arising from the 
Commission and possible challenges in an Article 226 E. C. Treaty proceedings. 186 
BothSA#3 characterised the reasoned opinion as "a wrong message. " He thought that 
die reasoned opinion in the Pimlico case could collapse the fragile house of cards, the 
PFI procurement practice. It was undisputed amongst lawyers that the Commission 
challenged one of the main cornerstones of the PFI procurement practice. BothSA#3 
said PFI would be very hard to do without using the negotiated procedure. "' As we 
have seen in chapter 3, the Article 226 E. C. Treaty action is not suitable to challenge 
specific projects but is directed against the Member State, here the United Kingdom. 
On the other hand, project lenders are presumably reluctant to cover any risks arising 
from not complying with procurement law in the form of an ECJ judgment. It is 
therefore submitted with PubSA#8 that a judgment that finds the regular use of the 
negotiated procedure in PFI not compatible with procurement law would have an 
immediate impact on PFI procurement practice. The reasoned opinion was too recent 
and the outcome too uncertain for lawyers to render conclusive judgements on 
%%, Iictlicr it could affect the risk assessment of authorities or, on a larger scale, the PFI 
procurement practice. 
Vic%ving the case together with the disappointing proposals to reform 
procurement law published by the Commission in September 2000, lawyers had the 




impression that Brussels "sends out wrong signals""' based on a fundamental 
nusapprchenslon "of what we are doing. " When compared with the nsk arising from 
aggrieved bidders, PrivSA#6 perceived that it was 
more likeýv that the Commission would intervene than one of the 
big players. ""' 
liitcrvicN%, ees did not mention the risks posed by a possible withdrawal of Community 
funds in case a public sector client did not strictly complying with procurement law or 
adopted risky procedural decisions. 
12. 
-5.3. Weighing the pros and cons of a procedural decision 
The last of the five potentially relevant conditions for law to make an impact is, 
froin an outsider perspective, that the benefits arismg from compliance have to 
outweigh the benefits of non-compliance. This hypothesis is based on the "general 
pruiciple of human psychology"190 that the degree of compliance with the law is the 
higher, die more the addressee reckons with a negative sanction (deterrence). For the 
reniedy to be deterrent, the detriment which the contracting authority may suffer as a 
result from the non-compliance (D) must exceed the benefit which it will derive from 
the conduct (B). In the case of public authorities, the detriment D does not only 
include the financial loss caused by damages or the time slippage of the project, but 
also die potential stigma involved in the remedy process, such as bad press. The 
uncertainty over whether any bidder lodges a remedy procedure requires that D must 
be discounted to reflect the probability (p) of the detriment being incurred. "' Hence, 
for die remedy to be effective, the legislator must seek to ensure that pD>B. 19' When 
the benefits (B) exceed the detriments (D) discounted by the probability of the 
1 iothSA# 3. 
I'tivSA#O. 
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sanction (p), deviating from the law may be beneficial for the addressee. The expected 
benefits from not complying with the law are a "driving force" motivating the 
deviating behaviour. '9' In complex legal situations where one decision may trigger a 
multitude of positive and negative consequences, addressees will carefully weigh the 
expected consequences and assess them commercially. 
The findings gained by adopting an outsider perspective were supported by 
several respondents. They said authorities usually weighed the benefits and risks 
arising from adopting certain procedural decisions in the form of a risk assessment. 194 
PubSA#9 pointed out that the assessment especially considered the characteristics of 
the individual project and the market. '9' To analyse the deterrence arising from the 
procurement Directives, especially the remedies Directives, the remainder of section 
12.5.3. will consider the benefits afising from compliance and non-compliance from 
the perspective of an outsider. The analysis of the benefits from an outsider viewpoint 
will be supported by insider accounts of practitioners. 
12.5.3. L Benefitsfrom compliance 
It seems plausible from an outsider perspective that rules are more likely to be 
complied with, if positive incentives are offered for compliance and they are known to 
actors. The latter must further perceive those incentives as sufficient to motivate a 
change in behaviour. 196 
We have seen in section 3.2. that the possible benefits of regulated procurement 
are predominantly of macroeconomic nature. The opening up of national procurement 
markets and the re-structuring of national industries, two of the industrial and 
economic objectives of regulated procurement, 19' have no immediate positive impact 
on an individual procurement task. On the micro-economic level, authorities find it 
therefore probably difficult to perceive direct benefits ansing from compliance. 
193 I)ieklllallll, Die Befolgung von Gesetzen (1980), chapter II, para 3.2. 
""' PubSA#9, l'ubSA# 10, BothSA#6, PubSA#3. 
10 PubSA#9. 
'ý)(' Opp, Soziologie im Recht (1973), pp. 190-207 
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PubSA41 I endorsed this analysis by saying that savings achieved in PFI resulted from 
the development of this more efficient procurement method rather than from 
Conu-nunity-wide competition. 
An incentive for PFI awarding authorities to adhere to the rules could be that 
project lenders require warranties that the statutory obligations have been complied 
with. They are not prepared to take the risk that the SPV is exposed to a third party 
claini which is not accounted for, especially because it is not in the financial model. 
PrivSA#6 affirmatively remarked that ignoring the rules was not something lenders 
N\ould readily turn a blind eye to. Especially in the case where the SPV became a 
utility within the meaning of the rules, as in the case of light rail projects, the lenders 
tended to act as a "policeman. " 198 
It is submitted from an outsider view that the lack of a micro-economic incentive 
to comply with a strict interpretation of the rules has detrimental effects on the impact 
of procurement law on the legal practice. 
125.3.2 Benefits from non-compliance 
Benefits arising from non-compliant or risky behaviour may result in additional 
detrimental effects on the impact of law which will be analysed in this section from an 
outsider perspective. We have seen that if the benefits from non-compliance (B) 
exceed die detriment (D) discounted by the probability of the sanction (p), deviance is 
beneficial to the addressee. 
In PH procurement, authorities balance the risks of being challenged on decisions 
adopted in the procurement process against potential benefits. One of the most 
pertinent procedural decisions is whether to employ the negotiated procedure in PFI. 
The competitive negotiated procedure provides authorities with the significant benefit 
of greater procedural flexibility. The department may reduce the number of bidders by 
asscssing the merits of the proposals, conduct negotiations based on different 
"" AitoNx. smith, op. cit., note 9 of ch. 1, p. 236 
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specifications, and select a preferred bidder. In addition, the application of the 
iicgotiated procedure reduces the risk of being challenged by bidders for errors made 
iii the more rigid restricted procedure. Further, it reduces the overall bidding costs for 
die tendcrcrs. 
On those grounds it is possible to conclude from an outsider perspective that 
authorities gain significant benefits (B) from employing the negotiated procedure 
althougli the derogations might not be satisfied m the given PFI project. In addition, as 
PubSA4 10 pointed out, contractors prefer the negotiated procedure and therefore "we 
have never ever encountered a contractor who was wanting to make mischief' on this 
ground. 
Due to the lack of commitment on the side of the bidders to enforce the rules and 
the patchy and rare enforcement actions tAen by the Commission, the probability of 
being sanctioned (p) when not complying with procurement law appears low from an 
outsider viewpoint. '99 Respondents to the empirical study endorsed this perception and 
said the probability of challenges was "negligible. 1)200 If it is accurate that the 
probability (p) of being challenged on procurement law is "negligible, " the deterrence 
(D) of procurement law is negligible too, because D is discounted by p. 
Hence, with respect to this essential procedural issue, the significant benefits of 
non-conip I lance (B) exceed the negligible detriment (D) discounted by the low 
probability of sanction (p). From an outsider perspective it may be concluded that the 
procurement rules fail to deter its applicants from breaching the law. The conclusion 
that it is beneficial for authorities not to comply with procurement law has detrimental 
effects oil the impact of the law in the books on the legal practice. 
12.5.3.3. Findings 
Procurement law does not seem to offer any perceptible benefits to contracting 
audionties, since international competition between contractors and the related savings 
'" PrivSA#6. 
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for the aUthority have not yet materialised. Conversely, decisions that are either non- 
conipliant or at least risky in view of procurement law provide authorities with 
tangiblc bcnefits such as procedural flexibility and a reduction in time and costs of the 
proccss. In %, Icx%lng both aspects together, one can conclude from an outsider 
pcrspecti,,, c that procurement law lacks incentives for authorities to comply. It is 
subinitted that the lack of incentives significantly compromises the law's impact on the 
lcgal practice. 
We have seen that the non-compliant or risky behaviour of authorities does not 
pose a significant risk of being challenged. It appears unlikely that this situation will 
change, Anýý changes would limit the discretion of authorities to conduct the 
procedure as flicy please and threaten the commercial viability of the deals. From a 
pri%atc sector angle, more rigid procedures would increase the bidding costs and 
bidders %%ould be less able to present their tenders in negotiations, Hence, neither the 
pLiblic sector authorities nor private sector contractors have an interest to change the 
PH procurement practice. 
I'lus luts been discussed above in section 12.5.2. 
Sec section 12 S, 
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Chapter 13 Conclusion 
']'he aini of adopting an integrated perspective by combining insider and outsid r 
pci-spectiýc is to provide the study with a complete picture of PH procurement 
practicc. This section will summanse the findings for each perspective and will, 
t-inalIN, give a comprehensive analysis of the practice. 
13.1. Analysis of the outsider perspective 
We have seen that a functional concept of law underlies the outsider perspective 
to the legal practice. The concept of functionalism perceives norms as tools to 
accomplish specific tasks within society, especially to influence the behaviour of their 
addressees. In adopting an outsider perspective, it is possible to maintain that rules 
ftill-il dicir function, if they change legally relevant behaviour of addressees. Under 
tliosc circtinistances. the law is described as having an "impact" on the behaviour of 
addressees 
AnalNsis from an outsider perspective leads to questions such as whether the law 
inflLicnced the legally relevant behaviour of addressees. Chapter 12 has explored a 
selection of the most pertinent conditions for the law to make and to maximise its 
impact under die specific circumstances of PH procurement. The following section 
N% ill stininiarisc wliether those conditions are fulfilled and, consequently, whether 
procLircnictit law has the intended impact on PH procurement practice. 
As explained in section 12.4.1.1., for the law to have a maximum impact, 
addressees liould not accept competing rules and values. The divergence between the 
commercial requirements of PPP procurement practitioners and the non-amended 
prOCUremcnt Directives has led to the adoption of competing norms, which provided 
practitioncrs N%itli greater procedural flexibility. The competing rules accepted by 
pi-actitimiers alongside die Directives have been described as governmental guidance 
notes and PFI procurement practice which matured substantially over the years. We 
lia., c scen diat the latter may not always be compatible with the strict interpretation of 
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the procurei-ncnt rules. On the other hand, it was suggested that the practice is 
compatible with the principles of non-discrimination and, to a large extent, 
competition. The compatibility with some of the principles underlying the Directives 
may suggest that PH procurement practice does not deviate entirely from procurement 
law. 
Section 12.4.1.2. has introduced another potentially relevant condition for law to 
be effective if it is based on supra-riational E. C. Directives. It was assumed that 
Directives may have to be adequately implemented into national law to become fully 
effective. We have seen that the U. K. has implemented material procurement law 
properly in legal terms, and thus its potential non-implementation is not a factor 
influencing the law's impact on PH procurement practice. 
The second relevant pre-condition of law to effectively influence the legal 
practice is its diligent enforcement. It was discussed in section 12.5.1 that 
I implementation of the Remedies Directives has been inadequate. ' 
Sections 12.5.1.1. and 12.5.1.2. have shown bidders did not enforce the 
procurement Regulations in the national Courts as the European legislator envisaged 
it. This is mainly for the reason that bidders perceive actions enforcing a strict 
interpretation of procurement law as contravening their commercial interests. On the 
other hand, we have seen in section 12.5.2. that the Commission showed only recently 
the commitment to enforce its interpretation of the law using its powers granted by 
Article 226 E. C. Treaty. The inadequacies of both ways to enforce procurement law 
have substantially limited the law's impact in the PF1 context. 
Section 12.5.3. dealt with the third relevant condition for law to have an impact. 
It %%as submitted that addressees are incentivised to comply with a rule if the benefits 
arising from compliance outweigh possible detriments. Respondents maintained in 
section 12.5.3. that PF1 awarding authorities constantly weighed the benefits and 
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detriments of procedural decisions. They reached the conclusion that the detriments of 
strict compliance with procurement law outweighed the benefits by far. Especially the 
gains in procedural flexibility were said to be considerable. On the other hand, 
possible detriments in the form of bid challenges are negligible. The lack of incentives 
to coniply with procurement law limited the law's impact on the PFI practice. 
Section 12.4.1.3. described the consistent re-evaluation of the law as the fourth 
relevant condition for law to make an impact. We have seen that the impact of law 
was limited since the European legislator has chosen not to re-evaluate procurement 
law according to changes in its socio-economic context. 
It can be concluded from the summary of the outsider perspective that all four 
relevant conditions for law to make an impact on the legal practice are not or not fully 
satisfied. The impact of procurement law on the practice can therefore only be 
described as limited. This means that in the context of PFI, procurement law was 
bereaved of the opportunity to influence legally relevant behaviour of its addressees in 
a substantial manner. From an outsider perspective and in having respect to the 
concept of functionalism underlying this perspective it is therefore possible to 
conclude that public procurement law is not entirely fulfilling its functions in the PFI 
context. 
13.2. Analysis of the insider perspective 
We have seen in section 4.1.7. that exploring the insider perspective of a legal 
practice involved in this project to mvite participants to submit their subjective 
nicaning, their interpretation, and their arguments with respect to legal uncertainties. 
The adoptioii of the insider perspective sought to gain their understanding of the role 
of public procurement law in PFL The questions to be addressed included how 
lawyers bridged the gaps between the commercial requirements of PFI and the legal 
requirements of the Directives and how they assessed the risks involved. 
011 die requirement of an effective remedies system see: Pachnou, "Enforcement of the EC 
Footnotes continued on the next page. 
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Adopting the insider perspective has made it possible for this study to explain the 
rcasons leading to the adoption of PFI procurement practice. Section 12.3.1. explored 
that, froni the viewpoint of insiders, PFI procurement practice was developed because 
the commercial requirements diverged from the legal requirements of procurement 
IaN%. Respondents remarked that the U. K. government actively supported this 
dcvc1opnient not only by issuing guidance notes, but also by applying pressure on 
authorities to adhere with central government policy. 
The legal advisors considered the practice to reflect a "commercial approach" 
%Oilch partly included the adoption of wide and risky interpretations of the 
procurement rules and partly clearly non-compliant behaviour. Lawyers justified the 
adoption of the lax approach with pragmatic and commercial considerations. They 
perceived the development of a flexible and commercially oriented PFI procurement 
practice as a natural reaction to an inadequate regulatory framework. 
Asked for their perception of the impact of the rules on the practice, respondents 
gcncrally concurred with the observation that PFI procurement practice was not 
coinpatiblc with a strict interpretation of procurement law. Practitioners felt they were 
victims of conflicting policies underlying European procurement law. While the law 
was enacted to reduce public purchasing costs, it stifles, on the other hand, the 
discretion of authorities to adopt more efficient procurement methods reducing public 
spending. 
The more efficient procurement methods are a sign of significant changes in the 
commercial situation of public authorities. These changes have not been reflected in 
changes to the legal framework. It was mainly for this reason that practitioners 
perceived procurement law as an unnecessary burden placed on PFI and supported the 
development of PH procurement practice. 
piocuienient rulesl the standards required of national review systems under EC law in the context of 
the pinciple ofeffectiveness" (2000)P. P. L. R., p. 55. 
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We have seen in section 12.5.3. that authorities regularly assessed the risks 
arising from adopting decision in the procurement process. It was submitted that 
authorities could deviate from a strict interpretation of procurement law only because 
bidders did not enforce the rules in the Courts. Authorities assessing the risk of being 
challenged could be confident that their non-compliant or risky behaviour would not 
be die subject of sanctions. This confidence was mainly based on the perception that 
an ineffective review system significantly reduced the risk for authorities to be 
challenged by bidders on decisions deviating form the letter of procurement law. 
Especially the costs of proceedings, which were described as "phenomenal, " were an 
effective impediment against employing the remedies. 
Lawyers said that another obstacle against challenging authorities was the legal 
culture of the U. K. We have seen in section 12.5.1.3. that by using the term "legal 
culture, " they referred to a variety of aspects including the relative newness of the 
remedies system and the greater familiarity of U. K. lawyers with amicable settlement 
of disputes. 
A further important reason to assess the risk of challenges as negligible was the 
commercial approach of U. K. bidders towards winning government contracts. 
Respondents argued that it was not in the commercial interest of bidders to launch 
challenges against government departments. According to their legal advisors, private 
sector firms perceived authorities as invaluable clients. Bidders seem prepared to 
accept adverse procurement decisions without casting too much doubt on the general 
fairness of the proceedings. 
It is possible to conclude from those deliberations that the risks of being 
challenged by contractors were perceived as negligible. The balance between the risk 
of adopting a lax approach to procurement law and the benefits incurred by adopting a 
more pragmatic interpretation was therefore clearly in favour of the "commercial 
approach. " 
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13.3. Analysis of the integrated perspective 
The study sought to adopt an Integrated approach of looking at law su esting gg 
that %%c should try to understand law from every angle possible. Viewing PFI 
procurement practice from two angles, the outsider and the insider perspective, has 
provided us with a complete picture of the practice. Each view has made an integral 
contribution to die understanding of the practice and it was sought to treat them in a 
balwiccd nianner. 
It may be seen as one outcome of the study that insider and outsider perspective 
are naturally interwoven and that the two perspectives can be fruitftilly combined 
N%lien studying -living law. " In fact, the reliance on only one perspective, as suggested 
by insider or outsider perspective alone will almost certamly miss the opportunity to 
gain a complete picture of a social phenomenon. 
In this study, the outsider perspective has enabled us to observe the development 
oftlic practice and, especially, the impact procurement law has on PFI procurement. 
On the other hand, the accounts of insiders have provided us with the opporturuty to 
learn more about the motivation and understandings underlying their actions. The 
combination of both perspectives has led to the repeated contrast and companson 
bctN%, eeii the law in the books and the law in action, meaning the behaviour of the 
addressees of procurement law. 
]'he complete picture of PFI procurement has increased the understanding about 
proctircinent law, its practical application, and its perception by addressees. Possible 
repercussions of the findings for procurement law have to be expressed in the form of 
questions rather than answers. Having reference to four relevant pre-conditions for 
procurement law making an impact on the legal practice prompts the question whether 
die law's relevance should be increased in the context of complex procurement tasks. 
This raises especially the question of whether procurement law should be re- 
evaluated in the light of the emergence of PPP projects. Is it still justified and 
necessary to bring PFIs under the ftill regulatory ambit of the Directives? Are less 
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iil%, asi%, e means of regulation conceivable for the procurement process of complex 
contracts'. ' Would the introduction of those means increase the acceptance of the law 
in the books'? Should the rules be dragged to the practice, as demanded by PrivSA#I, 
or does the Commission rightly insist on strict compliance with the letter of the 
existing la%%". 1 
If the rules are held worthwhile to be maintained in their current form, the 
qUestioii has to be raised whether the procurement remedies should be made more 
accessible and their use more attractive for bidders. Is it conceivable to remedy 
coilceriis of bidders related to the possible misconduct of procurement proceedings in 
a swift and inexpensive way'? 
The aiiii of this study has been to increase the understanding of procurement law 
and its practical application in the context of PPPs and PFIs. It is submitted that such 
increased understanding of the law is a necessary requirement of positive change. 
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1. Introductionl EKpert Status 
Qla In wh ich PF1 sectors have you personally advised contracting 
authorities? 
Q1b When you are advising your public sector clients on the implementation 
of PF1 projects, do they following your advice? 
Q1C When we talk about the relationship between the regulatory regime 
governing public procurement and PFI, which particular concerns 
instantly spring to your mind as a result ofyour experience? 
Q1d Some ofyour colleagues argue that the procurement rules are 
fundamentally incompatible with the commercial necessities ofPFI 
procurement; do you agree? 
If yes-. Why? 
If no: Why not? 
2. Choke of Procedure 
Q2a The overwhelming number ofPFIprojects was delivered by using the 
negotiated procedure; which procedure do you normally choose to award 
PH contracts? 
Q2b What considerations influence your decision on which procedure should be 
employed in a PFI? 
Q2c The directives provide certain derogationsfor using the competitive 
negotiated procedure; on which grounds have you employed it? 
- 
"Overall pricing is not possible" 
"Specification cannot be drawn up with sufficient precision 
Other ground 
Q2d Many PFI practitioners argue (with the Treasury) that PFIprojects will 
regularly come under the umbrella of the "overall pricing" derogation, 
since it is often impossiblefor the authorit to predict in advance what y 
amounts the tenderers will bid; how do you interpret the terms "overall 
pricing" and "is notpossible"? 
According to the wording of the directives, the "overall pricing" derogation 
may only be employed in "exceptional" circumstances. What importance 
did you attach to the "exceptionality" of the "overall pricing" derogation 
when compared with other derogations? 
Why? 
Didyou consider using other derogations alternatively? 
Q2e The other derogation often employed in PH projects allows the use of the 
competitive negotiated procedure if "specifications cannot be drawn up 







with sufficient precision". From your point of view, in which cases is it 
possible to employ this exemption? 
How do you interpret "sufficient precision"? 
In the light of the current trend towards standardisation ofPFI contracts it 
is suggested to advertise and deliver PFIs in applying the restricted 
procedure. Do you think that this suggestion is viable? 
Some authors argue that if one applies a strict interpretation to the 
procurement rules, it will be hardlyfeasible to employ the negotiated 
procedure in PFIProcurement. Considering this approach, do you andyour 
clients consider the risk of being challenged when optingfor the negotiated 
procedure? 
If no: Q2i 
If yes: By whom'? 
Did you rely on Treasury guidance notes when assessing the risks involved? 
Was the litigation risk commercially balanced against benefits arisingftom 
adopting this decision, such as a reduced time and costs to negotiate the 
contract? 
If yes: Was the litigation risk commercially balanced against 
incurring benefits when adopting otherprocedural decisions? 
Which.? 
If no: Don't ask the "balancing" question again in the context 
of the other procedural problems. 
If yes: Ifyou balanced the risk what considerations were taken into 
account? 
Apart. /rom aggrieved bidders, the European Commission may challenge any 
behaviour thought to be deviatingftom the EU Law by embarking on an 
Article 226 (ex 169) procedure against the UK. Didyou andyour clients 
consider the possibility that the Commission could embark on such a 
procedure. '; ' 
Have you ever given your advice on a project which was partlyfunded by 
the European Community? 
If no: Q2k 
If yes: Didyou consider thepossibility that the Commission might 
withdraw the funds in case ofany irregularities in the 
procurement process? 
Q2k On the continent, contracting authorities currentlyface a wave of litigation. 
What consideration didyou and your clients give to the assumption that 
continental bidders tenderingfor contracts in the U. K. are probably more 
likely to utilise the remedy system than U. K. contractors? 
If so: How did it effect your decision-making process? 
Q21 Is this Situation is likely to change after the Harmon case? 
3. Drafting step-in Rights 
Q3a Another grey area of PFIprocurement is the question of how to draft 
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step-in rightsfor the project lenders. Normally, the authority will enter 
into a "direct agreement" with the major subcontractors and the person 
providingfinance to the consortium Typically, such a tripartite agreement 
will allow thefinancier "step-in rights" to intervene where the contractor 
becomes insolvent or seems unlikely to meet his obligations to the 
authority or thefinancier. The direct agreement generally allows the 
authority to veto the proposed new contractor or sub-contractor, but only 
on limited grounds set out in the agreement. Many authorities include 
veto grounds such as national security and secrecy; what veto grounds do 
you normally include into the contract? 
Q3b It is suggested in the literature to restrict the authority's veto to grounds 
which are contemplated by the procurement Regulations, such as 
financial and technical standing of the new (sub-) contractor, what do you 
think about this suggestion? 
Is it viable? 
Didyou consider this possibility? 
4. Classification of the contract as Concession/ Utility 
Q4a Have you encountered the situation where a PF1 project could have 
been classified as a concession contract? 
If no: Q5a 
If yes: 04b 
Q4b The procurement rules cover only contractsfor works concessions. Did 
you consider that one of the contracts you have given legal advice on 
could have been a service concession and thusfalling completely outside 
the procurement rules? 
Q4c Where payment is receivedfrom public users orftom the government and 
the public users, PFI contracts contain concession elements. In your view, 
what proportion of the project income must derive from the exploitation of 
the asset to classi the whole project as concession contract? VY 
Q4d The H. M. Treasury suggests that a contract can he classified as 
concession contract, if at least 15-20% of the income stream derivesfrom 
the "exploitation " element. This interpretation exempts many contracts 
from applying thefull procurement regime. 
Which threshold didyou apply? 
Didyou consider the risks of being challenged on this decision? 
Q4f Didyou andyour clients consider thepossibility of being challenged by 
firms when deciding that the project has to be classified as concession? 
If no: Q4g 
If yes: Did you rely on Treasury guidance notes when assessing the 
risks involved? 
Q4g Was the litigation risk commercially balanced against the various benefits 
arisingfrom the classification of the contract as concession? 
If no: Q4h 
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If yes: tfyou balanced the risk, what considerations were taken into 
account? 
Didyou andyour clients acknowledge that continental bidders 
are probably 
more likely to utilise the UK remedy system than UK. 
contractors? 
Q4h Apartftom aggrieved bidders, the European Commission may challenge 
tiny behaviour thought to be deviatingftom the EU Law by embarking on 
tin Article 226 (ex 169) procedure. Was this consideration taken into 
account when classi)ýing the contract as concession? 
Q4h Do you have experience in delivering PFIs in the Utilities sector, such as 
lightrail or waste-to-energy projects? 
If no: Q5a 
If yes: Didyou encounter any specific problems? 
Didyou andyour clients consider that the project company may 
be obliged to advertise its sub-contracts under the Utilities 
Regs? 
5. Use of Selection, Shortlisting and Award Criteria 
Q5a What sources influence your choice of the selection, shortlisting or award 
criteria applied? 
Treasury guidance notes? 
If so". Were thosefavoured over the Directives? 
(, hvn experience? 




Q5b Which criteria do you normally suggest authorities to employ to 
a. select and shortlist tenderers and 
b. to award the contract? 
C. Didyou use one of thefollowing criteria? 
- 
Abili(y and willing-ness to 
- 
form a good working relationshi 
- 
Acceptance ofstandardised contract terms 
- 
Development ofPFI industries 
- 
Acceptance of the bidders b)Z members ofstaffin staff 
consultations 
Q5c Did it occur in one of the PFIprojects you have given your advice on that 
the contracting authority was inclined to change the award criteria in 
rexponse to the proposals submitted by bidders? 
Possible conditionsjbr changes to the assessment criteria: 
changes are notified to the bidders 
fi I rms are given sujficient time to adjust their bids 
changes are not material 
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C15d Did you and your clients consider the possibility of being challenged by 
firms when choosing/ changing the shortlisting and award criteria? 
If no: Q5e 
If yes: Djdyou rely on Treasury guidance notes when assessing the risks 
involved. '? 
C15e Was the litigation risk commercially balanced against the benefitsfrom 
choosing1changing specific selectionl award criteria? 
If no: cool down question 
If yes: Ij'you balanced the risk, what considerations were taken into 
account? 
Did you and'your clients acknowledge that continental bidders 
are probably 
more likely to utilise the U. K. remedy system than UK. 
contractors? 
6. "Cool down" questfon 
CD1 If you had the chance to amend. the procurement directives, what would you 
change or alter'? 
CD2 Now that you know my research, is there anything that I should have asked 
but did not'? 
Annex 11 Sampling chart 
Private Sector Advisors 
page 
#1 Private Sector Advisor 
City law firm, defence, health and recent experience in local government 
#2 Private Sector Advisor 
Regional law firm, transport, defence 
#3 Private Sector Advisor 
City law firm, health, education, local government, defence 
#4 Private Sector Advisor 
City law firm, transport, prisons, defence, government accommodation 
#5 Private Sector Advisor 
City law firm, prisons, roads, transport, London Underground 
#6 Private Sector Advisor 
City law firm, transport, prisons, defence, government accommodation, health 
sector 
Public Sector Advisors 
#1 Public Sector Advisor 
City law firm, government accommodation, health, utility projects 
#2 Public Sector Advisor 
City law firm, health, local government 
#3 Public Sector Advisor 
Regional law firm, local government, health sector, defence 
#4 Public Sector Advisor 
Regional law firm, local government, health sector 
#5 Public Sector Advisor 
City law firm, transport, prisons, defence, government accommodation 
#6 Public Sector Advisor 
City law firm, IT, defence 
#7 Public Sector Advisor 
Regional law firm, defence, government accommodation, health, local 
government, utility projects 
#8 Public Sector Advisor 
Regional law firm, health, sewage and water, defence, government 
accommodation, local government, education, IT, some private sector experience 
N9 Public Sector Advisor 
City law firm, health, education, local governments, some private sector 
experience 
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#10 Public Sector Advisor 
Regional law firm, local govenunent, education, housing 
#11 Public Sector Advisor 
Regional law finn, local governinent, health sector, education 
#12 Public Sector Advisor 
City law firm, IT, transport, prisons, defence 
Advisors with exiDerience in both sectors 
#1 Advisor to both Sectors 
City law firm, transport, Utility projects 
#2 Advisor to both Sectors 
City law firm, utility projects, prisons, DBFO roads, London Underground, 
health, advised banks 
#3 Advisor to both Sectors 
Regional law firm, health, education, accommodation, IT, housing 
#4 Advisor to both Sectors 
Brussels office of a city law firm, health, transport, utility projects 
#5 Advisor to both Sectors 
Brussels office of a city law firm, utility projects, transport 
#6 Advisor to both Sectors 
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